Judgment : 1. This writ petition is directed against the proceedings of the respondents under the provisions of Act 31 of 1978, whereby the property of the petitioners mere acquired for the purpose of formation of a pathway to the burial ground for the benefit of Adi Dravidare of Thekkal Naickenpatti Village, Pappiredipatti Taluk in Dharmapuri District. 2. The factual matrix necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are an under: The property in Survey No. 150/10 in Thekkal Naickenpatti Village, having an extent of.70 hectares absolutely belongs the petitioners. When they came to know of the proposal of the respondents to acquire the said property for the purpose of Adi Dravidars of the area, they have submitted a representation to the first respondent on 212. 1996. However without considering the said representation the second respondent issued a notice under Rule 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Lands for Harijan Welfare Scheme Rules 1979. In response to the said notice, the petitioners have submitted their objection. Subsequently the first respondent had published a notification in the-District Gazette on 16. 1998 under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Lands for Harijan Welfare Act, 1979 (hereinafter refer red to as “Act 31 of 1978”). The said notification is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. According to the petitioners, the acquisition in question is invalid for the following reasons. (a) The petitioners are all small farmers eking their livelihood out of the meager income derived from the said land and in case of acquisition of land, they would be put to difficulties. (b) The impugned acquisition is violative of the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 378 dated 23. 1986 as the said Government Order prohibits the acquisition of land of the Scheduled Caste for any purpose. (c) There was no subjective satisfaction by the Collector before passing the order under Section 4(1) of the Act. 4. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit wherein they have contended that originally acquisition was proposed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as per notification under Section 4(1) dated 21. 1977 and subsequently after the introduction of Act 31 of 1978, the acquisition was continued under the said Act. 4. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit wherein they have contended that originally acquisition was proposed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as per notification under Section 4(1) dated 21. 1977 and subsequently after the introduction of Act 31 of 1978, the acquisition was continued under the said Act. Proceedings were subsequently commenced by issue of notice under Section 4(2) of Act 31 of 1978 and the statutory notice under Rule 3(1) was served on the pattadars and enquiry was conducted on 23. 1998. 5. It was only after consideration of the objection filed by the petitioners that the proposal was approved by the Collector under Section 4(1) of the Act and accordingly the same was published in Dharmapuri District Gazette dated 16. 1998. Subsequently award enquiry under Section 5(2) was conducted on 20.8.1998 and in the said enquiry the daughter in law of the first petitioner took part and presented her objection and on consideration of the objection submitted by the land owners in respect of Survey Nos. 150/13 and 150/16, award was passed by overruling the objection. The second respondent, has also admitted the receipt of representation from the first petitioner on 212. 1996 requesting the respondents to abstain from acquiring the property in Survey No. 150/10. However the action taken by the respondents for acquiring the property was justified on the ground that the proceedings were already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The second respondent also contended that the property of the petitioners are fit for the purpose of making a path way to the burial ground in existence and no other lands were available for the said purpose. 6. Thiru Kandavadivel Doraisamy, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no attempt made by the District Collector to consider the objections submitted by the petitioners and without satisfying himself about the need and necessity to acquire the land of the petitioners, the first respondent has issued the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 6. Thiru Kandavadivel Doraisamy, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no attempt made by the District Collector to consider the objections submitted by the petitioners and without satisfying himself about the need and necessity to acquire the land of the petitioners, the first respondent has issued the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It was also contended that though Section 4(1) mandates that the concerned District Collector, has to be satisfied about the necessity for acquiring the property, no such consideration has been made by the District Collector, and on the other hand, it was only the satisfaction of the Government that weighed with the Collector to issue the impugned notification under Section 4(1) and as such the very notification has to be quashed. Learned counsel also relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in R. Pari v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Devakkottai and Others (2007) 2 MLJ 706 : (2006) 3 LW 1000 as well as the judgment of a Division Bench in Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R. Manickammal (2002) 2 CTC 1 as also the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court in M. Nagu v. District Collector, Sivagangai District (2008)4 MLJ 609 : (2008) 2 CTC 468 in support of his contentions. .7. The learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that though Section 4(1) mandates that the District Collector has to be satisfied about the necessity to acquire the land by invoking the provisions of Act 31 of 1978 and as the Collector is part of the Government, it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the Government was not enough to proceed with the acquisition. It was the further contention of the learned Government Advocate that due opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit their objections and in fact their objections were considered by the first respondent and it was only after overruling those objections, that the acquisition was proceeded with. In such view of the matter, the learned Government Advocate prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. In such view of the matter, the learned Government Advocate prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. Even though the petitioners have challenged the land acquisition on various grounds including failure to grant necessary opportunity to submit their objections and failure of the first respondent to consider the objections submitted on behalf of petitioners, the consideration of those issued are not necessary in the present case inasmuch as the very notification under Section 4(1) is liable to be quashed on the ground of failure of the Collector to satisfy himself about the necessity to acquire the land in question. 9. The acquisition in question in the present mater has been resorted to under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of lands for Harijan Welfare Scheme Act. The Harijan Welfare Scheme Act is a self contained code and the District Collector is given the authority to acquire the land on the basis of his subjective satisfaction that the land is required for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme. Unlike the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Act 31 of 1978 gives clear authority to the District Collector to proceed with the acquisition, even without reference to the Government. .10. Section 4(1) of Act 31 of 1978 gives power to the District Collector to acquire the land for the purpose of any of the Harijan Welfare Schemes, in case the Collector was of the opinion that such acquisition is necessary. However before taking a decision to acquire the property, the Collector is required to issue notice to the perso9n, who in the opinion of the District Collector got. Interest in the said property. The Collector is required to issue notice under Rule 3(1) giving fifteen days time to the interested parties to submit their objections. Such notice need not be issued by the Collector himself and the same can also been issued by his delegate. In case notice has been issued by the Collector himself, he has to consider the objection submitted by the land owners in pursuance of such notice and only after satisfying himself about the necessity to acquire the and,, that the notification under Section 4(1) could be issued by the Collector. In case notice has been issued by the Collector himself, he has to consider the objection submitted by the land owners in pursuance of such notice and only after satisfying himself about the necessity to acquire the and,, that the notification under Section 4(1) could be issued by the Collector. In the event of the Collector delegating the function to an officer authorized by him and the notice under Rule 3(1) was issued by the said officer, the objection submitted by the parties interested in the land against such acquisition, has to be considered by the delegate and he should submit a report to the District Collector containing the recommendation on the cause so shown for the decision of the Collector. Therefore, in cases wherein enquiry proceedings under Rule 3(1) has been issued by the Collector, enquiry has to be conducted by the Collector and in case of proceedings issued by the delegate of the Collector, enquiry should be conducted by the said authority and a report to the said effect has to be submitted to the District Collector with the recommendations. However, in both the cases, the Collector has to apply his mind and only after satisfying himself that the property is required for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme, that the Collector is authorized to issue the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 11. The scheme of the Act is very clear that the ultimate authority is only the Collector for the purpose of acquiring the property for the Welfare of Harijans and it was only after publication of the notice under Section 4(1) in the District Gazette that the land would vest with the Government free from all encumbrances. .12. The procedure prescribed under Act 31 of 1978 is very stringent inasmuch as the safeguards available to a land owner in a proceeding initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not available in respect of acquisition under Act, 31 of 1978. Since the reason for introducing the special enactment is for the purpose of early acquisition of property for the benefit of Harijans, the lengthy procedure contemplated under the Central Act has not been incorporated under the Special Act. Since the reason for introducing the special enactment is for the purpose of early acquisition of property for the benefit of Harijans, the lengthy procedure contemplated under the Central Act has not been incorporated under the Special Act. Since the Harijan Welfare Scheme Act permits the District Collector to acquire the property, after resorting to a summary procedure contemplated under the Act, the provisions of the said Act has to be interpreted in a stringent manner. When the statute mandates that a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done in that manner. When the Collector is given the authority to consider the question of acquisition of the property, the satisfaction should be that of the Collector himself and the satisfaction arrived at by the Government cannot be substitute for the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Collector. In the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, it is found that the satisfaction has been arrived at by the Government and the Collector was acting only in accordance with the decision taken by the Government to acquire the land. Even though the District Collector can be termed to be a representative of the Government, but by no stretch of imagination, the Collector can be termed to be the Government. The legislature in their wisdom thought it fit to give power to a lower grade officer of the state administration and such conferment of power was granted for the specific purpose to conclude the land acquisition proceedings without waiting for the approval at a various levels of the Government as done under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 13. The notification issued by the Collector and impugned in the present writ petition shows that the subjective satisfaction to acquire the property has been arrived at by the Government and the Collector has exercised his powers under Section 4(1) of the Act only for the purpose of implementing the decision of the Government to acquire the property for the purpose of Adi Dravidar Welfare Scheme. 14. 14. There is no mention in the notification that an opinion has been formed by the Collector to acquire the property on a careful consideration of the objections files by the land owners/persons interested in the land, in pursuance of the notice issued under Section 4(2) of the Act and more particularly in the statutory format issued under Rule 3(1) of Act 31 of 1978. The satisfaction of the Government is immaterial in the case of such acquisition. In case the Collector has decided to drop the acquisition or to acquire the property, in either of these cases, the Government cannot direct the District Collector to exercise the power under Section 4(1) in a particular manner. The act gives a clear mandate to the Collector to decide about the necessity to acquire the land for the purpose of Adi Dravidars. 