JUDGMENT 1. - The civil suit (CO No. 43/1990) for redemption of mortgage having been decreed after trial by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Pratapgarh on 24.8.2001 and the appeal (CAD No. 16/2001) preferred by the mortgagee-defendant No. 1/1 having been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Pratapgarh on 31.10.2007, the said defendant seeks to maintain this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and has suggested the following to be involved as the substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the findings given by both the Courts below are vitiated in as much as while passing the impugned Judgments and Decrees the Courts below have refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them and decided issue Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs/ respondents and against the appellant/ defendant without there being any strong evidence to prove them ? 2. Whether the findings given by both the Courts below in respect of issue No. 1 is totally contrary to the evidence available on record in as much as the plaintiffs/ respondents could not sufficiently prove that the suit property was in the exclusive ownership of them ? 3. Whether the findings of the Courts below are perverse in as much as the appellant/ defendant has been able to prove his possession and ownership over the suit property for the last more than 100 years ? 4. Whether the Judgments and Decrees are vitiated on the sole ground that alleged mortgage deed dated 14.7.1955 was executed and registered after the death of Panna Lal on 31.5.1953 ? 5. Whether the learned Appellate Court legally erred in dismissing the application submitted by the appellant/ defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. because one of the documents which was sought to be proved, if admitted, would have rendered the mortgage deed dated 14.5.1955 null and ab-initial void on the ground that the same was executed in favour of a dead person namely Parana Lal who breathed his last on 31.5.1953 ?" 2. Briefly put, the facts and aspects relevant for the present purpose are that the plaintiffs, asserting themselves to be the heirs of the deceased Narayanji Sunar, filed the suit aforesaid for redemption of mortgage of a house situated at Pratapgarh with the averments in the plaint that late Shri Narayanji mortgaged with possession the property in question with Pannalal, father of the defendant No. 1 on 11.7.1955 and got registered the deed of mortgage on 14.7.1955 carrying the stipulation that interest shall be charged on the mortgage money at the rate of 9 annals per cent and the amount of rent that would be in excess of the amount of interest shall be adjusted towards the principal and the mortgagee shall deliver possession upon repayment of the mortgage money. It was averred that Pannalal had expired and the defendant No. 1 was his legal heir taking the usufruct of the property in question; that the rent received from the property was in excess of the interest payable and upon its adjustment, the mortgage money stands repaid and yet if any amount be due, the plaintiffs were ready to make payment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was requested to redeem the mortgage and to hand over the possession of the house but he was avoiding to do so; and prayed for the decree for redemption of mortgage, for delivery of possession of the house and for payment to the defendant, if any amount be found due. 3. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 denied the plaint averments altogether and asserted that the defendant No. 1 was the owner of the house in question and was in possession of the same for over 100 years as owner. It was also asserted that late Shri Pannalal constructed the house in question in the year 1934. The defendants also denied existence of any mortgage transaction and of execution and registration of the mortgage deed on 14.7.1955 and took several other objections. It was also asserted that late Shri Pannalal constructed the house in question in the year 1934. The defendants also denied existence of any mortgage transaction and of execution and registration of the mortgage deed on 14.7.1955 and took several other objections. Upon pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court for determination of the questions involved in the case: " 1- vk;k oknhx.k e`rd ukjk;.kth lqukj fuoklh izrkix<+ ds oS/kkfud mRrjkf/kdkjh gS vkSj ukjk;.kth dh laifr okds izrkix<+ ds Lokeh gS\ &oknhx.k 2- vki fnukad 11-7-1955 dks okn dh pj.k la[;k nks esa of.kZr edku iUukyky firk eksguyky th lqukj o izfroknh dzekad ,d ds ;gka oknhx.k ds firk ukjk;.kth iq= gsejkt th lqukj fuoklh izrkix<+ us fcy ,ot :i;k 3000@& v[kjs :i;k rhu gtkj jgu fcy dCt dj fnukad 14-7-1955 dks jguukes fcy dCt dk fof/kor iath;u djk;k vkSj is'k'kqnk jgu ukes o okn dh pj.k la[;k rhu ds vuqlkj 'kjk;r jgu r; o djkj ikbZ\ & oknhx.k 3- D;k oknksrj ds fo'ks"k dFku dh pj.k la[;k ,d esa of.kZr izdkj ls oknxzLr edku o rfy;k izfroknh dzekad ,d ds LokfeRo o vkf/kiR; dk gSA edku cgqr iqjkuk cuk gqvk gS ;g 1934 esa izfroknh la[;k ,d o mlds firk us rkehj djk;k gSA oknhx.k ml ds firk ukjk;.kth o gsejkt th dk dHkh dCtk oknxzLr edku o efy;s ij ugha jgk gS\ & oknhx.k 4- D;k oknksrj dh fo'ks"k dFku dh pj.k la[;k nks ds rF;ksa ds vuqlkj jgu ,d i{kh; lk{; gS o mlls izfroknhx.k ikcan ugha gS\ & izfroknhx.k 5- D;k oknksrj dh fo'ks"k dFku dh pj.k la[;k nks ds rF;ksa ds vuqlkj oknhx.k dks mDr okn ykus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS\ & izfroknhx.k 6- D;k lDls'ku lfVZfQdsV izkIr ugha djus ls ;g okn ugha py ldrk gS\ & izfroknhx.k 7- D;k oknhx.k okn dCts;kch dk vof/k ds ckgj gS\ & izfroknhx.k 8- nknjlh D;k gksxh\ " 4. It appears that the learned trial Court allowed an application moved by the plaintiffs for permission to lead secondary evidence in relation the mortgage document. The learned trial Court then proceeded to take the evidence led by the parties; and after hearing, proceeded to determine the questions 'involved in the matter by its impugned judgment and decree dated 24.8.2001. 5. It appears that the learned trial Court allowed an application moved by the plaintiffs for permission to lead secondary evidence in relation the mortgage document. The learned trial Court then proceeded to take the evidence led by the parties; and after hearing, proceeded to determine the questions 'involved in the matter by its impugned judgment and decree dated 24.8.2001. 5. The learned trial Court took up issue No. 2 for consideration at the first, being related to the fundamental and core question about existence of mortgage transaction. After a thorough appreciation of the entire evidence led by the parties including the copy of the registered mortgage deed Ex.1-A; the statements of PW-1 Suresh Kumar from the office of the concerned Registrar who deposed about the document having been registered at page Nos. 253 to 255 of the register of the year 1955 and about the fact that the document was obtained by Ramlal from the Registration Department; and the statements of DW-1, the defendant Ramlal, who denied the factum of mortgage and denied his signatures on the document Ex.1-A but then denied his signatures even on the written statement Ex.8 and Vakalatnama Ex.9, the learned trial Court found that the plaintiffs have been able to establish the factum of mortgage from documentary and oral evidence and also observed that in relation to the mortgage deed that was more than 30 years old, presumption could be drawn of its due execution and attestation per Section 89 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned trial Court observed that the defendants have not shown if the mortgage was not subsisting or had been redeemed earlier and decided issue No. 2 in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court observed on issue No. 1 that the suit was essentially for redemption of mortgage and the question of ownership was not as such germane to the real questions in controversy; but of course found the plaintiffs to be the legal heirs of the deceased Narayanji Sunar. 6. The learned trial Court observed on issue No. 1 that the suit was essentially for redemption of mortgage and the question of ownership was not as such germane to the real questions in controversy; but of course found the plaintiffs to be the legal heirs of the deceased Narayanji Sunar. 6. Taking up issue No. 3 on the assertion of the defendants about their ownership of the house in question, the learned trial Court referred to the evidence as produced by the defendants including that relating to letting out of the property or obtaining construction permission but found that such evidence was not the conclusive proof of ownership and there being no other cogent evidence on the question of ownership, decided issue No. 3 against the defendants. The objections regarding the document being a unilateral one as involved in issue No. 4; on the locus of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit as involved in issue No. 5; on want of succession certificate as involved in issue No. 6; and of limitation as involved in issue No. 7 were all decided against the defendants. The learned trial Court, accordingly, while decreeing the suit for redemption of mortgage, proceeded to pass a preliminary decree under Order 34 Rule 7 C.P.C. directing the plaintiffs to make payment of Rs. 3,000/- or to deposit the same in the Court. 7. The matter was taken in appeal by the present appellant (legal representative of original defendant No. 1) and three years later, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was filed wherein it was alleged that the alleged mortgage deed was a fabricated document and was void ab-initial for the reason that Shri Pannalal, grand-father of the appellant, had expired on 31.5.1953, much before the alleged date of registration of the mortgage document, i.e., 14.7.1955. It was alleged that the disputed document carried 'Miti' of Shrawan Bad 6 Svt. 2011 and as per the copies of the Panchang sought to be produced, on that day, the Gregorian calendar date was 21.7.1954' and not 11.7.1955' as stated in the document Ex.1-A. The learned appellate Court considered the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. from all angles and found the fundamental lacuna in the defendants' case that there was nothing on record to establish the date of death of Pannalal. The learned appellate Court noticed that Pannalal's son Ramlal stated in his deposition as DW-1 that he did not remember the date of death of his father. The learned appellate Court also observed that the document Ex.1-A carried specifically the date of 11.7.1955 in the office of Sub-Registrar too and in that view of the matter, found the reference to the Panchang and the Hindi Miti absolutely irrelevant. The learned appellate Court also considered the submission of the appellant that it was alleged in the written statement that Pannalal expired on Jeth Badi 3 of Deepawali Samvat Year 2010; and observed that Deepawali Samvat Year was not of exactitude, was based on different customs, and was not of general acceptance. The learned appellate Court further observed that in any case it was never asserted specifically that on 14.7.1955 Pannalal was not alive and the document was executed in reference to a dead person. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the learned appellate Court observed that there being no specific pleading on the aspect that Pannalal had expired prior to 14.7.1955 and when even his son Ramlal was unable to state the date of demise of his father, there was no necessity of entering into the question if the document was executed in relation to a dead person. The learned appellate Court thereafter examined the entire evidence on record, endorsed the findings of the learned trial Court on the relevant issues, and accordingly proceeded to dismiss the appeal. 