JUDGMENT (Per Vilas V.Afzul Purkar, J.) Writ Appeal No.221 of 2002 is filed by respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No.6194 of 1992, whereas Writ Appeal No, 1350 of 2002 is filed by respondents 1 and 2 in Writ Petition No.6194 of 1992. 2. The learned single judge by his order, dated 25.09.2001, allowed Writ Petition No.6194 of 1992 filed by respondents 1 to 41 and the notification issued under Section 3(3) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (For short ‘the imams Abolition Act’) was quashed. 3. The said impugned order is questioned by (respondent No.4) landholder and the State, in these appeals. 4. For the sake of convenience, respondents 1 to 41 (writ petitioners in Writ Petition NO.6194 of 1992) are referred to as tenants and the appellant in Writ Appeal No.221 of 2002 (respondent No.4 in Writ Petition NO.6194 of 1992) is referred to as landholder, 5. The facts, in brief, which led to filing of the writ petition by the tenants are as follows: - The subject matter of these proceedings are the lands in Arepalli Agraharam Village, Rompecherla Mandai, Guntur District. The chronological events of the case may be stated as follows: 15.07.1950 After Madras Estates Land Act of 1937 and A.P., (Andhra Area) Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwan Act of 1948 came into force, the Settlement Officer, Vijayawada conducted enquiry in S.R.No.7 of 1949, wherein he held that age of Rompecherla Mandai is not an Estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) of Madras Estates Land Act. 18,11,1952 The Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram in A.S.No.18 of 1952 filed by the tenants upheld the finding of the Settlement Officer as it is not an Estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. While the aforesaid decision had become final, the Explanation-1A was added in Section 2 (3)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. While the aforesaid decision had become final, the Explanation-1A was added in Section 2 (3)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. By virtue of the said amendment, the said Explanation 1-A reads as follows: - "An inam village, hamlet or khandriga in an inam village granted in inam, shall be deemed to be an estate, even though it was confirmed or recognized on different persons." 09.03.1959 The Assistant Settlement Officer by exercising the suo motu power reopened the matter in S.R.No.8/1958 after the Amendment of Sec. 2 (3)(d) and Explanation-1 A of the Madras Estates Land Act, and held that the village is an inam estate within the provisions of the Amended Act. 02.05.1962 As against the said orders, an appeal was filed before the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Guntur, (Guntur DistrictJudge) in S.R.No.2/58 filed by the father of the appellant (land holder) and the appellate Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer. 6. The father of the landholders filed Writ Petition NO.1188 of 1962 before this Court questioning the aforesaid order of the Tribunal as well as the Settlement Officer. By an order, dated 26.08.1968, the learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition. 7. Questioning the said judgment of the learned single judge, Writ Appeal No.40 of 1969 was filed by the landholders, which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 11.08.1972 and was also reported in P. V. Choudary v. K.K. Veerabhadrachan". In view of the said decision intra parties, it has been held that the Assistant Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction to hold fresh enquiry into the question as to whether the village is an inam estate or not and the order passed by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram in the previous enquiry in A.S.No.18 of 1952 had become final and binding on the parties. 21.09.1989 Thereafter notification under Section 3 (3) read with Rule 3 (2) Form II under the Inams Abolition Act read with Rules was published in the Guntur District Extra Ordinary Gazette, stating that it is an inam land in an inam village. 8. Questioning the same, the tenants filed Writ Petition NO.6194 of 1992 challenging the gazette notification, dated 21.09.1989 and for consequential direction to initiate action over Arepalli Agraharam village under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short 'Estates Abolition Act') and pass further orders. 9. 8. Questioning the same, the tenants filed Writ Petition NO.6194 of 1992 challenging the gazette notification, dated 21.09.1989 and for consequential direction to initiate action over Arepalli Agraharam village under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short 'Estates Abolition Act') and pass further orders. 9. As mentioned above, the learned single Judge had allowed the said writ petition and thereby, the present writ appeals have been filed. 10. In these appeals, we have heard Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned senior counsel representing Sri G. Krishnamurthy, learned counsel appearing for the land holders in support of Writ Appeal No.221 of 2002, and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue in support of Writ Appeal NO.1350 of 2002. We have also heard Sri M.Chandra Shekar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the tenants in both the appeals. Both the learned senior counsel appearing on either side have submitted written synopsis in support of their respective cases. 