Judgment R. M. S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:- T his appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 15th January, 1992 passed in Sessions Case No.752 of 1990 by the learned Sessions Judge, Mumbai. By the impugned judgment and order, the appellant has been held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Pursuant to the appeal filed against the said impugned judgment and order, the appellant has been on bail. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased Farzana, after obtaining divorce from her first husband, got married with the appellant herein as his second wife. After her marriage, for some time, Farzana went to Mumbra at her matrimonial house to stay along with the accused. However, soon she returned to her parents' house at Bandra, Mumbai. Though the accused continued to reside at Mumbra, he had been visiting the parental house of Farzana at Bandra and occasionally used to stay with Farzana. There used to be quarrels between Farzana and the appellant on account of failure on the part of the appellant to provide necessary maintenance to Farzana. On the day of the incident i.e. on 18th May, 1990 at about 12.30 noon hours, Farzana and the appellant were in the loft area of the said premises at Bandra while the aunt and the grandfather of Farzana were on the ground floor premises. Though the noise of quarrel between Farzana and the appellant was audible, nobody had paid attention to it as it was an usual happening on account of demand of money by Farzana from the accused. On the said occasion, Farzana demanded money from the appellant, however, latter refused to part with any amount to her. Out of frustration, Farzana collected some kerosene in a cooking utensil from the tank of the stove and poured the same on her body so as to attract attention of the accused. The accused however, did not pay any attention to her and on the contrary told her that "You may die. I do not care for you. Hencef0l1h do not ask for money." So saying, the accused picked up a match stick, lit it and threw it towards Farzana. As the clothes worn by Farzana were already soaked with kerosene, the same caught fire. I do not care for you. Hencef0l1h do not ask for money." So saying, the accused picked up a match stick, lit it and threw it towards Farzana. As the clothes worn by Farzana were already soaked with kerosene, the same caught fire. Farzana thereupon started shouting as she sustained burn injuries, while the accused quietly left the premises. Hearing the shouts, the aunt and grandfather of Farzana went to the loft area and extinguished the fire with the use of bed-sheet and thereafter, Farzana was taken to the Cooper Hospital where she informed the doctors and others that she had poured kerosene on her body out of anger and frustration but it was the accused who set her on fire and thereafter left the premises. Her statement was recorded on 18th May, 1990 at 11.00 p.m. and she was provided with necessary treatment in the hospital. However, she succumbed to her injuries on 22nd May, 1990 during early hours of the day. 3. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined nine witnesses including the complainant, panchas and doctors. The prosecution produced documentary evidence in the form of post-mortem report, dying declarations and panchanamas. On the analysis of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him for life imprisonment. Hence, the appeal. 4. We have heard the learned advocate for the appellant and the learned APP for the State and also perused the records. The challenge is mainly on the ground that the evidence based on which the appellant has been held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC is comprised of the dying declarations, however, the learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that there was no consistency in the said dying declarations and on the contrary, they contradict each other on the relevant aspects of the matter, and therefore, could not have been relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said offence. While pointing out inconsistency in the dying declarations of the deceased, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the inconsistency not only relates to the narration of the happening of the alleged events but also relates to the manner in which the accused is alleged to have acted in setting fire to the clothes of the deceased as well as on the aspect of the person who has been responsible for setting the clothes on fire. While taking us through the testimony of the witnesses as well as documentary evidence in the form of dying declarations, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the law on the point that in a case where there is more than one dying declaration and they are inconsistent with each other. the same require proper scrutiny before arriving at any finding about the involvement of the accused person, is well settled and in that regard, he sought to rely upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the matters of State of Maharashtra Vs, Sanjay s/o, Digambarrao Rajhans, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 231 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 211 (S.C.)]; State of Punjab Vs. Parveen Kumar, reported in (2006)1 SCC (Cri) 146; Dandu Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of A.P., reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 1176 : [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1784 (S.C.)]; K. Ramachandra Reddy and another Vs. The Public Prosecutor, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1994 ; Tarachand Damu Sutar Vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1961 SC 180; Kishan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1999 Cri.L.J. 4070 and of the Division Bench of this Court in the matters of Shahu Parshu Rathod (Aade) Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 817; Burakhbee w/o. Riasuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 1368 and Sajjan s/o. Maroti Pakhare & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3518. He further submitted that the evidence on record nowhere establishes the presence of the accused at the site at the time of the alleged incident, apart from mere allegation in that regard in the dying declarations. Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3518. He further submitted that the evidence on record nowhere establishes the presence of the accused at the site at the time of the alleged incident, apart from mere allegation in that regard in the dying declarations. In view of the inconsistency in various dying declarations and there being no evidence led to establish the presence of the accused at the relevant time in the premises, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. In the course of the argument, he pointed out various discrepancies which, according to the learned advocate, being very relevant for the decision in the matter, clearly support the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. He also pointed out that though the utensil in which the kerosene was stated to have been collected by the deceased from the stove was undisputedly a relevant piece of evidence. it was never produced before the Court during the course of trial inspite of the fact that the same was seized in the course of investigation. He also submitted that the evidence on record nowhere discloses as to how and at what point of time the clothes which the deceased were wearing at the time of incident were taken off and where those clothes were stored and when were they seized by the police. He also drew our attention to the evidence which discloses that the investigating agency had located the two half burnt match sticks at the site when it is the case of the prosecution itself that only one match stick was thrown towards the deceased which caught fire to her clothes which were worn by the deceased. There is no explanation about the existence of the second half burnt match stick which was collected from the scene of offence. Referring to the testimony of PW-1 Smt. Malikabee, who is the aunt of the deceased, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that undisputedly she was present at the time of the alleged incident in the house. However, she had nowhere supported the prosecution case about the presence of the accused at the site at the relevant time. 5. Referring to the testimony of PW-1 Smt. Malikabee, who is the aunt of the deceased, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that undisputedly she was present at the time of the alleged incident in the house. However, she had nowhere supported the prosecution case about the presence of the accused at the site at the relevant time. 5. The learned APP however, submitted that taking into consideration the entire evidence as a whole, no fault can be found with the findings arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge regarding the offence having been committed by the appellant, and therefore, there is no case for interference in the impugned judgment. 6. The charge against the appellant was to the effect that on 18th May. 1990 at about 12.30 p.m. in the loft of Dayabhai Amarshi Chawl No.316, Bazar Road, Bandra West, Bombay – 400050, he had voluntarily set on fire to the clothes of the deceased Farzana Mohamed Hanif Ansari when the clothes were already soaked in kerosene, with an intention to cause the death of the said Farzana and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 of I.P.C. 7. In support of the charge, the prosecution examined nine witnesses. The PW1 Smt. Malikabee is the aunt of the deceased Farzana. She has stated in her testimony that she had been residing in the premises in question along with Farzana, while latter was residing in the loft area and former along with her husband was occupying the ground floor premises. She has stated that on the relevant day at about 12 noon, while she was busy grinding Masala, she heard the shouts of Farzana and suddenly she saw Farzana surrounded by flames falling down from the loft. Having noticed so, she rushed to Farzana and managed to extinguish the fire with the help of neighbours who then took Farzana to the Cooper Hospital. In the course of cross-examination, she has categorically stated that she had not seen the appellant in the premises on the said day, however, she had seen him on the earlier part of the day in the neighbourhood of the house. As rightly pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellant, apart from this witness, the prosecution has not examined any other witness on the point of presence of the accused person at the site at the relevant time. As rightly pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellant, apart from this witness, the prosecution has not examined any other witness on the point of presence of the accused person at the site at the relevant time. Only other evidence sought to be relied upon by the prosecution on the point of presence of the accused at the site at the relevant time is the dying declarations stated to have been made by the deceased. 8. Perusal of the impugned judgment and order also discloses that the conviction of the appellant has been essentially on the basis of the dying declarations of the deceased person. Being so, it would be necessary to peruse the said dying declarations and to ascertain as to what extent the dying declarations support the prosecution case. 9. The first such dying declaration appears to have been made to the PW -8 Dr. Arun Kumar. He has stated in his testimony that when he asked about the history of the injuries sustained by Farzana, she gave the said history alleging that the burns were caused by the husband after she had doused herself with kerosene. Even the medical report of the doctor reads thus :- "All burnt by husband after she doused herself with kerosene today………………..” As per medical report, it was recorded at 2.00 p.m. on 18th May, 1990. 