Judgment : R. BANUMATHI, J. Whether even on the Plaint averments the Suit is to be rejected is the question raised for consideration in this Application. 2. The respondent/plaintiff has filed the Suit for partition and separate possession of his l/5th share in the Suit Schedule Items (1) and (2) properties on the basis that the properties are the joint family properties of his father C.E. Reddi and therefore, he is entitled to 1/5th share. The first defendant/C.E. Sulochana has filed this Application to reject the Plaint. For convenience, the Parties are referred to in their original rank in the Suit. 3. The plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 are the sons and daughters of C.E. Reddi and the first defendant-C.E. Sulochana. The Suit property comprises of two items of valuable properties in Lake Area, Nungambakkam. Item (1) relates to 3 Grounds and 244 sq.ft. together with the building built upon Ground and First Floor bearing New No. 7. Second item comprises of two Grounds together with the Building thereon. Item (1) was purchased from Madras Property Investment Corporation Limited by C.E. Reddi in the name of first defendant-C.E. Sulochana by a Sale Deed dated 6.8.1956. The Item (2) was also purchased in the name of the first defendant-C.E. Sulochana. 4. The case of the respondent/plaintiff as projected in the Plaint is as follows: (i) Suit Properties Items (1) and (2) were purchased In the name of the first defendant by C.E. Reddi from out of the joint family funds. C.E. Reddi, who is the father of the plaintiff, is the absolute owner of the Schedule Suit properties. After the death of C.E. Reddi, Item (2) Schedule property was allotted to defendants 3 and 4 by the first defendant without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. A misunderstanding and family dispute arose in 1987 and an oral partition was effected between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. As per the oral partition the Western portion of Schedule Item (1) along with Garage was allotted to the plaintiff and Eastern portion was retained by defendants 1 and 2. Evidencing the same a wall was also built in between Western and Eastern side of the property from North to South. As per the oral partition the Western portion of Schedule Item (1) along with Garage was allotted to the plaintiff and Eastern portion was retained by defendants 1 and 2. Evidencing the same a wall was also built in between Western and Eastern side of the property from North to South. According to the plaintiff, while dividing the property, it was orally agreed that the Western portion to be allotted to the plaintiff as he being the eldest son and accordingly, he was allotted the Western portion. (ii) It is the further case of the plaintiff that, even though oral partition was effected in the year 1987, the first defendant has filed the Suit in C.S. No. 719 of 2005 to direct the plaintiff to quit and deliver vacant possession of the Western portion of Suit property Item (1) and also for mesne profits. Since the first defendant had filed C.S. No. 719 of 2005, the plaintiff has no other way except to file the Suit for partition. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to l/5th share of the Suit properties in both Items (1) and (2) including the properties given to defendants 3 and 4 and therefore, the Suit for partition and separate possession. (iii) The first defendant has filed the Application under Order 7Rule 11 C.P.C. read with Order 14Rule 8 of O.S. Rules to reject the Plaint. Seeking rejection ” of the Plaint, the first defendant has filed the Application contending that Plaint Items (1) and (2) have nothing to do with the joint family properties or estate of C.E. Reddi and that the Suit has been filed only as a counter blast to C.S. No. 719 of 2005. In the earlier Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the plaintiff himself has put forth the case of oral partition and in the said Suit a specific issue was framed, whether the present Suit property Item (1) is a joint family property. After full fledged trial, the Trial Court held that the property is not a joint family property, but self-acquired property of the first defendant and the Suit filed by the first defendant was decreed. The respondent/plaintiff has filed an Appeal in A.S. No. 324 of 2000 and the said Appeal was later withdrawn. The averments in the Plaint in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 and the judgment would operate as res judicata. The respondent/plaintiff has filed an Appeal in A.S. No. 324 of 2000 and the said Appeal was later withdrawn. The averments in the Plaint in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 and the judgment would operate as res judicata. Insofar as Item (2) is concerned, it is the case of the Applicant/first defendant that she is the owner of Item (2) and that by two registered Settlement Deeds dated 27.3.1986, she has settled portions of the property upon her two daughters/defendants 3 and 4 and delivered possession of the site to them and that they have constructed their houses and completed before 1990. The plaintiff, who is admittedly residing in the Western portion of the property had not chosen to make the claim for partition of Plaint Item (2) on the earlier occasion. It is alleged that only after the first defendant had filed the Suit in C.S. No. 719 of 2005 in order to black-mail her and other defendants, the plaintiff has come forward with this Suit for partition claiming l/5th share. According to the first defendant, the Suit is clear abuse of process of Court and barred by res judicata. The first defendant is aged about 85 years and that she cannot be compelled to undergo the ordeal of going through a long drawn out and expensive litigation in defending the false Suit filed by the respondent. 