Judgment :- Challenging the Award passed by the Labour Court in I.D.No.406/1995 ordering reinstatement of the Petitioner without backwages and without other attendant benefits, Petitioner has filed the Writ Petition. 2. Brief facts which led to the filing of Writ Petition are as follows:- .(i) Petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Tradesman on 6. 1982 in the 2nd Respondent Corporation. On 02. 1990, while the Petitioner was working at Madhavaram Depot, he was directed by the Assistant Engineer of the Depot to replace the Air Compressor Assembly in Fleet No.E399 with the help of one Apprentice. Petitioner refused to carry out the work and he was alternatively directed to overhaul the rear wheel of the same Fleet No.E399 with the help of one Apprentice. Again, Petitioner refused to carry out the work. Since, Petitioner wilfully refused to carryout the work, he was kept under suspension from 02. 1990 to 33. 1990 and three charges (i) disobeying the orders of superior officer (Clause 25(i) of CSO); (ii) failure to complete the work and (iii) irresponsible in duty (Clause 24(14) of CSO) were framed against the Petitioner. As his explanation was not satisfactory, enquiry was conducted. Petitioner fully participated in the enquiry and reasonable opportunity was given to him to defend his case. During enquiry all the three charges levelled against him were held proved. Enquiry Officer gave his findings on 22. 1993. .(ii) During the pendency of disciplinary action, 2nd Respondents Corporation was bifurcated and 3rd Respondents Corporation started functioning w.e.f. 11. 1994 in the name of Dr. Ambedkar Transport Corporation Limited (DATC) subsequently named as Metropolitan Transport Corporation (MTC). As the depot to which Petitioner was attached was taken over by DATC, disciplinary action was continued by DATC Ltd. Based on the findings of the Enquiry Officer and after observing the procedural formalities, Petitioner was removed from service vide Proceedings No.22864/LSDP/2/DATC/90 dated 28. 1994. (iii) Challenging the order of dismissal, Petitioner raised dispute by way of filing Petition under Sec.2A of I.D.Act in I.D.No.406/1995. Respondents-Management filed a detailed counter-statement and adduced evidence through four Management witnesses. (iv) Upon consideration of the evidence, Labour Court held that domestic enquiry was held in a reasonable and fair manner and charges were rightly held to be proved. (iii) Challenging the order of dismissal, Petitioner raised dispute by way of filing Petition under Sec.2A of I.D.Act in I.D.No.406/1995. Respondents-Management filed a detailed counter-statement and adduced evidence through four Management witnesses. (iv) Upon consideration of the evidence, Labour Court held that domestic enquiry was held in a reasonable and fair manner and charges were rightly held to be proved. Though, Labour court concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer, Labour Court held that punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the gravity of charges and the Labour Court ordered reinstatement without backwages and without attendant benefits. Challenging the order of Labour Court in I.D.No.406/1995, Petitioner has filed the Writ Petition. 3. Reiterating the findings of Labour Court, Respondents-Management has filed the counter elaborating the circumstances which led to disciplinary proceedings and imposing punishment of removal from service. 4. Petitioner appeared as party in person. Petitioner has submitted that the findings of Labour Court are not justified and Labour Court erred in saying that charges are proved. Contention of the Petitioner is that had he been given reasonable assistance by allocating an Apprentice, Petitioner would have been able to complete the work entrusted to him and therefore, Petitioner cannot be charged for insubordination. Petitioner assails the findings of Labour Court as perverse. 5. Mr. Raghunatha Reddy (M/s. King and Partridge), learned counsel for the Respondents-Management has submitted that going through the materials and evidence adduced before the Labour Court, it fairly concluded that domestic enquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner and the findings of the Enquiry Officer was a reasonable one and exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence as Appellate court. 6. Learned counsel for the Respondents-Management further submitted that disciplinary action was taken against the Petitioner for having refused to carry out the first work allotted by his superior (1) to replace the Air Compressor of the vehicle bearing Fleet No.E-399 with the help of one Apprentice and (2) to overhaul the rear wheel of the same vehicle with the help of one Apprentice. Later the work regarding replacement of Air Compressor was completed by Palani, Assistant Tradesman with the help of one Apprentice and the other work of overhauling of back wheels was completed by Dasarathan, Assistant Tradesman with the help of one Apprentice. Later the work regarding replacement of Air Compressor was completed by Palani, Assistant Tradesman with the help of one Apprentice and the other work of overhauling of back wheels was completed by Dasarathan, Assistant Tradesman with the help of one Apprentice. Velayutham, Assistant Engineer, who was supervising the works on the said date was examined as M.W.3. In his evidence before the Labour Court, M.W.3 had clearly stated that the Air Compressor work was completed by one Assistant Tradesman with the help of an Apprentice and another Tradesman by name Dasarathan with the help of an Apprentice overhaul the rear wheels. 7. Contention of the Petitioner is that the findings of Enquiry Officer are not justified and not based upon the evidence on record. Petitioner further argued that the records of Management and the evidence adduced by the Management would clearly indicate that Palani, Palani Velayutham and Apprentice Sakthivel Murugan accomplished the work of Air Compressor and Thasarathan, Dhanasekaran and Apprentice Xavier accomplished the work of overhauling the rear wheel on 02. 