Judgment :- (1.) THE appellant is an Execution Clerk to the Court of the learned Civil judge, Junior Division at Jhargram, District Midnapore (West). A criminal case under section 498a/320/34 of the Indian Penal Code has been registered against the elder brother of the appellant. Allegations are also made against the appellant. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, appellant was arrested when he was returning home after office on 2nd January, 2007. He remained in custody till he was released on bail by order dated 29th January, 2007. On February 2, 2007 when the petitioner reported for duty a show-cause notice was served upon him asking him to show-cause as to why appropriate steps shall not be taken against him for unauthorized absence from duty since January 3, 2007. The petitioner submitted the reply to the show-cause notice and stated that he did not attend the duty as he was in custody. Since his absence from duty was unintentional and due to unavoidable circumstances, he prayed for grant of leave and permission to join duty. At that stage, the competent authority issued the order dated 6th of February, 2007 directing that the appellant shall be placed under deemed suspension with effect from 3rd January, 2007 in terms of provision contained in Rule 7 (3) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1971. This order was challenged by the appellant in the writ petition which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 8. 10. 07. Hence, the present appeal. (2.) WE have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. (3.) THE learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the order of suspension under Rule 7 (3) is not bad in law as it is supported by the statutory provision. The appellant has been placed under deemed suspension as he remained in custody for more than 48 hours. It has also been observed that there is no question of breach of natural justice in case the authorities had failed to take into consideration that the involvement of the appellant in the criminal case was not with reference to discharge of any official function. It is also observed that an employee is deemed to be suspended under Rule 7 (3) when he is detained in Police/judicial custody for more than 48 hours. It is also observed that an employee is deemed to be suspended under Rule 7 (3) when he is detained in Police/judicial custody for more than 48 hours. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the learned Single Judge has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Jourt in the case of Union of India vs. Rajiv kumar, 2003 (6) SCC 516 and judgment of this Court in the case of Mihir kumar Das vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 84 CWN 339. (4.) IN our opinion, the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge with regard to the legality of the deemed suspension of the appellant being based on a statutory provision cannot be said to be illegal. We are, however, of the opinion that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the further course that was required to be adopted by the disciplinary authority upon release of the appellant on bail, as Rule 7 (3) provides that the employee shall remain under suspension until further orders. We may notice here the relevant provisions of Rule 7 : "rule 7. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension-(a) where a disciplinary proceeding or departmental enquiry against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (c) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial: provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government servant against whom a proceeding has been commenced on a criminal charge but who is not actually detained in custody (e. g. , a person released on bail) may be placed under suspension under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) by an order made by any of the authorities mentiored in that sub-rule. If the criminal charge is related to the official position of the Government servant or involves any moral turpitude on his part, suspension shall be ordered under this sub-rule, unless there are exceptional reasons for not adopting such a course. If the criminal charge is related to the official position of the Government servant or involves any moral turpitude on his part, suspension shall be ordered under this sub-rule, unless there are exceptional reasons for not adopting such a course. (3) A Government servant who is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under any law providing for preventive detention or as a result of a proceeding either on a criminal charge or otherwise, shall be deemed to have been suspended, by an order of the appointing authority, with effect from the date of his detention and shall remain under suspension until further orders. A Government servant who is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment shall also be dealt with in the same manner, pending a decision on the disciplinary action to be taken against him." (5.) A bare perusal of these provisions would show that Rule 7 (1) enables the competent authority to place a Government servant under suspension in certain specified situations. The provisions contained in Rule 7 (1)tc) would be relevant in this case. Rule 7 (2) enables the competent authority to place a Government servant under suspension against whom a proceeding has been commenced on a criminal charge but who is not actually detained in custody (e. g. , a person released on bail). A perusal of this sub-rule also indicates that it would be mandatory to place a Government servant under suspension if the criminal charge relates to his official position or involves any moral turpitude on his part. However, even under this sub-rule the government servant may not be placed under suspension when the appropriate authority is of the opinion that there are exceptional reasons for not placing him under suspension. Similarly, under sub-rule (3) a government servant is deemed to be suspended when he is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. The deemed suspension would continue "until further orders", i. e. , there is no automatic revocation of the deemed suspension. A specific order is required to be passed by the competent authority. (6.) IN our opinion, a bare perusal of Rule 7 (3) would tend to show that the intention with which the Rule