5. Contending that the earlier Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 was not a Suit for Partition, but a Suit for Mandatory Injunction to reconstruct the demolished portion of the compound wall and therefore, the finding in the said Suit is not binding on the plaintiff and the said judgment would not operate as res judicata, the plaintiff has filed the counter affidavit. 6. Seeking rejection of the Plaint, Mr. Venkatesan, the learned counsel for the Applicants/defendants has submitted that only to harass the mother and sisters, the respondent/plaintiff has filed the Suit as a counter blast to C.S. No. 719 of 2005/which was filed by the first defendant for possession and mesne profits. Laying emphasis upon the earlier Suit and judgment in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the learned counsel for the first defendant has submitted that in the said Suit after contest the Court has held that the property is self-acquired property of the mother and while so, the present Suit is barred by res judicata. Laying emphasis upon the earlier Suit and judgment in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the learned counsel for the first defendant has submitted that in the said Suit after contest the Court has held that the property is self-acquired property of the mother and while so, the present Suit is barred by res judicata. Insofar as Item (2) is concerned, it is submitted that Item (2) belongs to the mother, who has settled in favour of the two daughters/defendants 3 and 4 way back in 1986 and for all these years the plaintiff has not challenged those Settlement Deeds. It was further submitted that the earlier judgment would operate as res judicata and that the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, the learned counsel for the first defendant prayed for rejection of the Plaint. 7. Submitting that the plaintiff has 1/5th share both in Items (1) and (2) the learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that only by adducing oral and documentary evidence, the plaintiffs case could be established. It was further submitted that when the first defendant had taken a stand the plaintiff is in permissive occupation of the property, the plaintiff has no other option excepting to file a Suit for partition. It was further submitted that the Plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the pleadings in the written statement and that the Plaint as it is has to be taken into consideration. It was further urged that if the Plaint is rejected at the threshold, the plaintiff would fee throwninto the street and that he would be subjected to great hardship and inconvenience. 8. In the light of the contentions and upon consideration of the relevant materials the following points arise for consideration: i. Whether the Suit is barred by res judicata. ii. Whether the present Suit would amount to re-agitation of the issues already determined in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996. ?liable to be rejected exercising the power under Order VIIRule 11 C.P.C. . 9. Mere issuance of summons by the Trial Court does not require that the trial should proceed even when no triable issue is shown to have arisen, Urging that the Suit is liable to be rejected, the learned counsel for the defendants placed strong reliance upon Raj Narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi (2002) 10 SCC 501 . 9. Mere issuance of summons by the Trial Court does not require that the trial should proceed even when no triable issue is shown to have arisen, Urging that the Suit is liable to be rejected, the learned counsel for the defendants placed strong reliance upon Raj Narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi (2002) 10 SCC 501 . In the said case referring to T. Arivandandams case, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “………. in the case of T. Arivandandam v. T. V. Satyapal T. Arivandandam v. T. V. Satyapal T. Arivandandam v. T. V. Satyapal AIR 1977 SC 2421 : (1977) 4 SCC 467 wherein this Court categorically Said down that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it manifestly appears to be vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the trial Court should exercise its power under Order 7Rule II of the Code of Civil Procedure taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled since bogus litigation ought to be shot down at the earliest stage. 3. It is convenient to note at this juncture that in an application for rejection of the plaint under Order 7Rule 11, the law has been rather well settled for quite some time in a long catena of cases that the plaint should be taken as it is and the application should be considered on the basis of the averments in the plaint itself and no external aid is available to the Court for the purpose. It has also been the well-settled principle of law that the law Court should be rather hesitant to exercise the jurisdiction under Order 7Rule 11 unless the factual score warrants such exercise and the matter in issue falls within the four comers of the requirement of the statute. It is for this purpose, however, the necessary averments in the plaint ought to be considered.” 