Judgment :- 1. In the affidavit of the petitioners/plaintiffs advocate, the following averments are found: 1.(i) The junior advocate of the plaintiffs counsel affirms that the suit bundle was returned for some corrections from the Court, however, the bundle mingled with other bundles in the advocates office and hence he could not represent in the court in time, therefore, 1573 days delay has occurred in representing the petition, which may be condoned. 2. In the counter filed by the first defendant/first defendant, it is stated as below: 2. (i) The petition is not maintainable which is liable to be dismissed in limini. The alleged reasons stated by the petitioner is not at all valid to condone the delay of 1573 days. It is not correct to state that the bundle got mingled with other bundles in the advocate office and the person who has filed the affidavit is not having vakalat in the suit. There is no merit in the petition and the petition has to be dismissed. 3. The following are the allegations contained in the counter filed by the fifth respondent/defendant: .3. (i) The petition is not maintainable. The petitioner is put to strict proof of the allegations found in the affidavit. The reason for not representing the petition in time is not acceptable. The affidavit is totally blank with regard to the facts when the case bundle was lost and when it was located. The reason is neither acceptable one nor a valid one. The delay is enormous and if it is condoned, the valuable right of limitation available to the respondent will be lost. The petitioner or his advocate should have been cautious to preserve the case bundle. At least the petitioner ought to have taken steps to reconstruct the bundle with the office copy. Nothing such sort of steps have been taken by the petitioner. Hence there is no bona fides in the allegations found in the affidavit to condone the delay. Having slept over for a long time, the petitioner cannot now come and ask for condoning the delay. The general principle of law is that the law should not help a person who sleeps on his right. Hence the petition has to be dismissed with costs. 4. Having slept over for a long time, the petitioner cannot now come and ask for condoning the delay. The general principle of law is that the law should not help a person who sleeps on his right. Hence the petition has to be dismissed with costs. 4. After hearing both sides, the learned Sub-Judge, Namakkal has dismissed the petition to condone the delay of 1573 days by observing that since the petition was represented beyond the time of limitation which is prescribed for filing of the suit, and that the representation is not valid. Before the trial court both sides have not adduced any oral evidence nor produced any documentary piece of evidence. 5. The back drop of the circumstance under which the petition was filed for condoning delay has to be considered in the light of the facts discernible in this case and the law settled in this regard. Factually, one has to admit that the reasons assigned in the affidavit are as vague as possible and it may be usual allegations that the bundle got mixed with other bundles in the Advocates office which could not be traced out for the purpose of representation in time. However, if the said reason is explained to the satisfaction of the Court, there could be no embargo on the part of the court to condone the delay. The fifth respondent has assailed the reasons mentioned in the affidavit by stating that it contains usual reasons which have been made in a casual manner and that no particulars are available with reference to return of case bundle. It is to be seen that the petitioner counsels junior advocate has affirmed the affidavit. Hence some sanctity has to be attached to it. Still the court has to hesitate to entertain those reasons if the same is not depicting the facts properly. It is also contended that Mr. Palanisamy, advocate who has filed the affidavit has no vakalat in this case. .6. The plaint was originally presented on 210. 1991 into the Sub-Court, Sangagiri, for the relief of specific performance of a contract entered into between both parties. On account of territorial jurisdiction, the matter had come up before the Sub-Court, Namakkal. The learned Sub-Judge has gone through the records. As on 110. 1991, the period of limitation was over for filing of the suit. 1991 into the Sub-Court, Sangagiri, for the relief of specific performance of a contract entered into between both parties. On account of territorial jurisdiction, the matter had come up before the Sub-Court, Namakkal. The learned Sub-Judge has gone through the records. As on 110. 1991, the period of limitation was over for filing of the suit. In view of the Dasara vacation it could not be filed on 110. 1991. On 210. 1991 when the Court was reopened, the suit was filed. On that date instead of payment of Court fee of Rs.9,660.50, Court fee for Rs.100/- alone was paid and hence the plaint was returned by the Court for payment of deficit court fee and for complying with some other corrections. For several occasions, the Court granted time for payment of deficit court fee. Only on 30.4.2002, the Court fee was paid. Hence the trial Court has rendered a finding that inasmuch as the plaint was presented on the last date to save the limitation, the plaintiff should have paid the entire court fee and as the deficit Court fee was paid after a long time, it has to be presumed that the suit was barred by limitation. To arrive at a conclusion, it has followed the decisions of this Court. 