Judgment : his appeal is focused by the unsuccessful defendants as against the judgment and decree dated 212. 1993 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Pondicherry in O.S.No.1 of 1983, which was filed for obtaining the relief of getting the Court auction sale set aside and for other allied reliefs. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the case of the plaintiffs as stood exposited from the plaint could be portrayed thus: a) One Govindasamy, son of Appasamy, purchased the suit properties described in the schedule of the plaint from one Thangavelu Gounder vide the Notorial Sale deed dated 12. 1936. The first plaintiff is the wife, the plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the children of deceased Govindasamy. The defendants 1 and 2 are the son and daughter of one Late Govindan son of Kalivaradan, who was the son-in-law of one Ramasamy Naicker. The said Govindasamy was related to Ramasamy Naicker as he was his first cousin. Govindasamy was looking after the family of Ramasamy Naicker, who subsequently died in the year 1949. Thereafter, the said Govindasamy became addicted to drinks; whereupon at the request of the first plaintiff, Govindan the father of D1 and D2, was asked to manage Govindasamy’s properties as well as Ramasamy Naicker’s property. The said Govindan died in the year 1975. b) The suit house, which is described in the “B” Schedule of the plaint was leased out to 3 even during the life time of Govindan in the year 1975. D1’s mother was collecting rents from D3. Owing to bad blood started running in the relationship between the defendants’ family and plaintiffs’ family, Govindasamy started living with his family in one other mania described in the “A” schedule of the plaint situated on the northern side of the same road where “B” schedule of the properties is situated. The notice dated 11. 1977 was issued by Govindasamy to first defendant’s grand mother Visalakshi and mother Kuppammai, calling upon them not to collect rent from D3 and also not to meddle with the suit property, which evoked a reply notice dated 211. 1977 from them asserting title over the suit properties on the basis of a Court Auction Judgment dated 29. 1955 as though the said Govindan purchased the suit properties in the. 1977 from them asserting title over the suit properties on the basis of a Court Auction Judgment dated 29. 1955 as though the said Govindan purchased the suit properties in the. Court auction sale. In fact, the said Govindan was only a name lender for Govindasamy as it was Govindasamy, who made arrangements to bid in the Court auction sale, so as to prevent third parties from purchasing his suit properties; consequentially Govindan did not make any payment and he had not taken steps to complete the obligations as an auction purchaser. c) The “A” Scheduled property was a vacant mania with a well. D3 was inducted into it as a tenant. Govindan was authorized by Govindasamy to collect the rents and after the death of Govindan in the year 1975, his wife and mother-in-law Visalakshi and Kuppammal respectively used to collect the rent and pay to Govindasamy till the year 1977. D1 came forward for a settlement during the year 1978 on behalf of his mother Kuppammal and himself requesting that D3 might be permitted to continue in the “B” Scheduled house and that D1 would pay the rent as a lessee and D3 would be a sublessee; whereupon D1 was paying the rent of Rs. 300/- per month relating to the “A” and “B” scheduled properties till May 1995. Inasmuch as there was default, Govindasamy issued lawyer’s notice, for which, D1 gave untenable reply; which necessitated Govindasamy to file HRCOP No. 31 of 1987 on 211. 1987. However, D1 filed counter, claiming title based on the said auction judgment dated 29. 1955; wherefore, the said HRCOP was withdrawn as not pressed by the plaintiffs, who are the legal representatives of Govindasamy, who died on 12. 1987 intestate. d) D4 being a real estate dealer was inducted by D1 in the “A” Schedule property. D2 Jayakumari is the sister of D1 and she was shown in the party array, in view of the stand taken by D1 in the said HRCOP, as though there was a partition, which took place between D1 and D2 herein and that D2 got a share in it. D1 and D2 are trespassers in the suit properties as they did not have any manner of right. The Court auction sale did not fructify and in view of the same, Govindasamy continued to be the owner. D1 and D2 are trespassers in the suit properties as they did not have any manner of right. The Court auction sale did not fructify and in view of the same, Govindasamy continued to be the owner. Despite such Court acution judgment, Govindasamy resisted the original proceedings initialed by the brother of Thangavelu Gounder, who was the vendor of Govindasamy, challenging the sate in his favour. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit with the following prayer: “to set aside the decree and judgment dated 29. 1955 and proceedings commenced there under as time barred and for the consequent relief of possession of the suit property jointly and severally from the defendants 1 to 4 through the process of this Honourable Court along with the prayer for mesne profits. 3. Remonstrating and gainsaying, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning, the allegations/averments in the plaint, D1 and 2 filed the written statement setting out various averments, the warp and woof of them would run thus; a) The said Ramasamy Naicker and Govindasamy did not live together in the suit property. Govindasamy did not look after the family of Ramasamy Naicker; Govindasamy did not became a sot or alcoholic. Govindan purchased the “A” and “B” Scheduled properties of the plaint in the year 1945 in the said Court auction sale, validly and conclusively. After the time of purchase, there was a dilapidated house in the “A” Scheduled property, which was subsequently demolished by Govindan and constructed a latrine and bathroom. In the “B” Scheduled property, which was vacant at that time of D1 purchasing it in the Court auction sale, Govindan constructed a Madras terraced house and he leased it out to various persons and collected rents. After his death, his wife Kuppammal, the mother of D1 and D2 was collecting rents. Thereafter, D1 and D2 effected partition between them on 20.1.1983, whereby the “A” Scheduled property was allotted to D1 and the “B” scheduled property to D2. Ever since that time onwards D1 and D2 have been collecting rents concerning those properties. The allegations to the contrary in the plaint are all false and frivolous, baseless and untenable. b) Govindan was not a benamidar of Govindasamy in purchasing the suit properties in the Court auction sale. Ever since that time onwards D1 and D2 have been collecting rents concerning those properties. The allegations to the contrary in the plaint are all false and frivolous, baseless and untenable. b) Govindan was not a benamidar of Govindasamy in purchasing the suit properties in the Court auction sale. Govindan paid the money as per his bid in the Court auction sale and complied with the formalities relating to Court auction safe and got the sale certificate validly, which subsists irrevocably. c) The contention that D3 was inducted into the suit property as tenant and Govindan was permitted to collect rents are all false. It was Govindan, who leased out the property to D3 and collected rents. Govindasamy did not lease out either the “A” Scheduled or “B” Scheduled properties to any one. The alleged settlement referred to in the plaint is an imaginary one, D1 leased out the “A” Scheduled property in favour of D4 Ranganathan, even eight years anterior to the filing of the suit and has been collecting rents from him. D1 and D2 also have acquired prescriptive title over the suit properties as their father Govindan enjoyed the suit properties for more than 30 years, openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly as owner of them. The patta for the house in the suit properties got changed in the name of Govindan and he had been paying taxes. At his instance electricity supply was provided to the house in the “B” scheduled property. d) Govindan was not a party to the legal proceedings instituted by the brother of Thangavelu Gounder, the original owner of the suit property, challenging the sale in favour of Govindasamy; the auction sale however referred to supra was not in challenge in it. The present suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation, as after the lapse of 30 years, this vexatious suit emerged. e) The plea of benami as pleaded by the plaintiffs is not available as statutorily such a plea is barred. 4. Since D2 Jayakumari died her legal heirs, viz., D5 to D1 were impleaded in the suit. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit, 5. The defendants filed additional written statement, the gist and kernel of it would run thus: The suit to set aside the Court auction judgment dated 29. 1955 is not tenable. 4. Since D2 Jayakumari died her legal heirs, viz., D5 to D1 were impleaded in the suit. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit, 5. The defendants filed additional written statement, the gist and kernel of it would run thus: The suit to set aside the Court auction judgment dated 29. 1955 is not tenable. As per Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, no suit claiming to enforce such right pleading benami could be enforced. The said Govindasamy was convicted by the erstwhile Criminal Court of Pondicherry for having committed forgery by selling the properties belonging to Ramasamy Naicker, the father-in-law of Govindan and so as to evade punishment, he proved himself a fugitive in the eye of law and was absconding. Neither Govindasamy nor the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit properties after the Court auction sale. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. The plaintiffs filed their reply statement setting out various averments, which could quintessential and precisely be set out thus: Govindan at no point of time exercised ownership right over the suit properties and the allegations to the contrary in the additional written statement are false and vexatious. D1 and D2 had no right to lease out the property in favour of D3 and D4 as claimed by them. Accordingly, they prayed for decreeing the suit as prayed for in the plaint. 7. The trial Court framed as many as ten issues. During trial, the third plaintiff examined himself as PW1 along with P.Ws.2 and 3 and Exhibits A-1 to A-19 were marked. On the defendant’s side D1 and D3 examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exhibits B-1 to B-19 were marked, The lower Court did not set aside the Court action sale as prayed for in the plaint but decreed the suit granting the following reliefs: “i) that the suit be and the same is hereby decreed. ii) that the plaintiffs are hereby entitled for declaration to the effect that the auction sale dated 25. 