Judgment :- Common Judgment: 1. These appeals are focussed against the judgment and decree dated 37. 2000 passed in O.S.No.10219 of 1996 by the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. 2. Briefly but broadly, precisely but narratively, the case of the plaintiff, as stood exposited from the plaint could be portrayed and parodied thus:- The deceased Santhanasamy-the father of the plaintiff and defendants and his brother jointly purchased the suit property comprised of the plot and the house situated thereon during the year 1925 from out of the joint funds. Subsequently, Santhanasamy acquired the half share of his brother also during the year 1928 for valid consideration. Thereafter, Santhanasamy and his son-the plaintiff Vanathayya contributed jointly for raising a pucca construction on the above said property. (b) On 5. 1973 Santhanasamy executed the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff, transferring the suit property in his favour. The patta was got transferred in the name of the plaintiff, who also mortgaged the suit property with the Egmore Benefit Society Ltd., on 5. 1974 for a sum of Rs.10,000/-and he started paying tax. As such, the plaintiff has been exercising his right of ownership over the suit property ever since the date of execution of the settlement deed by Santhanasamy, in his favour. .(c) While so, D1, without any legal basis issued the notice dated 2. 1974 to Santhanasamy-the father of the parties, and the plaintiff herein, contending that Santhanasamy was only a benamidar of the suit property and that D1 only had put up construction on the concerned suit property out of his own funds. .(d) D1 filed a suit in O.S.No.2743 of 1974 in the City Civil Court Madras seeking declaration that D1 herein was the legal owner of the suit property, in addition to praying for permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed on 33. 1977. Aggrieved by the same, the appeal in A.S.No.306 of 1977 was filed before the City Civil Court, Madras, and the same was allowed on 12. 1979. As against the same, the Second Appeal, viz., S.A.32 of 1982 was focussed before this Court, which set aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the original suit. 1979. As against the same, the Second Appeal, viz., S.A.32 of 1982 was focussed before this Court, which set aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the original suit. (e) Even after the completion of the earlier proceedings, D1 herein did not come forward to vacate the suit property, despite incessant demands. The plaintiff issued lawyers notice to the defendants on 4. 1993 calling upon them to pay the rents and also directed them to vacate and hand over possession of the suit property on or before 30.4.1993, which evoked false and untenable reply, denying the title of the plaintiff and also ignoring the earlier Court proceedings. The defendants attempt to claim adverse possession was not tenable. Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of his title and for delivery of possession of the suit property, in addition to claiming damages towards use and occupation. 3. Remonstrating and gainsaying the allegations/averments in the plaint, D1 filed the written statement, setting out various averments, the warp and woof of them would run thus:- The disposal of the second appeal No.32 of 1982 by the High Court was on technical grounds, which would not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff. Even in the year 1975, when D1 filed the suit for declaration of his title, he had perfected his title by adverse possession. Neither Santhanasamy nor the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. Accordingly, D1 prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. D2 filed the written statement, the gist and kernal of them would run thus:- .(i) Santhanasamy-the father of the parties to the suit, was the absolute owner of the suit property and along with him the parties to the suit have been in occupation of the same. D1 was earning good income by running a mechanic shed and from out of the income derived from it, he developed the suit property by putting up fresh construction. D1 effected developments in the suit property in the name of his father Santhanasamy. After completing the construction in the 1961, the parties to the suit have been occupying various portions in the suit property, respectively. .(ii) During the year 1970 onwards difference of opinion crepth in, wherefore Santhanasamy betraying D1 and supporting the plaintiff herein, executed the settlement deed dated 5. After completing the construction in the 1961, the parties to the suit have been occupying various portions in the suit property, respectively. .(ii) During the year 1970 onwards difference of opinion crepth in, wherefore Santhanasamy betraying D1 and supporting the plaintiff herein, executed the settlement deed dated 5. 1973 in favour of the plaintiff. But the real fact is that the first defendant is the real owner of the suit property. (iii) D2 gave evidence during trial in the previous suit O.S.2743 of 1974 denying the title of the plaintiff herein over the suit property and supporting the case of the first defendant. Despite such denial, the plaintiff had not chosen to institute legal proceedings as against him for obtaining possession of the suit property within a reasonable time. From 23. 1977 onwards, the possession of D2 became adverse to the interest of the plaintiff in the suit property. Despite the plaintiff having given notice, dated 24. 