10. The second dying declaration is stated to have been made to PW -4 Ramchandra (PC No.19388). He has stated in his testimony that the woman gave him her name as Farzana and stated that she had poured kerosene on her body out of anger and at that time her husband threw a lighted match stick on her clothes. The extract of the station diary (Exhibit-10) produced by the witness in respect of the information given by Farzana which is stated as the dying declaration reads thus :- "The name of the said woman is Farzana Mohammed Hanif Ansari, a Muslim, 22 years, residing at Dahya Amarsing Chawl No.316, Bazar Road, Bandarwadi, Bandra (W), Bombay - 50. On this day the date 18-5-90 at about 1.00 p.m., when the aforesaid woman herself poured kerosene on her body in her own house, her husband viz. Mohammed Hanif Ansari, a Muslim, 30 years, residing at above, lighted a match-stick and set her on fire and on account thereof she got burn injuries. On this day the date 18-5-90 at about 1.00 p.m., when the aforesaid woman herself poured kerosene on her body in her own house, her husband viz. Mohammed Hanif Ansari, a Muslim, 30 years, residing at above, lighted a match-stick and set her on fire and on account thereof she got burn injuries. The aforesaid facts were stated by the said lady when her grand-father viz. Ahamed Chand Sheikh, a Muslim, 80 years, residing as above, brought her in burnt condition to the Cooper Hospital. After examining her, the doctors declared her 80% burnt and admitted her in Ward No. 13." The said recording in the station diary discloses that the same was made at about 2.15 p.m. 11. The third dying declaration is stated to be in the form of recording by the doctor, P.W.9 - Debashis, who had examined the deceased. He has stated in his testimony that the lady had disclosed her name as Farzana and she herself narrated the history of being burnt by the husband after pouring kerosene on her person. The recording in that regard in the medical reports reads thus :- "Informant self: alleged h/o homicidal burnt today when husband poured kerosene and set her on fire ". The recording is dated 18th May, 1990. However, it does not disclose the time at which the same was recorded. 12. The fourth dying declaration appears to be in the form of the FIR wherein Farzana had stated that she could not bear her husband's carelessness towards her and, therefore, she got angry and took out the kerosene from the nearby stove, collected the same in an utensil and poured it on her person. At that time she was wearing a maxi. Inspite of the fact that the appellant was present at that time he did not stop her from doing so. On the contrary, he said that "you may die. I do not care about you. Henceforth, do not ask for monies from me." So saying, he picked up a match box lying nearby and took out one match stick therefrom and lighted it and threw it towards her, as a result of which her soaked clothes caught fire. She suffered burn injuries. 13. The fifth dying declaration is stated to have been the one recorded by PW-2 Philips Almeida. She suffered burn injuries. 13. The fifth dying declaration is stated to have been the one recorded by PW-2 Philips Almeida. He has stated in his testimony in the capacity as the SEM that he was required to record a dying declaration of Farzana who was admitted in the Cooper Hospital with burn injuries on 18th May, 1990 and accordingly he recorded her statement in his handwriting as per the say of Farzana. The Exhibit-7 is the said dying declaration recorded by the PW-2. According to the witness, to the specific query by him to Farzana as to how the burn injuries were sustained by her, it was answered by the deceased as under :- "On 18-5-90 at the above mentioned house at that time my husband Mohamed wharf came to my residence at Bandra. When I was sitting with him, I asked him to give some money for daily expenses. For that he got angry but I was very much mentally disturbed in that anger. I took stove lying close to me and poured all the kerosene from the stove. As my husband was close to me took the match box light the match and light my kerosened body and I was on fire (i.e.) burning. My husband ran away after setting fire. At that very moment my grandfather and my aunty was close to me tried to extinguish the fire with the help of Bed-sheet. Then I was removed to Cooper Hospital." The statement was recorded at about 10.20 p.m. on 18th May, 1990. 14. Perusal of the above five dying declarations which are relied upon by the prosecution apparently discloses that while giving her history to the doctor. Farzana had stated that it was her husband who had poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire, whereas in other statements she had stated that she herself on being angry with her husband on account of failure on his part to provide necessary maintenance and consequently being frustrated that she had poured kerosene on her body solely with the intention to draw her husband's attention towards her. It was only after the kerosene was poured by herself on her body, her husband threw the lighted match stick towards her which caught fire to her clothes. It was only after the kerosene was poured by herself on her body, her husband threw the lighted match stick towards her which caught fire to her clothes. Thus, apparently, there is material discrepancy on the aspect of the manner in which she was subjected to suffer burn injuries which had been the cause for her death. 15. The learned advocate for the appellant is justified in raising doubt about the genuineness of the contents recorded in the station diary. Such recording was apparently made at 2.15 p.m. As already seen above, the recording of the alleged dying declaration by the PW-8 was immediately after the patient was brought to the Cooper Hospital at about 2.00 p.m. on 18th May, 1990 wherein it was recorded that she had doused herself with kerosene but Immediately thereafter the Doctor who had examined the deceased has stated that the kerosene was poured on her body by her husband. In these circumstances, it is not understood as to on what basis the statement at 2.15 p.m. in the station diary came to be recorded to the effect that the deceased had stated to her grandfather that she herself had poured kerosene on her body and subsequently her husband had set her on fire. In view of this discrepancy, as rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant, it was necessary for the prosecution to explain the same and more particularly in view of the fact that the description of the history recorded by the two Doctors at the relevant time differs on the material aspect as to who had poured the kerosene on the body of the deceased. This assumes importance also for various other reasons. 16. The panchanama of the scene of offence clearly reveals existence of the two burnt matchsticks at the site at the relevant time. There is no evidence on record to establish as to which of the burnt matchsticks could have been used for setting the deceased on tire and further that the same was the one which was thrown by the accused. It was certainly necessary for the prosecution to establish how the second burnt matchstick could appear at the scene of offence when it was the case of the deceased herself that only one matchstick was used for setting her on fire. There is absolutely no explanation forthcoming from the prosecution on this aspect. It was certainly necessary for the prosecution to establish how the second burnt matchstick could appear at the scene of offence when it was the case of the deceased herself that only one matchstick was used for setting her on fire. There is absolutely no explanation forthcoming from the prosecution on this aspect. Was there any other person involved in pouring the kerosene on the body of the deceased causing burn injuries to the deceased? Was the match stick which caused the clothes on the body of the deceased to catch fire was thrown by a person other than the accused? Was it a case of suicide by the deceased herself out of frustration and anger? The investigating agency did not appear to have given any thought to these aspects inspite of the fact that the deceased had categorically stated in her statement that out of frustration and anger and merely to draw an attention of her husband towards her that she had poured kerosene on her body. We find it difficult to believe the statement of the deceased, in view of the inconsistent and contradictory statements made by her as is revealed from the different declarations recorded by different persons during the short span of time, coupled with the fact that at the relevant time the deceased was frustrated on account of her own version that she was neglected and was not provided necessary maintenance to her by the accused and that she was angry with him, and had axes to grind against him. 17. In Chaganti Kotaiah & Ors. Vs. Gogineni Venkateshwara Rao & Anr., reported in AIR 1973 SC 1274 : (1973)2 SCC 249 , the Apex Court had held that whether the dying declaration of the deceased can be taken into account is a matter which the Trial Court is entitled to decide one way or the other. If its view is wrong, the High Court can go into that aspect and differ from the opinion of the Sessions Court and this can be even in a case where the State approaches in an appeal against the acquittal. 18. If its view is wrong, the High Court can go into that aspect and differ from the opinion of the Sessions Court and this can be even in a case where the State approaches in an appeal against the acquittal. 18. In a matter where the prosecution relies solely on the dying declaration to establish the involvement of the accused persons in the alleged incident, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that the dying declaration reveals the true state of affairs in relation to the cause of death. In Tarachand Damu Sutar's case (supra), the Apex Court had observed that "it is always a difficult question to speculate why the deceased accused a certain person of committing the crime, or why a witness deposes against a person with whom he has no ostensible cause of enmity or why the police, in the discharge of its public duty should influence persons to make inaccurate statements, when Courts come to the conclusion that the accusation or the evidence does not appear to be true and that there are reasons to suppose that the police had influenced the testimony of witnesses", It was further observed that :- "It is clear that the relations between the wife and the husband were strained to such an extent that, according to the prosecution, the accused not only starved her, but also set fire to her clothes with the intention to cause her death. Such a conduct of the husband cannot be on account of ordinary domestic unpleasant nesses, but must be the result of a very acute feeling of desperation and a desire not to live any more with his wife. If such were the relations which one is inclined to infer from what the prosecution wants the Court to believe, it should not be difficult to imagine that the wife's motives in charging the husband falsely may be equally strong. If such were the relations which one is inclined to infer from what the prosecution wants the Court to believe, it should not be difficult to imagine that the wife's motives in charging the husband falsely may be equally strong. She too must have been fed up with the misery of her life and might have committed suicide and put an end to her life, but when, as often happens, she was questioned, she accused her husband of setting fire to her clothes, not with a view to save herself from a conviction for attempting to commit suicide, but either on account of her feeling that her husband was responsible for all her troubles and that her desperate action was also due to the same cause or out of malice." The above observations clearly record the realities of life. It is a lithographic reflection of a situation wherein a wife having made to suffer at the hands of her husband, out of anger and frustration can accuse her husband of setting her on fire when infact she might have adopted the course of committing suicide by dousing herself by kerosene and setting her clothes on fire. In other words, a person in the state of anger and out of frustration can go to any extent to tell lie even though the person is on the verge of death. The Courts are, therefore, required to caution themselves that a dying declaration is not to be believed merely because no possible reason can be given for accusing the accused falsely. It can only be certainly believed if there are no grounds for doubting it at all. 19. In K. Ramachandra Reddy's case (supra), the Apex Court, while dealing with the plea raised on behalf of the accused that they were being falsely implicated due to enmity and while dealing with the issue relating to the dying declaration, held that the dying declaration is undoubtedly admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. However being a statement which could not be subjected to scrutiny by cross-examination, the Courts have to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement before acting upon it. However being a statement which could not be subjected to scrutiny by cross-examination, the Courts have to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement before acting upon it. It was also held that while great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person, yet the Court has to be on guard against the statement of the deceased being a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of his imagination and the Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement after the deceased had a clear opportunity to observe and identify his assailants and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. It is only after the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it could be sufficient to the foundation for conviction. It was also specifically ruled that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the various circumstances including whether the statement has been consistent or not throughout, if the deceased had opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official one. 20. In Kishan Lal's case (supra), the Apex Court has held that while in one of the dying declarations stated to have been made before the witness the deceased had named the accused, the dying declaration which is stated to have been made before the Magistrate, there was no mention of the name of any of the accused persons. The Apex Court held that in those circumstances, the two dying declarations gave two conflicting versions and there was inter se discrepancies which were sufficient to discard both the dying declarations. 21. In Sanjay's case [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 211 (S.C.)] (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with the matter wherein the deceased had suffered burn injuries. When she was questioned about the cause for such burn injuries, she had stated that "since husband was doubting me, today in the evening while we were going on scooter from road behind Lokmath Building, he poured petrol on my body and set me on fire with matchstick. When she was questioned about the cause for such burn injuries, she had stated that "since husband was doubting me, today in the evening while we were going on scooter from road behind Lokmath Building, he poured petrol on my body and set me on fire with matchstick. Petrol was there in the can in my hand." The doctor to whom the said statement was made had recorded the name of the husband as that of the accused. At the same time, the constable on duty at the hospital was present on the occasion. Having heard the statement of the deceased, he had made a note in the MLC Register which was similar to what was recorded by the Doctor. The question before the Court was whether the deceased had pointed out to Sanjay as her husband or whether the doctor on his own guessed that the person accompanying her was her husband? While dealing with the matter, the Apex Court held thus :- "Thus, the version of homicide set up by the prosecution as well as the version of suicide set up by the accused appear to be highly improbable and do not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to believe either version. In this state of things, when two incredible versions confront the Court, the Court has to give benefit of doubt to the accused and it is not safe to sustain the conviction. The contradictions in the two dying declarations coupled with the High degree of improbability of the manner of occurrence as depicted by the prosecution case leaves the Court with no option but to attach little weight to these dying declarations. It is not the plurality of the dying declarations that adds weight to the prosecution case, but their qualitative worth is what matters. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness (vide the observations of a five Judge Bench in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra - (2002)6 SCC 710 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1491. Inasmuch as the correctness of dying declaration cannot be tested by cross-examination of its maker, "greater caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence" (SCC p.713, para 3). State of Maharashtra - (2002)6 SCC 710 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1491. Inasmuch as the correctness of dying declaration cannot be tested by cross-examination of its maker, "greater caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence" (SCC p.713, para 3). When there is more than one dying declaration genuinely recorded, they must be tested on the touchstone of consistency and probabilities. They must also be tested in the light of other evidence of record." The Apex Court, therefore, has clearly ruled in the said decision that it is only qualitative narration imparted by the dying declaration in relation to the point which is required to be established by the prosecution to prove the offence by the accused person that is relevant rather than plurality of the dying declarations. In other words, merely because the number of dying declarations are recorded by different persons that itself cannot be sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but what is relevant is the quality of and consistency in the narration alleged to have been imparted to such various persons by the deceased and to what extent such narration would establish link between the accused and the alleged offence. This is to be established on the face of the dying declaration coupled with the other evidence placed on record. 22. In Dandu Lakshmi Reddy's case [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1784 (S.C.)] (supra) the Apex Court had held that in the fact situation of a case, ajudicial mind would tend to wobble between two equally plausible hypotheses, was it suicide, or was it homicide? In case the dying declaration projected by the prosecution gets credence, the alternative hypothesis of suicide can be eliminated justifiably, but for that purpose a scrutiny of the dying declaration with meticulous circumspection is necessary and it must be sieved through the judicial cullendar and if it passes through the gauzes, it can be made the basis of a conviction and nor otherwise. It was also reminded that a dying declaration is not a deposition in court. It is neither made on oath nor in the presence of an accused and its credence cannot be tested by cross-examination and these inherent weaknesses attached to a dying declaration would not justify any initial presumption to be drawn that the dying declaration contains only the truth. It is neither made on oath nor in the presence of an accused and its credence cannot be tested by cross-examination and these inherent weaknesses attached to a dying declaration would not justify any initial presumption to be drawn that the dying declaration contains only the truth. It was then held that when the sphere of scrutiny of the dying declaration is a restricted area, the court cannot afford to sideline any material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime, and therefore, the dying declaration should be tested by taking into consideration all other materials placed on record by the prosecution and it is unsafe to convict person merely on the strength of fragile dying declaration. 23. In Parveen Kumar's case (supra), while dealing with the various dying declarations which were stated to have been recorded, it was held that in the first dying declaration, there was no allegation against either the mother-in-law, the father-in-law or the sister-in-law and the allegation was solely against the Parveen kumar, who was said to have sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and set her on fire. In the second dying declaration, the allegation was that the mother-in-law sprinkled the kerosene oil and the husband set her on fire with a matchstick, and while they were doing so, her father-in-law and sister-in-law were exhorting them to do away with her by setting her on fire. These two versions were held quite different and not consistent with each other except that so far as the Parveen Kumar was concerned, the act of lighting the fire was ascribed to him in both the dying declarations. Referring to these common reference to Parveen Kumar in both the dying declarations, it was sought to be argued on behalf of the State that since his name was found in both the dying declarations, his conviction could be sustained. Rejecting the said argument, it was held that the order of acquittal passed on the basis of the finding of fact would not warrant interference, and merely because on the basis of some evidence another view is possible, it would not be a ground for conviction of Parveen Kumar. 24. Our High Court in Kalyan Balasaheb Barungale Vs. Rejecting the said argument, it was held that the order of acquittal passed on the basis of the finding of fact would not warrant interference, and merely because on the basis of some evidence another view is possible, it would not be a ground for conviction of Parveen Kumar. 24. Our High Court in Kalyan Balasaheb Barungale Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1998 Cri.L.J. 1859 : [1998 ALL MR (Cri) 523], while relying upon the Supreme Court decisions, had held that in a case where more than one dying declaration is sought to be placed on record, it is necessary to observe that whether they are consistent with each other or not and if they are found to be inconsistent in material particulars, it would be unsafe to rely upon them. 25. In Bhupen Vs. State of Madya Pradesh, reported in AIR 2002 SC 820 : (2002)2 SCC 556 , the Apex Court has held that mentioning of caste of the accused being a material fact necessary to prove the identification of the person named in the dying declaration, in case of wrong mentioning thereof cannot be brushed aside and the Courts below had seriously erred in ignoring the same while relying upon such dying declaration while convicting the accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 26. In State of Gujarat Vs. Khumansingh Karsan Singh and Ors reported in AIR 1994 SC 1641 , the Apex Court has held that in a case where in the first dying declaration the deceased had implicated her mother-in-law while in the second both her husband and mother-in-law, and the evidence disclosed bad blood between the deceased and the family members, in those circumstances, the possibility of false involvement could not be ruled out and, therefore, it was unsafe to rely of such inconsistent dying declarations in the absence of corroborative evidence. 