Judgment Navin Sinha, J. 1. The petitioner, who was a police constable, is aggrieved by the order of termination of his service dated 3.7.1985, as confirmed in appeal and the memorandum against which has also been rejected. The ground for his dismissal is his unauthorized absence of 90 days. On 29.11.1982, the petitioner proceeded on earned leave for 40 days valid till 8.1.1983. On 6.1.1983 he represented for extension of leave on the ground that the construction of his house was not over. On 11.1.1983 his application for extension of leave was rejected. It is his case that the rejection was never communicated to him. He joined duty on 9.4.1983 and was placed under suspension. Departmental proceedings were initiated for unauthorized absence of 90 days. The enquiry report came to be submitted on 16.5.1985 finding him guilty. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had submitted a medical certificate of his illness, from a Medical Officer in the government service. That there was no contradiction between his leave application dated 6.1.1983 and the medical certificate produced by him at the departmental proceedings. That the finding of the enquiry officer is based on surmises and conjectures with regard to the illness and the certificate in support thereof. Reliance is placed on a Judgment of the Court Mithilesh Kumar Pathak V/s. Union of India and Ors., 2007 Supp PLJR 93 in support of the proposition. 3. It is next urged that the order of punishment of dismissal dated 3.7.1985 is vitiated as it takes into consideration the past conduct of the petitioner when that was not a subject of the memo of charges for which reliance is placed upon Rule 286 of the Bihar Police Manual. It is next submitted that under Rule 843 of the Bihar Police Manual adequate provisions are there with regard to nature of punishment for absence of leave. That the appellate order was non-speaking in nature for which reliance is placed upon a judgment in Shiv Shankar Modi V/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors., 2007 4 PLJR 496 . It was lastly urged that the punishment of dismissal was stoo harsh and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged for which reliance was again placed on the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pathak (Supra). 4. Learned Counsel for the State supported the enquiry report to submit that it was reasoned and considered. It was lastly urged that the punishment of dismissal was stoo harsh and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged for which reliance was again placed on the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pathak (Supra). 4. Learned Counsel for the State supported the enquiry report to submit that it was reasoned and considered. That the scope for interference with an order passed in a departmental proceeding in exercise of writ jurisdiction will be limited. That the memorandum against the appellate order was reasoned and speaking. 5. The scope for the writ Court to interfere with an order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding stands well explained in B.C. Chaturvedi V/s. Union of India and Ors., where in paragraph-12 it has been observed: Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion of finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion of finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. This Court shall now examine the matter, in that limited perspective. 6 There are no allegations of any procedural non-compliance of the principles of natural justice or fair play in the departmental proceedings or that evidence has been taken behind the back of the petitioner, that he has not been allowed to lead evidence etc. The petitioner himself chose not to lead any evidence before the enquiry officer in support of his claim of illness, but sought to rely only upon the medical certificate. This Court, in exercise of its powers under Article-226 of the Constitution shall not sit in Judgment over the findings of the enquiry officer or the appellate authority on a finding of fact to reappreciate its evidentiary or sufficiency value. This Court, on the facts of the present case, can only examine if the order of the enquiry officer is reasoned arriving at a conclusion which is not perverse. The petitioner gave a leave application on 6.1.1983. He maintained complete silence till he appeared with a medical certificate on 9.4.1983 at the departmental proceeding. In the initial application he claimed leave to build his house. Subsequently, he claimed illness, but did not lead any evidence of treatment apart from the medical certificate. The enquiry officer has disbelieved the defence. This Court finds it difficult to interfere with the conclusion of the enquiry officer on the inherent contradiction in the stand of the petitioner and to re-assess the defense of the petitioner based on his medical certificate sitting in writ jurisdiction. 7. In the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pathak (supra) it has been held that the enquiry officer acted on surmises and conjectures in rejecting the medical certificate in support of the plea of illness without putting the same to any scientific test making the same subjective. 7. In the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pathak (supra) it has been held that the enquiry officer acted on surmises and conjectures in rejecting the medical certificate in support of the plea of illness without putting the same to any scientific test making the same subjective. These are not the facts presently and therefore this decision is of no avail to the petitioner. 8. Rule 843 of the Bihar Police Manual, relied upon by the petitioner which deals with punishment for absence without leave itself notices that if the police officer had remained absent from duty without sufficient reason, he may be inflicted with a punishment as provided in Rule 824 of the Bihar Police Manual. The latter Rule visualizes dismissal as one of the punishments. Insofar as Rule 826 is concerned, it provides that in awarding a punishment, the previous service record of the officer concerned, if not included, shall not be taken into account for determining the quantum of punishment. The Court will deal with this aspect of the matter subsequently also. Presently this Court does consider it necessary to take note of the fact that the past conduct could be a relevant consideration for determination of quantum of punishment. This could have been ascertained from the second show cause notice admittedly issued to the petitioner with regard to the quantum of punishment. The petitioner has chosen not to place the second show cause notice on record. The petitioner himself having withheld vital material from the Court, the Court naturally draws an adverse inference. 9. Rule-802 of the Bihar Police Manual provides that no police officer shall overstay leave. If he has applied for extension of leave and no information has been granted to him of extension, he is required to join immediately. In the present case, his leave application was rejected on 11.1.1983. His assertion that he did not receive the same does not appeal to this Court in view of the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. Of course, it was a rebuttable presumption. It was therefore for the petitioner to satisfy in the departmental proceeding that he did not receive any such communication. He has clearly failed to do so. 10. In State of U.P. and Ors. V/s. Ashok Kumar Singh and Anr. a police constable was removed from service in a departmental proceeding. Of course, it was a rebuttable presumption. It was therefore for the petitioner to satisfy in the departmental proceeding that he did not receive any such communication. He has clearly failed to do so. 10. In State of U.P. and Ors. V/s. Ashok Kumar Singh and Anr. a police constable was removed from service in a departmental proceeding. The defense was of illness to explain the absence from duty for long periods. That it was his case that he had applied for grant of leave. The High Court set aside the order of dismissal and ordered reinstatement. This Court considers it proper to quote paragraph-8 of the judgement: We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the punishment while concurring with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. The High Court failed to bear in mind that the first respondent was a police constable and was serving in a disciplined force demanding strict adherence to the rules and procedures more than any other department. Having noticed the fact that the first respondent has absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, we are unable to appreciate the High Courts observation that his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge. Even otherwise on the facts of this case, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the punishment holding that the punishment does not commensurate with the gravity of the charge especially when the High Court concurred with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. No case for interference with the punishment is made out. 11. In Union of India and Ors. V/s. Datta Lina Toshatwad, 2005 13 SCC 709 a member of the Central Reserve Police Force, a uniformed force, like the petitioner, absented himself from service for 12 days. He was proceeded departmentally and punished. The High Court held that the order of dismissal was too harsh a punishment. The Supreme Court held that the Courts could not take such matters lightly particularly when it relates to a uniformed force of the country. A member of a uniformed force who overstays his leave by a few days and fails to give satisfactory explanation, cannot be visited with sympathy. Members of the uniformed forces cannot absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on these forces. A member of a uniformed force who overstays his leave by a few days and fails to give satisfactory explanation, cannot be visited with sympathy. Members of the uniformed forces cannot absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on these forces. Such indiscipline, if it goes unpunished, will vitally affect the discipline of the force. In Govt. of A.P. and Ors. V/s. Mohd. Taher Ali a police constable absented himself from duties unauthorizedly for 21 days. This Court can do no better than to quote paragraph-4 of the judgment which runs as follows: It is an admitted position that the respondent was appointed on election duty but he absented himself from election duty. It seems that the respondent did not consider the election duty to be an important business which is very important for the while nation. The respondent was appointed on election duty and was deputed to take security arrangement but absented himself from duty. This is a very serious lapse on the part of the respondent. The police force is a disciplined force and the respondent was detailed for such an important duty of election. He absented himself from election duty. Such kind of serious lapse cannot be treated lightly. It is a very important function and if the incumbent avoided the duty of election, he cannot escape from the liability of the penalty of compulsory retirement. We fail to understand the reason for the Administrative Tribunal or for the High Court to have remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the respondent. In conclusion, their Lordships at paragraph-5 held as follows: Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that in fact, the disciplinary authority while passing the order has taken into consideration the earlier absence of the respondent from the duty. He submitted that this could not have been taken into consideration as the respondent was not aware about these incidents and those were not the part of the charges levelled against him. He submitted that this could not have been taken into consideration as the respondent was not aware about these incidents and those were not the part of the charges levelled against him. In support of his submission learned Counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the judgment of this Court titled State of Mysore V/s. K. Manche Gowda but in the present case we are satisfied that in fact the respondent deliberately absented himself from duty and did not offer any explanation for his absence from election duty. It is not the respondents first absence. He also absented himself from duty on earlier occasions also. In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority. The police force is a disciplined force and if the respondent is a habitual absentee then there is no reason to ignore this fact at the time of imposing penalty. Moreover, even ignoring the earlier absence, in our opinion, the absence of 21 days by a member of a disciplined force is sufficient to justify his compulsory retirement. 12. Coming now to the question of quantum of punishment, which the counsel for the petitioner urged was excessive and harsh, it stands settled that it is not the domain of the Courts to interfere with the same. Reference may appropriately be made only to a Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. V/s. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari where in paragraph-15 and 16 it has been held: 15. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 16. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 16. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court arrives at the finding that there has been no procedural illegality in the departmental proceeding. The petitioner did not lead any evidence in support of his plea of illness. This Court does not have the jurisdiction to sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the enquiry officer. He has overstayed on leave for 90 days which has been reckoned as unauthorized absence for a member of uniformed disciplined force. The submission that the appellate order was non-speaking also does not appeal to this Court. The question is, will any useful purpose be served by remitting the matter back to the appellate authority for passing a reasoned order? It has been noticed above that the memorial preferred by the petitioner against the appellate order is reasoned and considered. 14. It has been held that in matters of departmental proceedings, the Courts should not resort to short-cuts and remand the matter on the slightest pretext. The Court should endeavour to examine the materials placed before it and then arrive at a determination that if the petitioner was being prejudiced. Only if the said conditions were fulfilled, could an order of remand be passed. That it was not to be passed mechanically. In Managing Director, E.C.I.L. V/s. B. Karunakar followed in State of U.P. V/s. Harendra Arora and Anr. Only if the said conditions were fulfilled, could an order of remand be passed. That it was not to be passed mechanically. In Managing Director, E.C.I.L. V/s. B. Karunakar followed in State of U.P. V/s. Harendra Arora and Anr. the observations are quoted below: ...If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts.... It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. 15. In the facts of the present case and in light of the discussions as above, this Court is satisfied that no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter to the appellate authority on the ground that it is non-speaking in nature. This Court arrives at the finding that the petitioner has not been prejudiced in any manner by the non-speaking nature of the appellate order. 16. In the result, there is no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed.