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2008 DIGILAW 307 (GAU)

Khroksila Nongkhlaw Rngi Umsning v. State of Meghalaya

2008-04-29

AMITAVA ROY

body2008
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked to annul the memorandum No. L.14/II(I)86/PT/73-A dated 19.10.2004 of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), East Khasi Hill District, Shillong, rejecting the petitioners' claim for annual rent for the land involved pursuant to the judgment and order dated 28.7.1997 passed by a Full Bench of this Court in CR 1(SH)/1991. 2. I have heard Mr. P.G. Baruah, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. B.M. Roy Dolbi, Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. A. Sarma, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, assisted by Mr. R. Goswami, Government Advocate for the State respondents and Mr. N.C. Das, Sr. Advocate for the respondent No. 5, Syiem of Mylliem, Mawkhar, Shillong. 3. The abbreviated pleaded facts projecting the rival stands need be set out at the threshold. The petitioner claiming herself to be a member of the Scheduled Tribe (Hills) and belonging to Nongkhlaw Rngi family of Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw and late Ka Tyngshain Nongkhlaw Rngi contends to be the owner of 676 acres of land. According to her, this land is her ancestral property and is Ri Kynti (Special) Lands open to succession and inheritance and by virtue of the custom and law prevailing in her society, she has eventually become the owner thereof. She has maintained that in terms of the custom prevalent in her society, her family used to be administered by the male members thereof and at the relevant point of time, her ancestor Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi entered into an agreement with the British Government and by the indenture that was signed by him on 8.12.1863 a portion of the family land was leased out to the said Government on payment of an annual rent of Rs.50/- for construction of Civil and Military Sanitaria, Posts and Cantonment etc. It was stipulated inter alia that on payment of the aforementioned amount in advance, the petitioner's ancestors would not exercise their rights for the land. 4. The petitioner has asserted that the amount agreed upon was accordingly paid to Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi upto the year 1903 and thereafter to U. Syllo. On the demise of the latter, the payment was made to U. To Nongkhlaw Rngi and on her death to Smt. Armai Nongkhlaw Rngi, the mother of the petitioner. 4. The petitioner has asserted that the amount agreed upon was accordingly paid to Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi upto the year 1903 and thereafter to U. Syllo. On the demise of the latter, the payment was made to U. To Nongkhlaw Rngi and on her death to Smt. Armai Nongkhlaw Rngi, the mother of the petitioner. On her death, the agreed sum was used to be paid to the petitioner upto 1976-77, the last payment being made on 2.9.1976. The petitioner has pleaded that by an agreement dated 30.7.1974, the then surviving members of the family authorized her to receive the payments. The petitioner has insisted that the Government of Meghalaya also acknowledged her to be the original owner of the land as a testimony whereof Shri V.S. Jafa, the then Deputy Commissioner, Khasi Hills District, Shillong, by his letter dated 15.12.1973 addressed to her, requested her to collect the amount annually which she did till 1976-77. The petitioner has contended that in a devastating fire that broke out in the meantime in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, many valuable documents including those pertaining to the land involved were gutted. 5. Several approaches were made to the said authorities for payment of compensation/rent thereafter and eventually on 28.11.1986, a notice was issued from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong inviting the heirs and/or representatives of the Nongkhlaw family to ascertain their agent to present himself before the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong, so as to facilitate the payment of the land rent to them. The notice inter alia set out a time limit of 90 days indicating that if within the period prescribed no claim was made, it would be construed that the land rent was no longer acceptable and that no right in future therefore would be entertained. 6. The petitioner has averred that in response to the said notice many imposters presented themselves for the rent and a number of title suits were also instituted which ultimately culminated in Civil Reference 1 (SH)/91 before this Court. One of such suits being Title Suit 17 (H)/85 was said to be instituted by the Nongkhlaw Clan through one S. Kemal Singh Kharkongar praying inter alia for a decree for ejectment of the defendants namely Union of India etc. and for khas possession of the suit land. One of such suits being Title Suit 17 (H)/85 was said to be instituted by the Nongkhlaw Clan through one S. Kemal Singh Kharkongar praying inter alia for a decree for ejectment of the defendants namely Union of India etc. and for khas possession of the suit land. According to the petitioner, the said S. Kernal Singh Kharkongar had no right or authority what so ever to represent the Nongkhlaw Rngi family, as he did not belong to it. 7. By judgment and order dated 28.7.1997, the Civil Reference 1 (SH)/91 was disposed of and that thereafter by the impugned order/memorandum dated 19.12.2004, the petitioner's claim for compensation/rent was negated purportedly on the basis thereof. The petitioner has insisted that in none of the suits namely Title Suit 17 (H)/85, Title Suit 18(H)/85 and Title Suit 19 (H)/85 initially instituted in the Court of the Munsiff, Shillong and dealt with in the aforementioned Civil Reference, she, who represents the Nongkhlaw Rngi family was impleaded as a party and, therefore, the judgment and order dated 28.7.1997 was passed in the said reference in her absence. According to her, in the reference proceeding, the real and authentic document pertaining to the transaction involving the land was not produced. Without