JUDGMENT This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been presented by the defendants. It arises out of judgment and decree dated 23-11-2002 passed by learned First Additional District Judge, Khargone in Civil Regular Appeal No. 18-A/01 which arose out of judgment and decree dated 27-11-1998 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Khargone in Civil Suit No. 33-A/98. This appeal also contains cross-objections filed by the respondents-plaintiffs. 2. Original plaintiffs Vallabhdas and his wife Smt. Seetabai filed the suit for ejectment and mesne profits against the appellants-defendants. As the original plaintiffs, one after the other, died, their legal representatives continued the litigation and they presently respondents. The suit for ejectment was based on the allegation that both the original plaintiffs were owners of Survey Nos. 274 and 276 of Khargone and Vallabhdas as Manager of the family rented out the above open land to defendant-appellant No. 1 at the rate of Rs. 100-00 per month. The rent note was executed on 7-7-1970. Thereafter the rent was revised and it was struck at Rs. 125-00 per month. The land was leased for the purposes of establishing a Saw Mill. After the execution of the sale-deed, the defendant-appellant No. 1 taking the possession of the disputed land established over there his business of Saw Mill. However, he without the permission of the plaintiffs made a sub-letting of half of the disputed land to defendant-appellant No. 2, his real brother. He also parted with his possession from the said half portion and the defendant-appellant No. 2 carries out his business over there. It was also pleaded that the entire disputed land was required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of starting the business of his major son, Legal Representative/ respondent No. 2 Krishnalal and they did not have any other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of their own in their occupation in the town concerned. It was also stated that for the business of Krishnalal, a Welding Plant and Steel Furniture Shop would be set up there. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants-appellants. In their written-statement it was pleaded that the suit land was initially taken on rent of Rs. 100-00 per month which was subsequently raised to Rs. 125-00 per month. It was also stated that for the business of Krishnalal, a Welding Plant and Steel Furniture Shop would be set up there. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants-appellants. In their written-statement it was pleaded that the suit land was initially taken on rent of Rs. 100-00 per month which was subsequently raised to Rs. 125-00 per month. It was also pleaded that the disputed land was taken on rent by appellant-defendant No. 1 for the business which was going on in the name of Ajanta Timber Traders. It was a joint business of both the defendants-appellants. Accordingly it was set up that the defendants were joint tenants in the suit land. As regards sub-tenancy, in these circumstances it was denied as also the bona fide business need of the landlord for Krishnalal was also disputed. 4. The learned trial Court framed issues, received evidence and at the conclusion of the trial held that ground of eviction under section 12(1)(b) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ("Act" hereafter) regarding sub-letting as well as ground for eviction under clause (n) of the Act relating to construction was made out. It held that ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act was not made out. Accordingly the learned trial Court passed the decree. 5. Against the said decree not only the first appeal but cross-objections were also taken and the learned first Appellate Court confirmed the finding of the learned trial Court as regards ground of eviction under section 12(1)(b) of the Act. While it confirmed the finding of the learned Court below regarding non-making of the ground of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act, it reversed the finding of the Court below regarding ground of eviction under section 12(1)(n) of the Act. Hence, this second appeal as well as cross-objections. 6. While this Court admitted this appeal, the same was being admitted relating to hearing the parties as to following substantial questions of law :- "(1) Whether lower Appellate Court was justified in confirming the decree passed under section 12(1)(b) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act ? (2) Whether lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that a ground under section 12(1)(b) ibid is made out when admittedly the tenant and alleged sub-tenant happens to be the real brothers ? (2) Whether lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that a ground under section 12(1)(b) ibid is made out when admittedly the tenant and alleged sub-tenant happens to be the real brothers ? (3) Whether in the light of clear admission made by the plaintiff in Ex.D/5 describing both the defendants to be tenant of his father Vallabhdas, whether lower Appellate Court was justified in still holding a case of sub-tenancy to be made out ?" 7. The cross-objections have been entertained for hearing the parties relating to following substantial question of law :- "Whether the finding recorded by both the Courts in respect of bona fide need of the suit premises is perverse and-contrary to the evidence on record ?" 