15. The constitutional validity of Act 31 of 1978 has been challenged before this Court and the Act was struck down as ultra vires of the constitution of India. The matter was taken up before the Apex Court and as found from the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandi Ammal AIR 1995 SC 2114 : (1995) 1 SCC 519 that the entire scheme of the Act was taken into consideration by the Supreme Court and the Act was upheld except the provision regarding payment of compensation in instalments as contained in Section 11. While considering the validity of the Harijan Welfare Scheme Act, the Apex Court also considered the basic difference between the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vis-à-vis the provisions of Act 31 of 1978. After analyzing the provisions as contained under Sections 3 and 4 of Act 31 of 1978, the Apex Court observed that the satisfaction for the purpose of acquiring the property must be that of the District Collector and observed thus: “8. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 empowers the District Collector, if he is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire some land for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme, to acquire that land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire it in pursuance of Section 4. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 empowers the District Collector, if he is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire some land for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme, to acquire that land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire it in pursuance of Section 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 obliges the District Collector or any officer authorized by him in this behalf to call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the District Collector or the officer so authorized, is interested in such land to show cause why it should not be acquired. Where the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under subsection (2), clause (a) of sub-section (3) requires him to pass orders on the cause so shown. Where an officer authorized by the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), clause (b) of Section 3 requires that officer to report to the District Collector his recommendations on the cause so shown and the District Collector is required to pass such orders as he may deem fit after considering the report. Sub-Section (2) of Section 4, therefore, obliges the acquiring authority to serve notice upon the landowner and other persons interested in the land to show cause why it should not be acquired. By reason of sub-section (3) of Section 4, such cause has to be taken into account and orders passed in respect thereof. It is only thereafter that the acquiring authority can arrive at the satisfaction that is necessary to acquire the land. The provisions of Section 4 therefore, substantially encapsulate the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the only major difference being that, under the said Act, it is the District Collector and not the State Government who must be satisfied that the land is required to be acquired. It does not appear to us that this is a provision which is unreasonable or arbitrary.” 16. It does not appear to us that this is a provision which is unreasonable or arbitrary.” 16. The question regarding the necessity for the Collector to give personal hearing to the owner in the context of their objection and the remarks of the Tahsildar, the entitlement of the owner to a copy of the report of the Special Tahsildar as well as necessity for the Collector to record his reason with respect to the objection submitted by the land owner were considered by the Full Bench of this Court in R. Pari v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Devakkottai and Others (supra). The Full Bench considered the extensive power given to the Collector under the State Act and made the following observation at p. 717 of MLJ: “19. Under the Central Act, the power of eminent domain is with the appropriate Government, which obviously would mean an officer of very high rank and experience, whereas under the State Act it is with the Collector, who obviously is an officer of much inferior rank and less experience as compared to the Secretary to the Government. Since enormous power and responsibility have been vested with a comparatively less senior and less experienced officer, to lessen the possibility of any arbitrary and immature decisions being taken, it is always desirable to strengthen the procedural safeguard by reading into the provisions, the principles of natural justice in the shape of at least giving an opportunity of making a further representation to the Collector on the recommendation/report of the authorized officer.” 17. The Full Bench in R. Pari v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Devakkottai and Others (supra) after considering the scheme of the Act with particular reference to the proceeding before the Collector under Section 4(2) of the Act, and which culminated in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act answered the questions thus at p. 728 of MLJ: “43. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are as follows: The owner should be furnished with a copy of the report/recommendation of the authorized officer. Thereafter, he should be given “two weeks” time to make further representation, if any, before the District Collector to give a further personal hearing or make any further enquiry. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are as follows: The owner should be furnished with a copy of the report/recommendation of the authorized officer. Thereafter, he should be given “two weeks” time to make further representation, if any, before the District Collector to give a further personal hearing or make any further enquiry. However, mere non-furnishing of the report would not have the ipso facto effect of vitiating the proceedings and the question of prejudice to the land owner is required to be considered in each case depending upon the facts and circumstances. The District Collector is expected to reflect the reasons, but merely because the communication to the land owner does not contain the reasons, the decision of the Collector is not ipso facto vitiated and it would always open to the concerned authority to prove before the Court, if such action of the Collector is challenged, that there has been application of mind and the reasons are available in the relevant records relating to such acquisition. The necessity to record the reasons is applicable where the Collector himself makes the enquiry and also where the Collector takes an appropriate decision on the basis of the report/recommendation made by the authorized officer.” 