prejudice to the above, however, the petitioner has asserted that the finding in the civil reference sustaining the investiture of the land in the State of Meghalaya notwithstanding her individual private right thereon has remained intact inasmuch as the land had neither been acquired by the Government nor forfeited by it at any point of time. She further claimed that the land had been registered in her name by the Syiem and Durbarof Mylliem Syiemship, Shillong, vide registration No. 6 of 1987 dated 27.9.1987. She also referred to a news item published in the local issue dated 25.8.2005 of the local daily the "Shillong Times" carrying a policy statement of the Government of Meghalaya for restoration of the lands to the original inhabitants on production of their records of ownership. While contending that the decision in the civil reference was not binding on her, the petitioner has assailed the impugned memorandum as lacking in jurisdiction and authority pleading that the State Government has no right in the land. 8. While contending that the decision in the civil reference was not binding on her, the petitioner has assailed the impugned memorandum as lacking in jurisdiction and authority pleading that the State Government has no right in the land. 8. The State respondents in their affidavit have questioned the maintainability of the writ petition pleading the same to be barred by the principle of res judicata in the face of the Verdict in Civil Reference No. 1(H)/1986. Claiming that the same land was involved in the said proceeding wherein the issue of right, title and interest of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan in the land was adjudicated upon, the answering respondents have contended that on the rejection of the civil reference, the petitioner has no subsisting right or interest in the said land. It has been stated that the land claimed by the petitioner was leased to the then British Government in India and after the independence it devolved on the Union of India by the operation of law and eventually on the State of Meghalaya. This transition of the land having been affirmed by the judgment and order dated 28.7.1997 passed in Civil Reference 1 (Sh)/91, the petitioner's claim of ownership and/or compensation/rent is misconceived. While admitting that in response to the notification/notice calling upon the rightful heirs of Late U. Beh Nonkhlaw Rngi to make their claim for compensation/rent, a number of claimants had approached, the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, with contradictory claims and that subsequent thereto. Title Suits were filed, the answering respondents have maintained that with the disposal of the Civil reference neither the so called legal heirs of Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi nor the petitioner can be permitted to reopen the issue once again as done in the instant proceeding. It has been asserted that Title Suit 17 (H)/85 had been instituted on behalf of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan by its representative/attorney, S. Kernal Singh Kharkongar and therefore the petitioner was precluded by the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence from re-agitating the issues decided in the Civil reference by questioning the finality thereof. The answering respondents also dismissed the petitioner's contention that the District Council had the exclusive authority over the land involved and affirmed the competence and jurisdiction of the State Government to issue the impugned memorandum. 9. The answering respondents also dismissed the petitioner's contention that the District Council had the exclusive authority over the land involved and affirmed the competence and jurisdiction of the State Government to issue the impugned memorandum. 9. The respondent No. 4 in its affidavit while claiming that the land in question fell within the Tribal Areas of the Autonomous District over which the Council exercises its jurisdiction maintained that the petitioner had approached it for issue of land record documents in respect thereof and that the process related thereto is in progress. The Council further disclosed that the petitioner in praying for the registration of the land based her claim on the registration No. 6/1987 dated 22.9.1987 issued by the Syiem of Mylliem and Durburin her favour, 10. The respondent No. 5, the Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship, Mawkhar, Shillong, in his counter referred to the petitioner's application dated 14.8.1987 for registration of her ancestral private land described therein and the documents submitted in support of her claim. The respondent further stated that after the perusal and scrutiny of the said documents notices were issued to all concerned inviting objections, if any, but none was received within the stipulated period and that thereafter following the prescribed procedure, the registration of the land was granted in favour of the petitioner under registration No. 6/1987 dated 22.9.1987 by the then Syiem and his Durbur. 11. The petitioner in her affidavit in reply has cast aside the plea of res judicata con- tending that the suits leading to the civil reference had not been instituted by the rightful heir or representatives of the Nongkhlaw clan and that in the judgment and order dated 28.7.1997 the issue of ownership of the heirs of Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi over the land involved was neither raised nor decided by this Court. She maintained that though the land had vested in the State Government, it not having acquired or forfeited the same, the private rights of the petitioner or her clan therein did not get extinguished and that, therefore, her claim for compensation/rent as stipulated cannot be denied under the cover of the said decision. She reiterated to have inherited the land and, therefore, legally entitled to receive the compensation/rent payable as stipulated. 12. In the backdrop of the above pleadings, Mr. She reiterated to have inherited the land and, therefore, legally entitled to receive the compensation/rent payable as stipulated. 12. In the backdrop of the above pleadings, Mr. Baruah has strenuously urged that as the decision in the civil reference does not in anyway extinguish the petitioner's right to receive the compensation for the land involved from the Government of Meghalaya, the impugned memorandum is nonest in law. The learned Sr. Counsel contended that the document dated 8.12.1863 said to have been executed on behalf of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan (hereafter referred to as the Clan) and involved in the civil reference being different from the one on which the petitioner bases her claim in the instant proceeding, the determination therein is not binding on her and the plea of res judicata is wholly misconceived. Even assuming that the document referred to in the civil reference portrayed the actual agreement between the petitioner's ancestor and the British Government pertaining to the same land, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court not having effaced her private rights in me said land her entitlement for the compensation cannot be denied, he urged. Mr. Baruah assiduously pleaded that the factum of payment of compensation for the land to the petitioner's ancestor's or the representatives of her clan and in due course of time to her till 2.9.1976 is a testimony of the recognition of her right thereto by the State Government. The learned Sr. Counsel argued that in any view of the matter, the Full Bench not having dealt with the applicability of Article 294 of the Constitution of India in the earlier round of litigation, the judgment rendered in the civil reference does not extinguish the petitioner's right to receive the compensation and that the impugned denial thereof is liable to be adjudged ineffectual, null and void. The transaction evidenced by the document dated 8.12.1863 being construable as an onerous gift envisaged in Section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the petitioner's right to receive compensation is saved by Article 294 of the Constitution of India, he urged. Referring to the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India as well as to the Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, and North Eastern Area Reorganization Act, 1971, Mr. Referring to the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India as well as to the Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, and North Eastern Area Reorganization Act, 1971, Mr. Baruah contended that the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (hereafter referred to as the Council) being the authority having exclusive dominion over the land involved, the impugned memorandum by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), East Khasi Hills District, Shillong, being illegal and without jurisdiction is liable to be quashed. Mr. Baruah to buttress his submissions has placed reliance on the following decisions. Nongkhlaw Clan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1997 (2) GLT 652, Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1620 , Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Ors. [2002] 2 SCR 1006, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan and Anr. 2006 (1) LLJ 704 SC and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector Etio and Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1984 . 13. The learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, assailed the maintainability of the instant proceeding in the teeth of the decision in the civil reference pleading that on that ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Referring to the petitioner's pleadings and the documents annexed thereto, Mr. Sarma urged that as admission of the investiture of the same land in the State of Meghalaya as held by the Full Bench is clearly discernible therefrom, she ought not to be permitted to re-agitate the same issues as. endeavoured. As the pleadings of the parties raise disputed questions of facts bearing on the genuineness of the documents and the authenticity of the petitioner's claim to the land involved, this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction would not embark on a roving enquiry therein, he urged. Mr. Sarma emphatically contended that as the petitioner has failed to produce unimpeachable evidence of her right to the land as the only heir or representatives of the clan, the challenge laid by her is palpably misconceived. The learned Advocate General argued, that the document now relied upon by the petitioner not having been proved, in accordance with law and the custody wherefrom the same has been produced not having been established, her entitlement to the compensation is questionable even otherwise and, therefore, the impugnment of the memorandum dated 19.10.2004 is misconceived. 14. Without prejudice to the above, Mr. 14. Without prejudice to the above, Mr. Sarma has urged that the nature of the transaction evidenced by both the documents being the same demonstrating renunciation of the executant's interest in the land involved, in face of the decision of the Full Bench in the civil reference, the petitioner's claim for compensation is obviously untenable. According to the learned Advocate General, the payments of compensation in between as asserted, by the no means act as an estoppel against the State Government to deny the petitioner's entitlements in terms of the decision in the civil reference. Referring to Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereafter referred to as the Act), Mr. Sarma has pleaded that having regard to the transaction pertaining to the land with the vesting thereof in the State of Meghalaya, the claim for compensation has been rendered nonest. The learned Advocate General also dismissed the petitioner's contention against the State Government's authority over the land contending that the same is beyond the Tribal Areas as noticed by the Full Bench. Further this Court having held that the land had vested absolutely in the State of Meghalaya, the insistence of the title therein in the Council is patently flawed and unsustainable in law, he urged. 15. Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5 while affirming that the mutation of the land in favour of the petitioner had been granted by the Syiemship in absence of any objection thereto has candidly admitted that the official records ace not readily available as the office of the Syiem had been demolished in between. 16. The emulous pleadings and the arguments advanced have received the cautious consideration of this Court. That the same land was involved in the civil reference decided by this Court is not in dispute. The parties thereto are also the same. The petitioner, however, asserts that the document actually evidencing the conveyance is the one now produced by her in the present proceeding. 17. Considering the litigational background testified by the pleadings, it would be expedient to trace the facts leading to the civil reference and to acquaint oneself with the conclusions arrived at therein. The petitioner, however, asserts that the document actually evidencing the conveyance is the one now produced by her in the present proceeding. 17. Considering the litigational background testified by the pleadings, it would be expedient to trace the facts leading to the civil reference and to acquaint oneself with the conclusions arrived at therein. The reference was made under Section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereafter referred to as the Code) by the learned District Judge, Shillong, by the common judgment and order dated 10.5.1990 passed in Title Appeal 2(S)/1988, Title Appeal 3(S)/1988 and Title A ppeal 4(S)/1988. The appeals arose from the dismissal of the Title Suits being Title Suit 17(H)/85, Title Suit 18 (H)/85 and Title Suit 19(H)/85 filed on behalf of the three clans namely the Nongkhlaw, Kharkongor and Kurkalang respectfully before the Munsiff at Shillong inter alia praying for a declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit lands described in the schedules to the plaints, injunction and recovery of actual possession by evicting the defendants therein. The areas of the land involved in the three suits were: (i) Title Suit No. 17(H)/1985 = 300 acres, (ii) Title-Suit No. 18(H)/1985 = 60 acres and (iii) Title Suit No. 19(H)/1985 = 60 acres. 18. The plaintiffs' principal contention was that the suit land belonged to three respective clans and had been leased out to the Queen of England and mat on the lapse of the paramountcy with the enactment of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the emergence of the dominion of India those reverted to the Syiem of Mylliem, Mawkhar and its owners i.e. the three clans. They averred that the erstwhile sovereign authority took the land on lease for a period of 99 years in the year 1863 with the concurrence of the Syiem of Mylliem and on the expiry of the period, the lease having determined, the land reverted to the plaintiff. The following questions in particular were referred by the first Appellate Court to be answered by this Court. (1) Whether the Document Nos. 3, 8 & 14 appended to paper mark 'X' are conditional sale, contractual issue, or licence or what is the correct interpretation, to be given to these documents. (2) What is the status of the Successor's Government in relation to these lands after the British paramountcy lapsed. (1) Whether the Document Nos. 3, 8 & 14 appended to paper mark 'X' are conditional sale, contractual issue, or licence or what is the correct interpretation, to be given to these documents. (2) What is the status of the Successor's Government in relation to these lands after the British paramountcy lapsed. (3) Whether the Government of Union and the State had defaulted payment of yearly rent, if so, whether they are liable to be evicted therefrom or (4) Whether the. land is to revert back to the original owners in terms of the agreement or whether the agreement can be extended on fresh terms and conditions. (5) What is the alternative remedy available to: (a) The Government of the Union and the State; its officers and men, the private and public properties standing thereon. (b) Thousand of people, both tribal and non tribal having land properties to their lands and also thousand of unintelligible male and female members of the three clans whose lands have been enjoyed by the Government on the payment of paltry sum of Rs.50/- to the Nongkhlaw, Rs.50/- to the Kurkalong and Rs.8/- to the Kharkongor clan. 19. The Full Bench recorded that the lands virtually cover the entire Wards of Shillong Municipality and Cantonment land (erstwhile British portion of Shillong or normal area). It was inter aha contended before it on behalf of the plaintiffs that in the Khasi Hills, the land did not belong to the Government but to the people who held the same through their clans and the Syiem was only a custodian thereof in the Syiemsbip. It was urged that the land was comprised in the British Administrative Area and belonged to the three clans which was leased out to the then British Government for a period of 99 years by executing three lease deeds on 18,12.1863 on a stipulated annual lease rent. 20. The Full Bench recorded that after the independence, the erstwhile Princely States including Khasi States merged with the Indian Union and on the framing of the Constitution, the Khasi State was integrated in the 6th Schedule merging with the State of Assam. 20. The Full Bench recorded that after the independence, the erstwhile Princely States including Khasi States merged with the Indian Union and on the framing of the Constitution, the Khasi State was integrated in the 6th Schedule merging with the State of Assam. The Plaintiffs claimed that despite the merger, the position of the land leased to Queen Victoria in respect of the three clans remained unaltered and as the State of Assam and thereafter the State of Meghalaya and the Government of India did not cause renewal of the lease after its expiry on 7.12.1962 vacant possession thereof was sought for through notices under Section 80 of the Code and eventually the suits were filed for the reliefs aforementioned. 21. The Full Bench noticed that by the Act 55 of 1969 i.e. Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, the Autonomous State of Meghalaya was formed comprised of the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills areas. It recorded that the rest of Meghalaya which comprised of the three wards of Shillong Municipality which were known as British areas of Shillong were then not included in the Autonomous State of Meghalaya and that it was only by Act, of 1971 i.e. the North East Areas (Reorganization) Act. 1971. Meghalaya attained full Statehood formed of the following-- (a) The territories which immediately before that day were comprised in the autonomous State of Meghalaya formed under Section 3 of the Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969. (b) So much of the territories comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong as did not form a part of the autonomous State. 22. The Full Bench on a survey of the constitutional as well as legislative evolutions and taking note inter alia of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, concluded that all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction in respect of Tribal Areas vested in the new dominion of India after the lapse of British paramountcy and with the merger of the Khasi States in Assam and the emergence of the full fledged State of Meghalaya, it (State of Meghalaya) became the successor Government with full suzerainty and sovereignty. The plea on behalf of the plaintiffs that notwithstanding the Constitutional changes, the position of the lands leased to Queen Victoria for 99 years by the three clans remained unchanged, was rejected as fallacious. The plea on behalf of the plaintiffs that notwithstanding the Constitutional changes, the position of the lands leased to Queen Victoria for 99 years by the three clans remained unchanged, was rejected as fallacious. The Full Bench drew sustenance for its conclusion also from the decision of the Apex Court amongst others in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem and Anr. 1961 (1) LLJ 652 SC and held that after the lapse of British paramountcy and consequential merger of the Khasi States with the State of Assam and on the fcKmation of the full fledged State of Meghalaya it became the successor with regard to the land claimed to have been leased. 23. The contents of the document dated 8.12.1863 claimed by the Nongkhlaw clan to be a demonstrative of a transaction of lease and referred to in the reference deserve to be quoted. Whereas I Oo Beh Nongkhlaw on the part of myself and my Clan gave on my own from will in gift Ninety-nine years on my land to Her Majesty the Queen of England all my land on, the Hills to, the North Lemare, East Laban, West of the Yongdeo Bazar, the Land of Dor Ding Kongor Kharkongar, South Oom Uooree the land of Borjan Kurkakang Ksch. The boundary of my land 1000 acres more or less of which I pointed out in the presence of Rajah Mejy Singh: and his Montrees and Lieutenant Col. J. C. Houghton Governor-General's Agent, N.E.F. and whereas the said Gover. Genl's Agent agreed to the part of her Majesty the Queen of England, that I should receive the sum of Rupees fifty 50/- yearly in compensation for the said land to be paid yearly in advance. I acknowledge hereby to have received in advance the sum of Rupees fifty for one year and I hereby renounce all right to the said land and its streams water and trees and whatsoever is on so long shall continue to be paid in advance to me. The next payment will fall due on 1st January, 1865. 24. I acknowledge hereby to have received in advance the sum of Rupees fifty for one year and I hereby renounce all right to the said land and its streams water and trees and whatsoever is on so long shall continue to be paid in advance to me. The next payment will fall due on 1st January, 1865. 24. The Full Bench on a perusal of the said document held the view that the transaction displayed thereby is a gift from the Clan elders on behalf of the clan with the concurrence of the Syiem of Mylliem and that the recitals thereof evinced that all rights and title to the land, streams, water and trees have been renounced. It recorded that though the documents had been executed before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, having regard to the basic legal concept, the ingredients and the legal connotation appertaining to lease, the document could not even on a liberal construction be construed to be a lease deed. Recalling the basic principles for interpretation of a document, the Full Bench held that in view of the express, clear and unambiguous language used, the transaction could not be deemed to be a lease for a fixed term the nomenclature applied thereto being "gift" and not "lease". It was thus finally pronounced that the plaintiffs had miserably failed in making out their pleaded case of lease of the suit land which had merged and vested with the State of Meghalaya for being a part of the Union of India. While upholding the dismissal of the suits in terms of Article 363 of the Constitution of India, the Full Bench also recorded the absence of pleadings on the plaintiffs bond with the clan elders who had parted with their right, title and interest in the property to Her Majesty the Queen of England. It was further held that though the suits were instituted in the representative capacity, the necessary legal formalities as mandated by Order I, Rule 8 of the Code had not been complied with. The reference was thus rejected and the suits were dismissed. 25. An application thereafter by the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan represented by Shri Smienty Nongkhlaw, the Khadduh of the Nongkhlaw Clan for review of the above judgment was filed and was registered as Review Petition No. 5 (Sh.) of 1998. The reference was thus rejected and the suits were dismissed. 