Judgment :- Elipe Dharma Rao, J. The petitioner, is the mother of the detenu by name Madhusudhanan @ Madhu, who is detained as a "Goonda" as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), by the impugned detention order dated 4. 2008, challenges the same in this Petition. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the thirteen adverse cases for the alleged commission of offences under Section 379 of IPC are only minor theft offences, which according to him are put up cases, they are in no way involve any public order. So far as the ground case is concerned, which came to be registered in H-3, Tondiarpet Police Station in Crime No.150 of 2008 for the alleged commission of offence under Sections 341, 323, 336, 392, 397, 384 & 506(ii) IPC, also does not involve any public order. 4. In other words, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a solitary instance mentioned in the grounds of detention is not of such magnitude and intensity as to have the effect of disturbing the public order so as to pass an order under Section 2(f) of the Act branding the detenu as a "Goonda". It is also contended that when the petitioner is already in judicial custody and is in jail as an undertrial prisoner and a mere possibility of his release n bail is not enough for the detaining authority to pass the impugned order. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, by the impugned order of detention, the petitioners right to life and liberty guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution has been infringed which is violative of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. 5. In support of the his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Raghavendram & Ingarsal v. District Magistrate and District Collector, Tiruchirappalli District & others, [2007 (1) T.N.L.R.83 (Mad) (MB). 5. In support of the his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Raghavendram & Ingarsal v. District Magistrate and District Collector, Tiruchirappalli District & others, [2007 (1) T.N.L.R.83 (Mad) (MB). In the said decision, this Court has held that the cases registered against the detenu are only theft cases except one case for attempt to murder and they are all individual acts which do not involve any public order and there may be violation of law and order. 6. On perusal of the materials available on record and after going through the grounds of detention, we find that the thirteen adverse cases relate to individual acts and there may be violation of only law and order and not public order. Even in respect of the ground case which came to be registered under Sections 341, 323, 336, 392, 397, 384 & 506(ii) IPC, we find that it relates to individual act and, in our opinion, it would not be a violation of public order. 7. The basis upon which the petitioner has been detained in the instant case is that he along with his associates involved in an attempt to snatch away the chain of a mobile canteen vendor, and it is only one of his associate has robbed away a paltry sum of Rs.200/= from the shirt pocket of the canteen vendor. The charge attributed against the detenu is that he only intimidated his associates to kill the canteen owner, otherwise, he will expose their misdeeds to others. Of course, this has happened in a public place. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a criminal offence is bound, to some extent, affect the peace prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order, but the same need not affect maintenance of public order as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma Vs. State of T.N. and others, reported in (2003 SCC (Cri.) 537). State of T.N. and others, reported in (2003 SCC (Cri.) 537). Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court further held thus:- "....Under the definitions in the Act, it is stated that in the case of "goonda" the acts prejudicial to public order are "when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order(Section 2(a)(iii)". The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society; that a solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act providing for preventive detention. 8. In the present case, the thirteen alleged incidents to which the Commissioner of Police has referred to as adverse cases are thefts arising under Section 379 IPC and, therefore, there is only a solitary instance wherein it is alleged that when his associates tried to snatch away the sum of Rs.200/= from an individual the detenu is alleged to have intimidated his associates to kill him which all happened in a public place. It is to be taken note of that one of the associates has stabbed him, who sustained a cut injury. Therefore, there is no material on record to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident or robbery or criminal intimidation was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the minds of the general public of the locality. The reasons assigned to arrive at the subjective satisfaction to pass the detention order by the detaining authority are more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any significance to the content of the matter. Thus, a solitary instance of criminal intimidation as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thus, a solitary instance of criminal intimidation as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the light of the decisions referred to above, we are of the considered view that this ground is enough to quash the order of detention made by the respondents. 9. Accordingly, the habeas corpus petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 4. 2008 passed by the second respondent is quashed. The detenu is ordered to be set forth at liberty, if not his detention/remand is required in any other case.