1977, he did not take any action and as such, D2 acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession by his open and continuous enjoyment of the suit property for more than 12 years as owner, hostile to the claim of the plaintiff. The claim for damages for use and occupation is not tenable. Accordingly, D2 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. D3 filed the written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. 6. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During enquiry, before the trial Court the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A12 were marked on the side of the plaintiff. On the side of the defendants, D1 and D2 examined themselves as D.W.1 and D.W.2 and Exs.B1 to B12 were marked. 7. Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court D1 and D2 filed separate appeals in A.S.No.409 of 2000 and A.S.446 of 2000, respectively. 8. The nitty-gritty of the appeal in A.S.No.409 of 2000 filed by D1 would run thus:- .(a) the trial Court failed to note that the previous proceedings cannot be relied upon by the plaintiff to save limitation in instituting the suit for vacating the defendants and that the adverse possession of D1 cannot be construed as one got interrupted by the previous proceedings. .(b) the trial Court taking into consideration that in the year 1974 itself the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff and they claimed prescriptive title also should have dismissed the suit holding that D2 acquired prescriptive title by adverse possession. .(c) the lower Court was wrong in construing that the defendants were permissive occupiers, as they were born and brought up in the suit property. .(d) the trial Court should have upheld the respective portions under the occupation of the defendants as the ones, over which, the defendants claimed prescriptive title by adverse possession. .(e) The Settlement Deed relied on by the plaintiff was not proved as per law. Accordingly, D1 prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and for dismissing the suit. 9. Quintessentially and precisely the grounds of appeal filed by D2 in A.S.No.446 of 2000 would run thus:- .(i) the suit was barred by limitation, but the trial Court wrongly decreed the suit and that too ignoring the plea of adverse possession pleaded by D2. .(ii) the entire approach of the lower Court was based on wrong proposition of law. (iii) the trial Court took into account only the pleadings and evidence of plaintiff, whereas D1 and D2s case was not at all considered. .(iv) the trial Court wrongly understood as though injunction in O.S.No.2743 of 1974 prevented the plaintiff from filing the suit as against the defendants, even earlier. .(v) the trial Court failed to note that D1 herein alone got the benefit of injunction in O.S.No.2743 of 1974. .(vi) the trial Court failed to note that D2 herein was not a party in the previous suit O.S.No.2743 of 1974. (viii) the trial Courts finding that D2 is the permissive occupier in the suit property was wrong and that too in the absence of any pleading to that effect by the plaintiff. .(ix) the trial Court wrongly understood Ex.B6 and Ex.B7 and held that the plaintiff terminated the licence given to D2. .(x) the D2s specific plea of adverse possession, based on specific interest pleaded in the written statement, and his evidence were not considered by the trial Court. .(xi) D2s evidence would indicate that he denied the title of the plaintiff and that tantamount to ouster of the plaintiff, but the trial Court did not consider the same. (xii) the very issuance of Ex.B12 dated 24. .(xi) D2s evidence would indicate that he denied the title of the plaintiff and that tantamount to ouster of the plaintiff, but the trial Court did not consider the same. (xii) the very issuance of Ex.B12 dated 24. 1977 by the plaintiff to D2 would exemplify that the possession of D2 was adverse to that of the plaintiffs interest in the suit property. (xiii) the lower Court failed to take note of the fact that there was a gap of 16 years between the date of ouster and assertion of hostile title and the date of filing of the suit against D2. (xiv) the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to project as though Ex.B12 was not a genuine one, and the trial Court failed to take note of the conduct of the plaintiff. (xv) the lower Court also was wrong in awarding damages for use and occupation in favour of the plaintiff, payable by D2. Accordingly, D2 prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and for the dismissal of the original suit. 10. The points for consideration are as to: .(i) Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property. .(ii) Whether the defendants 1 and 2 have acquired title by adverse possession over the suit property or to the extent of the portions, which are in their respective possession, in the suit property? (iii) Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 11. Points (i) & (ii): These two points are taken together for discussion, as they are interwoven and interlinked with each other. 