10. In the light of the well-settled principle, let us advert to the facts of this case and contentious points raised. The Plaint Schedule Item (1) comprises of 3 grounds 244 sq.ft. in Lake Area, Nungambakkam. The first defendant had purchased the Suit property Item (1) under a registered Sale Deed dated 6.8.1956. It is stated that with her own funds the first defendant had constructed a residential house consisting of Ground and First Floor measuring approximately 5000 sq.ft. The Plaint Schedule Item (1) comprises of 3 grounds 244 sq.ft. in Lake Area, Nungambakkam. The first defendant had purchased the Suit property Item (1) under a registered Sale Deed dated 6.8.1956. It is stated that with her own funds the first defendant had constructed a residential house consisting of Ground and First Floor measuring approximately 5000 sq.ft. and that the Property Tax, Water Tax for Item (i) has been assessed in the name of the first defendant. 11. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant/Mother is only a name lender and benami of Item (1) and the real owner is their father C.E. Reddi and that the Suit property Item (1) is the joint family property. It is the further case of the plaintiff that in the oral partition effected in 1987, he was allotted the Western portion in Item (1). The first defendant has tried to explain the possession of the plaintiff by contending that the plaintiff is in permissive possession of the Western portion (excepting Car Shed). 12. Alleging that the plaintiff is in permissive possession of Item (1) and. that he has indulged in waste and destruction of the property and further alleging that the plaintiff has demolished part of the compound wall, the first defendant has filed the Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 against the plaintiff directing him to reconstruct the demolished compound wall in Item (1) and also for permanent injunction restraining him from causing any further damage to the Suit property. The plaintiff herein hotly contested the said Suit inter alia contending that the Suit property Item (1) is a joint family property. The plaintiff raised a specific plea that the Suit property Item (1) was purchased from the funds of Hindu Undivided Family of C.E. Reddi. On those pleadings, specific Issue was framed, viz., “ Whether the Suit property is the joint family property.” 13. After full fledged trial, in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the learned II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, by the Judgment dated 16.2.1999 held that the Suit property Item (1) is the absolute property of the first defendant and as such the plaintiff herein cannot have any right over the same. After full fledged trial, in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the learned II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, by the Judgment dated 16.2.1999 held that the Suit property Item (1) is the absolute property of the first defendant and as such the plaintiff herein cannot have any right over the same. The Court has further held that the entire Suit property Item (1) is the absolute property of the Mother C.E. Sulochana and that the plaintiff has not adduced evidence showing that the property is the Joint Family Property. While decreeing the Suit for Mandatory Injunction, the learned Judge inter alia held, ‘ I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has proved her case that the Suit property is her absolute property and the Defendant is only a permissive occupier of the Western half portion of the Suit building and also the Defendant has demolished the disputed compound.’ 14. Aggrieved by the judgment, the respondent/plaintiff has filed the Appeal in A.S. No. 324 of 2000 on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, and subsequently, the Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.12.2001. 15. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the defendants-Venkatesan, the finding in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 has become final and the plaintiff cannot re-agitate the same issue once again. It was further submitted that in view of the findings in the earlier Suit that the Suit property is the absolute property of the first defendant, the present Suit for partition is barred by law and would also amount to abuse of process of Court. As noted earlier in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, the Parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. After full fledged trial the Suit property Item (i) was held to be absolute property of the first defendant and the Court has rejected the plea of the plaintiff that the Suit property is the joint family property. Section 11 embodies the doctrine of res judicata which rests on the principle that one should not be vexed twice for the same-cause and that there should be finality of litigation. The rule of res judicata will be applicable as a rule of public policy for giving finality to orders passed by judicial authorities and for avoiding frivolous and multifarious litigation. The rule of res judicata will be applicable as a rule of public policy for giving finality to orders passed by judicial authorities and for avoiding frivolous and multifarious litigation. The principle of res judicata is intended not only to prevent a new decision, but also prevent a new investigation so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same question of law. 16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 was not for partition and it is the Suit for Mandatory Injunction to reconstruct the demolished portion of the compound wail and that the first defendant cannot take advantage of the said decree passed in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996. it was further submitted that relying upon the assurances of the defendants that they would settle the matter, the plaintiff has withdrawn A.S. No. 324 of 2000 and that the withdrawal of the Appeal would not in any way amount to res judicata, it was also submitted that the share of the plaintiff was not an issue in the earlier Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 and therefore, the findings in the earlier Suit would not amount to res judicata. The above contention of the respondent/plaintiff does not merit acceptance. In considering the applicability of Section 11 C.P.C., Court in the subsequent Suit has only to see the matter which was directly and substantially in issue in earlier Suit between the Parties and the decision thereon. The words used inSection 11 C.P.C. are ‘directly and substantially in issue.’ If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. 17. In Sajjadanashin Sayed Md, B. B. Edr. The words used inSection 11 C.P.C. are ‘directly and substantially in issue.’ If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. 17. In Sajjadanashin Sayed Md, B. B. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer AIR 2000 SC 1238 : (2000) 3 SCC 350 : (2000) 2 MLJ 172 the Supreme Court has held, ‘The test to determine whether an issue was directly and substantially in issue in earlier proceedings is collaterally or incidentally, is that if the issue was ‘necessary’ to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as ‘ directly and substantially in issue’ and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case. 18. As noted earlier in the earlier Suit in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 specific plea was raised that the property was the joint family property and not the absolute property of the first defendant. The specific issue was framed, viz., whether the Suit is a joint family property.. By a plain reading of the written statement filed in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996, it is evident that the character of Suit Property Item (1) was specifically raised and therefore, it cannot be said that the s-finding in respect of Item (1) of the said issue is being incidental to the substantial issue. Even assuming that in the earlier Suit the said issue was not directly and substantially in issue, the plaintiff having raised the said plea cannot re-agitate the same issue by putting the case in another way. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But, if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it would amount to abuse of process of Court. 19. In respect of Item (1), the first defendant/Mother has filed C.S. No. 719 of 2005 for possession and also for past and future mesne profits. It is stated that while the first defendant has been taking steps to get along with the trial, the present Suit has been filed by the plaintiff. 19. In respect of Item (1), the first defendant/Mother has filed C.S. No. 719 of 2005 for possession and also for past and future mesne profits. It is stated that while the first defendant has been taking steps to get along with the trial, the present Suit has been filed by the plaintiff. The defence plea that there was oral partition and in the said oral partition the plaintiff was allotted the Western portion could have been raised as a defence plea in C.S. No. 719 of 2005. But, the plaintiff has chosen to multiply the litigation by filing the present Suit for partition. 20. It is relevant to note that the plaintiffs‘ pleading has been consistent thereon to the effect that in the year 1987, there was oral partition and in the said oral partition, he was allotted Western portion of Suit Schedule Item (1). Even going by the said averment, there cannot be a separate Suit for another partition subsequently in respect of Item (1). So far as Plaint Schedule Item (2) is concerned, the first defendant has purchased the same and that she has settled portions of the said property upon defendants 3 and 4 under two Settlement Deeds dated 27.3.1986. After the said Settlements, defendants 3 and 3 and their husbands have constructed their houses with their own funds and the houses were completed before 1990. The respondent/plaintiff, who is admittedly residing in the Western portion of Item (1), which is adjoining Item (2) property must have been fully aware of the Settlements in favour of defendants 3 and 4 on 27.3.1986 and their putting up construction of houses. While so, for about 21 years, the first defendant has not chosen to make any claim in respect of Item (2). 