55 in favour of the defendant’s father Govindan is for the real benefit and ownership of the plaintiffs No 1 to 3 herein and that there is no need to cancel the said auction judgment. iii) that the plaintiffs are hereby also entitled for past mesne profits at Rs.300/- per month for three years i.e. Rs. 55 in favour of the defendant’s father Govindan is for the real benefit and ownership of the plaintiffs No 1 to 3 herein and that there is no need to cancel the said auction judgment. iii) that the plaintiffs are hereby also entitled for past mesne profits at Rs.300/- per month for three years i.e. Rs. 10,800/- before the suit and the future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month from the date of plaint till delivery of possession. iv) that the claim of defendants No. 1 and 2 for title by adverse possession and prescription is not established and the same is hereby rejected, v) that the defendants 1 and 2 are hereby entitled to claim the value of improvement if any made by them in separate application with Court fee, on proof after fulfilling the conditions laid down in Section 51 and other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act regulating persons holding property with defective title. vi) that the defendants do deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within three months from this date and in default the plaintiffs to seek execution of decree. vii) that both sides to bear their cost.” 8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the defendants filed this appeal on the following grounds among others: 1. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are against law, weight of evidence and alt probabilities of the case. 2. The finding of the trial Court that Govindan was only a name lender i.e. benamidar of Govindasamy in the Court auction sale is not tenable. 3. Under the French Law, the plea of Benami in Court auction sale is not sustainable and tenable. 4. As per the French procedure, the Advocate, who participated in the auction on behalf of the purchaser once furnishes the name on whose behalf he participated in the Court auction and got A recorded them that becomes the final one and no more of pleading benami would arise. 5. The judgment debtor in the Court auction proceedings cannot plead that the purchaser is none but his benamidar and consequently, such judgment debtor or his legal heirs cannot try to get such sales set aside or derive benefit out of the plea of benami. These aspects have not been taken into consideration by the trial Court at all. 6. 5. The judgment debtor in the Court auction proceedings cannot plead that the purchaser is none but his benamidar and consequently, such judgment debtor or his legal heirs cannot try to get such sales set aside or derive benefit out of the plea of benami. These aspects have not been taken into consideration by the trial Court at all. 6. The trial Court ignoring the French law to the effect, that once the properties were sold in Court auction, the successful bidder become the owner with immediate right to enter upon possession of the properties with a duty to pay the sale consideration within six months from the date of auction or on demand of the creditor at whose instance the property was sold. 7. Ignoring the provisions of French Law and the fact that Govindasamy did not file any appeal; within 10 days from the Court auction sale, the trial Court decreed the suit. The failure to comply with the conditions of sale if any, would only enure to the benefit of the decree holder who brought the property for sale to get the sale set aside. 8. Owing to non-application of mind on the fact that Govindan paid as per law the auction amount properly, the trial Court simply decreed the suit quite against the factual evidence available on record. 9. The trial Court failed to take into consideration the Articles 2262 and 2265 of the French Code Civil, which cumulatively convey that by the lapse of 30 years, all right to take action would get extinguished and lesser period of limitation of 20 years and 10 years are also contemplated there in depending upon circumstances. 10. Ignoring the fact that the suit was filed after the lapse of even the longer period of limitation, the trial Court decreed the suit 11. The trial Court failed to note that the plea of benami under the Indian Law also was no longer available for the plaintiffs to plead. 12. The trial Court failed to note that Govindasamy was not in fiduciary relationship with Govindan and such relationship was not pleaded or proved by the plaintiffs, even then the Court suo motu invoked such a concept wrongly. 13. 12. The trial Court failed to note that Govindasamy was not in fiduciary relationship with Govindan and such relationship was not pleaded or proved by the plaintiffs, even then the Court suo motu invoked such a concept wrongly. 13. In the absence of any evidence to prove that Govindasamy in order to prevent third party from purchasing the suit properties, arranged for such benami dealing in the Court auction sale, the trial Court was not justified in decreeing the suit 114. The clinching evidence adduced on the side of the defendants was ignored by the trial Court for no good reason. The factum of Govindan having been in enjoyment of the suit properties in his own right as owner after the Court auction sale was unjustifiably ignored by the trial Court. 115. The trial Court failed to consider that the decree holder in the Court auction sale was not added as one of the parties to the suit. 116. Govindasamy had not taken any proceedings as contemplated under the French Code Civil to get the Court auction sale sat aside. During the year 1968 Civil Procedure Code 1908 was extended to Union Tammy of Pondicherry and even from that time onwards for mare torn 30 years, no action was taken by the plaintiffs. 117. The trial Court failed to consider Exhibits B4 to B19 and the oral evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 in proper perspective and uphold the plea of prescription as put forth by the defendants. 118. The trial Court failed to consider that D3 was put in possession as tenant of the suit properties by Govindan and not by Govindasamy. 119. The trial Court was not correct in awarding mesne profits. 120. The trial Court failed to note that the notices dated 11. 1977, 12. 1977 and 111. 1986, i.e., Exhibits A-3, A-5 and A-6 would not operate as interruption to the accruing of prescriptive title. Accordingly, the appellants/ defendants prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and for dismissing the original suit. 9. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing on either side. 10. The points for consideration are as to: .(i) Whether the evidence adduced on the side of the defendants was sufficient to prove the plea that Govindan acquired title under the Court auction sale? 9. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing on either side. 10. The points for consideration are as to: .(i) Whether the evidence adduced on the side of the defendants was sufficient to prove the plea that Govindan acquired title under the Court auction sale? (ii) Whether the trial Court was justified in ignoring the factum of payment made by Govindasamy, the Court auction purchaser? (Hi) Whether the suit as framed by the plaintiffs invoking the very plea of Benami is sustainable either under the French Law or the Indian Law? .(iv) Whether the trial Court was justified in ignoring the title acquired by Govindan in the Court auction proceedings and in declaring that the auction sale in favour of Govindan was for the real benefit and ownership of Govindasamy and also in giving a finding that there was no need to cancel the Court auction judgment? .(v) Whether the trial Court has failed to apply either the French Law or the Indian Law of Limitation in adjudging as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not? .(vi) Whether Govindan in the alternative acquired prescriptive title over the suit property? (vii) Whether there is any infirmity in judgment and decree of the trial Court? Point Nos.1 to 4: 11. These points are taken together as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with one another. Backdrop of the case A resume of facts which would exemplify quintessentially and tersely the case of the plaintiffs is to the effect that Govindasamy, the propositus of the plaintiffs, even though happened to be the judgment debtor, made arrangements in such a manner so as to make his relative Govindan, the propositus of the defendants to bid in the French Court auction sale of Govindasamy’s own properties so as to avoid third parties snatching away the same in the Court auction sale; Govindasamy continued to exercise his ownership right over the said properties and neither Govindan nor his legal heirs ever acquired any right over the suit properties. 12. 12. Per contra, broadly but briefly, the case of the defendants is that the concept benami being ushered into the French Court auction sale is virtually anathema to French Law and justice; Govindan paid his own money and acquired the title over the suit properties in the French Court auction sale; during him life time, he exercised absolute ownership over it and following him, his legal heirs exercised the right of ownership over the same. .13. The learned senior counsel for the defendants, drawing the attention of this Court to the various parts of the judgment would develop his argument that the lower Court misunderstanding the documents as well as the French law and that too quite antithetical to the evidence adduced before him regarding actual payment of bid amount by Govindan relating to the Court auction, decided the case erroneously. Whereas, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs would pin his faith in the conduct of Govindasamy, the propositus of the plaintiffs in contesting and resisting the legal proceedings initiated by the brother of Thangavelu who was original owner of the suit properties challenging the Exhibit A-1 and the attitude of Govindan in justifying and defending the validity of Exhibit A-1 executed by Thangavelu in favour of Govindasamy and develop his argument that at no point of time Govindan exercised his alleged absolute right of ownership over the suit properties as he happened to be only a benamidar of the Govindasamy. Analysis of French Court Auction Sale v. The Evidence on Record: 14. In this factual matrix it is just and necessary to analyse the evidence relating to the French Court auction sale and the conduct as to how Govindan and Govindasamy conducted themselves relating to the suit properties. .15. The learned senior counsel would file the genealogy at the time of his making submissions purely for the purpose of highlighting and spotlighting as to how Govindasamy and Govindan were not so closely related, but they were only distant relatives. It is therefore just and necessary to extract hereunder the relevant portion of the genealogy for better understanding. .CHAT 16. No adverse comment gushed forth from the plaintiff’s side as against the said genealogy. It is therefore just and necessary to extract hereunder the relevant portion of the genealogy for better understanding. .CHAT 16. No adverse comment gushed forth from the plaintiff’s side as against the said genealogy. This Court is not particular about the actual relationship and its correctness as found set out in the genealogy, but one fact is clear that Govindan and Govindasamy were not near relatives, but they were distant relatives. 17. A perusal of the records and more specifically Exhibit B-1(a) – the certificate copy of auction proceedings dated 110. 1955, Exhibit B-2-the sale certificate dated 27. 1960, Exhibit B.4 – the receipt dated 30.12.1961, Exhibits B-16 and B-17 – Extracts from the Register of Inscription with translation dated 110. 