12. A resume of facts, which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of the these appeals would run thus:- The relationship among the parties is an admitted one. The deceased Santhanasamys children are the parties to the suit. D1-Doss herein earlier instituted a suit in O.S.No.2743 of 1974 in the City Civil Court, Madras, for obtaining declaration that D1 herein was the real owner of the suit property and his father Santhanasamy was only a benamidar, and for permanent injunction as against the said Santhanasamy and his son the plaintiff herein from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by D1 herein. The said suit was dismissed on 33. The said suit was dismissed on 33. 1977, whereupon appeal A.S.No.306 of 1977 was filed before the City Civil Court, Madras, which reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit. As against which, the second appeal, viz., S.A.No.32 of 1982 was filed before this Court, and this Court set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the original suit. 13. Interim injunction was in force, during the pendency of the plaintiffs suit, but not during the first appellate stage. After the previous litigation initiated by D1 here is was ended in favour of the plaintiff, the latter has chosen to file the suit for declaration and delivery of possession as against the defendants herein. In the previous suit, the plea of D1-Doss herein that he was the absolute owner of the suit property, even though the suit property stood in the name of his father santhanasamy, was negatived and his plea of ownership over the suit property was finally decided as not tenable. As such, in the present suit filed by the plaintiff, who was D2 therein, the present D1 herein cannot once again set up title in himself under any pretext, as it is quite obvious that the principle of res judicata would be applicable as against him. 14. No-doubt, D1-Doss herein would try to lay claim over the suit property as though he acquired prescriptive title over it by adverse possession. Once again I would like to point out that D1 after meeting with his waterloo in the first round of litigation, which he initiated basing his claim on his alleged title over the suit property, cannot try to lay claim over the same suit property by dishing out a plea that he acquired prescriptive title by adverse possession. The previous judgment and decree of the trial Court and as confirmed by this Court, is binding on him. 15. D.W.1-Doss, in his deposition clearly and categorically without mincing words admitted that the suit property was originally purchased by his father Santhanasamy during the year 1928 and that Doss was born in that house. It is therefore quite obvious and apparent that his other brothers, who are parties to the suit, were also born in that house only. 15. D.W.1-Doss, in his deposition clearly and categorically without mincing words admitted that the suit property was originally purchased by his father Santhanasamy during the year 1928 and that Doss was born in that house. It is therefore quite obvious and apparent that his other brothers, who are parties to the suit, were also born in that house only. However, it is the contention of D1-Doss that he only raised construction afresh in the suit property. According to him Ex.A.1-the Settlement Deed, dated 5. 1973, executed by Santhanasamy in favour of plaintiff-Vanathayya is invalid. But all his pleas were negatived in the previous proceedings. Ex.A7-the Printed copy of the judgment in the previous suit O.S.2743/74 would demonstrate and exemplify that DossD1 herein as plaintiff therein filed the suit seeking declaration that he was the real owner of the suit property and that Santhanasamy was only a benamidar and for permanent injunction so as to restrain the said Santhanasamy and Vanathayya-the plaintiff herein not to interfere with the alleged peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by Doss-D1 herein. 16. In the previous suit the relevant issues were framed and ultimately the trial Court held that Ex.A1 herein-the Settlement Deed was valid and the claim of D1 herein was untenable and unacceptable. 17. Ex.A9-is the printed copy of the judgment in the previous appeal 306/77, which would indicate that the judgment and decree of the trial Court was reversed and the previous original suit was decreed. 18. Ex.A.10-the certified copy of the Judgment of this Court in S.A.No.32/82 dated 29. 1991, which would reveal that the judgment of the first appellate Court, as contained in Ex.A9 was reversed and the judgment of the lower Court, as contained in Ex.A7 was restored. 19. The judgment of the High Court was passed on 29. 1991, whereas the present suit was filed in the year 1993. The plaintiff and D1 herein got themselves locked up in litigation in the previous proceedings ever since 1974 till 1991. It is quite obvious from the deposition of D.W.1 and from the whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures relied upon by him that he has not acquired any title by adverse possession and for that matter, it was not his case also earlier. .20. Ex.A2-the mortgage deed dated 5. It is quite obvious from the deposition of D.W.1 and from the whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures relied upon by him that he has not acquired any title by adverse possession and for that matter, it was not his case also earlier. .20. Ex.A2-the mortgage deed dated 5. 1973 executed by the plaintiff-Vanathayya and his wife Arokiameri in favour of the Egmore Benefit Society Fund, would expatiate that the suit property was mortgaged by the plaintiff-Vanathayya, and that is indicative of the fact that the plaintiff-Vanathayya, who got the suit property under Ex.A1-the Settlement Deed executed by Snathanasamy in his favour, was acted upon and that he exercised his right of ownership also even during the life time of Santhanasamy and even while, the other plaintiffs were occupying the suit property. It is a fact, which could be readily seen from the very cause tile of the plaint that the plaintiff herein and the defendants, who are all brothers, are residing in the suit property. 