11. After duly considering the said submissions, we are of the opinion that both the appeals deserve to be allowed. The reasons in support of the same are as follows: - (a) The primary issue as to whether the lands in question are subject to the Estate Abolition Act or not was decided against the tenants in the earliest decision of the Settlement Officer, dated 15.07.1950, and the same was confirmed by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram, in A.S.No.18 of 1952 as early as on 18.11.1952. The said order has attained finality, as the same was not questioned by the tenants. (b) The tenants, however, claimed that the legal position with regard to applicability of the Estates Abolition Act underwent a drastic change after the incorporation of Explanation 1-A to the Madras Estates Land Act, whereupon a fresh suo motu enquiry was sought to be held by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Once again enquiry into the question as to whether Arepalli Agraharam village is an estate within the provisions of the Estate Abolition Act or not, was held and the Assistant Settlement Officer, under his order, dated 09.03.1959, found that it was an estate and the said order was confirmed by the decision of the Estates Abolition Tribunal in S.R.No.2/1985, dated 02.05.1962. The landholders questioned the same in Writ Petition NO.1188 of 1962 before this Court, which was also dismissed. The landholders questioned the same in Writ Petition NO.1188 of 1962 before this Court, which was also dismissed. However, on appeal, therefrom by the land holders, a Division Bench of this Court in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra) recorded the following specific findings: - “….Therefore, so far as grants of inam villages are concerned nothing new has been brought in by the introduction of Explanation 1-A. Even before, the position was the same. By the introduction of Explanation 1-A, so far as whole inam villages are concerned, no inam Village which was not an estate previously was made an estate. With regard to those villages, which was already the law under the existing definition, was only made more explicit under Explanation 1-A. Before the Amendment Act (XXXV of 1956), there was only one category of estate under Section 3 (2)(d) viz., whole inam village. By means of the amendment two more categories are introduced into the definition. They are 'hamlets' or 'khandrigas' in an inam village. Certainly with regard to these latter two categories of estates are concerned, which became estates, for the first time, after the Amendment Act, there would not be any question of a fresh enquiry. It would be an enquiry for the first time. They were not estates prior to that amendment. But so far as whole inam villages are concerned, by reason of adding Explanation 1-A, no village, which was not an estate already under the existing definition is made an estate." If the amendment and adding of Explanation 1-A was not there, certainly with regard to a whole village, a second enquiry would be barred by reason of Sec. 9 (6) of the Abolition Act. But on account of the adding of Explanation 1-A can it be said that the second enquiry, which was not otherwise valid, would be valid and the entire thing can be reopened again which had already become final? If the legislature contemplated such a situation and intended to invalidate the orders of the Tribunal, which have become final and reopen them, there must have been some indication about it In the Amendment Act of 1956. It may be mentioned that by the Amendment Act Section 9 (6) was not touched. It was allowed to remain as it was. If the legislature contemplated such a situation and intended to invalidate the orders of the Tribunal, which have become final and reopen them, there must have been some indication about it In the Amendment Act of 1956. It may be mentioned that by the Amendment Act Section 9 (6) was not touched. It was allowed to remain as it was. Even our learned brother Justice Ekbote has said that in so far as Section 9 (6) of the Abolition Act is concerned the matter is beyond any doubt that once a decision is given between the parties under Section 9 of the Abolition Act it shall be binding on them. Whatever it is, the fact remains that under Section 7 (i) the orders of the Tribunal under the Abolition Act are not invalidated or touched. Therefore. the order passed by the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram, on 25'" November, 1952, in AS.No.18 of 1952 which had become final, has not become Invalidated by reason of the Amendment Act of 1956 and it still remained in force. If that is so, the matter cannot be re-opened, though it was a wrong order as it had become final as provided under Section 9 (6) of the Abolition Act. For one thing, in the case before us, the law had always been the same and nothing new was brought in by the Amendment Act of 1956 with regard to whole inam villages are concerned. Not only that, in the above case it is by way of review the previous order was modified. But that is not the case here. The Assistant Settlement Officer took up fresh enquiry into the matter and the question, which we are dealing, is whether that enquiry is a valid one or not. In the end, we allow the Writ Appeal and declare that the Assistant Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to hold a fresh enquiry into the question whether the village is an 'inam estate' or not as the order passed by the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram, in the previous enquiry in AS.No.18 of 1952 had become final and binding on the parties." (c) The learned single judge, in the impugned order, while dealing with Writ Petition No.6194 of 1992, has noticed the decision of the Division Bench in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra), which has attained finality inter parties. 12. 12. Sri M.Chandra Shekar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the tenants in both the appeals, has referred to the said Explanation 1-A and has tried to justify the decision of the learned single judge in Writ Petition No.1188 of 1962, which was subject matter of the Division Bench decision in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra), and has pointed out certain circumstances, including that the learned single Judge earlier had followed the judgment of the Division Bench in K. Adinarayana v. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada, and that later, the Division Bench in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra) committed an error in reversing the said judgment of the learned single judge. He also placed reliance upon the Tenancy laws of the State vis-a-vis the aims and objects of the Amendment Act XXXV of 1956 and laid stress on the object of the amendment to give benefit to all the ryots in respect of inam estate of whole village whether confirmed under one title deed or different title deeds and also in respect of hamlets and khandrigas. 13. The aforesaid contentions, we are afraid, cannot be upheld in view of the fact that the judgment of the Division Bench in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra) has attained finality and the parties in the present proceedings are bound by the same, as their predecessors-in-interest were parties to the aforesaid decision. 14. The Explanation 1-A was specifically considered by the Division Bench in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra) and they have recorded a finding that nothing new has been brought about by introduction of the said amendment and as such, the earlier enquiry resting with decision of Estates Abolition Tribunal in AS.No.18 of 1952 holding that the village is not an estate as defined under the Act, cannot be enquired into afresh. So far as holding of subsequent enquiry on the very same question by the Assistant Settlement Officer is concerned, the same was held to be without jurisdiction. In view of the Tribunal's decision in A.S.No.18 of 1952 having attained finality, the said aspect, including the contention that the said decision of the Division Bench in P.V. Chaudary's case (1 supra) is not binding cannot be allowed to be contended in the present appeals. 15. In view of the Tribunal's decision in A.S.No.18 of 1952 having attained finality, the said aspect, including the contention that the said decision of the Division Bench in P.V. Chaudary's case (1 supra) is not binding cannot be allowed to be contended in the present appeals. 15. In fact, the learned single judge in the present case did not consider the said aspect and did not rest his decision on it and he was also of the view that sitting single, he cannot adjudicate on the said aspect. 16. It cannot be denied that the judgment of the Division Bench in P.V. Chaudary's case (1 supra) is conclusive to the extent of holding that the village in question is not an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act. Even assuming that contention of Mr. Chandra Shekar Rao, on correctness of decision in P.V. Chaudary's case (1 supra), as sustainable; it is well settled that even a wrong decision rendered by a Court having jurisdiction interparties is binding on the parties. 17. The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumafl held as follows: - Before proceeding with these arguments in detail, we can dispose of second contention very shortly. This argument proceeds on a fundamental misconception, as it seeks to equate an incorrect decision with a decision rendered without jurisdiction. A wrong decision by a court having Jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. The learned judges of the High Court who rendered the decision on 04.04.1952 had ample jurisdiction to decide the case and the fact that their decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from the later judgment at this Court, does not render it any the less final and binding between the parties before the Court. There is, thus, no substance in this contention. The decision of the High Court dated 04.04.1952 bound the parties and its legal effect remained the same whether the reasons for the decision be sound or not. Further, while dealing with principles of res judicata, the Supreme Court held in Y.B. Patii v. Y.L. Patif, held as follows: - "In appeal before us Mr. The decision of the High Court dated 04.04.1952 bound the parties and its legal effect remained the same whether the reasons for the decision be sound or not. Further, while dealing with principles of res judicata, the Supreme Court held in Y.B. Patii v. Y.L. Patif, held as follows: - "In appeal before us Mr. Gupta on behalf of the appellants has contended that the High Court was in error in not interfering with the order of the Tribunal whereby the revision petition filed by the appellants had been dismissed. It is urged that the Tribunal in affirming the findings of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner regarding the question of the appellants being strangers qua the land in dispute took a very restricted view of Section 79 of the Act dealing with revision. This contention in our opinion, is not well founded. The High Court at the time of the decision of the earlier writ petition on December 18, 1964 recorded a finding and gave directions to the Tribunal not to reopen the questions of fact in revision. The Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967 complied with those directions of the High Court. The appellants are bound by the judgment of the High Court and it is not open to them to go behind that judgment in this appeal. No appeal was filed against that judgment and it has become final. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course at a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. In view at the High Court judgment dated December 18,1964, the Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967, disposing of the revision petition filed by the appellant, could not reopen the question of fact which had been decided by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding in the judgment under appeal that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be set aside in the writ petition. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs." 18. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding in the judgment under appeal that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be set aside in the writ petition. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs." 18. In view of the said position, therefore, the primary contention of the learned counsel for the respondents in once again seeking adjudication on the very same question-as to whether the village in question is an estate or not has to be rejected as it is barred by principles of res judicata. 19. The only other question now survives for consideration is whether the impugned notification issued under Form II of Inams Abolition Act is valid and is in accordance with the Rules requiring the enquiry by the Tahsildar under the provisions of sub-sec.(3) of Section 3 of Inams Abolition Act? 20. For the sake of convenience, Section 3 of the AP. (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act is extracted hereunder: - Determination of inam lands: (1) As soon as may be, after the commencement of this Act, the Tahsildar may suo motu and share on application enquire and determine- (i) whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is an inam land; (ii) whether such inam land is in ryotwari, zamindari or inam village; (iii) whether such inam land is held by any institution. (2) Before holding such an enquiry, Tahsildar shall cause to be published in the village or town where the inam lands are situate a notice in the prescribed manner requiring every person or institution claiming an interest in any such inam land, to file before him, a statement of particulars in respect of items (i), (ii) and (iii) in subsection (1) within the prescribed time. (3) The Tahsildar shall thereafter give the persons or institutions concerned a reasonable opportunity of adducing any evidence I support of their cases and may also examine any relevant document in the possession of the Government and give his decision in writing in regard to items (i), (ii) and (iii) in sub-section (i) and communicate the decision to the persons or institutions concerned. [the words "by registered post" were omitted by Section 3 of the Amendment Act iii of 1960). [the words "by registered post" were omitted by Section 3 of the Amendment Act iii of 1960). (4) Any person or institution aggrieved by a decision of the Tahsildar under sub-section (3), may appeal to the Revenue Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision'[ ] and the Revenue Court may after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit. (5) The decision of the Revenue Court under sub-section (4), and in case no appeal is filed, the decision of the Tahsildar under sub-section (3) shall be final. (6) Every decision of the Revenue Court under sub-section (4) and if no appeal is filed within the period specified in sub-section (4) every decision of the Tahsildar under sub-section (3), shall as soon as possible, be published in the District Gazette, and in such other manner as may be prescribed. (7) Every decision of the Revenue Court, and subject to such decision, every decision of the Tahsildar under this section, shall be binding on all persons and institutions claiming an interest In any such inam land, not with standing that such persons or institutions have not filed any application or statement, or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Tahsildar or the Revenue Court, as the case may be" 21. One of the contentions which was raised before the learned single Judge and which has be8n upheld is that the impugned notification has been issued on 21.09.1989 i.e., beyond a reasonable time and is also nol:1 conformity with Section 3 (3) of the Inams Abolition Act, as extracted above. 22. It is evident from the chronology of events, referred to above, that the amendment by insertion of Explanation 1-A was added and thereafter, a suo motu fresh enquiry under the said Estates Abolition Act was taken up by the Assistant Settlement Officer and was decided by his order, dated 09.03.1959. Against it, an appeal was preferred by the land holders before the Tribunal and subsequently, a writ petition was filed before a learned single Judge and finally, under judgment, dated 11.08.1972, of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.40 of 1969, the said suo motu fresh enquiry was held to be without jurisdiction. 23. Against it, an appeal was preferred by the land holders before the Tribunal and subsequently, a writ petition was filed before a learned single Judge and finally, under judgment, dated 11.08.1972, of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.40 of 1969, the said suo motu fresh enquiry was held to be without jurisdiction. 23. The contention that the present notification has been issued after 17 years therefrom and thereby, it is beyond a reasonable time was found in favour of the tenants by the learned single Judge. 24. In the counter filed by the Mandai Revenue Officer, in the writ petition, before the learned single judge, It has been contended that the proceedings remained pending up to 1972 on the question whether fresh enquiry under the Madras Estates Land Act is permissible or not. 25. The requirement under Section 3 of Inams Abolition Act contemplates that as soon as may be, after the commencement of the Act, the Tahsildar may suo motu or on an application enquire and determine as to whether a particular land in his jurisdiction I is an inam land or not? 26. The earlier proceedings having concluded by the decision of the Division Bench in 1972, the present notification under the Inams Abolition Act has been issued by the Tahsildar. The object of the Inams Abolition Act being to abolish the inams and conversion of inams into ryotwari lands, the statutory intendment of applying the said Act cannot be frustrated merely on the ground that there is some delay in publication of notification. The said contention of the tenants, as accepted by the learned single judge, would amount to holding that because there was a delay in issuance of notification, the very abolition of inams and conversion of inams into ryotwari lands would stand frustrated so far as the village in question is concerned. 27. The provisions of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act do not contemplate any time limit but the legislature has merely used the word "as soon as may be". 