8. Seeking to assail the judgment and decree aforesaid, it is contended in the present appeal that the findings on issue Nos. The learned appellate Court thereafter examined the entire evidence on record, endorsed the findings of the learned trial Court on the relevant issues, and accordingly proceeded to dismiss the appeal. 8. Seeking to assail the judgment and decree aforesaid, it is contended in the present appeal that the findings on issue Nos. 1 and 2 are contrary to the evidence on record; that execution of the alleged mortgage deed on 14.7.1955 hovers in a cloud of suspicion because before execution of the said document, Shri Pannalal, grand-father of the appellant, had already expired; that the alleged registered mortgage deed carries no legal value and remains null and void; that the provisions of Sections 66 and 89 of the Indian Evidence Act are not applicable to the present case as the defendant never received the mortgage deed nor had any knowledge about its execution; that the plaintiffs-respondents have failed to establish their title over the suit property; and that the appellate Court has erred in not allowing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The questions as noticed at the outset have been formulated accordingly. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the impugned judgment and decree, this Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved in the matter and the present appeal does not merit admission. The questions as suggested by the appellant at Sl. Nos. 2 and 3 remain baseless and irrelevant. The suit being essentially for redemption of mortgage, the question of exclusive ownership was not as such germane to the real questions in controversy. Then, though the contesting defendant suggested his possession and ownership over last more than 100 years, both the learned subordinate Courts, after a thorough appreciation of evidence on record, have concurrently returned the finding of fact that the defendant has failed to establish his ownership over the house in question. 10. The basic question involved in the matter in issue No. 2 on the factum of mortgage has also been found in favour of the plaintiffs upon proof of the mortgage deed dated 11.7.1955 as registered on 14.7.1955. Appreciation and analysis of evidence in that regard by the subordinate Courts has not been shown suffering from any perversity or any such error of law so as to call for interference in second appeal. Appreciation and analysis of evidence in that regard by the subordinate Courts has not been shown suffering from any perversity or any such error of law so as to call for interference in second appeal. It has clearly been found established that the document was executed on 11.7.1955, was registered on 14.7.1955, and was received by the defendant Ramlal from the Sub-Registrar's office. The question as suggested at Sl. No. 1 does not arise either. 11. The desperate attempt on the part of the appellant to seek re-trial of the matter by putting forward the contention that Pannalal had expired on 31.5.1953 and, therefore, the mortgage document dated 14.7.1955 was a fraudulent one has rightly been found unworthy of consideration by the learned appellate Court for the fundamental reason that no such case was specifically put forward by the defendants before the trial Court that the mortgagee was not alive at the time of execution of the mortgage document. Then, as noticed above, DW-1 Ramlal, son of the mortgagee Pannalal, has chosen to state that he did not remember the date of demise of his father. The submissions as suggested in question No. 4 supra remain hollow for lacking in the very fundamental i.e., of the date of demise of Pannalal. The application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. for permission to produce some Panchang to show Hindi Miti of the dates in question, does not carry any substance for the simple reasons, again, that it was not the specific case of the defendants before the trial Court that Pannalal had expired on 31.5.1953, before the date of the mortgage deed; and there appears not a remote evidence available on record in proof of the fact that Pannalal expired on 31.5.1953; and then, the dates of execution of the mortgage document and its registration have been proved by the official record. Therefore, the learned appellate Court has not committed any error in not allowing the record to be supplemented by way of the documents sought to be produced under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Suggested question No. 5 too falls to the ground. 12. Therefore, the learned appellate Court has not committed any error in not allowing the record to be supplemented by way of the documents sought to be produced under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Suggested question No. 5 too falls to the ground. 12. In an overall comprehension of the matter, this Court feels satisfied that with proof of the registered mortgage deed Ex.1-A, the plaintiffs, heirs of the mortgagor, are entitled to the decree for redemption; and the learned trial Court has not committed any error in passing such decree nor the learned appellate Court has committed any error in rejecting the baseless appeal filed by the present appellant. 13. None of the questions as suggested on behalf of the appellant arises for consideration in this case as substantial question of law. 14. This second appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed summarily.Second appeal dismissed. *******