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2008 DIGILAW 310 (CAL)

Nilmoni Mukherjee v. Asim Kumar Chattopadhyay

2008-03-19

S.K.GUPTA

body2008
Judgment :- (1.) BOTH the revisional applications were directed to be heard analogously by the order dated 29.11.2007. (2.) THE fact leading to the filing of these revisional applications is that in both the cases the opposite parties entered into an agreement with the petitioners for purchase of flats at Ananya Complex, 309, B. T. Road, Kolkata -700 036 measuring about 1900 square feet along with a motor garage of 150 square feet area. The consideration money was fixed at Rs. 12 lakhs. The vendors agreed to deliver possession of the finished flats to the purchasers, who are the opposite parties herein, within six months from the date of such agreement but not later than 31. 3. 2001. In the agreements details about the rights and obligations of both the parties were clearly mentioned. (3.) IN spite of such agreements, the flats in question were not completed within the stipulated time and till 15.12.2002 possession of the flats were not delivered enough, the purchasers made major part of the payment of the consideration money through the Bank. Said Bank wrote a letter on 24.12.2001 to the sellers/promoters for giving possession to the purchasers and for handing over the title deeds to them, as no security could be given in favour of the Bank till that date. The promoters/petitioners took a plea that the flats could not be completed within the prescribed time limit due to unavoidable circumstances and they also undertook to complete the flats at an early date and also to register the sale deeds by middle of February, 2002 and thereby undertook to handover the title deeds to the Bank. (4.) AS in spite of that, the promoters/petitioners failed to handover the possession of the flats to the opposite parties/purchasers, a letter was written on 28.2.2002 by the purchasers through their solicitors. Simultaneously the Bank also issued reminder to the vendors/petitioners. In spite of that, no concrete step was taken by the petitioners/vendors in that respect. (5.) SUBSEQUENTLY, the purchasers/opposite parties, on enquiry, came to know that the vacant land appertaining to the building was declared as excess land by the Government and as per the provisions of the land ceiling Act, an exemption was granted to the owners on conditions that no construction would be raised thereon and the land would not be transferred without the formal sanction of the State Government. The promoters/petitioners did not divulge this fact to the purchasers/opposite parties at the time of execution of the agreement. The purchasers then wrote letters of complaint to the various authorities informing them the conduct of the promoters/petitioners. Ultimately, possession of the flats was given in favour of the opposite parties/purchasers on 15.12.2002 without installing the lift and without constructing the motor garage with a motorable gate and thereby clearly violated the terms of the agreement. They also failed to execute and register the conveyance deed in favour of the purchasers. The Baranagar Municipality, being informed about the matter, took positive steps and granted permission for construction of the motorable gate at the southern side of Premises No: 209, B. T. Road. When the matter was taken to the High Court, an order was passed allowing the purchasers/opposite parties to construct such gate at the site question strictly in terms of the permission granted by the Baranagar Municipality. On the basis of such permission the purchasers/opposite parties constructed a motorable gate on 20.3.2004. (6.) THE purchasers made part payment out of the total consideration money, as was agreed in between the parties, in favour of the promoters/ petitioners. They were always ready to pay the balance amount in favour of the vendors/promoters/petitioners on completion of the flats in all respects and also after the registration of the deeds in their favour. (7.) AS the vendors/petitioners failed to take any step in fulfilment of the terms of the agreements, as was agreed between the parties, so finding no other alternative, the purchasers/opposite parties filed complaints before the Consumer Court praying for several reliefs including compensation for delayed possession of flats, compensation for not providing any lift, cost of installation of motorable gate, compensation for not registering the deed of conveyances and some other reliefs. (8.) THE petitioners/vendors contested the said case before the Forum by filing written objection denying the allegations, as made in the said complaints on the material points. That apart it was also claimed by the vendors/petitioners that the case was not maintainable before the consumer Court. In the meantime there was an order passed by the High court in its judgment dated 30.3.2001 in W. P. No. 6340 (W) of 2004 whereby a direction was given upon the Consumer Court to decide the question of maintainability of this case first as a preliminary point. In the meantime there was an order passed by the High court in its judgment dated 30.3.2001 in W. P. No. 6340 (W) of 2004 whereby a direction was given upon the Consumer Court to decide the question of maintainability of this case first as a preliminary point. On the basis of such direction, the State Consumer Forum heard the submissions of both the parties in that respect and thereafter, by its impugned judgment dated 19.6.2006, was of the opinion that the complaint, as filed before it by the purchasers/opposite parties, was maintainable in that forum and thereby rejected the contentions of the vendors/petitioners. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order of the State Commission, these revisional applications were filed as per the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (9.) MR. Sadhan Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the opposite parties, at the very outset, submitted that the revisional applications are not maintainable in this Court, as there is clear provisions of appeal in the consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). In this respect he has drawn my attention to the provisions of Section 19 of the said Act, wherein it has been provided as follows: - "section 19. Appeals.-Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 7 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed: provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period: [provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent of the amount or rupees thirty five thousand, whichever is less.] (10) HE also drew my attention to the provisions of Section 17 of the said Act, wherefrom it appears that any order passed by a Consumer Forum is appellable. Section 24 of the said Act provides for the finality of the order passed by a Consumer Forum when no appeal is preferred. Section 24 of the said Act provides as follows: -"every order of a District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Act, be final. " In view of such provision, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the opposite parties, argued that since no appeal has been preferred against the impugned order, so the present revisional applications, as preferred by the petitioners, are not maintainable. In support of his contention, he has cited decisions reported in 1995 (2) CLJ 218 (Biswabharati v. Smt. Rakhi Debnath and Ors.) wherein the learned single Judge of this Court observed "the provisions clearly direct that there is an appeal against the order of the District Forum before the State Commission. Even after the decision of the State commission, the aggrieved party may prefer revision before the national Commission and the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked in an appropriate case. Under Section 21 Clause B of the Act. Therefore, when there is alternative remedy available to an aggrieved party, without exhausting that remedy, ordinarily, he should not be allowed to raise disputed question of facts by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of india". (11.) MR. Roy Chowdhury further relied upon the decision reported in 1995 (1) CLJ 124 (United Bank of India v. Hirak Mukherjee and Ors.) In support of his contention. In the said decision the learned Division Bench of this court observed "where alternative remedy is a suitable solution available on the terms of the statute itself, the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by way of writ petition may not be appropriate and proper. Consumer Protection Act is self-contained Code making appropriate, provisions for rectification or correction of the grievances which could have been raised in this writ petition before the trial forum or the appellate forum". By making such Observation the Division bench directed the petitioner of that case to approach the National commission and to raise all questions of law and facts Same principle was also decided in the case reported in 1995 (1) CLJ 139 (Biswanath @ Deb kumar Pathak v. Shyamal Kumar Pathak and Ors.). By making such Observation the Division bench directed the petitioner of that case to approach the National commission and to raise all questions of law and facts Same principle was also decided in the case reported in 1995 (1) CLJ 139 (Biswanath @ Deb kumar Pathak v. Shyamal Kumar Pathak and Ors.). (12.) AS such, from the ratio, as decided in the decisions quoted above, it is palpably clear that it is now the settled position of law that when there is an alternative remedy available in an alternative forum, as provided in the Act, then an aggrieved party should not be allowed to approach the High Court by way of filing a revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of india. Under such circumstances, I fully agree with Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the present revisional applications are not maintainable in the High Court, as there is an alternative forum available to agitate the grievance of the petitioners. (13.) BUT, Mr. Saktinath Mukherji, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners in both the revisional applications argued that so far as these revisional applications are concerned, it is not the case of the petitioners that the legality of the impugned orders of the State Commission was only under challenge. According to him the main ground for approaching the high Court as per provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is the matter of jurisdiction for the Consumer Forum/state Commission to entertain the complaint, as filed by the opposite parties. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the allegations that have been put forward in the petition of complaint before the State Commission for adjudication, are beyond the scope of the State Commission and, as such, the State Commission was not at all justified in holding that the complaints were very much maintainable before it. Mr. Mukherjee argued that the State Commission was totally wrong in coming to such a decision. A bare reading of the complaint petitions, as submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, would reveal that the points that were raised in the complaint petitions require elaborate evidence to be adduced by the parties and the Consumer Court being created for summary disposal of complaint of a party cannot decide these complicated questions of fact without recording evidence from the parties. A bare reading of the complaint petitions, as submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, would reveal that the points that were raised in the complaint petitions require elaborate evidence to be adduced by the parties and the Consumer Court being created for summary disposal of complaint of a party cannot decide these complicated questions of fact without recording evidence from the parties. According to him, under such a situation, the State Commission should have referred the matter to the regular Civil Court for appropriate adjudication of the disputes, as raised in between the parties. In support of his contention, mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners cited decisions reported in AIR 1960 SC 1156 (The Printers Mysore Private Ltd. v. Pothan joseph); 2002 (2) SCC 1 (Synco Industries v. State of Bank of Bikaner and jaipur and Ors.); 2004 (13) SCC 656 (Trai Foods Ltd. v. National Insurance co. and Ors. ; 2005 (11) SCC 447 ; (Development Credit Bank Ltd. v. CCI chambers Co-op. Housing Society Ltd.); 2006 (7) SCC 655 (Oriental insurance Co. Ltd. v. Munimahesh Patel); 2003 (6) SCC 675 (Surya Dev rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors.); 2004 (4) SCC 785 (Shail (Smt.) v. Manoj kumar and Ors.); 2005 (7) SCC 211 (Atma Ram v. Shakuntala Rani); 2006 (3) SCC 312 (Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Anr. v. Praveen Kumar Singh) and 2006 (8) SCC 294 (Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab). (14.) MR. Mukherjee argued that the High Court has power to consider the question of jurisdiction and in support of his contention he cited decision reported in 2003 (6) SCC 675 (supra). There cannot be any dispute in respect of this legal position that the High Court has superintending jurisdiction to look into the functioning of all the Lower Courts/tribunals subordinate to it. Normally a revisional power is given under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. But the High Court has been given wide power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in addition to the said revisional power. But, the fact which was under consideration before the Apex Court in the above decision is, in my considered opinion, not applicable so far as this hearing is concerned. But the High Court has been given wide power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in addition to the said revisional power. But, the fact which was under consideration before the Apex Court in the above decision is, in my considered opinion, not applicable so far as this hearing is concerned. There, the revisional power under Section 115 of the code of Civil Procedure vis-a-vis the power given to the High Court under articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India were under consideration and it was decided that in view of the amendment of Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure when a party is not in a position to seek relief by way of filing revision, he can always file a revisional application by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But so far as the present case is concerned, it appears that the fact is totally different and I have already pointed out that the alternative remedy, as provided in the said Act was not availed of and as such, without availing such remedy, as provided in the said Act, it is not permissible for a party to invoke the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court, as provided under article 227 of the Constitution of India. So this decision, as cited by mr. Mukherjee, in support of his contention, is not of much help for the point, as raised by him in these revisional applications. (15.) BY citing in decision reported in 2004 (4) SCC 785 (supra), the learned advocate for the petitioners argued that the High Court can always give directions by way of guiding the inferior Courts and also has jurisdiction itself to pass such a direction or directions as the inferior Court or Tribunal should have made. It has already been pointed out that the question of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not disputed. There cannot be any doubt that the High Court has always power to look into the functioning of the subordinate Courts by way of superintendence. But so far as the decision of the Apex Court is concerned, it appears that it was passed in connection with a criminal matter and the High Court Interfered with the said proceeding, as the manner in which the Criminal Court proceeded was not proper. But so far as the decision of the Apex Court is concerned, it appears that it was passed in connection with a criminal matter and the High Court Interfered with the said proceeding, as the manner in which the Criminal Court proceeded was not proper. So it appears that the fact of that case is totally different with that of the present case. Learned Advocate for the petitioners argued that since the State commission failed to appreciate that the dispute, as was pending before that Commission, was not within the purview of the said Act, so the High court should interfere with the matter by exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The question as to whether the State commission improperly refused to refer the dispute in between the parties to the Civil Court will be considered by this Court at a later stage of this discussion. The fact remains the State Commission passed an order to the effect that it had jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and against that there is provision for appeal in the said Act itself and it was not availed of by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, I am unable to accept this contention that for that reason only the High Court