27. The provisions of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act do not contemplate any time limit but the legislature has merely used the word "as soon as may be". It is not disputed that the litigation under the Madras Estates Land Act was pending upto 1972 i.e., till it was decided by Division Bench of this Court and hence, it cannot be said that there is a delay between the period 1956 (when the Inams Abolition Act came into force) and the decision of the Division Bench in P.V. Choudary's case (1 supra) in 1972 under the Madras Estates Land Act. Subsequently, though a period of 17 years has elapsed before the notification is issued, it cannot be said that mere delay would render the Inams Abolition Act inapplicable and would permanently shut out the said Act from being applicable for the village in question. 28. Learned single judge in Writ Petition No.6194 of 1992 has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab (AI R 1952 SC 350) (5 infra), Keshav Nilakanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay ( AIR 1957 SC 28 ) (6 infra), State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) (7 infra) for the purpose of construing the expression 'reasonable time' and came to hold that the impugned notification is beyond reasonable time and consequently, quashed the same. 29. The decision relied upon by the learned single judge in Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab5 was a case dealing with preventive detention and while construing the provisions of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, the expression "as soon as may be" was construed by the Supreme Court at para 9 of the judgment, which reads as follows: - The Act does not fix the time within which the grounds should be furnished to the person detained. It merely states that the communication must be "as soon as may be". This means reasonable dispatch and what is reasonable must depend on the facts of each case. No arbitrary time limit can be set down. It merely states that the communication must be "as soon as may be". This means reasonable dispatch and what is reasonable must depend on the facts of each case. No arbitrary time limit can be set down. The delays in the communication of the grounds in the two petitions have been adequately explained by the Home Secretary who says in his affidavits that grounds had to be supplied to nearly 250 detenus and that the printing of the necessary forms occupied some time. According to him, he made an order even on 11.03.1950 for the supply of the grounds." 30. Similarly, the decision in K.N. Joglekar v. Commr of Police" is also a case under the Preventive Detention Act and the expression "forthwith" used in Section 7 of the said Act fell for consideration. In fact, in para 11 of the said decision, a clear distinction is made between the words "forthwith" and "as soon as may be". While the former is interpreted to mean that of reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay and expedition, but, so far as the words "as soon as may be" is concerned, the Supreme Court Interpreted the said words by its very nature, be indefinite depending upon the facts and circumstance of the case and the explanation is not to be equated with the verb "forthwith". In para 10 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows: - "We agree that "forthwith" In S.3 (3) cannot mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in S.7, and that the former is more peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expressions lies, in our opinion, In this that while under S.7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under S.3 (3) what is allowed is only the period during which he could not, without any fault of his own, send the report." 31. The third decision relied upon by the learned single judge in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, is a case where the revisional power of the Commissioner under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which did not have any prescribed time limit, fell for consideration and it was held that it is to be exercised within a reasonable time. The third decision relied upon by the learned single judge in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, is a case where the revisional power of the Commissioner under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which did not have any prescribed time limit, fell for consideration and it was held that it is to be exercised within a reasonable time. The said expression "reasonable time" was discussed in para 11, which reads as follows: - "The question arises whether the commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised." 32. The present case, however, stands on an entirely different footing as it is neither a case of preventive detention nor a case of exercising revisional power, but it is a case where statute of an agrarian reform is applied to a village by issuance of notification, particularly after settlement of the dispute between the parties as to whether the village in question is an estate or an inam. Therefore, the expression "as soon as may be" used in Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, has to be appreciated and interpreted in tile context of the object of the said Act and the over all circumstances evident from the records of the present case. 33. It is to be appreciated that in none of the above cases, notification bringing into force the effect of a Statute was in question. Thus, as stated above, the impugned notification was issued to bring into force the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. In fact, the tenants themselves approached this Court after almost three years of the said notification. The words “as soon as may be” used under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act and "reasonable time" as construed by the learned single judge in the said writ petition cannot be stretched to an extent as to insulate the village in question from the applicability of the Inams Abolition Act. The words “as soon as may be” used under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act and "reasonable time" as construed by the learned single judge in the said writ petition cannot be stretched to an extent as to insulate the village in question from the applicability of the Inams Abolition Act. The non-issuance of notification may be on account of various administrative reasons, but, that by itself would not frustrate the Inams Abolition Act from being applied to a land, which is otherwise an inam land within the meaning of the Inams Abolition Act. 34. By issuance of a notification enquiry into conversion of Inam land into ryotwari tenure would be taken up as contemplated under the Act. In other words, therefore, the agrarian reform envisaged under Inams Abolition Act would get implemented after the notification under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act is issued. The question, therefore, is as to whether the delay in issuing such notification would debar the State from applying the said Abolition Act to the village concerned. The act of issuing notification for the purpose of initiating the ryotwari settlement, therefore, cannot be said to be either administrative or a quasi-judicial function but is in the nature of a legislative function whereby from the date of issuance of notification, ryotwari settlement would be taken up. The issuance of the notification regarding a particular inam land is, therefore, sine qua non for operating the other provisions of the Abolition Act which deals with conversion of inam land into ryotwari lands. The entire ryotwari settlement, as contemplated under the Acts, therefore, takes place after the notification. The invalidation of the notification on the ground of delay would, therefore, result in frustration of all the provisions relating to conversion of inam land into ryotwari land and would defeat the very object and purpose of the Act. The rules of natural justice or the delay in publishing the notification etc. therefore, do not apply to such act of issuance of notification and consequently, such notification, even if issued after a considerable length of time, cannot be invalidated on the ground of delay. In this context it is useful to refer to the following decisions of the Supreme Court: State of Punjab v. Tehat Singh and other. Paras 6, 7 and part of para 8 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder: "6. In this context it is useful to refer to the following decisions of the Supreme Court: State of Punjab v. Tehat Singh and other. Paras 6, 7 and part of para 8 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder: "6. In Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra [ (1981) 2 SCC 722 ] it was held that making of a declaration by notification that certain place shall be the principal market yard for a market Area under tile relevant Agricultural Produce Market Act was an act legislative in character. In Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [(1987) 2 see 720] this Court while making distinction between legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial held thus: (SCC pp.735-36, para 7) "'A legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases; as administrative act is the making and issue of a specific direction or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy'. 'Legislation in the process of formulating a general rule of conduct without reference to particular cases and usually operating in future; administration is the process of performing particular acts, of issuing particular orders or of making decisions which apply general rules to particular cases.' It has also been said: 'Rule-making is normally directed toward the formulation of requirements having a general application to all members of a broadly identifiable class' while,' an adjudication, on the other hand, applies to specific individuals or situations.' But, this is only a broad distinction, not necessarily always true. Administration and administrative adjudication may also be of general application and there may be legislation of particular application only. That is not ruled out. Again, adjudication determines past and present facts and declares rights and liabilities while legislation indicates the future course of action. Adjudication is determinative of the past and the present while legislation is indicative of the future. The object of the rule, the reach of its application, the rights and obligations arising out of it, its intended effect on past, present and future events, its form, the manner of its promulgation are some factors which may help in drawing the line between legislative and non-legislative acts." 7. The object of the rule, the reach of its application, the rights and obligations arising out of it, its intended effect on past, present and future events, its form, the manner of its promulgation are some factors which may help in drawing the line between legislative and non-legislative acts." 7. The principles of law that emerge from the aforesaid decisions are: (1) where provisions of a statute provide for the legislative activity i.e. making of a legislative instrument or promulgation of general rule of conduct or a declaration by a notification by the Government that certain place or area shall be part of a Gram Sabha and on issue of such a declaration certain other statutory provisions come into action forthwith which provide for certain consequences; (2) where the power to be exercised by the Government under provisions of a statute does not concern with the interest of an individual and it relates to public in general or concerns with a general direction of a general character and not directed against an individual or to a particular situation; and (3) lay down future course of actions, the same is generally held to be legislative in character. 