Judgment :- The petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of quashing the proceedings initiated against him in CC.No.696/2004 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Erode, for the alleged offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. Mr.G.R.Hari, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a physically handicapped person and he has lost his right arm above the elbow in a bus accident and he has been served with the summons in this case to appear before the learned Magistrate. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the basis of the complaint preferred by the respondent/complainant and made the following three-fold submissions:- "[1] The cheque involved in this case had been presented for collection by the respondent/complainant on 29.03.2004 itself and the same was returned on the ground of "Insufficient Funds" on 05.04.04 and the intimation of the return of the cheque was given to the respondent/complainant on 15.04.2004 and a statutory notice was also issued on 19.04.2004. But the respondent/complainant has deliberately and intentionally suppressed all those material factors and preferred the present complaint on the basis of the 2nd presentation of the cheque on 15.06.2004 and on the basis of the 2nd statutory notice dated 26.06.2004. The earlier presentation of the cheque and return of the same is very much evident from the list of documents mentioned to the impugned complaint as Bank Memo dated 05.04.2004 and Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004 and as such, the learned Magistrate has not perused the impugned complaint in entirety and not noticed the list of documents mentioned in the complaint. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in PEPSI FOODS LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE AND OTHERS reported in 1998 SUPREME COURT CASES [CRI.] 1400. [2] The respondent/complainant having presented the cheque on 29.03.2004 and the same was returned on the ground of "Insufficient Funds" on 05.04.2004 and the Bank Debit Advise was received on 15.04.2004 and a statutory notice dated 19.04.2004 was given to the petitioner, the impugned complaint preferred on the basis of the 2nd presentation of the cheque and after the issue of the 2nd statutory notice dated 26. 2004 would not give rise to any fresh cause of action and as such, the initiation of proceedings on the basis of the 2nd cause of action is liable to be quashed. The decision of the Honble Apex court in PREMCHAND VIJAYAKUMAR vs. YASHPAL SINGH AND ANOTHER reported in 2005 [4] SCALE 541 was relied in support of the contention. [3] The order of taking cognizance of the learned Magistrate against the petitioner is non-est in the eyes of law as the same was taken by playing fraud on the court by the respondent/complainant as the respondent has suppressed the material fact of earlier presentation of the cheque and on the dishonour, sending and serving the earlier statutory notice dated 19.04.2004 and preferring the present complaint on the basis of 2nd statutory notice dated 26. 2004 as there is no fresh cause of action and thereby, the complaint is barred by limitation. A reliance was placed on the decision of the Honble Apex court in MCD VS. STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER reported in 2005 [4] SCC 605." 4. Per contra, Mr.N.Doraisamy, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant contended that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned complaint preferred by the respondent/complainant. It is submitted that the petitioner did not appear before the Court and in spite of not appearing, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing. It is also contended that Non Bailable Warrant was issued by the learned Magistrate and the same was pending against the petitioner. learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the respondent is entitled to prove his case by adducing evidence in respect of preferring the complaint on the basis of the issue of the alleged 2nd notice. It is vehemently contended that the petitioner has not chosen to give any reply to the statutory notice served on him denying the allegations contained in the complaint and also making his present contentions of suppression of earlier statutory notice. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the complaint is not liable to be quashed at its threshold and it is for the petitioner to raise all the points only at the time of trial. 5. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward on either side and also perused the materials available on record including the impugned complaint. 6. 5. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward on either side and also perused the materials available on record including the impugned complaint. 6. At the outset, this Court is constrained to state that there is much force in the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The main ground raised in this petition is preferring the impugned complaint on the basis of the 2nd statutory notice and as such, there is no fresh cause of action to initiate the proceedings under section 138 of the Act as it is barred by limitation. A perusal of the impugned complaint does not disclose any material about the first presentation of the cheque on 29.03.2004 itself and thereafter, about the return of the cheque on the ground of "Insufficient Funds" on 05.04.2004 and the intimation of the Bank dated 15.04.2004 and thereafter, issuing the statutory notice dated 19.04.2004. 7. It is pertinent to be noted that the petitioner produced the earlier Statutory notice dated 14. 2004 with the postal cover. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the impugned complaint itself there is a list of documents mentioned, in which Bank Memo is dated 05.04.2004 and Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004 [Xerox copy] which are mentioned as Document Nos.2 and 3 and the complainant has not mentioned in the list of documents, in respect of the 2nd Bank Memo dated 15.06.2004, though he has mentioned the same in paragraph 3 of the impugned compliant. This Court cannot brush aside lightly the documents produced by the petitioner along with his affidavit in the petition, viz., the first Statutory notice dated 14. 2004 and the postal cover and this Court is entitled to look into such un-impeachable document in considering the points raised in this petition for quashing. Therefore, it is crystal clear from the perusal of the impugned complaint as well as from the perusal of the list of documents mentioned in the impugned complaint-the first Statutory notice along with the postal cover produced before this Court by the petitioner, that the impugned complaint was preferred only on the basis of the 2nd Statutory notice dated 26. 2004 and as such, the complaint is barred by limitation. 8. The Honble Apex Court has held in SADANANDAN BHADRAN VS. 2004 and as such, the complaint is barred by limitation. 