25. An application thereafter by the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan represented by Shri Smienty Nongkhlaw, the Khadduh of the Nongkhlaw Clan for review of the above judgment was filed and was registered as Review Petition No. 5 (Sh.) of 1998. The principal contention on behalf of the review applicant was that the transaction evidenced by the document dated 8.12.1863 executed on behalf of the Nongkhlaw clan was out and out a lease and that the Full Bench had taken a wrong view thereof. The determination sustaining dismissal of suits by invoking Article 363 of the Constitution of India was also assailed. The Bench constituted to hear the review petition-by its order dated 29.5.2007 on a threadbare consideration of the rival pleas, rejected the same. It is not the case of either of the parties that the original decision of the Full Bench or the order on the review petition had been further challenged in any higher forum. The findings contained therein, therefore, have attained finality. 26. Incidentally the petitioner as well claims herself to be the heir of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan with Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi (executant of the document produced by her in the present proceeding) to be her predecessor in interest. While contending that the plaintiff in Title Suit 17(H)/85 representing the same clan was an imposter she, in order to endorse her exclusive claim to the compensation as the rightful heir of the clan has annexed a copy of a document purportedly executed by the grand nephews and nieces of Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi and children of late Ka Tyngsham Nongkhlaw Rngi testifying to the said effect. This document inter alia recognizes her right to the major share of the inherited properties moveable and immovable belonging to Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi: She has also appended to her additional affidavit, the application submitted by her on 22.9.1987 on behalf of her clan members before the Durbor of the Syiem of Mylliem, Mawkhar, Shillong, for registration of their private lands in confirmation of their right, title and interest therein. She has also claimed to be the rightful heir in charge of administration of the land involved. She has also claimed to be the rightful heir in charge of administration of the land involved. A copy of the document dated 22.9.1987 issued by the Acting Syiem of Mylliem, Mawkhar, Shillong and his Myntries granting the registration as claimed (Registration No. 6/87) has also been produced to substantiate her claim. Apart therefrom, the petitioner has appended to the writ petition, a copy of the document dated 8.12.1863 executed by Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngj in favour of her Majesty the Queen of England gifting the land referred to therein on payment of compensation of Rs.50/- per annum. A document claimed to be the original thereof was also produced in course of the arguments. The endorsements evidencing payment of rent at the above rate on various dates between 1865 to 2.9.1976 bearing amongst others the signature of the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong, with the official seal has also been relied upon in authentication of her claim for the compensation. That the land had not vested absolutely in the State of Meghalaya has been sought to be demonstrated from the notice dated 23.11.1986 issued by the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong, inviting the eligible heirs or representatives of the Nongkhlaw Rngi and Kurkalang clans to present themselves for payment of the land rent. This notice, however, precedes the decision in the civil reference referred to hereinabove. 27. Noticeably except, the document dated 8.12.1863 claimed to be the authentic deed of the transaction in question, the originals of no other document on which the petitioner has sought to found her claim in the land and/or the compensation has been produced before this Court. This assumes significance in view of her unrelenting plea that the deed dated 8.12.1863 produced and taken note of in the civil reference is different from the one oft which she relies and is unauthentic and, therefore, the verdict of the Full Bench is not binding on her. 28. This necessitates extraction of the contents of the petitioner's deed dated 8.12.1863 to decipher the testifying features of the transaction vis-a-vis the one proclaimed by the document noticed in the civil reference. 28. This necessitates extraction of the contents of the petitioner's deed dated 8.12.1863 to decipher the testifying features of the transaction vis-a-vis the one proclaimed by the document noticed in the civil reference. Whereas 10º Beh on the part of myself and my family gave of my own free will in gift to Her Majesty the Queen of England all my land on the Hills to the North and East of the Youdoe Bazar, the boundary of which I pointed out in the presence of Raja Melay Singh and his Montrees and Lt. Call. I.C. Houghton Governor-General's agent agree on the part of the Majesty that I should receive the sum of Rupees (fifty) 50/- yearly in compensation for the said land to be paid yearly in advance. I acknowledge hereby to have received in advance the sum of Rupees fifty for the year commencing 1st January, 1864 and I hereby renounce all right and title to the said land its streams water and trees and whatsoever is on its so long as the said sum due on the 1st of January in each year shall be continued to be paid in advance to me or my heir on my demand. The next payment will fall due on 1st January, 1865. 29. The contents of the two documents (one dealt in the civil reference and the other produced in the present proceeding) on juxtaposition reveal the following features. (a) The executant is the one and the same. (b) The transaction is described to be of gift of the land infavour of Her Majesty, the Queen of England. (c) The stipulated amount of compensation is Rs.50/- per annum. (d) Renunciation of the executants' right and title in the land, streams, water and trees so long as the amount of compensation agreed upon is paid in advance to him or his heir on demand. 30. The only distinguishable attributes in the document considered in the civil reference are that it mentions the period of lease to be 99 years, the area of the land as 1000 acres and provides somewhat better particulars thereof. On all other counts, the two documents are identical. More importantly the transaction in unequivocal terms is referred to as gift and not a lease in both the documents. 