8. Viewed in the light of the statement of law stated hereinbefore, we find that the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act which provide for declaring territorial area of a Gram Sabha for that area do not concern with the interest of an individual citizen or a particular resident of that area. Declaration contemplated under Section 3 of the Act relates to an area inhabited by the residents which is sought to be excluded or included in a Gram Sabha. The declaration under Section 3 of the Act by the Government is general in character and not directed to a particular resident of that area. Further, the declarations so made under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act do not operate for the past transactions but for future situations. The declaration under Section 3 of the Act by the Government is general in character and not directed to a particular resident of that area. Further, the declarations so made under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act do not operate for the past transactions but for future situations. Under the aforesaid situation, when declarations by issued of notifications by the Government are made under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act respectively, determining the territorial area of a Gram Sabha and establishing a Gram Sabha for that area, such declarations become operative at once." The Supreme Court considered and interpreted the words 'as soon as' in the context of Motor Vehicles Act in the case of General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh, para 8 is relevant thereof, which is extracted hereunder: "8. Use of the expression 'as soon as' implies that there has to be promptitude in action. To do a thing 'as soon as possible' means to do it within a reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time. [Per Dysant, J. in King's Old County Ltd. v. Liquid Carbonic Can. Corporation Ltd. (1942) 2 WWR 603]. 'As and when' and 'as soon as' are almost synonymous. Whenever these expressions are used in respect of time and place, they denote 9. 2007 (5) SCJ 397 = AIR 2007 SC 2696 = 2008 (2) ALT 5.1 (DNSC). contemporaneous notion. '.As soon as' and 'forthwith' both are to be normally understood as allowing reasonable time, but latter is more peremptory than the former. But urgency is the hallmark of both expressions. Expression 'as soon as' may be stretched to mean 'as soon as' practicable. It has to be forwarded with promptitude." In view of the above, therefore, the invalidation of the impugned notification on the ground of delay, as done by the learned single Judge, is not sustainable. 35. The last submission made by Sri M. Chandra Shekar Rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants, is that the procedure prescribed under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act has not been followed by the Tahsildar and that the Tahsildar has straightway issued the impugned notification without holding any enquiry. 35. The last submission made by Sri M. Chandra Shekar Rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants, is that the procedure prescribed under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act has not been followed by the Tahsildar and that the Tahsildar has straightway issued the impugned notification without holding any enquiry. Though the official respondents have denied the same and claimed that after publication by 'tom tom' and after following the procedure, the Tahsildar had issued the said notification, we find some substance in the said contention of Sri M. Chandra Shekar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the tenants. 36. Sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, as extracted above, stipulates that the Tahsildar, shall, before holding such enquiry, cause to be published in the village, where such inam land is situated requiring every person or institution claiming interest in such land, to file before him a statement of particulars as required under sub-clause (1). Under sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, the Tahsildar shall give the person or Institution reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence and give his decision in Writing and communicate the same. Under sub-clause (4), a right of appeal is given to any person or institution aggrieved by the decision of the Tahsildar under Section 3 of the Act and it is only under sub-clause (6) that such decision of the Tahsildar subject to orders of appellate authority is published in the District Gazette. 37. We find from the record that straightaway notification referable to sub-clause (6) is published in the District Gazette and they appear to be not preceded by any detailed enquiry under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, briefly referred to above. 38. In the circumstances, therefore, we are of the opinion that the said impugned notification, if treated as a preliminary notification, under sub-clause (1) of Section 3 of the Act, and if adequate opportunity is given to the tenants and any other person or institution interested in the inam land to file objections, the interest of Justice would be served rather than quashing the notification altogether. Both the appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed and they are accordingly allowed and the impugned Judgment of the learned single judge is set aside. Both the appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed and they are accordingly allowed and the impugned Judgment of the learned single judge is set aside. Consequently, the impugned notification published by the Tahsildar In the District Gazette, dated 21.09.1989, shall be treated as notice under sub-clause (1) of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act and the Tahsildar shall follow the further procedure under Section 3 (2) and (3) of the Inams Abolition Act and subject to appeal, if any, shall publish a final notification under sub-clause (6) of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act and act accordingly, thereafter, as per law. However, there shall be no order as to costs.