1965, would demonstrate and display that Govindan was a Teacher by profession at the relevant time of he having participated in the French Court auction sale; Govindasamy was heavily indebted, whereupon the suit properties were brought for sale at the instance of one of the creditors namely Noel Fanovard and at that time alone Govindan through his advocate bid in the Court auction sale and became successful bidder, thereafter, executing the relevant documents and incorporating the same in the French hypothecation bureau concerned and making payment of the bid amount with interest as undertaken by him in the French Court, became absolute owner. 18. Exhibit B-1 – the certified copy of the auction proceedings would speak by itself that it was transcribed in the register of Transcription on 110. 1955. It would evidence that the suit properties belonged to Govindasami Naicker, son of late Appasamy Naicker and he was the judgment debtor. The creditor, namely Noel Fanovard being the decree holder brought the suit properties for sale. In fact, the creditor Noel Fanovard was the mortgagee and Govindasamy was the mortgager of the suit properties as per the mortgage deed dated 28. 1946. Since Govindasamy committed default in discharging the mortgage debt, the said mortgagee Noel Fanovard brought the suit properties for being sold in the auction sale. The property was sold in the Court auction sale in favour of Govindan, subject to the conditions relating to payment of the bid amount. It is therefore just and necessary to extract here under condition No.4 for ready reference: “4. The property was sold in the Court auction sale in favour of Govindan, subject to the conditions relating to payment of the bid amount. It is therefore just and necessary to extract here under condition No.4 for ready reference: “4. After the expiry of six months time from the auction the purchaser will be bound to pay his price in principal and interests accrued at seven per cent per annum from the date of the final auction to the inscribed creditors usefully and in default to the distrained party before one of the Notaries of this town. The cost of the notorial acquittance and the process fees remain at the charge of the auction purchaser. In case the inscribed creditors and the distrained party will not be in position to receive the sale price, the purchaser will be bound to deposit it in the Government consignment office at every requisition of the pursuer, of the distrained party or of one of the inscribed creditor and to give notice of the fact to the executing creditor, by doing so, he win be discharged permanently from this count towards the rightful claimants. No interest can be claimed from him from the date of deposit. The default of deposit after the expiry of six months time will lead to over bidding.” 19. Exhibit B-2 – the sale certificate issued by the French Court concerned on 27. 1960 would exemplify and exfoliate that in pursuance of the said auction conducted and Hi view of the fact that Govindan happened to be successful bidder and that he paid tie necessary auction charges, the sale certificate was issued in favour of Govindan subject to the condition that he must be ready to pay the amount due to the creditor on his demand with 7% interest. As such, in commensurate with the condition as found set out in Exhibit B-1 and Exhibit B-2 and as revealed by Exhibit B3- the Triplicate copy of challan, Govindan deposited a sum of Rs. 1526.67 p on 211. 1962 including the interest accrued there on from the date of auction i.e. 29. 1955 till the date of payment i.e. 211. 1962, at the request of Noel Fanovard, the said decree holder/creditor in his favour. .20. 1526.67 p on 211. 1962 including the interest accrued there on from the date of auction i.e. 29. 1955 till the date of payment i.e. 211. 1962, at the request of Noel Fanovard, the said decree holder/creditor in his favour. .20. As such, a cumulative reading of Exhibit B-1, B-2 and B-3 would unambiguously evidence that Govindan through his advocate bid in the auction sale in the French Court auction sale and became the successful bidder and consequently, he got the sales certificate and also deposited the entire amount payable with interest as per the Court-auction proceedings. The very terms and conditions as found set out in Exhibit B-1(a) would demonstrate and establish that Govindan had become the absolute owner of the suit properties and in such a case to say the least, without any rhyme or reason and also without taking care to peruse the exhibits marked during trial, the trial Court erroneously gave a finding as though there was no proof to hold that the amount was paid. The plaintiffs in the plaint without any basis, simply contended as though the bid amount was not paid and blindly the lower Court also gave a finding in support of the plaintiffs. .Significance of French Court auction sale: .21. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would convincingly and correctly put forth his argument that no sooner the French law auction proceedings are over as per French Law, the auction purchaser would become the owner from the date of auction. Condition No.3 in Exhibit B 1(a) is extracted here under for ready reference: .“The purchaser will be the owner by the man fact and from the date of auction. Immediately after proof of payment of taxes on property, transfer and of general cost of sale to the Registry of the Court he shall enter into enjoyment of the auctioned property.” .22. A bare perusal of it would unambiguously highlight and spotlight that on proof of payment of taxes on property and of general cost of sale to the Registry of the Court, he could enter into the enjoyment of the auctioned property. Here, the recitals in Exhibit B2 – the sale certificate would clearly indicate that the Court itself certified that such payments as contemplated under the said condition No.3 were complied with. Here, the recitals in Exhibit B2 – the sale certificate would clearly indicate that the Court itself certified that such payments as contemplated under the said condition No.3 were complied with. Over and above that Exhibit B-3, the receipt would exemplify that even the amount payable to the decree holder Noel Fanovard was paid by Govindan and in such a case, absolutely there is no exiguous or modicum extent of doubt that Govindan became absolute owner of the suit properties consequent upon his participation in the auction proceedings and his subsequent compliance with the terms and conditions as per French Law. 23. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would be right in his argument that if at all there had been any irregularity or non-compliance with the procedure prescribed by law in conducting the auction or in complying with the conditions of sale, the creditor or the debtor should have initiated action, but no such action was taken and the sale proceedings were not set aside. As per the French law procedure, the appellate Court had got jurisdiction to set aside sle and there is no quarrel over such a proposition, but no step was ever taken either by the creditor or the debtor. It is therefore pellucid and apparent that the auction sale became conclusive and Govindan became the absolute owner of the suit properties. Exhibit B-3, the challan itself countersigned by the Court would clearly highlight that at the request of the creditor as contemplated in Exhibit B-1 (a), the said Govindan deposited the amount due to the creditor Noel Fanovard with interest. As such, by no stretch of imagination it could be stated that there had been non-compliance with the auction proceedings as per French Law by Govindan. 24. The plaintiffs would try to dish out a theory of benami, for which the learned senior counsel for the defendants would correctly contend that such a theory of benami in French Court auction sale is something unknown and such a plea of benami is totally untenable. Exhibit B1(a) would unambiguously and unequivocally exfoliate that advocate Joseph Antoine had participated and bid in the auction on behalf of Govindan. As per French law, advocate bidding in the French Court auction sale on behalf of a party is not an empty formality, it is having a solemnity and significance of its own. Exhibit B1(a) would unambiguously and unequivocally exfoliate that advocate Joseph Antoine had participated and bid in the auction on behalf of Govindan. As per French law, advocate bidding in the French Court auction sale on behalf of a party is not an empty formality, it is having a solemnity and significance of its own. If any advocate misbehaves by ushering in benami element for judgment debtor, then legal action would be taken as against the advocate concerned and that is a very serious matter under the French law and it is quite obvious from a mere reference to any treatise on French law. The plea as put forth by the plaintiffs that Govindasamy, the judgment debtor for the purpose of saving his properties had set up Govindan to bid in the auction is turned out to be a false and frivolous plea unsupported by any evidence on record, Govindasamy could have had no financial wherewithal to bid in the Court auction sale and pay the amount through his alleged binamidar Govindan for the reason that Govindasamy was indubitably and incontrovertibly, heavily to as many as the following persons: 1. Paul Charles Derisud 2. The territory represented by the Treasury Officer 3. Moel Fanovard 4. The Societe des Secours Mutuels des Originiaries catholiques de Rettiarpalayam and 5. Essoudasse called also Louisdasse in addition to Noel Fanovard, the decree holder. 25. As such without any rhyme or reason, ignoring in addition to throwing to winds and without considering the factum of the sum of Rs.1,526.67 which was a huge amount in those days paid by Govindan, the plaintiffs simply contended as though Govindan was a benamidar of Govindasamy. In order to prove benami transaction, there should be clinching and convincing evidence before the Court in support of the benami transaction that the amount was actually paid by Govindasamy in the name of Govindan. But in this case, absolutely there is no miniscule extent of evidence to support the plea of benami as put forth by the plaintiffs. Ingredients of Benami transaction v. The Evidence on Record: 26. But in this case, absolutely there is no miniscule extent of evidence to support the plea of benami as put forth by the plaintiffs. Ingredients of Benami transaction v. The Evidence on Record: 26. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would advance his argument that the concept benami is unknown to French Law in Court auction sale conducted before the French Courts and that too, the judgment debtor himself cannot be heard to contend in a separate suit in the Court auction sale, the judgment debtor only caused his benami to bid in that auction sale and purchase the property and even under the Indian Law such Benami transactions cannot be entertained. 27. I am fully in agreement with such proposition as put forth by the learned senior counsel for the defendants in view of the following maxims: .(i) Ex turpi causa non oritur action-(Out of a base (illegal or immoral) consideration, an action does (can) not arise. .(ii) Ex dolo malo non aritur action-(Out of fraud no action arises; fraud never gives a right of action. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act (iii) In pari delicto potior est condition possidentis (defendantis) In a case of equal or mutual fault (between two parties) the condition of the party in possession (or defending) is the better one. Where each party is equally in fault, the law favors him who is actually in possession. Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it. 28. I would like to extract the relevant portion from BROOMS LEGAL MAXIM, Tenth Edition. “……………….An action cannot be maintained which is founded in fraud, or which springs ex turpi causa. Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it. 28. I would like to extract the relevant portion from BROOMS LEGAL MAXIM, Tenth Edition. “……………….An action cannot be maintained which is founded in fraud, or which springs ex turpi causa. The connection which exists between these maxims may, indeed, be satisfactorily shown by reference to a case already cited, in Fivaz v. Nicholls (x), an action was brought to recover damages for an alleged conspiracy between B, the defendant, and a third party, C, to obtain payment of a bill of exchange accepted by the plaintiff in “consideration that B, would abstain from prosecuting C for embezzlement; and it was held that the action would not lie, inasmuch as it sprang out of an illegal transaction, in which both plaintiff and defendant had been engaged, and of which proof was essential in order to establish the plaintiff’s claim as stated upon the record. In this case, therefore, the maxim, ex dolo malo non oritur action, was evidently applicable; and not less so, with regard both to the original corrupt agreement and to the subsequent alleged conspiracy, was the general principle of law, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis (y). Both maxims, again, seen equally applicable to the rule of the common law, now abolished by statute, that contribution could not be enforced amongst wrongdoers(z), and that a person, who knowingly committed an act declared by the law to be criminal, could recover compensation from others who participated with him in the commission of the crime(a). Bearing in mind, then, this connection between the two kindred maxims, we shall proceed to consider briefly the very comprehensive principle, ex dolo malo, or more generally, ex turpi causa, non oritur action. Bearing in mind, then, this connection between the two kindred maxims, we shall proceed to consider briefly the very comprehensive principle, ex dolo malo, or more generally, ex turpi causa, non oritur action. In the first place, then, we may observe mat the word dolus, when used in its more comprehensive sense, was understood by the Roman jurists to include “every intentional misrepresentation of the truth made to induce another to perform an act which he would not else have undertaken” (b), and a marked distinction accordingly existed in the civil law between dolus bonus and dolus malus: the former signifying that degree of artifice or dexterity which a person might lawfully employ to advance his own interest, in self-defence against an enemy or for some other justifiable purpose (c); and the latter including every kind of craft, guile, or machination, inte4ntionally employed for the purpose of deception, cheating or circumvention (d), As to the latter species of dolus (with which alone we are now concerned), it was a fundamental rule, to be observed by everyone in a judicial position, that dolo malo partum se non servaturum (e); and, in our own law, it is a familiar principle that an action brought upon a supposed contract, which is shown to have arisen from fraud, may be successfully resisted (f).” 29. I am t a loss to understand as to how the judgment debtor could have any legal right to contend that he only committed illegality in the Court auction sale by making his surrogate/benami to bid in the auction and take the property and as per his illegal act, he should be declared as a real owner. 30. The learned senior counsel for the defendants properly and appositely would argue that had really Govindasamy himself possessed had the necessary financial where withal to pay the debt, then he would have redeemed the suit properties and on that line, he would have taken action, but he did not do so. Ex facie and prima facie it is clear from the very description of Govindan, that he was a teacher by profession at that relevant time. The onus probandi is on the plaintiffs who came forward with the plea of binami to prove that Govindan had no financial wherewithal to pay the amount and that virtually the amount was paid by Govindasamy through Govindan. The onus probandi is on the plaintiffs who came forward with the plea of binami to prove that Govindan had no financial wherewithal to pay the amount and that virtually the amount was paid by Govindasamy through Govindan. But the plaintiffs have not obviously had any evidence to establish the plea. 31. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would cite the following decisions so as to highlight that the burden of proof is on the person, who pleads benami transaction and ingredients. In order to prove such transaction evidence has to be led to demonstrate .(i) that the purchaser paid the consideration .(ii) that he had the custody of the sale deed (iii) that he was in possession of the property and (iv) the motive for the transaction An excerpt from Jaydayal Poddar (deceased) through L.Rs. and Another v. Ms. L Bibi Hazra and Others AIR 1974 SC 171 : (1974) 1 SCC 3 would run thus:- “6. It is well settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through-But such difficulties do not relieve the parson asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevan indicia, the Courts are usually guided by these circumstances: (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction benami colour, (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, it any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar,(5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. 7. 7776 above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless No. 1 viz. the source, whence the purchase money came, is by far the most important test for determining whether the sale standing in the name of one person, is in reality for the benefit of another.” A mere perusal of it would clearly demonstrate that in this case, the plaintiffs whose burden to prove the benami transaction miserably failed to adduce any evidence much less reliable evidence relating to it. 32. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would convincingly and correctly argue that the relevant documents relating to Court auction sale, including the sales certificate, Exhibit B-2 and Exhibit B-3, the triplicate of the challan showing the payment of the auction amount were all produced by the defendants, so to say, the legal heirs of Govindan, the auction purchaser and not by the plaintiffs. 33. From the cited decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that if the relevant documents are produced by the person, who plead benami, then in that case, at least some doubt would arise that the transaction might be a benami transaction. 33. From the cited decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that if the relevant documents are produced by the person, who plead benami, then in that case, at least some doubt would arise that the transaction might be a benami transaction. But, in this case, no piece of document was produced from the defendant’s side relating to the Court auction sale, for the purpose of proving such alleged benami transaction. (i) Gapadibai v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1980 SC 1040 : (1980) 2 SCC 327 “3. ……………In order to prove the benami nature of the transaction the State could have led evidence to show (1) that Defendant 5 paid the consideration, (2) that he had the custody of the sale deed, (3) that he was in possession of the property and (4) the motive for the transaction, None of these factors has been proved by the State ……………” .(ii) Valliammal (D) by LRs. V. Subramankun and Others AIR 2004 SC 4187 : (2004) 7 SCC 233 : (2004) 4 MLJ 153 at p. 157 of MLJ “12. This Court in a number of judgments has held that it is well established that burden of proving that a particular sale is benami lies on the person who alleges the transaction to be a benami. The essence of a benami transaction is the intention of the party or parties concerned and often, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. Refer to Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra, Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P. (supra), Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh, Pratap Singh v. Sarojini Devi and Heirs of Vrajlal, J., Ganatra v. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah, It has been held in the judgments referred to above that the question whether a particular sale is a benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining the question no absolute formulas or acid test, uniformly applicable in ail situations can be laid. After saying so, this Court spelt out the following six circumstances which can be taken as a guide to determine the nature of the transaction: “(1) the source from which the purchase money came; .(2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; .(3) motive, if any, forgiving the transaction a benami colour, .(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; .(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and .(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale.” (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazral, SCCp, 7, para 6) (iii) Binapani Paul v. Pratima Ghosh and Others (2007) SCC 100 : (2007) 4 MLJ 1076 In this judgment, the earlier judgment Vattiammal (D) by LRa. V. Subramankun and Others (supra) has been referred to. 34. As such, the Hon’ble Apex Court consistently held that the burden of proof is on the person, who put forth the plea on benami to prove the benami transaction by clearly pointing out that the money was not paid by the person, who purported to have purchased it but by the person who pleads benami. But, in this case, absolutely, there is no oral or documentary evidence to exemplify that the money was paid relating to the Court auction sale by Govindasamy in the name of Govindan. But on the other hand, the plaintiffs, being the propositus of Govindasamy would plead that no money at all was paid in the Court auction. However, it is found that the money was actually paid by Govindan, the Court auction purchaser as revealed by Exhibit B-3. 35. The provisions of the benami transaction in Benami Prohibition Act 1984 was sought to be invoked. But, in my opinion the said prohibition is not applicable as the transaction took place long prior to the commencement of the said Act and that too before de jure the merger of Pondicherry with the Indian Union. But the real point is that under the French Law, such sort of binami pleas are not tenable and that too French law attached immense solemnity to the Court auction sale as found exemplified in Exhibit B-1 (a) itself. But the real point is that under the French Law, such sort of binami pleas are not tenable and that too French law attached immense solemnity to the Court auction sale as found exemplified in Exhibit B-1 (a) itself. Even otherwise, my discussion supra would indicate as to how the plea of binami transaction as put forth by the plaintiffs has not been proved and in fact, such plea is quits antithetical to the clinching and authentic documentary evidence put forth by the defendants. 36. An unsuccessful and unreasonable attempt has been made by the plaintiffs to misinterpret Exhibits B-16 and B-17 and it is therefore, just and necessary to scrutinize those documents in detail. Exhibits B-16 and B-17 are the two extracts from the Register of Inscription relating to the first item of the suit properties and the second item of the suit properties respectively. 