7. The only legal position to be observed in this case is whether the plaint has to be deemed to have been presented out of time. 8. It is to be borne in mind that when a suit is filed for specific performance of contract, naturally the plaintiff has to show his readiness and willingness to have the contract completed and sale deed executed at the hands of the defendant. Whatever may be the plaint allegations, the attitude of the plaintiff on the date of presenting the plaint before the Court appears to be indifferent. Even after the Court granted time, immediately after return of the plaint on the first occasion, there was no proper response on the part of the plaintiff. It is also to be noted that the plaintiff did not file any application for enlargement of time for the purpose of payment of court fee. 9. Even after the Court granted time, immediately after return of the plaint on the first occasion, there was no proper response on the part of the plaintiff. It is also to be noted that the plaintiff did not file any application for enlargement of time for the purpose of payment of court fee. 9. Mr.K. Sasindran, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, would place reliance upon a decision of this Court by a learned single Judge reported in (2007) 4 MLJ 635 [D. Muralidharan vs. Chinnappan (died) and others] in which it is held, after following the observation rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, that a petition to condone the delay in filing a petition and a petition to condone the delay in representing the papers filed within time are not one and the same and the courts should have different consideration for a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and for the petition filed to condone the delay in representation of papers. The learned Judge has distinguished another single Judges decision of this Court reported in 2006 (1) CTC 187 [Muthusamy, A v. Muniammal] in which it is observed that the principles which are applicable for an application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be deemed to apply even for representation of the case and in case of depriving of the valuable right has accrued to the other party and the delay being deliberate, the same could not be condoned. 10. In the above case in 2006 (1) CTC 187 [Muthusamy, A v. Muniammal], Supreme Court rulings in 2001 (6) SCC 176 [M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam] and 2002(1) CTC 769 : 2002 (3) SCC 195 [Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Sahu & Others v. Gobardhan Sap & Others] have been referred. These decisions have been followed by a Division Bench in a decision reported in 2003 (1) LV 585, [Sundar Gnanaolivu, rep. By his Power of Attorney Agent, Mr. Rukmini v. Rajendran Gnanavolivu rep. By its Power of Attorney Agent, Veina Gnanavolivu] where the learned Judges have opined that sufficient caution has been exhibited to note that wherever there is lack of bona fides or attempt to hoodwink the Court by the party concerned who has come forward with an application for condonation of delay, in such cases, no indulgence should be shown by condoning the delay applied for. 11. 11. Even if this court applies different yardstick to consider the petition to condone delay in representation of the papers, still it has to be shown by the plaintiff that there was no lack of bona fides on his part nor any attempt to deceive the Court. In this case, even though it is stated that the bundle got mingled with other bundles in the advocates office, there is no impediment for the plaintiff to contact his advocate and to pursue him to represent the papers within time allowed by the Court. There is no specific allegations in this regard. There is no other subsequent affidavit on the side of the plaintiff to show his efforts taken for representation of the plaint in time. In the absence of such reason, it is difficult to hold that there was bona fide on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff could be attributed with lack of bona fides on account of lethargic attitude on his part. As contended by the respondent, the reasons found in the affidavit are in a casual manner. They do not explain the inordinate and long delay of 1573 days. 12. This Court in 1990-2-L.W. [Tiruchi Paper Bags Industry by its Mg. Parnter R. Arivalagan v. M. Aarbshah] has held that failure to state details in the affidavit with particular reference to relevant dates about the papers of the Advocate getting mixed up with other papers and subsequently being found out would not lead to interference in the order of dismissal of the application to condone the delay. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in a decision in 2003-3-L.W. 803 [ K. Natarajan vs. P.K. Rajasekaran] has formulated certain principles which are followed by the Courts in the matter of condoning delay in representation of the papers which were returned for want of proper Court fee. One of the guide lines is as follows: "21. ... .... .... .... ... .. (9) The Court should exercise its judicial discretion while considering as to whether time should be granted or not. Cases where the plaintiff wrongly (bona fide mistake) valued under particular provisions of law under Court Fee Act or where he could not pay the required Court fee for the reason beyond his control, due to some bona fide reasons, the Court shall condone the delay. Cases where the plaintiff wrongly (bona fide mistake) valued under particular provisions of law under Court Fee Act or where he could not pay the required Court fee for the reason beyond his control, due to some bona fide reasons, the Court shall condone the delay. Payment of substantial Court fee is a circumstance, which will go in favour of the claim of the plaintiff that a bona fide mistake has crept in." 14. The above said guideline is applicable to the case on hand. The Plaintiff has not adduced any reasons for paying Court fee of Rs.100/-at the time of filing of suit and nextly when the Court had granted time for payment of deficit Court fee on the first occasion, while the plaint was returned, the plaintiff should have assigned bona fide reasons so as to enable the Court to consider condonation of delay. But that circumstance would arise only if the period of limitation is available even after the representation is made before the Court. In the present case, the plaint itself was filed on the last date of limitation and the plaintiff should have been vigilant enough to pay the Court fee in entirety and there is no justification on his part to make the Court to return his plaint for affixing deficit Court fee. In this context, it has to be construed that if the return of the plaint happened at the behest of the plaintiff, the plaint should be deemed to have been barred by limitation. This event is enough to infer lack of bona fides on the part of the plaintiff. 15. Following the above said Division Bench decision of this Court, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed in 2005 (5) CTC 401 [S.V. Arjunjaraja vs. P. Vasantha] that since the guidelines mentioned in the Division Bench were offended not only by the plaintiff but also infringed by the trial Court without adopting the procedure prescribed, further Order 7, Rule 11, proviso of C.P.C. also not complied with and in that view, the payment of Court fees, after the period of limitation is over, will come within the meaning of Order 7, Rule 11 (c) and the subsequent grant of time which is not in accordance with law, cannot be taken advantage of. I am in respectful agreement with the above said proposition. 16. I am in respectful agreement with the above said proposition. 16. With regard to the impact on the rights accrued on the other side due to the delay caused by the plaintiff in initiating steps, it is well settled that if any valuable right is accrued to the other side, the delay could not be condoned. In 2006 (2) L.W.99 [Mannariah & Sons (P) Ltd., Harbour Link Road Tuticorin & others vs. M.M. Sankaranarayan] a single Judge of this Court has observed that while condoning the delay, the Court has to keep in view the valuable right accrued to the opposite party. The party claiming indulgence must prove that he was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and where the valuable rights have been accrued to the opposite party the Court is not to condone the delay so as to substantially affect the rights accrued to the opposite party. Identical view has been taken in a decision of the Delhi High Court in AIR 2001 Delhi 30 [State Bank of India v. M/s Indian Utility Products]. In the said case, the suit was originally presented on 26.09.1975 but it was represented after return only on 111. 1976 and due to the non payment of Court fee on the date of original filing, the Court has held that the subsequent date of filing of the suit with proper court fee on 111. 1996 was out of time and the suit was held to be barred by limitation. 17. On the factual features also, the plaintiff has miserably failed to explain the reason for delay. It is held that the plaint was presented out of time with proper Court fee, thereby the valuable right was accrued to the defendant by that time and hence it ought to be held that the plaintiff has to be non-suited for the relief of condonation of delay. 18. As adverted to supra, there was lack of bona fides on part of plaintiff and no reasons have been assigned explaining the inaction on his part. I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Namakkal, and the same is hereby considered order, properly passed on merits, which is hereby confirmed. The revision petition is devoid of merits and it suffers dismissal. 19. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, confirming the order dated 9. I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Namakkal, and the same is hereby considered order, properly passed on merits, which is hereby confirmed. The revision petition is devoid of merits and it suffers dismissal. 19. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, confirming the order dated 9. 2006 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Namakkal in I.A.No.1842 of 2003. No costs.