21. The contention of the plaintiff that Item (2) is the joint family property of C.E. Reddi is unfounded and baseless. In the Partition Deed dated 5.3.1962, amongst C.E. Reddi and his brothers, clearly reiterates that the properties of the first defendant are her absolute properties and that the joint family has no right over them. The following recitals in the Partition Deed dated 5.3.1962 would show that the plaintiffs case is absolutely meritless. “……….Similarly the parties are agreed that house and ground No. 28, Natesan Nagar, Nungambakkam, Madras, has always been the absolute property of Sulochana Ammal….. The following recitals in the Partition Deed dated 5.3.1962 would show that the plaintiffs case is absolutely meritless. “……….Similarly the parties are agreed that house and ground No. 28, Natesan Nagar, Nungambakkam, Madras, has always been the absolute property of Sulochana Ammal….. and the joint family had no interest in respect of the same at any time…….” 22. The pleadings in C.S. No. 30 of 1960 and the Partition Deed dated 5.3.1962 were marked as Exhibits A-7 and 8 in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996. Para 10 of the Plaint of the present Suit cause of action refers to C.S. No. 30 of 1960. The said Suit culminated in the said Partition Deed dated 5.3.1962, which asserts that the Suit properties are the self-acquired properties of the first defendant. Even on the own showing of the Plaint averments, there is no cause of action and the once alleged are meritless. 23. Over the years, the plaintiff never seem to have claimed any right in Item (2). No such plea was raised in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996. While claiming that the Plaint Item (1) was joint family property, in O.S. No. 8620 of 1996 the plaintiff had not put forth the plea that the Plaint Item (2) is also a joint family property liable for partition and while so, the plaintiff cannot now set up a plea that Item (2) is also a joint family property liable for partition and he is barred by law from doing so under Section 11 Explanation IV C.P.C. which clearly states that ‘ any matter which might and ought to have been made ground defence or attack in such former Suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such Suit.’ 24. Having omitted to put forth such a defence in the earlier Suit, the plaintiff is now estopped from contending that Item (2) is a joint family property available for partition. As stated earlier, the Suit property Item (2) was settled in favour of defendants 3 and 4 under two different Settlement Deeds dated 27.3.1986. The plaintiff, who is living adjacent to the Suit property had not chosen to challenge the same for more than 21 years. As stated earlier, the Suit property Item (2) was settled in favour of defendants 3 and 4 under two different Settlement Deeds dated 27.3.1986. The plaintiff, who is living adjacent to the Suit property had not chosen to challenge the same for more than 21 years. In Raj Narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi ( supra), the transfer of certain landholding by sale deed executed by predecessor of plaintiff was sought to be challenged after 40 years, the trial Court has rejected the Plaint, which was confirmed by the High Court observing that the rejection of Plaint is justified as plaintiff itself showed execution of sale deed was within the knowledge of plaintiff and that he had -not taken steps to have the Deed declared invalid or ineffective. The above decision squarely applies to the case on hand, where the plaintiff had not taken steps to have the Settlement Deeds declared invalid or ineffective for more than 21 years. 25. The first defendant has filed O.S. No. 719 of 2005 for delivery of possession and for mesne profits. It would have been sufficient for the plaintiff to put forth his defence in contesting the said Suit. On the other hand, the plaintiff has turned around and filed fresh Suit seeking for partition. Even according to the plaintiff, he claims allotment by oral partition. Going by his own plea, the present Suit for partition is meritless. 26. Where there is abuse of process of Court by filing futile litigation permitting the trial to proceed would amount to licensing of vexatious litigation to continue. The re-agitation may or may not be barred by res judicata. But, if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it would also amount to abuse of process of the Court. Where there is clear abuse of process of the Court, the Court has to view such conduct seriously and the same is to be halted to save precious time of the Court being wasted. 27. In the decision of the Supreme CourtK. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi AIR 1998 SC 1297 : (1998) 3 SCC 573 : (1998) Suppl MLJ 91 elaborately considering the abuse of process of the Court, the Supreme Court has held that the Court has power to stop such frivolous and vexatious proceedings. 27. In the decision of the Supreme CourtK. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi AIR 1998 SC 1297 : (1998) 3 SCC 573 : (1998) Suppl MLJ 91 elaborately considering the abuse of process of the Court, the Supreme Court has held that the Court has power to stop such frivolous and vexatious proceedings. The Supreme Court has also cautioned that such power is to be exercised with circumspection and it has held as follows at p. 103 of MLJ: “ 42. Under Order 6, Rule 16f the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, Order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. MULLA in his TREATISE ON THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, (15th Edn., Vol. II. P. 1179, note 7) has stated that power under clause (C) of Order 6, Rule 15 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process. In the present case the High Court has held the Suit to be an abuse of the process of the Court on the basis of what is stated in the Plaint. 43. The Supreme Court PRACTICE 1995 published by SWEET & MAXWELL in paragraphs 18/19/33 (p. 344) explains the phrase ‘abuse of the process of the Court thus: ‘This term connotes that the process of the Court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The Court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation… The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and that the interests of justice may be very material.’ 44. One of the examples as an abuse of the process of the Court is re-litigation. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and that the interests of justice may be very material.’ 44. One of the examples as an abuse of the process of the Court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the Court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may nor may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the Courts discretion that has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no change of the Suit succeeding.” 28. In Nesammal v. Edward (1998) Suppl MLJ 29 : 1998 (3) CTC 165 , observing where the allegations in Plaint reveal abuse of process of law and that the trial is to be halted Justice S.S. SUBRARMANI has held as follows at p. 33 of MLJ: 11. In view of all these decisions the argument of the counsel for the Petitioners that unless the conditions are satisfied under Order 7Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the plaint cannot be rejected is without any basis. The provisions of Order 7Rule 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has got inherent powers to see that the vexatious litigations are not allowed to take or consume the time of the Court. In appropriate cases, directions can be given by this Court as well as the Court in which the suit is filed not to entertain the Suit, if on reading the allegations in the plaint it reveals that the same is abuse of process of law. In appropriate cases, directions can be given by this Court as well as the Court in which the suit is filed not to entertain the Suit, if on reading the allegations in the plaint it reveals that the same is abuse of process of law. In this case all the grounds are made out and the very same plaintiff who got defeated in the litigation has agitated the very same issue by filing the present plaint. I appreciate the stand taken by the lower Court in rejecting the Plaint at the threshold.” When the contested matter which was fought upto High Court was sought to be re-agitated exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 this Court has ordered striking off the Plaint in the decision K. K. Swaminathan v. Srinivasagam (2003) 3 MLJ 566 : 2003 (4) CTC 347. 29. In the case reported in Smt. Patasibai and Others v. Ratanlal JT 1990 (3) SC 68, the Supreme Court has held thus: “The trial should not proceed when there is no controversial issue but the trial Court failed to perform its duty and proceeded to issue summons without carefully reading the plaint. Since the plaint suffers from that fatal defect, the mere issuance of summons by the trial Court did not require that the trial should proceed even when no triable issue is shown to arise; permitting the continuance of such a suit is tantamount to licensing frivolous and vexatious litigation which cannot be done. The Supreme Court has also held that it is not necessary to adopt the technical course of directing the trial Court to make the consequential order of rejecting the plaint.” 30. The present Suit for partition is misconceived. The first defendant is aged about 85 years. The present Suit appears to be a counter blast to the Suit in C.S. No. 719 of 2005. On its own showing the Plaint allegations are baseless. The first defendant being aged cannot be forced to undergo the ordeal of another Suit, when she was ready to get along with the trial in C.S. No. 719 of 2005. 31. For the foregoing discussion, the Suit in C.S. No. 129 of 2007 filed by the respondent/plaintiff is liable to be rejected. This Application is allowed and the Suit in C.S. No. 129 of 2007 is rejected. Consequently O.A. No. 191 of 2007 is closed. 32. 31. For the foregoing discussion, the Suit in C.S. No. 129 of 2007 filed by the respondent/plaintiff is liable to be rejected. This Application is allowed and the Suit in C.S. No. 129 of 2007 is rejected. Consequently O.A. No. 191 of 2007 is closed. 32. It is made clear that the plaintiff/Sathiyanarayana Reddy is at liberty to put forth his defence in C.S. No. 719 of 2005 including the plea of oral partition. The observations in this order may not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the contentions of parties in C.S. No. 719 of 2005.