Judgment :- This appeal challenges an order of dismissal made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in O.P.No.589 of 2004 seeking to set aside an arbitral award dated 30.11.2003, on the reasons set out therein. 2. The appellant/petitioner filed the original petition under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside the award dated 30.11.2003, directing them to pay a sum of Rs.90,23,650/-withheld by them towards liquidated damages with interest of Rs.43,76,608/-. 3. The case of the appellant is as follows: The petitioner, a Public Sector Undertaking, invited tender on 20.5.1993. The first respondent was awarded a contract for supply of 110 ATA boiler package including fuel oil handling system, RCC chimney with state monitoring system, continuous polishing unit and all relevant spares at a cost of Rs.18,05,53,000/-. Thereafter, two more awards of work were granted to the first respondent under order dated 112. 1994 as stated in the petition. The completion period for the boiler package was 18 months. The first respondent completed commissioning of boiler on 25. 1997 with a delay of 14 months. The contract includes the general and special conditions. As per the contract and the letter of award of work dated 112. 1994, the work jobs have to be completed within 18 months from 29. 1994 i.e., on or before 25. 1996. But, the work was completed only on 25. 1997. Despite the same, the appellant allowed the first respondent to continue to complete the work and also made timely payment for the amount of work done in a phased manner. The appellant reminded the first respondent to complete the job to the satisfaction of the appellant i.e., to make the boiler more reliable and fully operational. As the first respondent failed in its duty to make the boiler operational within the stipulated time or the extended period of time, the appellant exercised the right to levy liquidated damages on the first respondent. 4. The first respondent invoked the arbitration clause and raised a dispute in respect of the levy of liquidated damages and other related issues, and the same was referred to the respondents 2 to 4. The appellant filed a detailed counter. Apart from that, the appellant also made a counter claim to the extent of Rs.14.36 lakhs together with interest. 5. The first respondent invoked the arbitration clause and raised a dispute in respect of the levy of liquidated damages and other related issues, and the same was referred to the respondents 2 to 4. The appellant filed a detailed counter. Apart from that, the appellant also made a counter claim to the extent of Rs.14.36 lakhs together with interest. 5. A common arbitral award came to be made by the Arbitral Tribunal directing the refund of Rs.90,23,650/- which was withheld by the petitioner/appellant along with interest of Rs.43,76,608/- and also ordering the claim made by the petitioner/appellant for a sum of Rs.14,36,000/- without any interest. 6. Challenging the award directing the appellant to make refund of the said sum, the appellant brought forth a petition stating that the delay in the completion of the project was purely due to various reasons attributable to the first respondent; that the clause 9.01 in the letter of award substituted sub-clause 51 of the General conditions of contract; that the letter of acceptance dated 112. 1994 clearly states that the award of work is subject to the terms and conditions and superseded any contradictory provision that may exist in any other contract documents; that there are no contradictory provisions between sub-clause 51 and sub-para 9.01; that it is pertinent to note that there was total consensus ad idem between the parties under the letter dated 112. 1994; that the first respondent could have opted to refuse to accept the terms contained in the letter of acceptance if the same were allegedly contrary to the general conditions of the contract; that the issue regarding the liquidated damages was an excepted matter, and hence the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the same; that in the instant case, the terms of the contract clearly stipulate that the appellant can levy liquidated damages if there was delay in completion of the project by the first respondent; that the contract did not stipulate that the appellant should put the first respondent on notice before imposing liquidated damages; that apart from that, the claim of the first respondent was totally barred by limitation, and hence the award was liable to be set aside. .7. .7. The first respondent resisted the OP by filing a counter stating that the conclusion of the arbitrators on the basis of their interpretation of the provisions of the contract is final and binding on the parties and cannot be challenged in the present proceedings; that the letter of award of work dated 112. 1994, clearly specified the documents which are to form part of the contract and also the order of precedence in case of contradictory provisions therein; that it also specifies that other than the terms and conditions set out therein, all other conditions shall be as contained in the General and Special Conditions; that the documents and records would go to show that it was the appellant who delayed the completion of the work; that the reference to the letter dated 15. 