1990. Contention of the Petitioner is that had he been given assistance of those persons, Petitioner would have completed the work and only because of non-allocation of reasonable assistance, Petitioner could not accomplish the work. Petitioner further argued that allocation of an Apprentice instead of a worker was in violation of usual practice and in violation of Standing Orders. Petitioner has further argued that Apprentice is only a learner and allocation of Apprentice with the Petitioner on 02. 1990 is violation of Standing Orders and therefore, findings of Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court are perverse and unsustainable. 8. Contending that the findings of Enquiry Officer and Labour Court are erroneous and that High Court can interfere with such perverse findings, Petitioner has placed reliance upon 2008-II-LLJ 1086 (SC) [Board of Directors, H.P.T.C. and another v. K.C. Rahi]; 1984-I LLJ 517 [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and others] and 1965-II-LLJ 346 [New Victoria Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur v. Rahini Kumar and others]. Arguments advanced by the Petitioner are purely questions of fact and depending on the analysis of evidence. .9. Upon analysis of evidence, Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that enquiry was held in a fair and reasonable manner. Arguments advanced by the Petitioner are purely questions of fact and depending on the analysis of evidence. .9. Upon analysis of evidence, Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that enquiry was held in a fair and reasonable manner. High Court can venture to interfere with the conclusion of Labour Court only if it stand vitiated by certain fundamental flaws, like refusal of admissible and material evidence, erroneously admitting inadmissible evidence which in fact has influenced the impugned findings or whether conclusion is based on no evidence, mis-reading of evidence and the like. Mistake of fact however grave cannot be corrected by High Court in Writ exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Credibility, adequacy or sufficiency of evidence cannot be gone into in Writ jurisdiction. .10. In 1995 II LLJ 173 [Virudhachalam Co-op. Urban Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court, Cuddalore and another), this court held as under:- ." ..... It is now by well settled that this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, does not exercise appellate jurisdiction and on the other hand only exercises supervisory control over the functioning of the Labour Court, and the exercise of powers by the forums constituted under the Act. Viewed in such context, I am of the view that the award of the Labour Court does not suffer from any patent error of law or perversity of approach, warranting the interference of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India." 11. Normally, High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the departmental enquiry. Findings of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, High Court will not normally interfere in Writ jurisdiction. It is not the function of High Court to consider whether there is evidence and whether available evidence would support the conclusion. 12. In (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1995 AIR scw 4374 (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India), Supreme Court has held as follows:- "The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal." The Supreme Court has further held that:- "A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rate cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 13. In (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1994 AIR SCW 4833 (Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian), Supreme Court has held as under:- "It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority." 14. Only when reasonings are perverse and if the decision was arrived at on no evidence, High Court would interfere with the findings of Labour Court. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority." 14. Only when reasonings are perverse and if the decision was arrived at on no evidence, High Court would interfere with the findings of Labour Court. In AIR 1999 SC 677 (Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police and others), Supreme Court has held as under:- "Normally the High Court and Supreme Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of guilt is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny." "A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But, if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 15. Applying the ratio of the above decisions, this court cannot scrutinize the evidence and materials to determine whether Petitioner was given proper assistance and whether allocation of Apprentice was in accordance with the Standing Orders. When there is some evidence on record, based on which Enquiry Officer and Labour Court arrived at the conclusion, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings cannot be interfered with. 16. Petitioner/Party in person has forcibly contended that in the chargesheet and the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd Respondent before Labour Court contains only two charges whereas domestic Enquiry Officer had illegally taken 3rd charge, which did not form subject matter of the chargesheet. Petitioner has further argued that 3rd charge was not at all enquired into at the domestic enquiry, which seemed to have weighed with the Management for imposing extreme penalty of removal from Service. Petitioner placed reliance upon 1965 I LLJ 247 (Bisra Stone Lime Co., Ltd v. Industrial Tribunal and another). 17. Petitioner has further argued that 3rd charge was not at all enquired into at the domestic enquiry, which seemed to have weighed with the Management for imposing extreme penalty of removal from Service. Petitioner placed reliance upon 1965 I LLJ 247 (Bisra Stone Lime Co., Ltd v. Industrial Tribunal and another). 17. The following three charges were framed against the Petitioner:- .(i) Disobeyed the orders of Superior Officer and failed to do the allotted work (Clause 25 .(i) of CSO); .(ii) Failed to complete the work within the stipulated period and caused hindrance to the work (Clause 25(21) of CSO); (iii) Irresponsible in duty (Clause 24(14) of CSO) No doubt, in the counter filed before the Labour Court only first two charges were referred in Para-3 of the counter. Xerox copy of charge memo (first page) filed by the Petitioner contain two charges. According to the Petitioner, explanation was called for from him only for two charges and Enquiry Officer, suo moto included 3rd charge viz., Irresponsible in duty (Clause 24(14) of CSO). 18. Even at the out set, it is to be noted that this point was not at all raised before the Labour Court; but raised for the first time only in this Court. This court has called for the original records from the Labour Court and also the file from the Management. In the Typed set of papers filed by the Petitioner before the Labour Court, he has filed only the xerox copy of served copy of Charge Memo. Based on that Petitioner seems to have advanced an argument that the Enquiry Officer himself has included the 3rd charge in the report. There is no merit in the contention of the Petitioner. By perusal of file, it is seen that first two charges were typed in the first page. First page contains "j/gp/gh/@ (P.T.O.) and the 3rd charge is typed on the backside. Therefore, it cannot be contended that Enquiry Officer himself has suo moto taken up the 3rd charge. Entire enquiry proceedings would indicate that Petitioner was chargesheeted for all three charges. This point was not at all raised before the Labour Court nor made a ground in I.D.No.406/95 filed before Labour Court. 19. Learned counsel for the Respondents has contended that Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and sit as Court of appeal. This point was not at all raised before the Labour Court nor made a ground in I.D.No.406/95 filed before Labour Court. 19. Learned counsel for the Respondents has contended that Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and sit as Court of appeal. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submitted that Labour Court has shown extreme indulgence to the Petitioner by ordering reinstatement without any backwages and the same cannot be challenged. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon (1986) 4 SCC 519 (Baldev Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala and another). The facts of the said case are almost identical with the case on hand. In the said case Roadways bus driver was dismissed from service for causing damage to the State Roadways to the extent of Rs.22.50 and Tribunal finding departmental inquiry to be fair and proper but order of dismissal to be not commensurate with the nature of misconduct and accordingly, ordering reinstatement with continuity in service by treating absence from duty as leave but without any back wages. Observing that denial of back wages by the Tribunal was not open to interference, Supreme Court has held as under:- "This order of the Tribunal, in our considered opinion, is quite in consonance with the provisions of Section 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which empowers the Tribunal to make an award, "directing reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case require. In the instant case we have stated hereinbefore that the Tribunal clearly found that the enquiry was held fairly and properly and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal on considering the harshness of the punishment in consideration of the nature of the charge directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service but without back wages. ..." 20. Petitioner has contended that the alleged act of misconduct would not fall within the ambit of wilful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of superior. The Tribunal on considering the harshness of the punishment in consideration of the nature of the charge directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service but without back wages. ..." 20. Petitioner has contended that the alleged act of misconduct would not fall within the ambit of wilful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of superior. Placing reliance upon 1990 II LLJ 23 (M.L.L. Kumar v. The Divisional Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. Cuddappah and another) and 1984 I LLN 57 (Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and others), Petitioner has further contended that first charge "insubordination do not fall on the enumerated misconduct of P.T.C. C.S.O.25(1). There is no force in the contention that the alleged misconduct would not fall on the enumerated misconduct of insubordination. Petitioner while on duty on 02. 1990, his Supervisor Velayutham, Assistant Engineer directed the Petitioner to replace Air Compressor for the vehicle Fleet No.E-399 with the assistance of Sakthivel Murugan an Apprentice. But the Petitioner allegedly failed to do so and refused to carry out the work and the work got delayed. Petitioner was rightly charge sheeted for insubordination and disobedience. Petitioner has no right in contending that the alleged misconduct would not fall under insubordination. 21. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, High Court would interfere only when there is miscarriage of justice or error in law on the face of record. There is nothing to show that the conduct of the employer lacks bonafide on the part of Management. No sufficient ground is made out warranting interference with the impugned order and this Writ Petition is bound to fail. 22. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed.