Judgment :- Heard Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 22326 and 22327 of 2006, Mr. P. Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 35828 of 2007 and Mr. G. Munirathnam learned counsel representing the respondent Corporation and perused the records. 2. W.P. No. 35828 of 2007 was filed by a Conductor working in in the respondent Corporation challenging the order of transfer dated 111. 2007 transferring the petitioner from Dharapuram Branch to Kavunthapadi Branch both situated in the Erode District. 3. When the matter came up for admission and since heavy reliance was placed upon the earlier interim order passed in W.P. Nos. 22326 and 22327 of 2006, those two writ petitions were also directed to be posted for hearing along with the writ petition. However, Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in those two writ petitions objected that his cases should not be heard along with this writ petition since his writ petitions are of the year 2006 and as old matters are still pending, this Court should not pass orders on the writ petitions of the year 2006. 4. However, when these matters were listed, Mr. G. Munirathnam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation stated that he had already filed counter affidavit in those two old matters even as early as September 2006 and for reasons not known to him, these matters were not listed and prayed for early disposal and in order to have an uniformity, all the three matters should be disposed of together. 5. It was thereafter, Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 22326 and 22327 of 2006 argued that these two writ petitions were also against similarly placed transport workmen and relating to transfer and since the transfer had emanated due to mala fide, the orders are necessarily to be set aside. The learned counsel submitted that the two petitioners were activists of the Anna Trade Union belonging to the opposition party in the State and since they were involved in the election held for the Tamil Nadu Assembly in the year 2006, at the instance of the present ruling party, the respondent has transferred the petitioner in W.P. No. 22326 of 2006 from Dharapuram to Kavunthapadi on the alleged administrative ground whereas no such administrative exigencies arise for the transfer. In the case of petitioner in W.P. No. 22327 of 2006, he has been transferred from Dharapuram to Sathyamangalam. 6. It is an admitted fact by both sides that the petitioners were workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, I.D. Act] and that if it is a victimisation for their legitimate trade union activities, they have a remedy by way of filing dispute before the appropriate Labour Court constituted under the I.D. Act. It is also an admitted fact that under the Certified Standing Orders applicable to workmen, there is a power to transfer workmen from one branch to another and that in the present case, the transfer was only within the District, viz., Erode District. .7. In the counter affidavit dated 09. 2006 filed on behalf of the respondent Corporation, it is stated that both the petitioners Selvaraj and Vijayakumar are working in the said branch since 2001 and that the transfer was made only on administrative grounds and there was no mala fide or victimisation in the said order of transfer. 8. However, Mr. D. Hari Paranthaman contended that it has become the practice in the Transport Corporation to transfer office bearers of the Trade Union having allegiance to the opposition party and, therefore, such a move should be condemned. Such a sweeping allegation is not substantiated by any specific pleadings and it is not stated as to, on whose orders the respondents are acting. On the contrary, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit refuting such a contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The learned counsel stated that his argument is solely based upon mala fides on the part of the respondents. .9. The Supreme Court in more than one occasion, while dealing with the case of transfer, has set standards with reference to the proof of mala fide in the matter of transfer. In the decision relating to E.P.Royappa vs. State of Tamilnadu reported in 1974 (4) SCC 3 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 92 of the judgment has held as follows: .Para 92: ".... The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up-these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach-but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent." .10. Likewise, in M.Sankaranarayanan, IAS vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in (1993) 1 SCC 54 , the Supreme Court, in paragraph 12 of the judgment, observed as follows: .Para 12: ".... It may not always be possible to demonstrate malice in fact with full and elaborate particulars and it may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation, surmise or conjecture. In the instance case, we are unable to find that there are sufficient materials from which a reasonable inference of malice in fact for passing the impugned order of transfer can be drawn." .11. By no stretch of imagination, the petitioners had discharged their responsibility in terms of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in proving the question of mala fide. In fact, in a recent judgment rendered by M. Katju, J. reported in (2007) 8 SCC 150 [Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P.], the Supreme Court dealt with the case of a transfer emanating from the letter of a Member of Legislative Assembly and paragraph 8 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below: .Para 8: "Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned transfer order of the appellant from Muzaffarnagar to Mawana, District Meerut was made at the instance of an MLA. On the other hand, it has been stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. On the other hand, it has been stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. In our opinion, even if the allegation of the appellant is correct that he was transferred on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. After all, it is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. There can be no hard-and-fast rule that every transfer at the instance of an MP or MLA would be vitiated. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of an individual case. In the present case, we see no infirmity in the impugned transfer order." 12. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2004 (7) SCC 405 [State of U.P. v. Siya Ram and another] wherein in paragraph 5, it was observed as follows:- Para 5: "The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No Government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident but a condition of service, necessary to in public interest and efficiency in the public administrative. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan". This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan". 13. Further, the Supreme Court in yet another decision reported in 2004 (11) SCC 402 (State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, in paragraph 7, observed as follows:- Para 7: "It is too late in the day for any Government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment, but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision". 14. In the light of the above, all the three writ petitions are misconceived and devoid of merits and accordingly, they stand dismissed. Interim orders already granted in W.P. Nos. 22326 and 22327 of 2006 will stand vacated. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.