1997, made by the appellant, is totally misconceived and baseless; that despite the best efforts of the first respondent, the work was delayed on account of various factors primarily attributable to the appellant; that it is pertinent to note that the floating of internal safety valve constituted the commissioning of the boiler, and hence the contention that the boiler was not made operational within the stipulated time or the extended time is baseless; that the clause relating to liquidated damages referred to by the appellant has been replaced by clause 9 of the letter of award of the work; that the learned arbitrators found that the delays are independent and not overlapping but in linearity account for the 14 months delay, and therefore the causes of delay could not be attributed to the first respondent; that this is a factual finding based on the records before the arbitrators which cannot be re-agitated in the present proceedings; that the learned arbitrators were justified in holding that the liquidated damages was not an excepted matter; that the interpretation by the arbitrators of the conditions of the contract cannot be challenged in a petition under Sec.34 of the Act; that the right to levy of liquidated damages per se would not be an excepted matter; that the arbitrators have considered the submissions made by both parties on the question of liquidated damages and have held that they have jurisdiction to entertain the same; that merely because the contract contains a clause for liquidated damages, it does not mean that such liquidated damages would automatically follow; that Section 55(3) does not make a distinction between un-liquidated and liquidated damages and mandates that if performance is being accepted at a time other than that agreed, a notice as contemplated in the Section is required to be given; that under the circumstances, the appellant has neither a legal nor a factual entitlement in the matter of levy of liquidated damages; that under the circumstances, there is no infirmity found in the finding of the arbitrators, and hence the petition was to be dismissed. 8. The learned Single Judge, on enquiry, dismissed the petition which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 9. 8. The learned Single Judge, on enquiry, dismissed the petition which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 9. The only question that would arise for consideration in this appeal is whether the arbitral award is liable to be set aside since the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to the liquidated damages referred to. .10. Advancing arguments on behalf of the appellant, the learned Counsel Mr. Jayesh Dolia would submit that the arbitral award in question should have been set aside since the appellant/petitioner was able to show that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the question either as to delay or as to the liquidated damages; that the levy of liquidated damages was not something within the purview of the arbitral clause; that a reading of the clauses would clearly indicate that the decision of the Engineer was final and binding on the parties; that it is also made clear that there could not be any reference to the claim of the same in the arbitral proceedings; that Clause 47 clearly stipulates that time was the essence of the contract and hence the finding recorded either by the arbitrators or by the learned Single Judge that time was not the essence of the contract was not correct; that Clause 103 specifically excludes clause 51 falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Engineer concerned and his decision was to be accepted as final and binding; that the very reading of Clause 51 would make it clear that it was beyond the scope of jurisdiction of arbitration and hence the contention of the first respondent that it has to be read as regards the quantification of the liquidated damages and not as regards to the question as to whether there had been a breach or not should have been rejected; that it is pertinent to point out that the parties had signed an agreement after understanding the terms of the contract, and hence it would be binding on the parties; that the contention that Clause 102 was limiting the rights of the parties and also it was against the public policy should have been rejected; and that the first respondent should not be allowed to take such a contention after signing such an agreement and making a breach of the same thereafter. 11. 11. Added further the learned Counsel that it is not correct to state that the Engineer could pass a decision for liquidated damages between 0.5% and 5%, and if there was any violation of terms of the contract, it could be decided by the arbitrator; that it was a jurisdictional issue; that the parties have understood the contract, signed the same and acted upon it also, and hence the first respondent being a party to the contract should not be allowed to give a go-by to the terms of the contract; that when the arbitrators themselves do not have a jurisdiction to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the claim for liquidated damages once decided by the Engineer is final and binding on the parties, the claim for refund of the liquidated damages should not have been allowed; but, in the instant case, it was not only allowed, but also interest at 12% per annum has been awarded; that the petitioner/appellant is able to show that the award was liable to be set aside in view of Sec.34(2)(ii)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act; that the learned Single Judge should not have rejected the petition following the decision reported in 2006(11) SCC 181 ; that in the instant case, the consistent stand of the appellant was that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction at all; that under the circumstances, the Court has to necessarily interfere under Sec.34 of the Act; that the appellant was able to show that the award was patently illegal, and hence it called for an interference under Sec.34(3)(d) of the Act. .12. .12. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel that the contention put forth by the first respondents side is that time was not the essence of the contract and therefore, if there was delay, the time could be extended; that if such an interpretation was to be accepted, the clause stipulating the power to levy liquidated damages and that the decision by the Engineer shall be final and binding on the parties would become totally redundant; that it is pertinent to point out that the extension of time was sought for by the first respondent only after the normal time agreed upon by the parties under the agreement; that if really there was delay on the part of the appellant, the first respondent would not have asked for extension of time; that the fact that the appellant did not answer the request of the first respondent seeking time would not amount to tacit approval for the request of the extension of time; that when there was a breach committed by the first respondent, the clause to levy liquidated damages was available to the appellant, and hence there was no need either to deny or to refuse extension of time; that since the award was in respect of an issue which was outside the scope of jurisdiction, the arbitrators have misconducted themselves which would suffice to set aside the award; that it was agreed explicitly that the decision of the Engineer regarding the levy of liquidated damages was outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, and under the circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for refund of liquidated damages; that the decision reported in AIR 1987 SC 1359 which was placed by the first respondent and relied on by the learned Single Judge has no application to the present facts of the case; that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the Engineer had authority only in respect of quantification and manner of recovery alone and the quantum of very leviability was not one of those excepted matters under Clause 103 was totally incorrect; and that under such circumstances, the order of the learned Single Judge upholding the award has got to be set aside. 13. 13. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1975 MADHYA PRADESH 152 (THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR, DANDAKARANYA PROJECT, MORAPUT, ORISSA AND ANOTHER V. M/S. PRABARTAK COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD., CALCUTTA) and in AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 957 (M/S.PRABARTAK COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD. V. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR, DANDAKARANYA PROJECT AND ANOTHER). 14. Contrary to the above contentions, the learned Counsel for the first respondent Mr. R. Murari would submit that there was no delay on the part of the first respondent; that it is true that the work should have been completed within 18 months; but, it could not be completed within time for the reasons beyond the control of the first respondent; that while clause 51 speaks about the general conditions of the contract, clause 47 would state that the time was the essence of the contract; that Clause 48 was introduced only for the purpose of extension of time which itself would indicate that even at the time of entering into the contract, the parties knew that it could not be completed in time and if not done so, the time could be extended and hence clause 51 has to be read along with clauses 47 and 48; and that under the circumstances, the contention put forth by the appellant that time was the essence of the contract was not correct. 15. 15. Added further the learned Counsel that in the instant case, when there was a delay in completion, it was the first respondent who sent its communications seeking extension of time; that it is pertinent to point out that the appellant neither replied nor denied to extend time and thus the appellant has kept itself silent and took delivery of the machinery found to be satisfactory, and the same is functioning; that the arbitrators have thoroughly taken into appraisement all circumstances attendant and have clearly found that the appellant was responsible for the delay caused and not the first respondent; that the authority of the Engineer was only limited with regard to the quantification of the liquidated damages; but, he could not decide the question as to whether there has been a delay caused or a breach of the contract; that only if a question whether there was any breach of the contract by reasons including the delay caused is decided, the question thereafter would arise as to the quantification of the liquidated damages itself; that it would be quite clear from Clauses 51, 103 and 104 that the Arbitral Tribunal has got jurisdiction to decide the question whether there was any delay and if so, on whose part and whether there was any breach of the agreement; that the appellant cannot be allowed to interpret the above clauses to its advantage; and that a reading of Clause 102 which limits the rights of the parties, would indicate that it was totally against the public policy. In support of that contention, the learned Counsel relied on a decision reported in 2003(5) SCC 705 . 16. In support of that contention, the learned Counsel relied on a decision reported in 2003(5) SCC 705 . 16. The learned Counsel would further submit that the Engineer can decide whether liquidated damages could be charged from 0.5% to 5%; but, he could not take a decision whether there was any violation of the terms of the contract which could be decided only by the arbitral proceedings; that in the instant case, there was a delay of 14 months in completion; but, despite the request made for extension of time, the appellant had neither replied nor denied the same and hence silence on the part of the appellant would be taken as acceptance for the request of extension of time; that the appellant has also allowed the first respondent to complete the work and has also taken delivery of the products; and that there was no complaint in respect of the work commissioned, but the appellant has unlawfully withheld Rs.90,23,650/- as if it was towards liquidated damages. 17. 17. Added further the learned Counsel that the contentions put forth by the appellants side that the question as to the liquidated damages was beyond the scope of jurisdiction of the arbitral proceedings has got to be rejected since only the arbitral proceedings can decide the question whether there were circumstances for levy of liquidated damages; that a perusal of the award would clearly indicate that the arbitrators have gone through the entire materials and have delivered the reasoned award stating the reasons for the delay; that once the arbitrators who are competent to decide the question as to the delay, have pointed out the reasons for the delay and have also recorded a finding that the first respondent was in no way responsible for such a delay and while they have taken a correct decision that there was no reason for levying any liquidated damages on the first respondent, the appellant should not have filed the OP seeking to set aside the award; that the Tribunal has taken the correct view as to the question of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter and as well as on the quantum; that before taking the decision, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the entire terms of the contract and has made a thorough appreciation of the facts and circumstances, and hence the learned Single Judge was perfectly correct in dismissing the OP and that order has got to be sustained. 18. The learned Counsel in support of his contentions relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 1359 (STATE OF KARNATAKA V. RAMESHWARA RICE MILLS, THIRTHAHALLI) and in (2006) 11 SUPREME COURT CASES 181 (McDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL INC. V. BURN STANDARD CO. LTD. AND OTHERS). 19. The following would emerge as facts admitted: The petitioner company a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking, flouted tenders on 20.5.1993. Following the same, the first respondent was awarded a contract for supply of 110 ATA boiler package including fuel oil handling system, RCC Chimney, etc., at a total cost of Rs.18,05,53,000/-. As per the agreement, the period of completion was 18 months ending with 23. 1996. There was a delay of 14 months since the first respondent completed the commissioning of the boiler only on 25. 1997. As per the agreement, the period of completion was 18 months ending with 23. 1996. There was a delay of 14 months since the first respondent completed the commissioning of the boiler only on 25. 1997. In view of the said delay, the company withheld a sum of Rs.90,23,650/-towards liquidated damages which, according to the company, they are entitled to retain as per the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the parties. The first respondent raised a dispute. The Arbitral Tribunal constituted by the respondents 2 to 4, on enquiry, made an award to the effect that the first respondent was entitled for the refund of Rs.90,23,650/-which was withheld by the petitioner along with interest of Rs.43,76,608/- totalling to Rs.1,34,00,268/-and also allowed the entire claim of the petitioner for a sum of Rs.14,36,000/-but without interest. Seeking to set aside the said award, the petitioner company filed the O.P. The learned Single Judge on enquiry of the said OP, took the view that no ground for interfering with the award as contemplated under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was noticed, and hence dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. 20. As could be seen above, under the contract awarded for supply of boiler package dated 29. 1994, a period of 18 months was stipulated for completion from the date of letter of indent. Admittedly, it was not completed within the stipulated date namely 23. 1996. A delay of 14 months had occasioned in commissioning of the boiler. Out of the total cost of Rs.18,05,53,000/-, Rs.90,23,650/-which would represent 5% of the total cost, was retained by the appellant company alleging that it was representing the levy of liquidated damages for the delay caused. Under such circumstances, the matter was referred to arbitration by the first respondent putting forth two claims, firstly the refund of the said sum of Rs.90,23,650/-which was withheld by the appellant, and secondly the interest of Rs.43,76,608/-on that sum. The appellant also made a claim of Rs.14.36 lakhs. The main question in controversy is whether the subject matter referred to arbitration by the first respondent was beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. Both the parties relied upon the following Clauses under the general conditions of the contract (GCC): "51. Liquidated damages for delay The time of completion as stated in the contract shall be deemed to be the essence of the contract. Both the parties relied upon the following Clauses under the general conditions of the contract (GCC): "51. Liquidated damages for delay The time of completion as stated in the contract shall be deemed to be the essence of the contract. If the Contractor shall fail to complete the works within the time prescribed by the Clause 47 hereof or extended time as sanctioned according to Clause 48, the Contractor shall pay to the Company a sum equal to one per cent of the amount of the contract price of the whole work as shown by the tender or such smaller amount as the Company (whose decision in writing shall be final conclusive and binding) may decide as liquidated damages for such default and not as a penalty for every week or part of a week which shall elapse between the time prescribed by Clause 47 hereof or extended time as the case may be and then the date of completion of the works. The Company may without prejudice to any other method of recovery deduct the amount of such damages from any money in his hands due or which may become due to the Contractor. The payment or deduction of such damages shall not relieve the Contractor from his obligations to complete the works or from any other of his obligations and liabilities under the Contract. ..... 103. Settlement of Disputes. Disputes to be finally determined by the Engineer The decision, opinion, direction, certificate on valuation of the Engineer with respect to all or any of matters under clauses 4(a), 4(b), 8, 9(b), 12, 14, 15, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 69, 70, 78, 81 (which matters are herein referred to as excepted) shall be final conclusive and binding on the parties hereto and shall be without Appeal, Any other decision opinion direction certificate or valuation of the Engineer or any refusal of the Engineer to give any of the same shall be subject to the right of Arbitration and review in the same way in all respects (including the provision as to opening the Reference) as if it were a decision of the Engineer under Clause, 104. 104. 104. Settlement of Disputes Arbitration Any disputes and differences of any kind whatever arising out of or in connection with the Contract on the carrying out of the works (whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the determination abandonment or breach of the Contract) shall be referred to and settled by the Engineer who shall state his decision in writing. Such decision of the Engineer with respect to any of the Expected matters shall be final conclusive and binding on the parties hereto and without any Appeal as stated in Clause 103. But if either the Company or the Contractor be dissatisfied with the decision of the Engineer any matter question or dispute of any kind (expect on any Expected Matters) or as to the withholding by the Engineer of any certificate to which the Contractor may claim to be entitled then and in any such case either party (the Company or the Contractor) may within 28 days after receiving notice of such decision give a written notice to other party requiring that such matters in dispute be arbitrated upon. Such return notices shall specify the matters which are in dispute and such dispute or difference of which such written notice has been given and the Member of the Institution of Engineer (India) to be agreed upon and appointed by both the parties or in case of disagreements as to the appointment of a single Arbitrator to the Arbitration of two Arbitrators being both Members of the Institution of Engineer (India) one to be appointed by each party which arbitrators shall before taking upon themselves the burden of Reference appoint an Umpire being a Member of the Institution of Engineers (India)." .21. The prime contention of the appellant placing reliance on the above clauses, is that it was specifically agreed between the parties that it would be quite clear that the time for the completion of the work under the contract was 18 months; that the time was the essence of the contract; that under Clause 51, if the contractor failed to complete the works within the time stipulated under Clause 47 or the extended time as sanctioned under Clause 48, the contractor shall pay to the company a sum equal to 1% of the amount of the contract price of the whole work or such smaller amount as the company might decide as to the liquidated damages for such default, and the decision in that regard shall be final, conclusive and binding. He would further contend that the company might without prejudice to any other method of recovery deduct the amount of such damages from any money in his hands due or which might become due to the contractor. Pointing to Clause 103, the learned Counsel would submit that the decision of the Engineer with respect to Clauses 51, 52 and 53 shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties and the same should be without any appeal. According to the Counsel, Clause 104 which speaks about the settlement of disputes by arbitration, would refer to any disputes and differences of any kind arising out of or in connection with the contract on carrying out the works except those mentioned in Clause 103, and in the instant case, admittedly, there was a delay of 14 months, and the appellant company was entitled to fix the liquidated damages, and in that regard, when the Engineer has taken a decision or gives a certificate, it becomes final, conclusive and binding on the parties, and accordingly, the company has withheld Rs.90,23,650/-towards the liquidated damages, and a conjoint reading of Clauses 51 and 103 would make it clear that the question as to the liquidated damages cannot be a subject matter of arbitration, and hence the subject matter was outside the scope of the arbitral proceedings. Contrarily it is contended by the first respondents side that the question of liquidated damages was not at all a subject excepted under the above clauses; that even assuming so, what is excepted was only the quantum and not the levy of liquidated damages under Clause 51; that in the instant case, the appellant was thoroughly responsible for the delay caused; that the same was also beyond the control; and that further so long as the first respondent was not responsible for the delay caused, even as per the Clauses the first respondent could maintain the claim before the arbitrator. 22. After careful scrutiny of the above relevant Clauses, this Court is of the considered opinion that it has to necessarily agree with the contentions put forth by the first respondent for the following reasons. A reading of Clause 47 speaking of the time for completion, would make it clear that the entire work should be completed within the time stipulated in the contract namely 18 months. Clause 48 was meant for extension of time. According to the said clause, if the contractor should desire an extension of time for the completion of the work on the grounds of his having been unavoidably hindered in his execution or any other grounds, he should apply in writing for extension as found therein. The inclusion of Clause 48 for extension of time would clearly indicate that if for any reason the contractor was deterred unavoidably, he can seek for extension. This would go to show that the time for completion could be extended. If really the time was the essence of the contract, there was no need for inclusion of Clause 48 for "extension of time". .23. Apart from the above, in the instant case, it is not in controversy that the first respondent who could not complete the work in time, had sent the communication seeking for extension of time. Neither the time was extended, nor it was replied nor denied. But, the appellant allowed the contractor to complete the work and has also taken delivery of the same. It is pertinent to note that no complaint in respect of the quality or the quantity was ever made. But, 5% of the entire cost namely Rs.90,23,650/-was retained by the appellant calling that it would represent the liquidated damages only on the reason of delay caused. It is pertinent to note that no complaint in respect of the quality or the quantity was ever made. But, 5% of the entire cost namely Rs.90,23,650/-was retained by the appellant calling that it would represent the liquidated damages only on the reason of delay caused. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out whether the appellant was justified in retaining the said sum under the circumstances attendant and referred to above. Insofar as the question whether the Arbitral Tribunal could go into and decide the question as to the delay caused, after looking into the necessary clauses in the GCC, this Court is of the considered opinion that it can well do so as it is done. Clause 51 speaks only about the quantity of the liquidated damages which the company can retain from any money in its hands due or which might become due to the contractor if the work is not completed within the time stipulated under Clause 47. According to the appellants side, a conjoint reading of Clauses 51 and 103 would clearly indicate that the question of liquidated damages cannot, but be outside the purview of the arbitral proceedings. After a conjoint reading of Clauses 51 and 103, the Court has to necessarily state that the question as to the delay or the levy of liquidated damages cannot be done by the appellant company. Under Clause 103, the decision, opinion, direction, certificate on valuation of the Engineer with respect to all or any of the matters under Clauses 4(a), 4(b), 8, 9(b), 12, 14, 15, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 69, 70, 78, 81 shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties. As per clause 103 when any decision is taken by the Engineer under clause 48 in respect of any extension sought for, the same shall be final. But, in the case on hand, despite the fact that the extension was sought for by the first respondent, the Engineer has not taken any decision at all. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that there is no specific clause under the agreement that if a delay is caused by the appellant, what is the remedy available to the first respondent. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that there is no specific clause under the agreement that if a delay is caused by the appellant, what is the remedy available to the first respondent. Apart from that, neither the Engineer taking shelter under Clause 103, nor the company under Clause 51 can decide that there was a delay on the part of the first respondent entitling the appellant for liquidated damages. In the absence of any such provision available in the contract, if the appellant is allowed to take a decision that there was a delay on the part of the first respondent, it would be nothing but allowing the appellant "the judge in its own cause", which the law would not permit. 