has been framed is to protect the employee in case of absence by reason of circumstances beyond his control, i. e. , when he is detained in custody in a criminal matter. (6.) IN our opinion, a bare perusal of Rule 7 (3) would tend to show that the intention with which the Rule has been framed is to protect the employee in case of absence by reason of circumstances beyond his control, i. e. , when he is detained in custody in a criminal matter. In the absence of such a provision, the employer would be left with no option but to take disciplinary proceedings against the employee on account of unauthorised absence. To guard against such an eventuality and to protect the right of an employee, the Rule making authority has provided for deemed suspension under Rule 7 (3). This indeed would be the only solution, as the employee cannot possibly be granted leave for remaining in custody. Rule 7 (3) has been considered by this Court in the case of Mihir Kumar Das (supra). The learned Single Judge has relied on the aforesaid judgment but without making any reference to the observations made therein by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. which are as follows : 8. Mr. Maitra, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has rightly submitted that in the instant case the petitioner had been detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours on a criminal charge. Therefore, under sub-rule (3) of rule 7 his suspension with effect from the date of detention was automatic and even if no formal order of suspension was made the petitioner must be deemed to be in suspension from the said date. The respondent No. 2 by his order No. 4141-ADMN/wfp/2e-27/7311 dt. 1st Dec. , 1975 had merely clarified the legal consequences of quashing of the petitioners termination of service by this Court in the previous Rule and also the effect of his detention for more than 48 hours. If another view be taken about the effect of the said order No. 4141 then the said order would be a retrospective order of suspension. Mr. Maitra has also rightly submitted that as soon as a Government servant is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under Rule 7 (3) he is ipso facto placed under suspension. His said suspension does not stand revoked as soon as he is released from custody or acquitted of the criminal charge. Mr. Maitra has also rightly submitted that as soon as a Government servant is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under Rule 7 (3) he is ipso facto placed under suspension. His said suspension does not stand revoked as soon as he is released from custody or acquitted of the criminal charge. Rule 7 (3) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 clearly lays down that a suspension order under Rule 7 (3)shall remain until further orders. In other words, the appointing authority is required to make an order revoking the suspension which has occurred under Rule 7 (3). Mr. Maitra has pointed out that the Supreme court in the case of Balvantrai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 800 with reference to Rules 151, 152, 153, 156 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules had inter alia held that a person who had been suspended pending a criminal case cannot claim that the said order of suspension was automatically terminated after his acquittal. The supreme laid down. : "until therefore a further order of the State Government was made terminating the suspension the appellant had no right to be reinstated to service. I respectfully apply the same reasonings and hold that in the instant case the appointing authority of the petitioner did not make any order revoking his suspension and reinstating him in service. " (7.) WE are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations of honble Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookerjee and would hold that in the present case also the appellant will continue to be under suspension, unless it is revoked by a specific order passed by the disciplinary authority. (8.) THE learned Single Judge also relied on a judgment in the case of rajiv Kumar (supra). In this case the Supreme Court considered Rule 10 (2)of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. For appreciation of the ratio of law laid down in this case it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 10 which reads as follows: "10. In this case the Supreme Court considered Rule 10 (2)of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. For appreciation of the ratio of law laid down in this case it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 10 which reads as follows: "10. Suspension.- (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension- (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial : provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the comptroller and Auditor-General in regard to a member of the Indian audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant-General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority- (a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours; (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction. Explanation.-The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. Explanation.-The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant under uspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders : provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case. (5) (a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent to do so. (b) where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings. (c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. " Interpreting the aforesaid provisions the Supreme Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 held as follows: 14. Rule 10 (2) is a deemed provision and creates a legal fiction. A bare reading of the provision shows that an actual order is not required to be passed. That is deemed to have been passed by operation of the legal fiction. It has as much efficacy, force and operation as an order otherwise specifically passed under other provisions. It does not speak of any period of its effectiveness. Rules 10 (3) and 10 (4) operate conceptually in different situations and need specific provisions separately on account of interposition of an order of a Court of Law or an order passed by the appellate or reviewing authority and the natural consequences inevitably flowing from such orders. Great emphasis is laid on the expression "until further orders" in the said sub-rules to emphasise that such a prescription is missing in sub-rule (2). Therefore, it is urged that the order is effective for the period of detention alone. The plea is clearly without any substance because of sub-rules (5) (a) and (5) (c) of Rule 10. The said provisions refer to an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made. Obviously, the only order which is even initially deemed to have been made under Rule 10 is one contemplated under sub-rule (2). The said provision under Rule 10 (5) (a)makes it crystal clear that the order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by aa authority competent to do so while Rule 10 (5) (c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke also. No exception is made relating to an order under Rule 10 (2) and 10 (5) (a). On the contrary, it specifically encompasses an order under Rule 10 (2). No exception is made relating to an order under Rule 10 (2) and 10 (5) (a). On the contrary, it specifically encompasses an order under Rule 10 (2). If the order deemed to have been made under Rule 10 (2) is to lose effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged comes to an end, there would be no scope for the same being modified as contended by the respondents and there was no need to make such provisions as are engrafted in Rules 10 (5) (a) and (c) and instead an equally deeming provision to bring an end to the duration of the deemed order would by itself suffice for the purpose. (9.) THUS, it is clear that the order of suspension does not lose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10 (5) (c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 10 (5) (a) and the employee has no right to be reinstated in service. This position was also highlighted in Baluantrai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra. Indication of the expression "pending further order" in the order of suspension was the basis for the aforesaid view. (10) THESE observations of the Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that by virtue of Rule 7 (3) the employee would continue to be under suspension till an order is passed by a competent authority revoking the same. Any other interpretation of Rule 7 (3) would render the words "and shall remain under suspension until further orders" superfluous and meaningless. (11.) IN the present case the appellant was taken in custody on 2nd of january, 2007. When he reported for duty on 2nd of February, 2007 he had already been released on bail. In spite of being released on bail the appellant was issued a show-cause notice on 2nd of February, 2007 to explain as to why disciplinary proceeding be not initiated against him for unauthorised absence from office since 3rd of January, 2007. He submitted a reply that he was absent as he was in custody due to the registration of a criminal case against him. He submitted a reply that he was absent as he was in custody due to the registration of a criminal case against him. He has also stated that since joining in service he had performed his duties with utmost sincerity and honesty. He had never committed any wrong during the tenure of his service. Thereafter, the District Judge being the competent authority by order dated 6th February, 2007 directed that the appellant shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from 3rd of January, 2007. The order states that the appellant shall remain under suspension until further order in terms of the provisions contained in Rule 7 (3). In spite of being aware of the aforesaid provision and noticing it in the order dated 6th February, 2007 the District Judge has not cared to consider the case of the petitioner for revocation of the suspension. In our opinion, it was necessary for the District Judge to pass a fresh order after placing the appellant under deemed suspension. Otherwise under Rule 7 (3) the appellant would be kept under suspension during the pendency of the criminal proceedings which may even result in either discharge or acquittal of the appellant. (12.) ON the other hand, in case after investigation a criminal charge is framed against the appellant, he may be placed under suspension under rule 7 (1) (c). Rule 7 (2) provider- that even if the criminal charge does not relate to the official position of the Government servant but involves any moral turpitude on his part, he shall have to be placed under suspension. This Rule, however, gives the discretionary power to the disciplinary authority not to suspend an employee in case there are exceptional reasons for not adopting such a course. It would appear that the learned Single judge has only considered the matter upto the stage of the passing of the order dated 6th February, 2007. In our opinion, it was also necessary for the learned Single Judge to consider the course that would be required to be followed by the authorities after passing the order dated 6th February, 2007. (13.) WE, therefore, dispose of this appeal by directing the respondent authorities to reconsider as to whether it is necessary to continue the suspension of the appellant during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (13.) WE, therefore, dispose of this appeal by directing the respondent authorities to reconsider as to whether it is necessary to continue the suspension of the appellant during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. We have been informed that till date no departmental proceedings have been initiated against the employee. Therefore, the decision shall be taken by taking into consideration all relevant factors including the issue as to whether it is necessary to continue the appellant under suspension for the purpose of the conduct of the criminal trial. In case it is found that the reinstatement of the employee would not cause any impediment in the conduct of the criminal trial, and/or the discharge of his official duties the authorities would be at liberty to reinstate the appellant, subject to the outcome of the criminal trial. (14.) LET the necessary order be passed within fourteen days of the receipt of a certified copy of this order. (15.) WITH these observations the appeal is disposed of treating the same as on days list. The application for appropriate order is also disposed of. Appeal disposed of.