Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. Heard Mr.M. Kalyanasundaram, Senior Counsel, for the petitioner and Mrs. Geetha Thamaraiselvan, Government Advocate, for the Respondents. .2. The question relates to punishment imposed on the present petitioner in a departmental proceeding. At the relevant time, the petitioner was functioning as a Sub-Inspector. Two charges were leveled against him, one relating to acceptance of bribe and since the second charge has not been proved even before the departmental authorities, it is not necessary to advert to such charge. The enquiry officer, on reference to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and others, came to the conclusion that there had been a demand relating to payment of bribe, though there was no definite conclusion regarding actual acceptance of the bribe. On the basis of such delinquency, the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect. Thereafter, the petitioner filed OA.No.6894 of 2001 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (in short "Tribunal"). The only contention raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal was that there was no evidence in support of the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority. The Tribunal, by referring to the evidence of some witnesses, more particularly P.Ws.1 and 2, had observed that, even though there was no proof for acceptance of bribe, at least the evidence disclosed that the delinquent had demanded bribe. The Tribunal further found that the order of punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect cannot be characterized as excessive, warranting any interference. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed such O.A. by order dated 9. 2003. The present writ petition has been filed challenging such order after a lapse of about three years. 3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the specific charge was relating to acceptance of bribe and since such charge has not been proved, the departmental authorities should not have imposed the punishment on the basis of the conclusion relating to the alleged demand of bribe, since there was no such specific charge. In other words, the main contention is to the effect that in the absence of a specific charge that there was a demand of bribe, the delinquent could not have been punished. 4. We do not think such a contention of the petitioner can be countenanced. In other words, the main contention is to the effect that in the absence of a specific charge that there was a demand of bribe, the delinquent could not have been punished. 4. We do not think such a contention of the petitioner can be countenanced. Apart from the fact that the matter has been dealt with in a departmental proceedings, where the technical rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence Act are not applicable and the standard proof is much less rigorous than in the criminal case, in our opinion, the charge of acceptance of bribe obviously would include the allegation that there has been demand of bribe. The departmental authorities on the basis of the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 have come to such a conclusion, which has been again accepted by the Tribunal. In this connection, we must also notice the allied contention made by the Senior Counsel that the evidence relating to demand of bride is insufficient inasmuch as there are some contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1 on the one hand and the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 on the other hand. .5. As already noticed, in the present case, the departmental authorities have accepted the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 regarding demand of bribe. This has been again analyzed and accepted by the Tribunal. While dealing with such matters, the Tribunal has got a limited jurisdiction to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority. The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in a matter arising from the decision of the Tribunal, is not expected to sit as a second court of appeal to appreciate the acceptability of evidence or otherwise of the materials on record. Of course, when a particular conclusion is based on no evidence, the Tribunal, or, for that matter, the High Court, can interfere. But, there is vast difference between a case of no evidence and a case of insufficiency of evidence. Whether particular evidence would be acceptable by an authority or not, cannot be considered as a question of law to be agitated while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may be that possibly another authority could have taken a different view on the same evidence, but that cannot be a ground to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority. 6. It may be that possibly another authority could have taken a different view on the same evidence, but that cannot be a ground to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority. 6. In such view of the matter, we hardly see any scope to interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority, which has been confirmed by the Tribunal. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.