24. Apart from the above, following the letter of indent dated 29. 1994, a letter was addressed on 112. 1994 which reads thus: "This award of work is subject to the following terms and conditions and supersedes any contradictory provisions that may exist in any other contract documents. .... 1.02 All the documents from (i) to (viii) will form part of the contract. In case of contradictory provision, the order of precedence will be in the same sequence from (i) to (viii), item (i) carrying the maximum precedence. ... 8. 04 The time of completion as stated above under 8.01 shall be deemed to be the essence of the contract and you shall make every effort to complete the work on time. 9. 00 Liquidated damages 9. 01 Liquidated damages are leviable at the rate of 0.5% per week or part thereof subject to a maximum of 5% of the total value of contract, if the 110 Ata Boiler System is not commissioned by the end of 18th month." 25. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the above letter which was intended to supersede all other contract documents would indicate that the Engineer can take a decision as to the quantum of the liquidated damages, but it does not whisper anywhere how to decide if there was any violation of the terms of the contract by causing delay or otherwise. The levy of liquidated damages under the given circumstances can be decided only by the arbitral proceedings and not by the appellant. The levy of liquidated damages under the given circumstances can be decided only by the arbitral proceedings and not by the appellant. A perusal of the award would clearly indicate that before making the award, the arbitrators have thoroughly taken into consideration and appraisement of the facts and circumstances and that the delay was not caused by the first respondent. 26. As rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, this Court is unable to see any one of the reasons to set aside the arbitral award as envisaged under Sec.34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It would be more apt and appropriate to reproduce the judgment of the Supreme Court speaking as to the scope of jurisdiction of the Court under Sec.34 of the Act reported in 2003 (5) SCC 705 (ONGC LIMITED V. SAW PIPES LIMITED) as follows: "The Court can set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes proof that: .(i) a party was under some incapacity, or .(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or .(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. (2) The Court may set aside the award: (i)(a) if the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, .(b) failing such agreement, the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with part I of the Act. .(ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with: .(a) the agreement of the parties, or .(b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part I of the Act. .(c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract. .(c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract. .(3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to: .(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or .(b) the interest of India; or .(c) justice or morality, or .(d) if it is patently illegal." 27. This Court is mindful of the caution made by the Apex Court that the scheme of Section 34 was aimed at keeping the supervisory role of the Court at the minimum level since the parties to the agreement have already taken a conscious decision to exclude the Courts jurisdiction by opting for arbitration. 28. The jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal was raised before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has declared that it had jurisdiction to decide both the reasonableness of the levy and the quantum of levy of the liquidated damages. A combined reading of Clauses 51, 103 and 104 would clearly indicate that the claim for liquidated damages was an excepted one under Clause 104. Had it been the intention of the parties that the jurisdiction of the Engineer was not only on the quantum, but also on the question of any dispute whether or not the liquidated damages was payable, the above Clauses would have been incorporated in a different manner. In short, it can be stated that the dispute was regarding the breach of the contract and also whether the first respondent was liable to make and the appellant was entitled to retain any sum towards liquidated damages. In such circumstances, the said issue could be decided only by the Arbitral Tribunal as has been done in the instant case, and it cannot be said to be outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral proceedings. 29. Above all, the appellant has also made a counter claim before the arbitral proceedings though questioned its jurisdiction. The Tribunal has also considered the same and has awarded the relief accepting the plea of the petitioner/appellant. Under the circumstances, this Court is unable to see any merit in this appeal. 30. In the result, this original side appeal fails, and the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their costs. Consequently, connected MPs are also dismissed.