8. The Honble Apex Court has held in SADANANDAN BHADRAN VS. MADHAVAN SUNIL KUMAR, [1998] 6 SCC 514 : AIR 1998 SC 3043 , that: "....Clause [a] of the proviso to sec.138 did not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right and not cause of action accrues. The payee or the holder of the cheque, may, therefore, without taking peremptory action in exercise of his right under clause [b] of section 138 of the Act, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once a notice under clause [b] of sec.138 of the Act is received by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or the holder of the cheque forefeits his right to again present the cheque as cause of action has accrued when there was failure to pay the amount within the prescribed period and the period of limitation starts to run which cannot be stopped on any account......" Subsequently, in the latest decision in PREM CHAND VIJAY KUMAR V.S YASHPAL SINGH AND ANOTHER 2005 [4] SCC 417, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the decisions rendered by the Apex Court earlier in SADANANDAN BHADRAN VS. MADHAVAN SUNIL KUMAR, [1998] 6 SCC 514 : AIR 1998 SC 3042 and DALMIA CEMENT [BHARAT] LIMITED VS. GALAXY TRADERS AND AGENCIES LIMITED, [2001] 6 SCC 463. In that decision the Apex Court held that: "It is well settled that if dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque. GALAXY TRADERS AND AGENCIES LIMITED, [2001] 6 SCC 463. In that decision the Apex Court held that: "It is well settled that if dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque. The period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires." 9.The above well settled principle of law laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the decision cited supra, is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, after the first presentation of the cheque, the first statutory notice was given and served on the accused and the copy of the statutory notice and postal cover produced before this Court and the list of documents reflects the Bank Memo dated 05.04.2004 and Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004 and as such, in view of the first presentation of the cheque and dishonour of the same, as once given a cause of action to arise, it is not permissible for the payee or the complainant to create another cause of action with the same cheque and the period of limitation has already expired from the date of serving the first statutory notice and therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed on this sole ground. 10. This court is also constrained to state that the learned Magistrate has not scrutinised the impugned complaint properly by perusing the entire complaint and the list of documents. The function of the learned Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance of an ofence is not an empty formality and the learned Magistrate should take care to peruse the impugned complaint and to satisfy himself about the prima facie case for the alleged offence made out in the complaint in accordance with law. Learned counsel has rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Apex Court in PEPSI FOODS [cited supra], wherein the Honble Apex Court has held in paragraph 28 that:- "28.Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. Learned counsel has rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Apex Court in PEPSI FOODS [cited supra], wherein the Honble Apex Court has held in paragraph 28 that:- "28.Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto." 11. If the learned Magistrate, as stated above, scrutinised the impugned complaint thoroughly including the list of documents mentioned along with the complaint, viz., the Bank Memo dated 05.04.2004 and the Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004, marked as Document Nos.2 and 3, the learned Magistrate could have very well seen that the second Bank Memo dated 15.06.2004 was not mentioned in the list of documents and the learned Magistrate could have questioned the complainant and thereby the earlier serving of the statutory notice could have come to the light and on such event, the learned Magistrate could have come to the conclusion that the complaint is clearly barred by limitation and the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioner herein and that there was already a cause of action that arose in view of the earlier presentation of the cheque and if the limitation is calculated from the date of the Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004, the impugned complaint is clearly barred by limitation and the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the Act against the petitioner herein. .12. A perusal of the impugned complaint, as already pointed out, discloses the contents of the list of documents, including the Bank Memo dated 04. 2004 and the Debit Advise dated 15.04.2004. But in the list of documents, there is absolutely no mention about the Bank Memo on which the 2nd statutory notice dated 26. 2004 was sent and served on the petitioner herein. It is pertinent to be noted that in the contents of the impugned complaint, there is a mention in paragraph 3 about the Bank memo dated 16. 2004. But in the list of documents, there is absolutely no mention about the Bank Memo on which the 2nd statutory notice dated 26. 2004 was sent and served on the petitioner herein. It is pertinent to be noted that in the contents of the impugned complaint, there is a mention in paragraph 3 about the Bank memo dated 16. 2004. But the same was not mentioned in the list of documents in the complaint. It is also pertinent to be noted, as already pointed out, the respondent/complainant has deliberately suppressed the material factor of first presentation of the cheque and thereafter, on the dishonour of the cheque, issuing the first statutory notice dated 14. 2004 as the same was evident from the production of the copy of the first statutory notice dated 14. 2004 and the postal cover before this court. This court is of the considered view that such deliberate suppression of the issuing and serving of the first statutory notice dated 14. 2004 would clearly amount to playing fraud before the court. .13. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly placed reliance on the decision reported in MCDs case [cited supra] wherein the Honble Apex Court has held that:- ."22. A person whose case is based on falsehood can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. In the instant case, non-production of the order and even non-mentioning of the conviction and sentence in criminal case NO.202 of 1997 tantamounts to playing fraud on the court. The litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party." 14. The litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party." 14. Therefore, in view of the above said well settled principle of law laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra, this court is of the considered view that suppressing material factor of issuing and serving the first statutory notice and the initiation of the impugned proceedings on the basis of the 2nd statutory notice dated 26.06.2004, would amount to a clear case of abuse of the process of court and as such, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the impugned complaint is liable to be quashed. .15. For the aforesaid reasons, this court is constrained to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner in CC.No.696/2004 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, NO.1, Erode and the petition is allowed. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 16. Before parting with the matter, this court is constrained to place it on record the commendable service rendered by Mr.N.Doraisamy, learned counsel as Legal Aid Counsel. He is entitled to a remuneration of Rs.2,500/-from the Tamilnadu Legal Aid Service Authority.