37. My above discussion supra would clearly demonstrate as to how Govindan, the purchaser was bound to pay as per the condition set out in Exhibit B-1(a) the bid amount with interest and by way of securing such payment of bid amount with interest, Exhibits B-16 and B-17 emerged and this glaring fact was sought to be misinterpreted by the plaintiffs as though Govindasamy, the judgment debtor himself obtained order of attachment from the French Court relating to the suit properties relating to the money given by him to Govindan and that Govindasamy became the owner. To say the least, such an interpretation would do utmost violence to the palpable and glaring realities as found proved in the circumstances of this case and the document available oh record. The first and the second Hem of the suit properties were sold in the Court auction sale for Rs.600/- and Rs.400/- respectively and Exhibits B-16 and B-17 relating to the first and second items respectively would clearly refer to the Court auction judgment and also the amount of Rs.600/- and Rs.400/-respectively and only for the purpose of securing prompt payment of the bid amount with interest, such documents Exhibits B-16 and B-17 emerged and which would also demonstrate that Govindan committed himself in black and white in the form of those documents that he would comply with the payment conditions and in regard to that alone, such encumbrances were created over the very same auctioned properties as per French procedure. As such, it is crystal clear that Exhibits B16 and B17 are not related to any money lent by Govindasamy in favour of Govindan in any manner. This Court’s judicial consciousness is shocked as to how this apparent and obvious reality was not realized by the lower Court and simply adjudged the lease at its own whims and fancies by tabulating on so many irrelevant, facts. Page 17 of the printed judgment of the lower Court is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “………Thus it will be seen that the prayer of the plaintiffs herein is not directly to nullify the auction sale on the ground of any irregularity in the conduct of sale prior to the auction. Only if the plaintiffs challenged the sale for irregularity in respect of notification of auction sale or in respect of the conduct of sale upto the date of auction, the limitation under Article 731 of the Code de Procedure Civil will apply and it will not be a bar to the present suit which is limited to the establishment of the plaintiffs’ right as aggrieved parties who are in fiduciary capacity relationship s debtor and creditor and closely related as cousin who are deprived of their property by arbitrary and unilateral act of the defendant’s father.” .38. I am constrained to point out that the trial Judge wrongly, did choose to give a finding recording Exhibits B-16 and B-17, as though Govindan was indebted to Govindasamy without understanding true implication of Exhibits B-16 and B-17 as set out supra and based on such false and erroneous notion, the trial Court went to the extent of dishing out pleas by his mere tabulation as though there is fiduciary relationship between Govindan and Govindasamy and rendered the judgment. My above discussion would indicate as to how the entire judgment of the trial Court got vitiated by the wrong approach and understanding of the fact and law without aucourant with facts and au fait with law, the trial Court rendered to say the least, wrong findings. 39. The trial Court having such erroneous subjective satisfaction, went on dilating and misinterpreting the documents and the facts and circumstances and decreed the suit by granting a peculiar relief as set out supra, i.e., declaration after negativing the plea of the plaintiffs for setting the auction sale. 40. 39. The trial Court having such erroneous subjective satisfaction, went on dilating and misinterpreting the documents and the facts and circumstances and decreed the suit by granting a peculiar relief as set out supra, i.e., declaration after negativing the plea of the plaintiffs for setting the auction sale. 40. Placing reliance on Exhibit A-2 – the certified copy of the judgment of the first instance dated 27. 1967, the plaintiffs would contend that the brother of Thangavelu, who sold the property in favour of Govindasamy instituted the suit questioning the sale in Exhibit A-1 effected by Thangavelu in favour of Govindasamy and it was resisted by Govindasamy and not by Govindan and that according to the plaintiffs that would demonstrate that Govindasamy was still the owner of the suit of properties. 41. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would by his argument expound and expatiate that an ex parte decree was obtained by the brother of Thangavelu and as against which Govindasamy took steps and got such ex parte judgment annulled and in those proceedings, Govindan was not at all a party. According to the learned senior counsel for the defendants, simply because Govindasamy resisted the suit filed by the brother of Thangavelu, there is no presumption that Govindasamy was the real owner. In my considered opinion, the said factum of Govindasamy having resisted seriously the proceedings instituted by the brother of Thangavelu in no way could be taken as a piece of evidence in support of the plea of the plaintiffs that Govindasamy was the real owner of the suit properties because Govindasamy at that time was duty bound to resist the said proceedings instituted by the brother of Thangavelu, as otherwise the position of Govindasamy in the hands of his debtors as welt as Govindan would have become more precarious and unbearable. .42. Assuming for a moment that Govindasamy did not resist the said suit, then Thangavelu’s brother would have taken away the suit properties, which were already mortgaged in favour of Noel Fanovard and which were sold in the Court auction in favour of Govindan who paid the auction amount with interest also as revealed by Exhibit B-3 dated 211. 1962. .42. Assuming for a moment that Govindasamy did not resist the said suit, then Thangavelu’s brother would have taken away the suit properties, which were already mortgaged in favour of Noel Fanovard and which were sold in the Court auction in favour of Govindan who paid the auction amount with interest also as revealed by Exhibit B-3 dated 211. 1962. In the process of undoing and setting the clock back by giving the suit properties to the brother of Thangavelu, all others who already acquired right over it should be provided with reliefs at the instance of Govindasamy only around him wheeled the whole gamut of transactions and proceedings relating to the suit properties. 43. Had Thangavelu’s brother succeeded in taking back the suit properties, the ultimate sufferer legally was Govindasamy and in such a case, it was no wonder that he took steps to resist the suit and such an act of Govindasamy cannot be capitalized by the plaintiffs in support of their case. 44. As such, in those facts and circumstances, understanding his heavy responsibility, Govindasamy resisted the suit instituted by Thangavelu’s brother. It is not as though simply because during the year 1967 already Govindasamy ceased to be the owner because of the Court auction proceedings, he could have totally wash his hands and kept quiet. It is therefore clear that the plaintiffs are wrong in placing reliance on the Govindasamy’s act of resisting Thangavelu’s suit, in support of their plea. 45. The plaintiffs relied on Exhibit A-15-the certified copy of the judgment and decree to prove the close relationship between Govindasamy and Govindan. A bare perusal of Exhibit A-15 would reveal that O.S. No. 40 of 1968 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Villupuram was instituted by the first and second defendants herein along with their mother and grand mother as against Govindasamy and Others for declaration and possession of one other item of property on the ground that Govindasamy fraudulently sold the property belonging to the plaintiffs and in the discussion, the Court made observations that Govinasamy’s marriage was performed by Ramasamy Naicker, who was the husband of Visalatchi Ammal, the first plaintiff therein and grand mother of D1 and D2 herein. In fact, the learned senior counsel for the defendants would clearly and categorically without mincing words would make a frank argument that no doubt, while Govindasamy proved himself quite fugitive from French criminal justice consequent upon his conviction by the French Court due to Govindasamy having committed forgery etc., and staying at Villupuram, which was a part of British in India and could not enter Pondicherry which was part of French India, Govindan made arrangements to solemnize the marriage of Govindsamy’s daughter as evidenced by Exhibit A-9. 46. The learned counsel for the defendants would correctly comment upon the deposition of PW1 that nowhere PW1 Datchinamoorthy, the third plaintiff stated anything about the benami element involved in the Court auction sale. 47. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would convincingly put forth the point that simply because at one point of time when Govindasamy was in self imposed exile at Villupuram fearing French criminal justice, Govindan arranged for the solemnization of Govindasamy’s daughter on 2. 1958 and that in no way would enure to the benefit of the defendants that the suit properties were the properties of Govindasamy. I am at a loss to understand as to how when parties are fighting litigative battle at arms length, this sort of evidence of cordial relationship existed between Govindasamy and Govindan would become legal evidence in support of ownership right. There is no hard and fast rule that when Govindan purchased the property at Court auction sale, necessarily Govindan should be at logger heads or t daggers drawn with Govindasamy at all circumstances. Legal right over a property is different from social relationship which one party might have with the other prty and as such, I am of the considered opinion that Exhibit A-9 cannot be pressed into service by the plaintiffs so as to buttress an d fortify their plea. 48. Exhibits A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13 and A-14 are alt relating to Dakshinamoorthy, the third plaintiff, who is the son of Govindasamy and those documents were relied on by the plaintiffs to prove and demonstrate that the permanent residence of Dakshinamoorthy was in the suit house. 48. Exhibits A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13 and A-14 are alt relating to Dakshinamoorthy, the third plaintiff, who is the son of Govindasamy and those documents were relied on by the plaintiffs to prove and demonstrate that the permanent residence of Dakshinamoorthy was in the suit house. A mere perusal of those documents would reveal that the said Dakshinamoorthy (P3) was working in Chennai, so to say, as driver in the then Madras State Transport Department during the year 1966 and 1967 and in those documents it is found recorded as, Dakshinamoorthy C/o K. Govindan, 1/24 Pillai Thottam, Pondicherry and that by itself would in no way connote or denote, exemplify or demonstrate, convey or display that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit properties. .49. In fact, P3’s name itself is shown as C/o Govindan, the propositus of the defendants. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would contend that the said address does not refer to the suit house but some other property. Be that as it may, it is not known as to how such bare reference in those exhibits and that too ignoring the fact that P3 had been shown as the one under the C/o Govindan, P3 could claim absolute right and title over the suit properties. To the risk of repetition, without being tautologous, a fortiori, I would hold that social relationship which might have got smoothened at one point of time between Govindasamy and Govindan’s family would not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the suit property was not the property of Govindan, who acquired it under the Court auction sale legally, as set out supra. 50. The learned senior counsel for the defendant would by placing reliance on the then existed Section 66 of the Code of CMI Procedure 1908 which was in prevalence at the time of institution of the original suit would develop; his argument that no suit could be instituted against the purchase of the property. In Court auction, sale on the ground that such purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiffs in the suit. Hence, he is correct in his argument that on that ground also, the present suit is not tenable. 51. Accordingly, the Point Nos. 1 to 4 are decided in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. Point Nos. In Court auction, sale on the ground that such purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiffs in the suit. Hence, he is correct in his argument that on that ground also, the present suit is not tenable. 51. Accordingly, the Point Nos. 1 to 4 are decided in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. Point Nos. 5 & 6 : The French Law and the Indian Law on Limitation relating to extinction of right and Adverse possession: 52. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would submit that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was miserably barred by limitation, under the French Law as well as the Indian Law. It is therefore just and necessary to refer Articles 2262 and 2265 of the French Civil Code and they are extracted here under for ready reference: “2262. All rights of action whether in rem or in personam are extinguished by prescription after thirty years. The person who sets up a title by prescription for thirty years is not obliged to rely on any title; nor can a plea alleging bad faith be set up. 2265. A person who acquires an immovable in good faith, and under an instrument which is on the face of it capable of giving a title, obtains a title by prescription to the land in ten years, if the district of the Court of Appeal, in which the owner lives is the same district as that in which he land lies; and in twenty years if the true owner lives outside such district.” 53. A. Perusal of the aforesaid two articles would clearly demonstrate that suit instituted by the plaintiffs on 111. 1987, so to say, more than 32 years after the Court of auction judgment dated 110. 1955 is barred by French Law of limitation. 54. It is also explicit from Article 2262 of French Civil Code extracted supra relating to this case is concerned, the shorter period of limitation of 10 years or 20 years as referred to therein, is attracted; because in this case, Govindan derived title under the Court auction sale in good faith and in such a case, 10 years limitation is attracted. Even assuming that Govindasamy was on self-imposed exile fearing for criminal justice and punishment lived in Villupuram which is beyond the French Court’s jurisdiction and accordingly, if construed that maximum 20 years limitation is attracted, then again the suit filed on 111. 1987 was far beyond the 20 years period of limitation. It is therefore crystal clear that as per the French Law of Limitation, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by limitation. 55. Incontrovertibly, there are catena of decisions on the aforesaid point, which are to the effect that within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the French Law of Limitation could be taken as a local law and accordingly, as on the date of filing of the suit in the trial Court, the law which was obtaining there was French Law: The French Law of Limitation was repealed only subsequently as per the Pondicherry Repeal of Limitation Laws Act. As such as per the then existed French Law of Limitation, the suit was barred. 56. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would also submit that de hors the consistent view taken by this Court that French Law of Limitation was applicable within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act in Pondicherry during those days, the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered a judgment as Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D.Naik and Another AIR 2001 SC 1968 : (2001)4 SCC 713 : (2001) 2 MLJ 97 to the effect that such sort of limitation prescribed under those laws cannot be taken as special or local law of limitation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. An excerpt from it would run thus at p. 104 of MLJ: “22. An excerpt from it would run thus at p. 104 of MLJ: “22. Admittedly, the Limitation Act is a statute enacting the provisions in general terms applicable to the entire country excepting the exception as mentioned in the statute itself: It is a later statute of the year 1963 only that Portuguese Civil Code assuming had its application in the State of Goa, Daman and Diu and an earlier statute thus stands altered, as the latter is expressed in affirmative language, more so by reason of specific application of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Indian Contract Act: It thus cannot but be said to be repealing by implication – “affirmative statute introductive of a new law do imply a negative” (Har Court v. Foxty) 23. As regards the doctrine of implied repeal, another aspect of the matter ought to be noticed vis-à-vis the Civil Code. The issue of limitation being a mixed issue of law and fact under the limitation Act, the Court in spite of plea not being raised by the defence, can go into the same suo motu but there is a specific bar under Article 515 of the Civil Code which records that the Court cannot suo motu take cognizance of description (sic prescription) unless it is specifically pleaded by the parties. It is a bar to jurisdiction of Court. The repugnancy and incongruity arise by reason of the fact that Parliament by law viz. the High Court at Bombay: (extension of jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 extended the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu from the appointed day and the Court of Judicial Commissioner was abolished. Section 9 of the statute [(Act of 1981) (supra)] provides that there shall be, on and from the appointed day, established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Panaji and some Judges of the High Court at Bombay being not less than two in number or as may be nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court from time to time shall sit at Panaji, in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court in respect of cases’ arising in this Union Territory. The authority and jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay, to take cognizance of an action being barred by limitation, thus stands negated-conceptually even a difficult situation to conceive that the same High Court will have two different spheres of jurisdiction while dealing with matters. At the cost of repetition we say that while implied repeal is not to be readily inferred but in the contextual facts, upon scrutiny, we cannot but hold that in the wake of the factum of the Limitation Act coming into existence from 1. 1964, Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code cannot but be termed to be impliedly repealed and it is on this score that the decision of this Court in Justiniano case stands overruled. There is one general law of limitation for the entire country, being the Act of 1963, and the Portuguese civil law cannot be termed to be a local law or a special law applicable to the State of Goa, Daman and Diu prescribing a different period of limitation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and in any event, question of saving of local law under the Limitation Act of 1963 does not and cannot arise. The submission that without there being a specific mention of repealing statue (since the 1963 Act of Limitation does not record express repeal of any other law excepting the Limitation Act of 1908), question of the Portuguese Civil Code being repealed does not arise, cannot hold good by reason of the doctrine of implied repeal as noticed above. In the premises aforesaid, these appeals fail and are dismissed without however any order as to costs.” 57. In fact, the Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment was rendered in connection with Portuguese Court concerning a case which had arisen from Goa. The logic is applicable here also, s the case has arisen from Pondicherry where French Civil Code was in prevalence. As such, if construed, as per Limitation Act 1963, only maximum 12 years limitation is contemplated in matters of this nature so to say either under Articles 65 or 66 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As such, if Indian Law is applied, it is glaringly clear that long prior to the institution of the suit, the period of limitation got expired to institute suits of this nature. .58. As such, if Indian Law is applied, it is glaringly clear that long prior to the institution of the suit, the period of limitation got expired to institute suits of this nature. .58. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that if Indian law if Limitation is applied, it is obvious that the defendants should prove that they acquired title by adverse possession and it is not enough if they could prove that the right of action of the plaintiffs to recover the immovable property got extinguished. No doubt, under the French law of Limitation, 30 years, 20 years and 10 years periods of limitation are contemplated only relating to extinction of rights intended to be enforced. But under the Indian law, it is not enough, merely because the plea of extinction is put forth, but the plea of adverse possession which is corollary to it should be proved unambiguously as per law. I am of the considered opinion that here the defendants are not under the dire necessity to prove adverse possession for the reason that they have clearly proved that their propositus Govindan acquired the suit property in the Court auction sale validly and they have been in possession under such a valid title and in such a case, within the period of limitation as contemplated either under the French law or the Indian law, Govindasamy or the plaintiffs should have taken action, but they had not chosen to do so. In such a case, it is quite obvious and axiomatic that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to regain possession and they cannot call upon the defendants to prove adverse possession. .59. However, the defendants pleaded alternatively, adverse possession in the written statement, whereupon, the trial Court also framed issue No.2 relating to adverse possession and held as against the defendants. The trial Court placing reliance on Exhibit A-2, the judgment dated 27. 1967 and subsequent issuance of the notices Exhibits A-3, A-5 and A-6 respectively dated 11. 1977, 12. 1977 and 111. 1986 held that there was interruption in the enjoyment of the suit property by the defendants. The trial Court also observed that no regular patta was issued. However, curiously the trial Court gave a finding as under: .“………. The defendant’s claim of prescriptive title is a defective one as contemplated under Section 51 of Transfer of Property Act. 1986 held that there was interruption in the enjoyment of the suit property by the defendants. The trial Court also observed that no regular patta was issued. However, curiously the trial Court gave a finding as under: .“………. The defendant’s claim of prescriptive title is a defective one as contemplated under Section 51 of Transfer of Property Act. If the defendents have really made any improvements on defective title they can only claim compensation as on date of suit without interest and after paying Court fee and separate enquiry. Under these circumstances the plaintiffs filed the suit originally on 111. 1987, which is certainly within the period of limitation and the defendants have not acquired title by adverse possession.” .60. The reasons given by the trial Court for deciding the issue relating to adverse possession is far from satisfactory and it is quite obvious from the mere perusal of it. The trial Court itself pointed out that the right accrued in favour of the defendants propositus with effect from 29. 1955 and he became the owner of the suit property by way of Court auction sale and as already pointed out above, under the French law the subsequent payment of the money as per the auction sale would enure to the benefit of the auction purchaser to claim ownership from the date of auction sale and accordingly from 29. 1955 and at the most from the date of inscription of the auction proceedings on 110. 1955 if 12 years period is calculated, it expired by 15. 1967 itself as per Indian law. Long prior to 1967 Indian law of Limitation was extended to Pondicherry and there is no quarrel over it. On the other hand, as per French law, as highlighted supra, 20 years period of limitation is contemplated under Article 2262 of the French Civil Code, if taken into account from 15. 1955, 20 years period expired by 15. 1975, but the suit was instituted only as pointed out above on 111. 1987. The suit notices Exhibits A-3, A-5, and A-6 dated 11. 1977, 12. 1977 and 111. 1986 were all subsequent to the expiry of 20 years period as set out supra. As such, on that ground also, the lower Court was not right in its ratiocination in deciding the issue relating to adverse possession by holding that there was interruption in possession. 61. 1977, 12. 1977 and 111. 1986 were all subsequent to the expiry of 20 years period as set out supra. As such, on that ground also, the lower Court was not right in its ratiocination in deciding the issue relating to adverse possession by holding that there was interruption in possession. 61. The trial Court took into consideration Exhibit A-2-the judgment dated 27. 1967 as though it was a litigation between Govindan and Govindasamy forgetting for a moment that Govindasamy only resisted the suit initiated by Thangavelu’s brother as already set out supra and white discussing Exhibit A2 earlier, I have pointed out as to how the trial Court wrongly construed as though Govindasamy continued as the owner of the suit properties. Hence, Exhibit A-2 by no stretch of imagination could be taken as one which caused interruption in the peaceful possession of the suit property by the defendants and their propositus Govindan in enjoying the suit properties as owner on the strength of the Court auction sale. .62. The defendants produced Exhibit B9 the Survey Notice dated 12. 1979, which informed that the said Govindan that the Settlement Officer had not been informed of any boundary dispute relating to his land. Exhibit B-8 is the proposed patta relating to the suit property. The trial Court did not place reliance on those two documents on the ground that the patta was merely a proposed patta, which emerged only during the year 1979, whereas there was no document to show that ever since 1955, the patta got changed. I am of the considered view that the approach of the lower Court is totally wrong. Exhibits B-18 and B-19 are the encumbrance certificates produced by the defendants, which would demonstrate that in the encumbrance certificate the said Court auction sale as contained in the relevant judgment and the consequent inscriptions are found indicated and that would exemplify conclusively in conjunction with Exhibits B-7 and B-8 that Govindan’s name had been in public records continuously ever since 1955 till 1979 and thereafter also. The trial Court went wrong approach in expecting that despite such clinching piece of evidence, there should have been some other revenue record ever since 1955 till 1979. The trial Court went wrong approach in expecting that despite such clinching piece of evidence, there should have been some other revenue record ever since 1955 till 1979. The encumbrance Certificates, clearly indicated that even in the year 1955, in the public record, the name of Govindan was found recorded as the owner of the suit properties and in such a case, the onus of proof is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that after 1955, Govindasamy’s name was incorporated; but that is not the case at all here. 63. As per the Court auction sale Govindan became the owner and that was inscribed in the French bureau concerned and from that time onwards, his name only figures in the record and that, when Survey was being conducted in Pondicherry, the survey authorities suo motu sent those Exhibits B-7 and B-8 confirming the possession relating to ownership and enjoyment. As such, instead of viewing the matter in the aforesaid manner, the trial Court had a tangent approach quite detriment to the cause of justice. The records would also go to show as to how the defendants and their proposituss Govindan have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties continuously in their own capacity as owners with requisite animus possidendt as owner, which is the significant ingredient to constitute adverse possession as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others v. Revamma and Others (2007) 4 MLJ 912 (SC). Certain excerpts from it would run thus at p. 915 of MLJ: “5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. (See Downing v. Bird; Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock; Mannot v. Murphy; City of Rock Springs v. Sturm.) 6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statues by operation of which light to access the Court expires through efflux of time. (See Downing v. Bird; Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock; Mannot v. Murphy; City of Rock Springs v. Sturm.) 6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statues by operation of which light to access the Court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modem statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Vol.3, 2d, p. 81.) It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go-by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim. 8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “willful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. 9. It is interesting to see the development of adverse possession law in the backdrop of the status of right to property in the 21st century. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. 9. It is interesting to see the development of adverse possession law in the backdrop of the status of right to property in the 21st century. The aspect of stronger property rights regime in general, coupled with efficient legal regimes furthering the rule of law argument, has redefined the thresholds in adverse possession law not just in India but also by the Strasbourg Court. Growth of human rights jurisprudence in recent times has also palpably affected the developments in this regard. New consideration in adverse possession law 10. In that context it is relevant to refer to J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring to the Court of Appeal judgment J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd, v. Graham made the following reference: “LORD JUSTICE KEENE took at his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even tho9ugh limitation periods both limited the right of access to the Courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol.” 14. Importantly, intention to possess cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize. 21. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize. 21. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nee precario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India in the following terms: (SCC pJ85, para 11) “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and taw. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and ‘(e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 22. It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 32. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner. 32. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession. The ingredients of adverse possession have succinctly been stated by this Court in S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina in the following terms (AIR p. 1256 para 5) “ Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.” A mere perusal of the aforesaid judgment would clearly exemplify to prove adverse possession, the animus possidendi as owner on the part of the enjoyer should be there to constitute adverse possession. Here, my discussion supra would indicate as to how such evidence is very much available in favour of the defendants and their proposrtus Govindan. It is therefore clear that the lower Court wrongly decided issue No.2 regarding adverse possession. 64. The trial Court while decreeing the suit in the last portion of para No. 18, observed as under. “But these defendants No.1 and 2 are entitled to claim the value of improvement if any made by them in separate application with Court fee, on proof alter fulfilling the conditions laid down in Section 51 and other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act regulating persons holding property with defective title. “But these defendants No.1 and 2 are entitled to claim the value of improvement if any made by them in separate application with Court fee, on proof alter fulfilling the conditions laid down in Section 51 and other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act regulating persons holding property with defective title. All defendants are liable to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within three months from this date and in default the plaintiffs to seek execution of decree.” The above excerpt from the judgment would clearly exemplify that the trial Court got satisfied that improvements were made in the suit property by the defendants and their propositus Govindan and they are in possession and in such a case, it is not known as to how, the trial Court could hold that the defendants have not acquired prescriptive title. 65. The trial Court without any sound basis, simply assumed and presumed under issue No. 10 that the defendant No. 3 was a tenant under the plaintiffs through Govindan. The lower Court also assumed as though Govindan on behalf of Govindasamy leased out the suit property to D3 and collect rents. D3 as DW2 in his deposition would depose that he was a tenant under Govindan from August 1963 onwards; he vacated the property a month anterior to the date of his deposing before the Court; after the death of Govindan, he was paying rent to Kuppammal, who is admittedly the wife of Govindan; after the death of Kuppammal, he was paying rent to Kamalakannan D1, the son of Govindan, herein and thereafter to Jayakumari, Govindan’s daughter and after D2’s death, he was paying the rent to her husband Balakrishnan. 