21. Ex.A3-the Property Tax Demand Notice for the year 1991 relating to the suit property, Ex.A4-dated 4. 1993-the Corporation Tax Receipt, Ex.A5-dated 12. 1991-the Water Tax Receipt and Ex.A6-19. 1973-the Original Patta dated 19. 1973, all would all clinchingly demonstrate and establish that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property, that too, to the knowledge of the defendants. 22. D2 would contend as though he acquired prescriptive title to the suit property. It is not known as to how D2 could be even permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, when the circumstances are glaringly as against his plea of adverse possession. D2 even though not a party in the previous proceedings, nonetheless he figured as P.W.5 therein and deposed in support of Doss-who is D1 herein, to the effect that Doss was the real owner of the suit property. He did not depose that D2 herein Mahimaidoss acquired prescriptive title over the suit property by himself. The very suit previously filed by D1 herein itself was for declaring that he was the real owner of the suit property and in support of him D2 herein deposed as detailed supra and it is not known as to how he could be permitted to plead as though he acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. The very suit previously filed by D1 herein itself was for declaring that he was the real owner of the suit property and in support of him D2 herein deposed as detailed supra and it is not known as to how he could be permitted to plead as though he acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. Over and above that, in the written statement itself D2 averred quite antithetical to his plea of adverse possession, wherefore it is just and necessary to extract hereunder his version. "3. This defendant further states that the first defendant was earning good income through his methanic shed. Out of his income the first defendant developed the suit property by making fresh constructions. Though the Tax receipts and Corporation plan stood in the name of the said Santhanasamy it was out of the money spent of D-1 that the suit property was constructed. Since the said Santhanasamy was the head of the family, D-1 made all development in the suit property in the name of his father. After construction of the suit property of the year 1961, the parties to the suit started occupying the suit property and have been living there in their respective portions." 23. Absolutely there is no exiguous or modicum extent of evidence to exemplify that the portion of the suit property in which D2 is occupying has been treated by him as his exclusive property so as to lay claim over that portion by way of adverse possession. It is an admitted fact that in the suit property the plaintiff and defendants are all residing. On the one hand D1 would contend that he acquired title by adverse possession for the entire suit property and even for argument sake if it is taken that D1 also is claiming adverse possession relating to the portion under his occupation in the suit property. There is no proof of he having exercised ownership. 24. Not to put too fine a point on it, it is the basic and rudimentary principle of law relating to adverse possession that the person who claims adverse possession should clearly spell out as to which area is under his exclusive, open, continuous, uninterrupted possession as owner and that too hostile to the interest of the real owners. 24. Not to put too fine a point on it, it is the basic and rudimentary principle of law relating to adverse possession that the person who claims adverse possession should clearly spell out as to which area is under his exclusive, open, continuous, uninterrupted possession as owner and that too hostile to the interest of the real owners. It is well known that when the defendants plead adverse possession as against the plaintiff, it implies that the defendants admit the title of the plaintiff. Here virtually D2 set up absolute title in D1-Doss, whereas, he pleads adverse possession as against the plaintiff-Vanathayya. The fact remains that D1-Doss, who instituted the previous suit claiming that he was the owner lost his contention and claim over the suit property and in such a case it is not known as to how D2, who placed reliance on D1s title and estranged the plaintiff, could plead prescriptive title at all against the plaintiff-Vanathayya. 25. A mere perusal of it would clearly indicate that the contentions of D1 and D2 in the written statement as well as in their depositions relating to adverse possession before the trial Court are not even worth the paper on which they were written/recorded. .26. D2s contention is to the effect that after the dismissal of the previous suit O.S.2743/74 initiated by D1-Doss herein, by the trial Court, Vanathayya-the plaintiff herein issued Ex.B12-Notice dated 24. 