31. The petitioner though is. On all other counts, the two documents are identical. More importantly the transaction in unequivocal terms is referred to as gift and not a lease in both the documents. 31. The petitioner though is. vociferous in contending that Title Suit 17 (H)/82 had been instituted by an importer claiming to represent her clan, no attempt what so ever had been made by her to get herself impleaded either in the suit or in the appeal or in the civil reference to bring forth the correct state of affairs more particularly the document claimed by her to be the only genuine deed on the transaction involving the land in question. Neither did she associate herself with the review proceeding nor did she endeavour to challenge the original decision in any appropriate legal forum. On the other hand, she instituted the instant proceeding before the Shillong Bench of this Court in the year 2005 pleading that the decision in the civil reference was not binding on her. 32. It, is too trite to mention that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not one for establishment of one's, right by resorting to an adversarial trial for a threadbare scrutiny of disputed facts but for enforcement thereof already acknowledged and recognized. A writ proceeding is ill conceived as an adjudicative pursuit to delve into highly contentious facts by conducting a roving investigation into the same. 33. Adeclaration of his right to an office in a religious institution was sought for by the respondent in P.R. Murlidharan and Ors. v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 501 , in a suit which was dismissed for default. He thereafter approached the Kerala High Court praying for police protection. The Division Bench of the said Court examined the question as to whether he was entitled to hold the said office for the purpose of issuing the said direction as prayed for. It was held that the State and the Police Officials were under a legal obligation to extend protection to the life and properties of tile respondent upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. It was held that the State and the Police Officials were under a legal obligation to extend protection to the life and properties of tile respondent upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. The challenge being taken to the Apex Court, their Lordships noticing that the issue was a contentious one so much so that a thorough interpretation of the several documents and the rights and obligations thereunder was involved-propounded that a person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed facts which was beyond the scope and purport of its writ jurisdiction. While recording that the jurisdiction of the, writ Court is wide, enough for granting relief to a citizen of India so as to protect his life and liberty as adumbrated under Article 21 of the, Constitution of India, it was held that it could not collaterally go into that question, determination whereof would undoubtedly be beyond its domain. It was observed that the issue raised in the writ petition would not only require exposition of the relevant documents but also necessitate adduction of oral evidence as well for explaining the true nature thereof and the practice followed. It was thus declared that in a case of this nature a writ proceeding cannot be substitute for a suit. In his concurrent judgment his Lordship P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. observed that when the status or right of the respondent remains to be adjudicated upon and when such adjudication can be got done in a properly instituted suit, it would be an abuse of the process of the Court for him to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil Court. His Lordship entertained the view that the High Court therefore should have directed the respondent to have his right adjudicated upon in an appropriate suit in a civil court and that it was in error in proceeding to adjudicate any right and obligation arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. The factual scenario in material aspects in substantially akin in the instant case. 34. The factual scenario in material aspects in substantially akin in the instant case. 34. The application dated 1.10.2004 submitted by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong, demanding payment of compensation in terms of her deed dated 8.12.1863 in response to which the impugned memorandum dated 19.10.2004 was issued candidly disclose that all official records in the said 'authority's establishment, asserted by the petitioner to be the testimonials of her claim as the rightful heir of Late U. Beh Nongkhlaw Rngi, have since been destroyed in a fire. The petitioner has not disclosed the custody or the source wherefrom the deed dated 8.12.1863 presented in the instant proceeding has been produced. The originals of the other documents more particularly the one claimed to have been executed by the other heirs of the clan in her favour have not been produced before this Court. In the background of the adjudication in the civil reference involving the same land and the clan, the document on which the petitioner founds her claim in the opinion of this Court ought to be proved in accordance with law. The communication dated 15.12.1973, which the petitioner asserts had been issued by Shri V.S. Jafa, the then Deputy Commissioner, Khasi Hills District, Shillong, recognizing her to be the rightful owner of the land has neither been produced nor summoned to be produced. It being the initial burden of the petitioner to produce all legally cognizable evidence proclaiming her right in the land and/or to the compensation claimed, the plea of omission of the State respondents in producing the original of the deed referred to in the civil reference is of no consequence. In the face of a detailed and exhaustive judicial scrutiny of the facts and the law involved in the civil reference, a summary adjudication of the petitioner's right, title or interest in the same land on the basis of the documents produced by her in a writ proceeding is neither"-permissible nor warranted. The pleaded facts and documents per se do not unassailably attest the petitioner's unquestioned and exclusive right in the land as a heir of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan or to claim compensation, even if payable, in terms of her deed dated 8.12.1863. 