66. It is a fact that D1 Kamalakannan and D2 Jayakumari got the suit property, partitioned between themselves and in that Jayakumari was allotted with the area wherein DW2 (D3) was occupying as tenant. Absolutely, there is nothing to doubt his testimony. During cross examination. It was only suggested to him that in his additional written statement, he did not state all those details, which he deposed before the Court. In the additional written statement, it is found detailed therein that D3 is the tenant in Govindan’s house. As such, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of D3. During cross examination. It was only suggested to him that in his additional written statement, he did not state all those details, which he deposed before the Court. In the additional written statement, it is found detailed therein that D3 is the tenant in Govindan’s house. As such, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of D3. Without any basis, however surprisingly, without any rhyme or reason, the trial Court after giving a finding that D3 was inducted into the suit property by Govindan simply held on behalf of Govindasamy only Govindan acted. 67. My above discussion supra would indicate that as for how Govindan was the absolute owner of the suit properties and that he enjoyed it. In such a case the lower Court had no reason to assume that Govindan inducted D3 only on behalf of Govindasamy. 68. Curiously enough while deciding issue No. 10, the lower Court without any objective evidence stated thus: “In view of the detailed findings of title in favour of the plaintiffs, it is natural to conclude that the defendant No.3 was a tenant under the plaintiffs through the defendant No. 1 and 2’ s father, Govindan,” Such hazardous finding by the lower Court is unwarranted. It is therefore clear that Govindan during his life time leased out a portion of the suit properties and also collected rent as owner and that would go against the case of the plaintiffs. 69. PW1 would plead ignorance about the electricity connection in the suit property, which was obtained by Govindan. Exhibit B6, the electricity receipt which is in French, would clearly demonstrate that the electricity connection in the suit property was in Govindan’s name Exhibits B-12 series 1 to 7, Exhibit B-14 series 1 to16, Exhibit B-15 series 1 to 12, would all amply evidence that the electricity charges were paid by Govindan following him, his son Kamalakannan (D1) paid those charges, This is an additional evidence to exemplify that Govindan only exercised his right of ownership over the suit properties. 70. Exhibit B-5, the application for electricity connection was given by Govindan on 11. 1962 and such connection was effected around the year 1962. Exhibit B6 would indicate of the fact that necessary fee was paid by Govindan towards such electricity connection. 70. Exhibit B-5, the application for electricity connection was given by Govindan on 11. 1962 and such connection was effected around the year 1962. Exhibit B6 would indicate of the fact that necessary fee was paid by Govindan towards such electricity connection. It proves that from the early 1960’s Govindan was enjoying electricity connection in his own name and he and his legal heirs continue to enjoy the same. Ignoring all these clinching piece of evidence proving ownership and possession of Govindan, the trial Court decided the case erroneously. 71. The trial Court while deciding issue No.1 relating limitation point dilated on various other points and raised queries suo motu, which are not even found set out in the plaint. The trial Court itself at para No.9 of the printed judgment set out thus. “To consider this objection it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the Article 731 of code de Procedure Civile is not at all applicable, since the plaintiffs herein have right to seek remedy in respect of beneficial and moral interest over the property which according to the plaintiffs was not altered or changed. The notes attached to Article 59 of the Code de Procedure Civile contemplate raising or initiating a dispute or litigation in respect of claims relating to execution of disposition, claims between legal heirs upto partition and so on. Again Article 480 of the Code de Procedure Civile which laid down that extra-ordinary procedure against the auction judgment which cause miscarriage of justice like, personal fraud, form prescribed have been followed before or at the time of judgment and for other causes mentioned in the said rule. In the light of these contingent circumstances the plaintiffs counsel submitted that the present suit is not barred by limitation period of ten days prescribed in Article 731 of Code Procedure. This Article applied to only nullities which are incidental to attachment upto date of sale as in Chapter XIII.” 72. As such, referring to Code de Procedure Civile, which means French Civil Procedure Code, for clarity sake, I would highlight that French Code Civil is different from French Civil Procedure Code. Here, the French Civil Procedure Code has been referred to by the trial Court and virtually accepted that Court auction sales as per French Civil Procedure Code could be challenged only in accordance with the rules contemplated therein. Here, the French Civil Procedure Code has been referred to by the trial Court and virtually accepted that Court auction sales as per French Civil Procedure Code could be challenged only in accordance with the rules contemplated therein. But Govindasamy, at the relevant time itself had not chosen to challenge the Court auction sale, obviously because, the Court auction sale was a genuine one. However, after 32 years, the legal heirs of Govindasamy in order to bye-pass and circumvent the aforesaid express provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, viz., the Articles 480 and 731 of the French Civil Procedure Code did choose to allege as though those provisions are not applicable concerning their suit. Absolutely, there is no rhyme or reason on the part of the trial Court in accepting their plea as such. 73. It is a trite proposition of law that once a specific set of procedures are contemplated to get set aside the Court auction sale, then no one is permitted to bye-pass it. As such, the trial Court was wrong in giving its finding otherwise. 74. The trial Court also placing reliance on Article 712 of the Code of French Civil Procedure expected that the defendants should have produced an order to show that Govindasamy was dispossessed from the premises and Govindan was put in possession. 75. The learned senior counsel for the defendants would correctly argue that Govindan, as per the evidence available, had taken possession of the suit properties and he had been enjoying it. In such a case, when there had been no necessity to have recourse to such help to take possession, the defendants are relieved of their liability to produce any order in that regard. Admittedly, in this case Govindan had been in possession and he dealt with it but the plaintiffs would only give a different colour to it as though Govindan virtually acted as an agent of Govindasamy, which the plaintiffs failed to prove. 76. Admittedly, in this case Govindan had been in possession and he dealt with it but the plaintiffs would only give a different colour to it as though Govindan virtually acted as an agent of Govindasamy, which the plaintiffs failed to prove. 76. The trial Court blatantly and grossly committed an error in giving a finding that no payment was made under the Court auction sale and that too assuming as though the sale itself was for only Rs.400/-, forgetting that two lots respectively were involved relating to first and second items and the first item was sold for a sum of Rs.600/-and the first item was sold for a sum of Rs.400/- and the said sum of Rs. 1000/- with interest was paid by Govindan as evidenced by Exhibit B-3. 77. The trial Court also fell into error in entertaining a doubt of its own as to whether the auction amount was paid in time or not? The trial Court at one breath would state that there is no evidence of payment of auction amount at all and in another breath, it would state that it was not known as to whether, it was paid in time unbeknownst of Exhibit B-3 the trial Court rendered its finding. Exhibit B-3 would clearly demonstrate that strictly in accordance with the conditions contemplated under the Court auction sale, the decree holder, viz.; Noel Fanovard made request for payment of money, whereupon the auction purchaser, viz., Govindan deposited the amount and the Court also approved it and it is evident from Exhibit B-3. In such a case, it is not known as to how it would lie in the mouth of the plaintiffs to utter out that auction amount was not paid and that it was not paid in time and the trial Court curiously in one place would state that there is no evidence of payment and in another place it would state that there is nothing to evidence that it was deposited in time. 78. I am at a loss to understand as to how such a contradictory argument can be made by the plaintiffs and pursuant to which the trial Court can give a finding. 78. I am at a loss to understand as to how such a contradictory argument can be made by the plaintiffs and pursuant to which the trial Court can give a finding. As such, it is clear that auction sale has become a fait accompli in all respects and the plaintiffs had no right to challenge, in total derogation of the provisions contained in the French Code of Civil Procedure and the French Code Civile of the French. 79. Even though P.Ws.2 and 3 would depose that it was Govindasamy, who inducted D3 as tenant, nonetheless, they clearly deposed that, it was Govindan who collected rents; whereas DW2 (Krishnasamy) the tenant would clearly and categorically depose that he became tenant only under Govindan and in such a case, P.Ws.2 and 3 could not say from which point of time, D3 started occupying the suit property. Hence, in such a case, the oral evidence of Pws.2 and 3 can only be taken as their blind statements so as to support the cause of the plaintiffs. 80. Not to put too fine a point on it, it is clear that viewing from any legal angle, the defendants also have proved their adverse possession over the suit properties. 81. Accordingly, point Nos. 5 & 6 are decided in favour of the defendants as against the plaintiffs that the suit is barred by limitation and that Govindan acquired prescriptive title over the suit property. 82. In view of the ratiocination adhered to in adjudicating the aforesaid points, it is crystal clear that the trial Court without au fait with law and au courant with facts and that too ignoring the whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures placed before it, simply passed the judgment and decree in its own way, which deserve to be set aside and accordingly, the same are set aside and the original suit is dismissed and the appeal is allowed. 83. In the result, the points are decided in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. However, there shall be no order as to costs.