1977 to D2 and thereafter, no steps were taken by the plaintiff-Vanathayya to evict or get vacated D2 from the suit property; but on the other hand Vanathayya-plaintiff filed the suit only during the year 1993 after lapse of more than 12 years(here it has to be clarified that originally the present suit was filed under C.S.812/93 before this Court and subsequently it was transferred to the City Civil Court and numbered as 10219 of 1996). He would also contend that the lower Court was wrong in assuming as though injunction was in force as against the plaintiff-Vanathayya herein in the previous proceedings and that was why he was not in a position to take steps to evict the defendants herein, even though indubitably and indisputably injunction was obtained only by Doss-D1 during the pendency of the earlier suit in the trial Court. 27. The plea of D2 is ex facie and prima facie legally not tenable. 27. The plea of D2 is ex facie and prima facie legally not tenable. Barely because Ex.B12-Notice was issued to Mahimaidoss-D2 on 24. 77 calling upon him to vacate the suit property and that he filed the suit only after the Second Appeal in the previous matter was disposed of, there is no presumption that D2 acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. Whether injunction was in force, at the instance of D1-Doss in the previous proceedings, only during the trial stage or till the end of second appeal, is not at all germane for deciding the case. The fact remains that in the previous proceedings, the very title of Vanathayya was disputed and D2 as well as D1 herein, who are contesting the present proceedings, figured as witnesses and denied the title of the plaintiff-Vanathayya herein and in such a case it is not known as to how Vanathayya could be expected to file a suit for vacating D2 alone because D2 was not a party in the previous proceedings. After the issuance of notice-Ex.B12, the appeal was came to be filed by Doss as against the judgment and decree of the lower Court. Whereupon Vanathayya was contesting the appeal and after loosing the appeal, he approached the High Court and got the trial Courts judgment restored as per the High Court judgment dated 29. 1991, which was in his favour. Thereupon, without wasting much time, he filed C.S.No.812 of 1993 and that too after issuing notice as contained in Ex.A11 dated 4. 1993. 28. It is pertinent to note that in respect of Ex.B12 as well as Ex.A11 notices sent by the plaintiff to D2, no reply was given by D2. From that itself adverse inference could rightly be drawn that D2 had no specific case of his own to put forth. No doubt the plaintiff, perhaps out of over reaching himself or out of some confused legal understanding of the circumstances might have averred that Ex.B12 was not issued by him, but the Court clearly found that Ex.B12 was issued through his Advocate. The fact remains that D2 has not chosen to reply either to Ex.B12 notice or Ex.A11 notice. In fact only D1-Doss replied vide Ex.A12. The fact remains that D2 has not chosen to reply either to Ex.B12 notice or Ex.A11 notice. In fact only D1-Doss replied vide Ex.A12. As has been already highlighted supra Doss-D1 already lost his contention in the previous proceedings and he cannot put forth his plea of adverse possession for the reasons delineated to supra. 29. Inasmuch as, because after issuing Ex.B12-notice, as aforesaid, the Plaintiff had not filed the suit as against D2, there is no presumption under law that automatically after 12 years from the date of Ex.B12, the defendant D2 is deemed to have acquired prescriptive title. If any such finding is given, it would amount to doing violence to law and justice and more specifically to the recent decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2007 (4) MLJ 912 (SC) (P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy and others vs. Revamma and others) – certain excerpts from it would run thus: "5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. (See Downing v. Bird; Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock; Monnot v. Murphy; City of Rock Springs v. Sturm.) 6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p.81.) It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go-by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim. 8. Also See Privy Councils decision in Chung Ping Kwan and Others v. Lam Island Development Company Limited (Hong Kong) (1997) Ac 38 in this regard. 9. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “wilful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. 10. It is interesting to see the development of adverse possession law in the backdrop of the status of right to property in the 21st century. The aspect of stronger property rights regime in general, coupled with efficient legal regimes furthering the rule of law argument, has redefined the thresholds in adverse possession law not just in India but also by the Strasbourg Court. Growth of human rights jurisprudence in recent times has also palpably affected the developments in this regard. New consideration in adverse possession law 11. Growth of human rights jurisprudence in recent times has also palpably affected the developments in this regard. New consideration in adverse possession law 11. In that context it is relevant to refer to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring to the Court of Appeal judgment JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham made the following reference: “Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol.” 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree, which is required for adverse possession to materialize. 21. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India in the following terms: (SCC p.785, para 11) “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 22. It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 32. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession. The ingredients of adverse possession have succinctly been stated by this Court in S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina in the following terms: (AIR p.1256, para 5) “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found." (emphasis supplied) 30. The learned counsel for D2 would contend that there had been no possibility of D2 approaching the authorities to get change of patta or change of name in the property tax register of the Corporation in his name in view of the Court proceedings and that itself would exemplify that the plaintiff has not acquired earlier adverse possession over the area under his occupation. 31. I am at a loss to understand as to how D1 and D2 occupying a portion of building, could simply contend that they acquired prescriptive title over it without in any way producing any peace of document that they exercised their right of ownership over that area. The "animus possidendi on owner" that they are the owners of the respective shares should have been found exemplified objectively. It is axiomatic that mere possession alone would not constitute adverse possession and thereby attract title in favour of the possessor. 32. Ex.B4 refers to bunch of House Tax Receipts, which would all speak in the name of Santhanasamy. The payment of tax by the defendants in the name of Santhanasamy would not in any way enure to their benefit to plead prescriptive title. In fact that would tantamount to their categorical admission and subjugation that they are under the plaintiff and not as absolute owners of the suit property. 33. Similarly, Ex.B5-the bunch of Electricity Receipts to the effect that Doss-D1 paid the Electricity consumption charges would not in any way demonstrate that he became the owner of the portion under his occupation in the suit property. 34. It is quite obvious from the list of documents appended to the lower Court judgment itself that D2 could not produce any evidence much less any clinching evidence in support of his plea of adverse possession. 35. The learned counsel for the defendants cited various decisions, which are being dealt with in seriatim. (i) (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 161) – BONDAR SINGH AND OTHERS VS. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS. 35. The learned counsel for the defendants cited various decisions, which are being dealt with in seriatim. (i) (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 161) – BONDAR SINGH AND OTHERS VS. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS. This decision has been cited out of context on the D2s side for the reason that the facts involved in that case is to the effect that the person who pleaded adverse possession had been in possession of the property under an unregistered and unstamped Sale Deed and for collateral purpose that was taken into consideration and held that it enured to the benefit of the person concerned to plead adverse possession. But here it is quite obvious that D1 and D2 simply, along with others, resided in the suit property and nothing more and it cannot be construed that they exercised right of ownership over it. .(ii) (AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 1893 – VASANTIBEN PRAHLADJI NAYAK AND OTHERS VS. SOMNATH MULJIBHAI NAYAK AND OTHERS). This decision is not relevant to this case for the reason that the facts involved in that case are to the effect that the defendants, by their hostile intention, long and uninterrupted possession and by exercising right of exclusive ownership openly to the knowledge of the owner, acquired prescriptive title and the plaintiff therein was precluded from contending that period of limitation would run only from the date on which he acquired ownership. It is quite obvious that this decision has been erroneously relied on the D2s side. 36. Absolutely there is no quarrel over the legal proposition as found set out in the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court cited on D2s side, but the facts involved in this case, as discussed supra, do not satisfy the standard expected by the Honourable Apex Court. (iii) An excerpt from (AIR 1988 BOMBAY 348) – JOTI DADU NAVALE VS. MANUKABAI KASHINATH MOHITE, would run thus: "10. I cannot part with the judgment without observing that apart from the question of validity of the adoption of the defendant, there is the question as to whether the plaintiff was not entitled to one-half share in the suit property instead of one-fourth share claimed by her and given to her. In the instant case, both the plaintiff as well as the defendant claimed right to the property as the heir of their father, Dadu. In the instant case, both the plaintiff as well as the defendant claimed right to the property as the heir of their father, Dadu. This means that the suit properties were either the separate properties or the self acquired properties of Dadu. I am assuming that they were the ancestral properties in his hand. But obviously, if they were the ancestral properties he was the last surviving coparcener and hence they were his separate properties within the meaning of Hindu Law. He had all the right in the world to dispose them the way he liked. In other words, the entirety of the property vested in himself alone before he adopted the defendant as his son. If that was the position, then under S.12, proviso © of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the adoption could not have the result of reducing his full share in the property to one-half share, because as per proviso © an adopted child cannot have the right to divest any person of any estate which had vested in him beore the adoption. On the date of adoption, 6. 