35. The pleaded facts and documents per se do not unassailably attest the petitioner's unquestioned and exclusive right in the land as a heir of the Nongkhlaw Rngi clan or to claim compensation, even if payable, in terms of her deed dated 8.12.1863. 35. As alluded hereinabove, even if the petitioner's document is recognizable in law, the transaction evidenced thereby is not different from the one Jaken note of by the Full Bench in the civil reference. In no uncertain terms, this Court held therein that the same land had eventually vested in the State of Meghalaya signifying that the transaction had been interpreted to be one of gift denoting absolute relinquishment of the donors right, title and interest therein notwithstanding the stipulation of payment of the agreed sum of Rs.50/- yearly as compensation. The Full Bench, therefore, did not recognize the subsistence of any right in the donor and, therefore, of his descendents in the clan to claim the same on the expiry of 99 years. The petitioner's document, to note, also does not limit the transaction by time. The Full Bench having enunciated absolute investiture of the land in the State of Meghalaya, the petitioner's reliance on Article 294 of the Constitution of India is of no avail. 36. Thus assuming that the petitioner's deed dated 8.12.1863 can be legally noticed, the land and the parties involved being the same as in the document dealt with in the civil reference any deduction different from the one made by the Full Bench is impermissible. This determination in the facts and circumstances of the case admits of no inference based on the decision in the civil reference but is a direct consequence of the adjudication made therein. Further the omission to raise the plea based on Article 294 of the Constitution of India in the civil reference or the consideration thereof does not permit a fresh scrutiny in the present proceeding, in view of the bar of the spirit of res judicata embodied in Section 11 of the Code with particular reference to Explanation IV thereto. 37. The Apex Court in Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 37. The Apex Court in Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574 while rejecting the plea that res judicata is a technical rule and thus is irrelevant in dealing with petitions under Article 32, ruled that the said doctrine is founded on the consideration of public policy and that it is on that count that a finality should be attached to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction and further that the individual should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. Their Lordships referred the expression "Res Judicata" as observed in Corpus Juris to be a rule of universal law that pervades every well regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded on two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, the one, public policy and necessity which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to the litigation-"Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and the other, the hardship on the individual if he be vexed twice for the same cause-nemo debet bis vexari pro eaden causa". Their Lordships held the view that the binding character of judgments pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of me rule of law, which is the basis of administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. This judicially enunciated axiom applies proprio vigore to the facts of the case in hand. 38. The decision of the Apex Court in Ambica Quarry Works, (supra), and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Limited, (supra), to the effect that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom and that it is not an authority on a point not considered; are of no assistance to her in the contextual facts and the determinations in the civil reference in particular. 39. Payment of compensation, if any, by the State of Meghalaya, in between as insisted upon does not act as an estoppel against it following the verdict in the civil reference. On the same logic, the notice issued by it inviting claims for compensation from the eligible heirs/representatives of the Nongkhlaw Rngi and Kurkalang clans does not advance the case of the petitioner. The endorsements of payment of compensation as inscribed on the petitioner's document dated 8.12.1963 remains unproved in accordance with law. On the same logic, the notice issued by it inviting claims for compensation from the eligible heirs/representatives of the Nongkhlaw Rngi and Kurkalang clans does not advance the case of the petitioner. The endorsements of payment of compensation as inscribed on the petitioner's document dated 8.12.1963 remains unproved in accordance with law. By no means the same is an evidence of the petitioner's exclusive right in the land or to claim the compensation, in the background of the earlier litigation involving the same land. The Full Bench having in categorical terms held absolute vesting of the land in favour of the State of Meghalaya, having regard to the legislative metamorphosis noticed by it preceding such conclusion, the petitioner's plea of absence of authority in the issuance of the impugned memorandum recognizing the Council instead to be possessed of sole jurisdiction over the land is also unconvincing. 40. The petitioner, thus, in the estimate of this Court has failed to justify a fresh examination of her claim in the land or the compensation demanded by her in this writ proceeding. The State Government's denial thereof based on the decision in the civil reference in the above premise, therefore, cannot be faulted with. 41. This Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review, therefore, is disinclined to interfere with the impugned memorandum. The petition in the result is thus dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.