Judgment :- M. Chockalingam, J. This judgment shall govern the above appeals, which have arisen from the order of dismissal of O.P.No.145 of 2005, seeking appointment of petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians and also for the custody of minor child Vishal Balaji aged 4-1/2 years at the time of filing of O.P., and also from the other interim orders. 2. The appellants herein filed O.P.No.145 of 2005 seeking appointment of petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians of the said minor child and also for a direction to the respondent to hand over the custody of the child to petitioners 2 and 3 within the time to be fixed by the Court. The petitioners also filed Application No.4568 of 2007, whereby they sought for a direction to the respondent to hand over the custody of minor child to petitioners 1 to 3 or in alternative appointing the petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians for the minor or in alternative, to direct the respondent to hand over the custody of the minor child to petitioners 1 to 3 for such time and on such terms as the court deems it fit and proper. A detailed counter was filed to the original O.P. and also for the amendment application. 3. The appellants sought for the said reliefs in the said O.P. inter-alia, stating that the marriage between the first petitioner and the respondent took place in the year 1999 as per the Hindu rites and a male child was born on 20.05.2000 in the U.S.A. and the child was named as Vishal Balaji. Due to disturbance in matrimony and strained relationship, the marriage between the spouses was dissolved by an order of the Court, dated 010. 2001 in F.C.O.P.No.407 of 2001 by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Pursuant to the order of the Court, the child was in the custody of the respondent. The first petitioner, who was in the United States remarried in the year 2002. The respondent also remarried in the year 2004. The first petitioner sent a letter to the respondent that his parents, namely the second and third petitioners, were anxious to see the child and made a request to the respondent to permit them. The first petitioner, who was in the United States remarried in the year 2002. The respondent also remarried in the year 2004. The first petitioner sent a letter to the respondent that his parents, namely the second and third petitioners, were anxious to see the child and made a request to the respondent to permit them. The same was replied by the respondent through the counsel, stating that they could not see the child, since permanent custody of the child was allowed to be with the respondent and that since the visiting right is not available to the first petitioner, it could not be extended to his parents. Under these circumstances, the petitioners filed O.P.No.145 of 2005, originally, asking the reliefs stated above. 4. The petition was countered by the respondent, inter-alia, stating that the petition was neither maintainable nor the petitioners can have the reliefs either custody or the appointment of guardianship and hence the petition was to be dismissed. 5. Pending O.P., interim order came to be passed in Application No.792 of 2005 on 212. 2005, wherein the respondent was directed to produce the minor child at the residence of the Senior Counsel for the respondent, where the petitioners 2 and 3, who are the parents of the first petitioner, were allowed to visit the child on every Friday by 5.00 p.m. till 7.00 p.m. This order was challenged by the respondent in O.S.A.No.331 of 2005, wherein the respondent challenged the very maintainability of the original petition. When the matter was taken up for consideration, the O.S.A. was withdrawn by an order, dated 110. 2006. The Division Bench of this Court granted liberty to the respondent to raise maintainability as preliminary issue before the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, an application, questioning the maintainability of the petition was also filed and the application was also countered by the petitioners. An application for appointment of Advocate Commissioner was filed by the petitioners seeking implementation of the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 212. 2005 and the same was countered by the respondent. While the matter stood thus, the petitioners filed the above amendment application, seeking amendment of the original petition. The same was also countered by the respondent. All those applications came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge and on enquiry, the learned Single Judge, sustaining the preliminary objections, dismissed the original petition itself. While the matter stood thus, the petitioners filed the above amendment application, seeking amendment of the original petition. The same was also countered by the respondent. All those applications came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge and on enquiry, the learned Single Judge, sustaining the preliminary objections, dismissed the original petition itself. The interim order in Application No.792 of 2005, dated 212. 2005 was vacated and both the application Nos.4573 and 4568 of 2007 were also dismissed. Aggrieved over the same, all these four appeals were brought forth at the instance of the petitioners. 6.Advancing arguments on behalf of the petitioners/appellants, the learned Senior Counsel made the following submissions: a) O.P.No.145 of 2005 should not have been dismissed for the simple reason that at the stage of dismissal, it was part heard stage and the evidence of P.W.1 was in progress. The respondent in the original petition has fully disobeyed the order of the court made in Application No.792 of 2005. The said order has become final, since she has withdrawn O.S.A.No.331 of 2005. After withdrawal of O.S.A.No.331 of 2005, the respondent has willfully disobeyed the order of this court made in Application No.792 of 2005. When a letter was sent to her after she has withdrawn the O.S.A. on 110. 2006, calling upon her to obey the order of the court, she has gone to an extent by sending a reply through her counsel that the interim order in Application No.792 of 2005 has been vacated by implications and the O.P. has been remanded and hence there was no act of contempt. When the appellants filed application No.4573 of 2006 for appointment of Advocate Commissioner to implement the order, dated 212. 2005 made in application No.792 of 2005, the respondent has been dragging on the matter, taking several adjournments and subsequently, she has filed application Nos.4602 and 4603 of 2006, one seeking permission to raise the question of maintainability as preliminary issue and the other for suspension of the order made in Application No.792 of 2005, which was thoroughly an after thought. b) The learned Single Judge should have allowed Application No.4573 of 2006 and directed the respondent to obey the order passed in Application No.792 of 2005. The respondent was the contemnor and she was not entitled to be heard unless and until she obeyed the order of the court. b) The learned Single Judge should have allowed Application No.4573 of 2006 and directed the respondent to obey the order passed in Application No.792 of 2005. The respondent was the contemnor and she was not entitled to be heard unless and until she obeyed the order of the court. What actually transpired in the Chambers of the learned Single Judge for arriving at a settlement between the parties is without prejudice to the rights of the parties and it cannot be used as evidence and the conduct on the part of the respondent in putting in the affidavit what transpired in the Chamber of the learned Single Judge in the counter affidavit and trying to use it as an evidence was not correct. The application to try the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue was purely an after thought and it was nothing, but an abuse of process of law. When the matter stood as part heard and P.W.1 was in box, the respondent could not file an application for maintainability. The learned Single Judge should have rejected the same. But, the learned Single Judge even without enquiry, dismissed O.P.No.145 of 2005 itself. c) The application No.4568 of 2007 for amendment was necessitated by circumstances and it was only for effective adjudication of the matter and the issue and to do justice between the parties. It is a settled law that the application for amendment could be filed if any technical objection was raised by the opposite party. The application for amendment should have been allowed. The reasons adduced by the learned Single Judge was not at all reason, which could be adduced in the eye of law. A perusal of the affidavit filed by the petitioners would clearly show that they have valid reasons in support of the amendment application and the amendment application was necessary and the first petitioner has also filed his supporting affidavit. d) Regarding the custody of minor child and visiting rights, the Court always passes orders keeping in mind the interest and welfare of the minor child. The consent order before the Family Court between the first petitioner and the respondent was only taking into account the then prevailing circumstances, in which the first petitioner was placed. d) Regarding the custody of minor child and visiting rights, the Court always passes orders keeping in mind the interest and welfare of the minor child. The consent order before the Family Court between the first petitioner and the respondent was only taking into account the then prevailing circumstances, in which the first petitioner was placed. The observations of the learned Single Judge that the petitioners never cared for the welfare of the minor child for 4 years was factually incorrect and the petitioners have pleaded in the petition as to how they were trying to have a glimpse of the child which has been refused by the respondent and her parents. The contention raised by the respondent that the O.P. has been filed by the petitioners with ulterior motive was contrary to the facts. Only in the grounds of appeal in OSA No.331 of 2005, the respondent has come forward with a specific plea as if she has given the minor child in adoption to her second husband and thus, she has spoken of severance in status between the minor child and the paternal grand parents which was not permissible in law. Under these circumstances, the same has necessitated the petitioners to seek for amendment of the original petition. e) It is an admitted position that the respondent has married again and that she has also stated that she would hand over the minor child to the second husband and his mother and would sever the relationship with the petitioners, which was adverse to the interest and welfare of the minor child. The respondent could not suppress the facts from the minor child and she could not also prevent the minor child to visit the petitioners. If suppression is allowed to take place and when the minor child comes of age, it will mentally affect the minor child and it would be adverse to the interest and welfare of the minor child. f) If the matter was taken up for trial and if the parties are permitted to let in evidence, the truth would come to light. Even if the court was not inclined to appoint the petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians and further was not inclined to hand over the custody of the minor child to the petitioners, the court can always pass orders regarding visiting right. Even if the court was not inclined to appoint the petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians and further was not inclined to hand over the custody of the minor child to the petitioners, the court can always pass orders regarding visiting right. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2007 (2) MLJ 298 (SC) (LEKHA VS. P. ANIL KUMAR). The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that it is quite clear from the judgment of the Apex Court that the remarriage of the wife was not the ground and at the same time, the Apex Court was pleased to pass orders regarding visiting right of minor. It is a settled law that at the time of considering the case for amendment, the merits of the matter should not be taken into account. g) From the available materials, it would be quite clear that the petitioners were making all attempts in contacting the respondent and her parents and have also requested them to see the minor child, but it was only the respondent and her parents who were adamant and dragged on the matter for more than two years, which resulted in the petitioners approaching the court and that it would be quite clear that the respondent is acting against the interest of the minor. It is pertinent to point out that the first petitioner has clearly stated that he was forced to agree for joint memo before the Family Court under the then given circumstance. Thus, the reasons given by the learned Single Judge are erroneous. Under these circumstances, the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be set aside and the O.P. has got to be restored to file, by setting aside the order and the amendment has got to be ordered. 7. Thus, the reasons given by the learned Single Judge are erroneous. Under these circumstances, the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be set aside and the O.P. has got to be restored to file, by setting aside the order and the amendment has got to be ordered. 7. The learned Senior counsel, advancing arguments on behalf of the respondent, in her sincere attempt of sustaining the order would submit that a reading of the order, whereby the marriage of spouses was dissolved, would clearly indicate that he has given up all his rights, including visitation right till the child attains majority and having accepted so and being a party in the order, now the first appellant is estopped from stating that he continues to have the right of visitation; that while the father and mother of the child are alive, there is no question of the second and third petitioners seeking for guardianship; that the first petitioner cannot ask for custody of the child in view of the order passed by the family court; that admittedly, the first petitioner remarried in the year 2002, but he did not come forward to seek any relief; that when the respondent remarried in the year 2004, he has come forward with the original petition with all false and untenable allegations; that when the original petition itself is not maintainable, they have filed amendment application; that the affidavit was filed by three petitioners and not by the first petitioner, who is admittedly staying in U.S.A.; that the first petitioner, who is in U.S.A., cannot ask for the custody or for guardianship and that the original petition itself was not maintainable, since neither the relief originally asked for or now sought for in the amendment application could be ordered and hence all the applications have been rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge and therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be sustained. 8. The Court has paid its anxious consideration on the submissions made. As could be seen, all the above four appeals have arisen, one challenging the dismissal of O.P.No.145 of 2005, whereby the petitioners 2 and 3 sought for appointment as Guardians of minor child and also custody of minor. Concededly, a consent order of divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act was passed in F.C.O.P.No.407 of 2001 on 010. 2001. Concededly, a consent order of divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act was passed in F.C.O.P.No.407 of 2001 on 010. 2001. The order came to be passed by mutual consent. Admittedly, the said petition was filed by both the spouses under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. In the said petition, the petitioners state that the first petitioner shall have custody of the minor son Vishal without any visitation rights to the second petitioner Chandrasekaran V.Ramanathan until the minor child attains majority and without any obligation on the part of the second petitioner Chandrasekaran V.Ramanathan to pay any maintenance allowance to the first petitioner Alur Lalithalakshmi Vinaya and the minor child Vishal until he attains majority. It would be more apt and appropriate to reproduce the following part of the order made by the family court, which runs as follows: "Both the petitioners have agreed that the permanent custody of the minor son Vishal will be with the First Petitioner. Further the Second petitioner has stated that he has given up all his rights with the child. Both the petitioners have agreed that they will not make any claim including maintenance against one another in future. Further the First petitioner has agreed not to claim any maintenance for her minor son Vishal. They have already exchanged their articles." The said order came to be passed by the Family Court on 010. 2001. It remains to be stated that after filing such a consent affidavit, pursuant to which an order came to be passed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, dissolving the marriage, this Court is afraid whether it can accept the contentions of the petitioners/appellants that the custody of the minor child has got to be given to them. It is pertinent to point out that in the course of the affidavit, it has been stated that the first petitioner therein, who is the respondent herein, should have the custody of the minor child without any visitation rights to the first appellant until the minor child attains majority and thus, it would be quite clear that when the first appellant filed the consent affidavit along with the respondent, he has also agreed that he would not claim even visitation right till the minor child attains majority. Needless to say that merely because the respondent has married again in the year 2004, it cannot be a reason to make any deviation from the original stand, which was taken by him and recorded by way of an affidavit, pursuant to which an order of divorce came to be passed. 9. It is a well settled proposition of law that the remarriage by the mother was not a ground for denying the custody of minor to her. In the instant case, it is pertinent to point out that the first appellant has also remarried in the year 2002 even before the remarriage of the respondent. Under these circumstances, the first appellant cannot be permitted to say that the custody of the child either or visitation right has got to be given to him. 10. So far as the amendment application is concerned, this Court is unable to see any reason to disturb the order of the learned Single Judge. A perusal of the petition, as originally stood, would indicate that the first petitioner sought the appointment of petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians of the minor and also for handing over the custody of the minor to those petitioners. The court is of the considered opinion that while both the parents of the child are alive, namely the respondent and the first petitioner/first appellant, no question of appointment of petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians would arise. It is pertinent to point out in law that guardianship is one thing and to have the custody of minor is the other thing. At no stretch of imagination, the petitioners 2 and 3 could be appointed as guardians for minor child, since both the parents are alive and the order of divorce, even by consent, will not take away the status of the respondent and the first petitioner as the mother and father respectively. 11.Insofar as the custody of the child, when it could not be claimed by the first petitioner/first appellant, the petitioners 2 and 3/the appellants 2 and 3 cannot also claim. When the custody of the child cannot be claimed by the first petitioner/first appellant himself, then all other appellants cannot make any claim. Hence the original petition, as rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, was not maintainable. When the custody of the child cannot be claimed by the first petitioner/first appellant himself, then all other appellants cannot make any claim. Hence the original petition, as rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, was not maintainable. 12.The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants laid emphasis that the first appellant/first petitioner was also a party in the original petition and hence he should be permitted to prosecute the petition, though the relief’s could not be granted to the petitioners 2 and 3 and the original petition itself was in part heard stage. The said contention though attractive at the first instance, does not stand the scrutiny of law. The amendment application and the affidavit in support thereon are also perused. Even if the amendment is ordered as requested by the appellants, the relief’s sought for could not be granted. What are all introduced by the amendment application are to direct the respondent to hand over the custody of the child to petitioners 2 and 3 or in alternative, appointment of petitioners 2 and 3 as guardians for the minor child or in alternative, directing the respondent to hand over the custody of minor child to petitioners 1 to 3 for such time as the Court deems it fit. All the above relief’s for the reasons stated above, even after the amendment, could not be granted. Under these circumstances, when the relieves even after the amendment, as sought for, could not be granted, there is no meaning in allowing the amendment application. Hence the learned Single Judge was perfectly correct in dismissing the amendment application also. So far as the application for appointment of Advocate Commissioner for implementation of the interim order made in Application No.792 of 2005 is concerned, when such an interim order was originally passed, wherefrom an appeal was made and thereafter the original petition itself was dismissed as not maintainable, no question of implementation of that order, at this juncture, would arise. Hence the dismissal of the application has got to be affirmed. Under these circumstances, the learned Single Judge was perfectly correct in dismissing the original petition as not maintainable and dismissing the other applications also. Accordingly, all these appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected MP is also dismissed.