27. In Shakuntala Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1994 SC 220 : 1995 Suppl.(4) SCC 498, it was held by the Apex Court that to base a conviction on the basis of dying declaration, the Court must satisfy that it is wholly reliable and it should not suffer from any major infirmity. If there are some infirmities then the Court should examine whether there is corroborating evidence which supports the prosecution case and renders the dying declaration acceptable. 28. If there are some infirmities then the Court should examine whether there is corroborating evidence which supports the prosecution case and renders the dying declaration acceptable. 28. Reverting to the facts of the case, as it is already seen above, there is a major discrepancy as regards the manner in which the clothes worn by the deceased caught fire. While in one of the dying declarations, it is stated that she herself poured the kerosene on body whereas in another dying declaration, it is stated that it was the appellant who had poured the kerosene on her body. At the same time, it is to be noted that the deceased was undisputedly in a state of anger and frustration and had axis to grind against the accused. Besides, it is pertinent to note that the prosecution has not led any evidence to establish the presence of the appellant at the scene of offence at the relevant time. The learned Public Prosecutor drew our attention to the testimony of PW-1 in that regard stating that she had stated that she had seen the accused at the entrance of the house. Indeed, the deponent had stated that half an hour before the incident she had seen the accused standing at the door of the premises, but at the same time, the witness had categorically stated that she had not seen the accused before or soon after Farzana fell down from the loft. She had also stated that even thereafter she had not seen the accused in the vicinity of her house or in the house till they had taken Farzana to Cooper Hospital and she had not seen the appellant even at Cooper Hospital. This clearly establishes that the witness is of no help to the prosecution to establish the presence of the accused at the site at the relevant time. On the contrary, it strengthens the case of the defence about the absence of the accused at the scene of offence at the relevant time. Undisputedly no other evidence has been led by the prosecution to establish that the accused at the relevant time was anywhere near the scene of offence. On the contrary, it strengthens the case of the defence about the absence of the accused at the scene of offence at the relevant time. Undisputedly no other evidence has been led by the prosecution to establish that the accused at the relevant time was anywhere near the scene of offence. It is also to be noted that in the dying declaration recorded by the PW-2, Farzana had categorically stated that at the relevant time her husband, the appellant, used to visit her frequently and in the FIR it was stated that the appellant had been residing at Mumbra. The PW -1 also lends support to this fact when she stated that after the marriage of Farzana with the appellant, she went to stay for some time with the appellant at Mumbra, but soon thereafter returned to her parents' house. Obviously, therefore, the prosecution utterly failed to establish the presence of the appellant at the scene of offence at the relevant time and the so called dying declarations on which the prosecution heavily rely upon to establish the alleged involvement of the appellant in the alleged offence cannot be believed, and therefore, there is no sufficient and cogent evidence on record to establish the charge against the appellant. In these circumstances, therefore, though on account of his marriage with Farzana and statement on the part of the PW-1 that the accused was seen at the door of the premises about half an hour earlier to the incident could create a strong suspicion, that itself would not be a proof of his involvement in the alleged offence and cannot be sufficient to hold him guilty of the commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. Presence of two burnt match sticks at the place of scene of offence, as against use of only one match stick, also remains unexplained by the prosecution. Added to all these things, undisputedly, the deceased was in a state of anger and frustration all throughout. No investigation is carried out to ascertain the probability of attempt to commit suicide by the deceased in those circumstances. The learned advocate for the appellant, therefore, is justified in contending that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of doubt in the matter. The trial Judge has totally ignored this aspect of the matter. No investigation is carried out to ascertain the probability of attempt to commit suicide by the deceased in those circumstances. The learned advocate for the appellant, therefore, is justified in contending that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of doubt in the matter. The trial Judge has totally ignored this aspect of the matter. The impugned judgment and order, in the circumstances, cannot be sustained and is liable to set aside. 29. The view that we are taking in the matter also finds support from the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the matters of Burakhbee [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 1368]; Shahu Parshu Rathod [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 817] and Salian Maroti Pakhare [2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3518] (supra). 30. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant being entitled for benefit of doubt is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused being on bail, the bail bond stands cancelled. Appeal allowed.