18. The judgment of the Full Bench in R. Pari v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Devakkottai and Others (supra) case also gives a clear indication that the decision to acquire the property must come from the Collector. The Full Bench held that the decision of the Collector is not ipso facto vitiated on account of absence of reasons in the communication to the land owners and in case such action is challenged before the Court, the action of the Collector to acquire the land can be proved by way of materials available in the file to show that there has been application of mind. This also shows that the Collector has to apply his mind with regard to the satisfaction to be arrived at for acquiring the property for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme. 19. This also shows that the Collector has to apply his mind with regard to the satisfaction to be arrived at for acquiring the property for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme. 19. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court considered the very issue with regard to supremacy of the Collector in the matter of acquisition of property for Harijan Welfare Scheme in Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R. Manickammal (supra) and the Division Bench speaking through the Honourable Chief Justice observed thus: “The provision is absolute in so many words that if the Collector is satisfied that the lands should be acquired, he will acquire the land and then when a notification is issued, the land vests absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act. A decision to acquire a land by the Collector has to be exercised only by the Collector by application of his mind independently and the Legislature did not provide any power of delegation. This legislature did not even reserve any power in the State to have a supervisory role as is provided in the Central Act. In view of he amending Act 68/84, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (Central Act), the Government role is increased, as, before passing the award, there is every right for the Government to probe into the award and direct the Land Acquisition Officer to modify the award. Even with regard to the finality of the acquisition, the report under Section 5-A has to be sent to the Government and even if the report is against the acquisition, the Government can overrule the said decision of the Land Acquisition Officer and direct the publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Such contingency is not provided in the State Act. It is well settled law that when the Legislature did not name any other authority for the exercise of powers and names only a particular authority, only that particular authority has to exercise the power and nobody else. In this view of the matter, the learned single Judge has rightly held that the Governmental intervention was unwarranted and without jurisdiction.” 20. In this view of the matter, the learned single Judge has rightly held that the Governmental intervention was unwarranted and without jurisdiction.” 20. In a very recent case, the issue regarding subjective satisfaction to be arrived at by the Collector came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this Court in M. Nagu v. District Collector, Sivagangai District (supra) and the learned Judge considered similar notification as in the present case issued under Section 4(1) of Act 31 of 1978 and held that the notification issued under Section 4(1) was bad in law since it was clear from the records that it was only the Government which satisfied itself about the acquisition and not the District Collector as required by law. 21. Even though it is possible for the Government to delegate some of the functions to the Collector as per the provisions of the relevant statute, it is not possible for the Government to take up the function of a Collector when the statute clearly mandates that the power has to be exercised by the Collector himself. Though the officers like the Collectors are also the limb of the Government, in matters wherein subjective satisfaction of the collector has to be arrived at for particular purpose, the Government cannot substitute its opinion or views in the place of the Collector. The legislature was very conscious of the fact that in case Government is entrusted with the responsibility to acquire the land, it will take its own course as the file has to be rooted through different departments at various levels and the ultimate decision would be taken only after considerable delay. 22. The very purpose of enacting the Harijan Welfare Scheme Act is to achieve the constitutional purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 46 of the Constitution of India as contained in the directive principles. While interpreting the provisions of an enactment, intention behind framing such law by the legislature also assumes significance and without reference to such factors, the provisions cannot be interpreted in isolation. In fact, previously the lands for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme were also acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. While interpreting the provisions of an enactment, intention behind framing such law by the legislature also assumes significance and without reference to such factors, the provisions cannot be interpreted in isolation. In fact, previously the lands for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme were also acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was only when the Government found that the acquisition in such cases often takes considerable time, for culmination in passing the award and to take possession, that the legislature has enacted the special Act to reduce the delay in acquiring the property, for Harijan Welfare Scheme. In fact, one of the main arguments before the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandi Ammal (supra) was to the effect that the entire matter was left to the District Collector to be satisfied that the land has to be acquired for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme. It was only in consideration of the said contention and taking into account the stringent provisions of the Act, that the Supreme Court observed that the Collector is the supreme authority in the matter of acquisition under Act 31 of 1978. 23. The Apex Court in T. Ashok Pai v. C.I.T., Bangalore (2007) 8 SCALE 364 observed that it is a well-settled principle of law that the more stringent is the law, more strict construction thereof would be necessary. The said principle has got relevance in the present case inasmuch as the provisions of Act 31 of 1978 and more particularly Section 4(1) and 4(2) are stringent provisions which permits the Collector to acquire the land on the basis of subjective satisfaction arrived at by him. 24. The Supreme Court in Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2008) 4 SCALE 278 , while considering the power of the State Government under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 for modification in the draft development plan scheme on the basis of subjective satisfaction arrived at by the State Government, observed:” 24. Proviso opens with the words “where the State Government is of the opinion that substantial modifications in the draft development plan and regulations are necessary………” These words are indicative of the satisfaction being subjective one but there must exist circumstances stated in the proviso which are conditions precedent far the formation of the opinion. Proviso opens with the words “where the State Government is of the opinion that substantial modifications in the draft development plan and regulations are necessary………” These words are indicative of the satisfaction being subjective one but there must exist circumstances stated in the proviso which are conditions precedent far the formation of the opinion. Opinion to be formed by the State Government cannot be on imaginary grounds, wishful thinking, however, laudable that may be. Such a course is impermissible in law. The formation of the opinion, though subjective, must been based on the material disclosing that a necessity had arisen to make substantial modifications in the draft development plan. 25. The formation of the opinion by the State Government is with reference to the necessity that may have had arisen to make substantial modifications in the draft development plan. The expression: “so considered necessary” is again of crucial importance. The term “consider” means to think over; it connotes that there should be active application of the mind. In other words the term “consider” postulates consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter. A plain reading of the relevant provision suggests that the State Government may publish the modifications only after consideration that such modifications have become necessary. The word necessary means indispensable, requisite; indispensably requisite, useful, incidental or conducive; essential; unavoidable; impossible to be otherwise; not to be avoided; inevitable. The word “necessary” must be construed in the connection in which it is used. (See ADVANCED LAW LEXICON, 3rd Edition, 2005; P. RAMANATHA AIYAR) 26. The formation of the opinion by the State Government should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record that it had become necessary to propose substantial modifications to the draft development plan.” 25. In the notification issued under Section 4(1) of Act 31/1978, satisfaction arrived at by the Government to acquire the property for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Scheme was shown as the basis for initiating the proceedings. Though the impugned Order cannot be justified by supplementing reasons by way of counter affidavit, in a given case, it is possible for the Collector to produce the Award File in Court and demonstrate that it was his subjective satisfaction which culminated in issuing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Though the impugned Order cannot be justified by supplementing reasons by way of counter affidavit, in a given case, it is possible for the Collector to produce the Award File in Court and demonstrate that it was his subjective satisfaction which culminated in issuing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. If there are sufficient materials in the award file to substantiate the contention of the Collector with regard to the subjective satisfaction arrived at by him, the notification under Section 4(1) would be perfectly valid, notwithstanding the wording in the notification which would project as though the satisfaction was only of the Government in initiating the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the production of the award file assumes significance in land acquisition proceedings. 26. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh AIR 2000 SC 3737 : (2000) 7 SCC 296 : (2001) 1 MLJ 45 while considering the question with regard to the necessity to record reasons in the case of a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1994, the Apex Court observed thus: “No reasons or other, facts need be mentioned in the Section 6 declaration on its face. If the satisfaction is challenged in the Court, the Government can show the record upon which the Government acted and justify the satisfaction expressed in the Section 6 declaration.” 27. There is no indication in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent that the matter was examined by the Collector independently and arrived at a subjective satisfaction for the purpose of acquiring the property of the petitioners. Even though due opportunity was given to the learned Government Advocate to verify the land acquisition file and to submit as to whether there were materials available in the file to indicate the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Collector to acquire the property, the learned Government Advocate was not able to produce any material to show such satisfaction by the Collector. Hence it is evident that the Collector was merely implementing, the decision taken by the Government. 28. Therefore, it is beyond any cavil that the satisfaction of the Collector is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings for acquisition under Act 31 of 1978 and failure on the part of the Collector to arrive at a subjective satisfaction with respect to the acquisition, vitiates the whole proceedings. 28. Therefore, it is beyond any cavil that the satisfaction of the Collector is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings for acquisition under Act 31 of 1978 and failure on the part of the Collector to arrive at a subjective satisfaction with respect to the acquisition, vitiates the whole proceedings. The satisfaction arrived at by the Government cannot be a substitute for the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Collector. Hence, the impugned land acquisition proceedings initiated on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the Government does not satisfy the requirement of law and as such the same is liable to be quashed. 29. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notification is quashed. It is open to the first respondent to proceed afresh in accordance with law. No costs.