should exercise its power under article 227 of the Constitution of India so far as the impugned order is concerned. That apart, in the decision referred to above, the Apex Court clearly observed that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be exercised sparingly and with care and caution. In my considered opinion the present case is not of such a nature inviting the high Court to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of india. So this decision is also of no help to the petitioners. (16.) MR. Mukherjee also cited a decision reported in 2005 (7) SCC 211 (supra). In the said decision it was observed by the Apex Court that in case of serious error in law the High Court can always interfere in exercise of the power given under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (16.) MR. Mukherjee also cited a decision reported in 2005 (7) SCC 211 (supra). In the said decision it was observed by the Apex Court that in case of serious error in law the High Court can always interfere in exercise of the power given under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But so far as the present matter is concerned, it has already been pointed out that an order was passed by the State Commission arid although an appellate forum is provided in the said Act itself, no such step was taken by the petitioners and instead they have filed these revisional applications seeking interference of the High Court, as provided under Article 227 of the constitution of India. It appears from the impugned order that the State commission was of the opinion that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute in between the parties. Such view of the State Commission may be correct or may be wrong and that can be decided after full-fledged hearing. The Commission had certainly jurisdiction to pass such an order. It cannot be said that by passing such an order the Commission committed serious error in law inviting the interference the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Legality of the impugned order can always be challenged before the Appellate Forum. As such, this decision cannot, under any circumstance, be of any help to the petitioners. (17.) MR. Mukherjee further cited a decision reported in 2006 (3) SCC 312 (supra) in order to establish his claim that the High Court has always jurisdiction to interfere with an order of any subordinate Court/tribunal in order to correct the errors of jurisdiction, as taken by the subordinate Court/ tribunal. In my foregoing discussion I have already discussed the matter. Be that as it may, so far as this decision is concerned, it was held by the apex Court that High Court can always invoke the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in order to correct any error by subordinate court/tribunal in usurping jurisdiction wrongly. In my foregoing discussion I have already discussed the matter. Be that as it may, so far as this decision is concerned, it was held by the apex Court that High Court can always invoke the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in order to correct any error by subordinate court/tribunal in usurping jurisdiction wrongly. It is needless to repeat that this question is proposed to be considered by this Court at a later stage as to whether it was proper on the part of the State Commission to take up the responsibility of adjudicating the dispute in between the parties itself instead of referring the matter to the Civil Court. If at that stage it is found that the dispute in between the parties could not be adjudicated by the State Commission on the basis of provisions of the. said Act and it would be the sole jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the said dispute, then and then only the question of error in invoking the jurisdiction will come into play. Unless and until there is any such finding, I do not think that any order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be passed by this Court holding that the State Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in between the parties, as claimed by the learned advocate for the petitioners. (18.) MR. Mukherjee further cited a decision reported in 2006 (8) SCC 294 (supra) in order to establish his contention that the High Court has power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with any proceeding of any Courts subordinate to it in case it was found that the courts subordinate to it was following a wrong procedure and has illegally exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it. In my above discussion, I have already pointed out that whether there was any illegality in the order of the State Commission to invoke jurisdiction in deciding the dispute in between the parties properly or not, that can only be considered after discussing the claim, as put forward before the State Commission by the petitioners. In my above discussion, I have already pointed out that whether there was any illegality in the order of the State Commission to invoke jurisdiction in deciding the dispute in between the parties properly or not, that can only be considered after discussing the claim, as put forward before the State Commission by the petitioners. There cannot be any doubt that the High Court has always power to exercise its jurisdiction, as given under Article 227 of the constitution of India in case there is any glaring defect in the procedure followed by the Courts below or in case there is any illegal usurpation of jurisdiction by those Courts. (19.) BE that as it may, from the decisions, as discussed above, it is clear that it is always open for the High Court to interfere with any proceeding of any Court/tribunal subordinate to it in case it is brought to the notice of the High Court that the Courts/tribunals subordinate to it are following a wrong procedure in conducting a particular case or that the court/tribunal illegally exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it to decide the dispute in between the parties. So far as these revisional applications are concerned, if it is proved that the State Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, as agitated before it by the complainant, then and then only the question of interference by the High Court, as provided under article 227 of the Constitution of India will arise. Let us now see as to whether the State Commission was competent to entertain the dispute, as put forward by the complainant as per provisions of the said Act. (20.) MR. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners argued that the disputes, as made out in the complaint petitions can only be decided by a competent Civil Court and not in a summary way by invoking the jurisdiction of the State Commission under the said Act. According to him, said Act was introduced by the legislature with the intention to settle the dispute in between the parties summarily and in speedy way. But so far as the present complaints are concerned, Mr. According to him, said Act was introduced by the legislature with the intention to settle the dispute in between the parties summarily and in speedy way. But so far as the present complaints are concerned, Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that those disputes require elaborate evidence to be adduced by the parties and then and then only those disputes can be resolved and for this purpose the Civil Court is the only proper forum for settling the dispute in between the parties. In support of his contention, Mr. Mukherjee argued that in the complaint petitions it has been alleged that the petitioners were guilty of committing fraud by not disclosing the material facts to the complainant/ opposite parties at the time of execution of the agreements and thereby misled them intentionally. In this respect he has pointed out to the complaint petitions where it has been stated that it was not disclosed by the petitioners/vendors at the time of execution of the agreement that some portions of the land in question was vested to the State and no construction could be made thereon as directed by the Government. True it is that this allegation was made in the petition of complaint. But nowhere it has been stated that the petitioners/vendors were guilty of committing fraud. Whether non-disclosure of the said material fact would make the petitioners/vendors liable to pay the compensation would be decided by the State Commission at a proper stage and for this purpose oral evidence is required. The State commission also, in the impugned order, observed to the effect that the allegation of fraud was not there in the petitions of complaint. As such, i am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that since the question of fraud can only to be decided by the civil Court, the State Commission cannot entertain such a complaint in order to resolve the said dispute in between the parties. In this respect the decision cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner being AIR 1960 SC 1156 (supra) is not applicable so far as this hearing is concerned. In this respect the decision cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner being AIR 1960 SC 1156 (supra) is not applicable so far as this hearing is concerned. True if is, in the said decision it was observed by the Apex Court to the effect that in case of deciding an allegation of fraud or dishonesty against a party, it is open to the party whose character is impeached to claim that he should be given an opportunity to vindicate its character in an open trial before the Court rather than before the domestic Tribunal. But, I have already pointed out that on perusal of the complaint petitions, it does not reveal that any direct allegation of fraud is made therein. The allegations, as made in the complaint petitions, can always be taken care of by the state Commission and for that it is not necessary to thrash out the matter in a Civil Court by way of allowing opportunities to the parties to adduce oral evidence, as claimed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Considering all these things, I am of opinion that this decision is not at all helpful in order to establish the claim of the petitioners that the matter can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the State Forum. (21.) MR. Mukherjee learned Advocate for the petitioners, cited decisions reported in 2002 (2) SCC 1 (supra) and 2004 (13) SCC 656 (supra) and 2006 (7) SCC 655 (supra) in order to establish his contention that so Jar as the present dispute is concerned, it is required to be decided by the Civil Court and not by the State Commission under the said Act. From the decisions, it appears that the Apex Court held that so far as the fact of that case was concerned, it required leading of very detailed evidence to prove the claim and thereafter to prove the damages and expenses, as alleged, and as such, it was desirable that such facts are to be decided by the Civil Court in a full fledged trial. But so far as the present case is concerned, it appears from the impugned order that it was held that in order to consider all allegations, as made in the complaint petitions, recording of detail evidence may not be required and it could be established from the document itself. But so far as the present case is concerned, it appears from the impugned order that it was held that in order to consider all allegations, as made in the complaint petitions, recording of detail evidence may not be required and it could be established from the document itself. At the same time, the State Commission further observed that in case at the time of hearing it is found that some of the disputes could not be resolved by the State Commission and it could only be decided by the Civil Court, then appropriate direction to that effect could be passed by the State Commission by way of refusing such prayer. I find no illegality in the said observation of the State Commission. (22.) MR. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners argued that observations, as made by the State Commission in this respect are totally wrong and devoid of proper reasoning. In this respect he pointed out that the prayers are made for separation of two premises and also for separation of commercial portion viz. ground floor market and first floor offices from the 2nd and 3rd floor residential flat portions, for an order for removing generator for commercial use kept in the lift well, which creates pollution and noise, affecting the flat owners, an order for keeping public toilet for market shop keepers and visitors adjacent to staircase in clean and under lock and key condition. The reliefs, as prayed for by the complainant in the complaint petitions, cannot be decided by the State Commission without impleading all other necessary parties who have interest in the entire building. That apart he further argued that those prayers could not be allowed by the State Commission without detail evidence being adduced by the parties and which can only be decided by a competent Civil Court. Without disputing this claim of Mr. Mukherjee in this respect, it can be said that the State Commission also took into consideration all these aspects and thereafter observed that in case it is found that some of the reliefs, as prayed in the complaint petitions, could not be granted by the state Commission, then at the time of hearing necessary order can be passed to that effect refusing those prayers and to allow the complainants to approach the appropriate Civil Court. The order, so passed by the State commission cannot be said to be unjustified or illegal under any circumstances. If we look into the complaint petitions, then it will appear that there are as many as 18 prayers made therein. Some of the prayers were in respect of directing the vendors to execute the sale deed in favour of the complainants after receiving the balance amount and some prayers have been made claiming damages for not providing the facilities which were agreed by the vendors at the time of execution of the agreement. These questions can always be looked into by the State Commission as per the provisions of the said Act and in case the complainant/opposite parties succeed in establishing that, then the State Commission can always pass appropriate final order in that respect. As such, at this stage, it cannot be said that the State Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint petitions, as filed before it. It may also be pointed out that the state Commission has not yet taken any final decision in this respect and kept the matter open for decision at the time of final hearing of the petitions. If we look into the decision reported in 2005 (11) SCC 447 (supra), then it will appear that the Three Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court observed to the effect that "inasmuph as the deponents will be subjected to full fledged cross-examination before the Commission, the Commission would be at liberty to form an opinion afresh, now or at any subsequent stage, whether it would like to conduct the trial before, itself or refer the parties to the Civil Court". So it appears that the Honble Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Commission should be allowed to take a decision in this respect in an appropriate stage of the trial and in case of necessity the Commission will also be at liberty to refuse any such prayer which can only be decided by the Civil Court. Without allowing any opportunity to the Commission in this respect, I do not think that it will be proper, at this stage, for this Court to hold that the State Commission was thoroughly wrong in entertaining the complaint petitions, as filed by the complainants before it. Without allowing any opportunity to the Commission in this respect, I do not think that it will be proper, at this stage, for this Court to hold that the State Commission was thoroughly wrong in entertaining the complaint petitions, as filed by the complainants before it. (23.) SINCE as per discussion made above, it is pointed out that some of the reliefs, as prayed before the Commission by the complainants, can always be adjudicated before it, as per provisions of the said Act, so it cannot be said that the State Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain those complaints, as filed by the complainants. As in my considered view the commission has certainly jurisdiction to entertain such complaints, so question of interference of the High court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise at all. To my mind, there is nothing wrong for the State Commission to entertain the complaint petitions and I think that since there is no lack of jurisdiction, so question of interference by the High Court as per Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise at all. Considering all these things, I am of opinion, that there is no merit in these revisional applications and those are liable to be dismissed. (24.) IN the result, the revisional applications being C. O. No. 2709 of 2006 and C. O. No. 2710 of 2006 are dismissed on contest but without costs. The state Commission is directed to proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law.