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The substantial questions of law as framed regarding the appeal, being interconnected they are taken together for consideration. It has not been disputed that defendant-appellant No. 2 is the brother of defendant-appellant No. 1. There has been statement of PW-3 Krishnalal Mahajan as also of DW-1 Shivjibhai on record. PW-3 has stated that vide Ex.P/1, the rent note, disputed land was given to defendant-appellant Shivji. He has further stated that Shivji has given disputed land to his brother Shyamji on sub-tenancy. DW-1 Shivaji has that ever since their inception as joint tenant, they are carrying on joint business on the entire disputed land. On perusal of Ex.P/1 it gives an idea that the tenancy started singly with defendant-appellant No. 1. However, it has not been disputed that originally the rent was at the rate of Rs. 100-00 per month which subsequently stood revised to Rs. 125-00 per month that means there has been subsequently oral agreement modifying the original contract of tenancy. Hence, in these circumstances Ex.D/5, the copy of a plaint between the parties from other suit, cannot be excluded from evidence and the provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act do not create a bar thereto. Ex.D/5 which was excluded by the learned lower Appellate Court on the ground that section 92 of the Evidence Act prohibited its admission into evidence is thus not correct. On its consideration it is found that therein vide Para 2 the tenancy under reference was joint and both the defendants were put as joint tenants over the disputed land. Ex.D/5 which was excluded by the learned lower Appellate Court on the ground that section 92 of the Evidence Act prohibited its admission into evidence is thus not correct. On its consideration it is found that therein vide Para 2 the tenancy under reference was joint and both the defendants were put as joint tenants over the disputed land. This is an admission made by the legal representative Krishnalal, respondent No. 2. AIR 1976 SC 2400 , Niranjan Kumar and others vs. Dhyan Singh and another is authority as to that under given set of circumstances the provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act may not be applicable. The instant is one of those cases wherein provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act stands excluded. As per Ex.D/5 and the above stated admission, it is to be observed that admissions made in pleadings are best evidence of the facts of which they speak. A reference in this connection may be made to 2004(2) MPLJ 169 = 2004(1) M.P.J.R. 511 , Smt. Mohini and others vs. Smt. Vidyawati Rathore and others. As such the finding recorded by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the learned Appellate Court regarding the tenancy being single needs interference of this Court. It is in fact joint right from the inception and in favour of the appellants, the defendants. On this short ground alone the ground of eviction under sub-section (1) clause (b) of section 12 of the Act is needed to be regarded as not made out. 9. Besides it has been found that in the evidence the substance of which has already been seen earlier, it has nowhere come on record that out of the whole disputed land which half portion has been put into exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant by the original tenant. Here it is to be remembered that sub-letting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. Further it is to be remembered that in the present circumstances of the case the evidence is only suggestive of the fact that the alleged sub-tenant, the brother of the tenant, is only in user of the disputed land. Further it is to be remembered that in the present circumstances of the case the evidence is only suggestive of the fact that the alleged sub-tenant, the brother of the tenant, is only in user of the disputed land. Thus, from the evidence necessary ingredients to constitute sub-tenancy within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act is not made out. Both the learned Courts below did not properly construe the above provision relating to sub-letting. In this connection a respectful reference may be made to AIR 1990 SC 1208 , M/s Delhi Stationers and Printers vs. Rajendra Kumar. 10. Accordingly the learned lower Appellate Court was not justified in confirming the decree passed under section 12(1)(b) of the Act as also the learned lower Appellate Court was not justified in holding that ground under section 12(1)(b) ibid is made out in the circumstances when the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant were admittedly real brothers. As also in the light of clear admission made by the plaintiff in Ex.D./5 describing both the defendants to be tenant of his father Vallabhdas, the lower Appellate Court was not justified in holding a case of sub-tenancy as made out. Thus, these are my replies to the substantial questions of law which have been discussed above. 11. Coming to the cross-objections, it is found from the record that PW-3 Krishnalal Mahajan (Legal Representative/plaintiff-respondent No. 2) has stated that over the disputed land he wants to start his business of Welding and Furniture. He wants to establish a shop there and he would make the necessary construction. He has further stated that he does not have any other place of his own excepting the disputed shop. In rebuttal DW-1 Shivjibhai has deposed that the original plaintiff Vallabhdas left behind him not only one plot of land but 10 shops out of 4 were vacant and in his cross-examination Krishnalal Mahajan (PW-3) has admitted that his deceased father left behind him 10 acres of land near the diversion road having 24 shops on both the sides thereof. He has also admitted that out of those shops, one of the shop has been rented out. Then he has also admitted that during the pendency of the litigation a few accommodation in the shape of shops fell vacant which was rented out. He has also admitted that out of those shops, one of the shop has been rented out. Then he has also admitted that during the pendency of the litigation a few accommodation in the shape of shops fell vacant which was rented out. This has a great bearing over the bona fides and the said admissions made by Krishnalal spoils his bona fides as to the need of the disputed land. Further it is found that he has deposed that right from the lifetime of his father, the property stood partitioned amongst the legal representatives and he as well as his sister were not obliged by the father with any property. Thus, in these circumstances it can also be inferred that he cannot be treated owner of the disputed land which is one of the necessary ingredient for passing a decree of eviction under the provisions of section 12(1)(f) of the Act. In these circumstances the cross-objections have got no substance. 12. In view of the above the cross-objections deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed, however, the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed with costs and the judgment and decree to the extent of challenge in the appeal are set-aside. The suit for eviction consequently stands dismissed. Order accordingly.