1958, therefore, the defendant got no share whatsoever in the suit property. He continued to have no share therein till the date of death of Dadu. Upon the death of Dadu, he got the share in the same, but by succession, not by survivorship. It is, thus, clear that he got share equally with his sister, the plaintiff. It must follow that the plaintiff had one-half share and not only one-fourth share in the property. The statement made by her in Para 3 of her plaint to the effect that she had one fourth share in the suit property was evidently the result of palpably wrong legal advice received by her. Unfortunately, the benefit of it has gone to the defendant only, who has proved himself none other than a rank grabber: feeling no hesitation to do down his own sister." A mere perusal of it would highlight that here the facts are entirely different as set out supra and the said decision is not applicable. (iii) Certain excerpts from (1996 AIR SCW 3751) – ARWATABAI V. SONABAI AND OTHERS would run thus: "3. (iii) Certain excerpts from (1996 AIR SCW 3751) – ARWATABAI V. SONABAI AND OTHERS would run thus: "3. Shri U.R. Lalit, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that since the husband of the appellant remained in possession, pursuant to the gift deed executed by Parwatabai, by operation of explanation (b) to Article 65, burden is on the respondents to establish as to when the possession of the appellant became adverse and they failed to discharge the same. Therefore the appropriate article applicable to the facts would be Article 64 and not Article 65. We find no force in the contention. Admittedly, after the demise of Panjuba, Parwatabai succeeded as Widows estate prior to 1941 and that, therefore, she was only life estate holder to enjoy the estate for her life time. Under the gift deed, what she could bequeath was enjoyment of life estate and not right and title of the property of Punjaba. Consequently, on her demise, the appellants being heirs of Punjaba are entitled to assert their right to the property of their father on the basis of their title. 4. Article 65 of the Act postulates that for possession of immovable property or any inter-est therein based on title, when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff, the suit has to be filed within 12 years. Therefore, when the plaintiffs asserted their title on the basis of succession to the estate of their father, it is for the appellant to prove as to on which date the appellants possession has become adverse to the respondents title. In this case, the appellant Court and the High Court found that the appellant had not established as to what was the exact date from which the adverse possession started running. Since Parwatabai died in 1966, admittedly, the plaintiff had filed the suit in 1976 within 10 years. Under those circumstances, the appellant had not perfected the title by prescription. The Courts below have rightly applied article 65 and decreed the suit. It is not vitiated by any error of law warranting interference." 37. It is therefore clear that the defendants must be able to say from which date onwards adverse possession started commencing. Counsel for D2 would contend that from the date of Ex.B12-the Notice sent by the plaintiff-Vanathayya to D2, the adverse possession started running. 38. It is not vitiated by any error of law warranting interference." 37. It is therefore clear that the defendants must be able to say from which date onwards adverse possession started commencing. Counsel for D2 would contend that from the date of Ex.B12-the Notice sent by the plaintiff-Vanathayya to D2, the adverse possession started running. 38. I am at a loss to understand as to how the issuance of notice by the plaintiff, calling upon D2 to vacate, would constitute date of commencement of adverse possession, as absolutely there is no legal basis for that. There should be evidence to show from which date onwards D2 exercised his right of ownership and that too hostile to the interest of the real owner, namely, the plaintiff. But absolutely there is no evidence and in fact, D2s written statement at paragraph No.4 would run thus:- "4. . . . . . . but the real fact is that the first defendant is the full owner of the property having constructed the same out of his own funds." (emphasis supplied) After pleading in the present suit itself as aforesaid to the effect that D1 is the absolute owner of the entire suit property, it is not known as to how D2 can set up the plea of adverse possession as against the plaintiff. 39. It is therefore clear that D2 even in the written statement never claimed that he had the animus possidendi adverse to the interest of the real owner. According to D2, D1 is the real owner and D2 is not pleading prescriptive title as against D1 and from this itself it could be understood as to how D2s plea of adverse possession is fraught with inconsistencies and misconceptions and no more elaboration in this regard is requited. In the wake of it, it is clear that the other judgments, which have been cited on the D2s side are in no way helpful to them. However, I would consider those judgments here under in seriatim:- (i) (1994) 6 SCC 591 – Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) vs. Arvind Kumar. This decision is relating to a case of possession, which emerged under a licence and the Honourable Apex Court clearly held that the burden of proof is on the person pleading that the possession became adverse. .(ii) AIR 1939 ALLAHABAD 728 – MOHAMMAD UMAR VS. ABDUL GHANI. This decision is relating to a case of possession, which emerged under a licence and the Honourable Apex Court clearly held that the burden of proof is on the person pleading that the possession became adverse. .(ii) AIR 1939 ALLAHABAD 728 – MOHAMMAD UMAR VS. ABDUL GHANI. This decision is relied on for the proposition that if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was in possession under a lease and if the lease is not proved, it would constitute adverse possession. Here, the facts are entirely different and it is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendants expressly took, on licence from Vanathayya, the suit property. 40. In fact, the whole kit and caboodle of the facts and figures placed before the lower Court would clearly exemplify that the defendants were born in the suit property as per their version and they continued to be there. The apple of discard is between two group, one comprised of the father of the defendants and the plaintiff, and the other group the defendants 1 and 2 and that dispute now got culminated in the form of the present suit, after D1 herein having faced debacle in the previous suit. Hence the above said decisions cited are not in any way helpful to the defendants. (iii) (AIR (35) 1948 Allahabad 31) – B.Budhram Rai vs. Benarsi Rai and others. This decision would highlight the following proposition: "There can be no adverse possession without an animus to prescribe: 30 A.I.R.1943 All.362 and 34 A.I.R.1947 P.C.19. The question of animus is a question of personal equation and all depends upon the will of the person in possession. It has no relation to anyone else. Hence, so long as the intention to prescribe is lacking, the question as to whether the possession was with the permission of the proper person or of some other person is immaterial." Here it is not known as to how the said proposition found posited in the cited decision would enure to the benefit of the D2 but as the contrary it is against D2. (iv) (AIR 1982 JAMMU AND KASHMIR 141) – Avtar Singh and others vs. Th.Atma Singh and others: This decision is relied on by D2 to highlight that mere pendency of earlier proceedings would not cause interdiction relating to adverse possession allegedly accrued in favour of D2 with effect from the date of issuance of Ex.B12. As has been already highlighted supra, there is nothing to indicate that from Ex.B12 onwards D2 started exercising his exclusive right of ownership over the area under his occupation in the suit property by performing any act of exclusive ownership. 41. However, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would cite the following decisions clinchingly and convincingly: (I) An excerpt from ( AIR 1984 SC 930 ) – GAVA PARSHAD DIKSHIT VS. DR.NIRMAL CHANDER AND ANOTHER, would run thus: ". . . . . . We find ourselves wholly in agreement with the view taken by the High Court that mere termination of the licence of a licensee does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession unless and until he sets up a title hostile to that of the licensor after termination of his licence. It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough. Here in the present case thereh is nothing to show that at any time after termination of his licence by Dr.Rama Shanker or by the first respondent the appellant asserted hostile title in himself. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough. Here in the present case thereh is nothing to show that at any time after termination of his licence by Dr.Rama Shanker or by the first respondent the appellant asserted hostile title in himself. The High Court was, therefore right in taking the view that the appellant had not established any title by adverse possession and in that view of the matter the suit of the first respondent for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant was not barred under Article 65 which is the only Article of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable in the present case. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal." (emphasis supplied) .(II) (AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 73) – THAKUR KISHAN SINGH (DEAD) V. ARVIND KUMAR. 42. In fact, the cited judgments on plaintiffs side clearly answers the contention of D2 and highlights as to how D2 was not right in simply relying on alleged inaction of plaintiff in not filing the suit as against D2 despite issuing Ex.B12-notice. Absolutely there is no modicum or miniscule extent of evidence to show that D1 and D2 exercised any right of exclusive ownership in the suit property. Accordingly, these points are decided in favour of the plaintiff and as against the defendants D1 and D2. 43. In view of the ratiocination adhered to in deciding the above issues, I could see no infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court and the same are confirmed. Consequently, these appeals stand dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.