ORDER 15.04.2008 — Learned counsels for the parties are present. With their consent, the appeal is taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission. The following substantial question of law is canvassed by the appellant. “Whether the judgments of the Courts below waiving pendentilite interest on the decretal amount is contrary to the provisions of Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C.” Heard The appellant, as plaintiff, filed Title Mortgage Suit No.16 of 1994 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kendrapara for realization of a sum of Rs.75,760.50 along with interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the date of decree from the defendant on the ground that the defendant took a loan from the plaintiff and did not repay the same. The defendant-Khirod Prasad Naik in his written statement denied to have taken loan and accordingly, denied the claim of the plaintiff. He also pleaded that the claim is barred by limitation. The trial Court framed as many as five issues and on consideration of the evidence produced by the parties, decreed the suit for Rs.75,760.50 with¬out pendentilite and future interest and also allowed the defend¬ants to pay the decretal amount within a period of one year in three equal instalments. The plaintiff filed appeal. During pendency of the appeal, the defendant-respondent died and the present respondents, who are the legal heirs, were substituted as respondents. Learned Addl. District Judge, Kendrapara in T.M.A. No.13 of 2001 confirmed the said decree in part, but set aside the direction for payment in instalments, specifically directed the defendant-respondent to pay the decretal amount within one month, with a further stipulation that failing payment within one month, the decretal amount would carry interest at the rate of 13% per annum. Aggrieved by that judgment and decree, the present appeal has been filed basically challenging the order waiving the pendentilite interest. Mr. P.R. Barik, learned counsel for the appellant states that in a mortgaged suit the Court granting the decree has to award the contractual rate of interest not only for future but also pendentilite. He states that in such a suit the provision of Section 34, CPC does not apply and the Court granting the decree is duty bound under Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. to grant interest. Mr. He states that in such a suit the provision of Section 34, CPC does not apply and the Court granting the decree is duty bound under Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. to grant interest. Mr. Barik further argues that as per Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. the Court in appropriate circumstances can vary the rate of interest, but it cannot waive the interest for any period. In support of his stand, he cites the cases of State Bank of India V. Nilakantha Roy and another, 1990 (II) OLR, 457, H.S. Dugal and another v. United Bank of India, 1992 (II) OLR 538 and Everest Industrial Corporation and others v. Gujarat State Financial Corpn., AIR 1987 S.C. 1950 . Mr. S.B. Panda, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, on the contrary submits that the Court granting the decree has a discretion to waive or vary the rate of interest by assigning reason. According to him, in this case, waiving of interest for the pendentilite period by the Courts below is based on good reasoning and therefore, the same is in the line with Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. There is no dispute that the present appeal arises out of a title mortgage suit. It has already been clarified in the case of Everest Industrial Corporation (supra) by the apex Court that in a mortgage suit the provision of Section 34, C.P.C. does not apply and that in such suits, the provision of Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. will apply. It has already been clarified in the case of Everest Industrial Corporation (supra) by the apex Court that in a mortgage suit the provision of Section 34, C.P.C. does not apply and that in such suits, the provision of Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. will apply. Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. reads thus : “Payment of Interest - In any decree passed in a suit for foreclosure, sale or redemption, where interest is legally recov¬erable, the Court may order payment of interest to the mortgagee as follows, namely, (a) interest up to the date on or before which payment of the amount found or declared due is under the preliminary decree to be made by the mortgagor or other person redeeming the mortgage- (i) on the principal amount found or declared due on the mort¬gage- at the rate payable on the principal, or, where no such rate is fixed, at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, (ii) (omitted) (iii) on the amount adjudged due to the mortgagee for costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by the mortgagee in re¬spect of the mortgage-Security up to the date of the preliminary decree and added to the mortgage-money, at the rate agreed be¬tween the parties, or, failing such rate, at such rate not ex¬ceeding six per cent per annum as the Court deems reasonable; and (b) subsequent interest up to the date of realization or actual payment on the aggregate of the principal sums specified in clause (a) as calculated in accordance with the clause at such rate as the Court deems reasonable.” Analysing this provision, this Court in the case of Nilakan¬tha Roy (supra) observed that in a mortgaged suit the interest is to be granted at the rate agreed between the parties till the period of redemption expires unless the Court for proper reason decides that such rate of interest is not to be awarded. This observation was given adopting the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Rashmi Small Industries and another, 58 (1984) CLT 540. This observation was given adopting the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Rashmi Small Industries and another, 58 (1984) CLT 540. In the case of H.S. Dugal (supra), this Court relying on several decisions of the apex Court and this Court held that in a mortgage suit the Court has a discretion to decree pendentilite and future interest being at variance with the contractual rate of interest and that award of rate of interest would depend upon conduct of parties, policy of advancement of loan and prevailing circumstances. In all these cases, the Courts were of the unanimous view that normally pendentilite and future interest is to be granted in a mortgage suit, but in appropriate circumstances, it may vary the rate of such interest or may waive such interest. A close reading of the provision of Order 34, Rule 11, C.P.C. and the case laws cited above, it will become clear that the Court passing the decree has a discretion to grant interest at the agreed rate or at any other rate or not to grant interest for a particular period, but such variance or waiving of interest must be support¬ed with reasons. As has been said by the apex Court, no rigid strait-jacket formula can be propagated in this regard, but the Court has to take note of the conduct of the parties, policy of advancement of loan and prevailing circumstances. I have my respectable agreement with the above noted views as those are based on sound logic and acceptable legal interpretation. In the present case, the Courts below have indicated that delay in disposal of the suit basically occurred for the latches of the plaintiff. In paragraph 10 of the trial Court judgment, it has been specifically indicated that the plaintiff delayed in payment of Court fees and took several years for examining the witnesses and for such conduct and circumstance both the Courts declined to give pendentilite interest to the plaintiff-appellant. So disallowing pendentilite interest by the Courts below was supported by reasons, which does not appear to be perverse or against the materials on record. So disallowing pendentilite interest by the Courts below was supported by reasons, which does not appear to be perverse or against the materials on record. That being the circumstance, the order waiving pendentilite interest by the Courts below is not contrary to the provisions of Order 34, Rule 11 C.P.C. For the aforesaid reasons, the substantial question of law is answered against the appellant. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree of the 1st appellate Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed on contest, but in the above noted cir¬cumstances without any cost. Ordered accordingly.