Judgment :- D. Murugesan, J. 1. The appellant in this Appeal is the sole accused and stands convicted for the offence under Section 202, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and in case of non-payment of fine, the default sentence shall run consecutively by the judgment of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pondicherry made in S.C. No.6 of 2004 dated 22. 2005. 2. The prosecution came forward with the following case against the appellant: The appellant and the deceased-Mohanavalli had illicit intimacy. As the husband of Mohanavalli left the house long back, she was living with one Navaroj, P. W.6. The appellant used to demand money from the deceased frequently. Just one day prior to the date of occurrence i.e., on 11. 2002, at about 10.00 p.m., the appellant demanded over phone 10 sovereigns of jewels and Rs.50,000/-from the deceased. On the next day i.e., on 11. 2002, at about 1.40 p.m., when the deceased was traveling in a bus belonging to M/s S.S.K. Transport Company, the appellant, after she got down from the bus, stabbed the deceased on her throat with the knife, M.O. 2 and committed the murder. The above occurrence was witnessed by P.Ws.1 & 2 namely, the cleaner and checker of the bus apart from the two other independent witnesses namely, P.Ws. 3 & 4. 3. On witnessing the occurrence, P.W.1 gave the Complaint, Ex.P-24 on the same day to P.W.23, the Inspector of Police attached to Orleanpet Police Station, Pondicherry at about 2.15 p.m., which was registered in Cr. No.255 of 2002 for the offence under Section 202, IPC. The First Information Report is Ex.P-25. He forwarded the copies of the report to the higher police officials. He thereafter proceeded to the scene of occurrence at about 2.15 p.m., and took photographs of the scene of occurrence. He prepared the Observation Mahazar, Ex.P-2 and also drew rough sketch, Ex.P-26 between 2.45 p.m., and 4.20 p.m., in the presence of P.W.10 and another witness. He seized the bloodstained earth, M.O.1 and the sample earth, M.O.2 under the mahazar, Ex.P-2 in the presence of the same witnesses. He conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 10.20 a.m., and 1.20 p.m., on 11. He seized the bloodstained earth, M.O.1 and the sample earth, M.O.2 under the mahazar, Ex.P-2 in the presence of the same witnesses. He conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 10.20 a.m., and 1.20 p.m., on 11. 2002 at the Government Pondicherry Hospital in the presence of panchayatdars and witnesses and prepared the inquest report, Ex.P-4. He thereafter sent the body of the deceased through the Constable with a requisition to the doctor for conducting post-mortem. 4. P.W.18, Specialist Grade II, Head of Department of Forensic Medicine attached to Government General Hospital, Pondicherry, conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased between 1.40 p.m., and 2.20 p.m., on 11. 2002 and he noted the following ante mortem injuries: "1. Transversely placed clean wound 11 cm x 2 x 2 cm present over front of neck starting 2 cm below right ear lobule extending to the left side of neck at thyroid cartilage level. The injury has completely cut thyroid cartilage, muscles and blood vessels of neck exposing prevertebral muscles. 2. Incised wound 2 x 1 x ½ cm present over left side of neck 1 cm below injury No.1. 3. Two cut injuries 2 x 1 x 1 cm, 1 x ½ x ½ cm present over left side of neck 3 cm below thyroid cartilage level. 4. Linear incised wound ½ x ½ x ¼ cm, ½ x ¼ x ¼ cm present over front of left shoulder. 5. Penetrating wound 6 x 4 cm x 6 cm present over middle of upper abdomen entering abdominal cavity. 6. Penetrating wound 4 x 2 cm x 6 cm present over right side of upper abdomen entering abdominal cavity. 7. Incised wound 2 x 1 x 1 cm present over left side of upper abdomen. 8. Amputation of left little finger with complete separation of distal part of the finger at the level of the first phalanx present. Distal part of finger and proximal part approximate correctly and belongs to the same individual. 9. Incised wound 5 x 2 x 1 cm over middle of left forearm." He issued the post-mortem certificate, Ex.P-16 with his final opinion under Ex.P-17 that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and hemorrhage due to multiple injuries. 5. P.W.23, in the meanwhile, went to Peter Nagar at 4.00 p.m., on 11. 2002 and arrested the appellant. Incised wound 5 x 2 x 1 cm over middle of left forearm." He issued the post-mortem certificate, Ex.P-16 with his final opinion under Ex.P-17 that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and hemorrhage due to multiple injuries. 5. P.W.23, in the meanwhile, went to Peter Nagar at 4.00 p.m., on 11. 2002 and arrested the appellant. He seized the motorcycle, M.O.13 bearing Regn. No.PY-01-B-6422 in the presence of P.W.16 under the mahazar, Ex.P-27. He brought the appellant to the police station and recorded his confessional statement. In pursuance of the admissible portion of his confession under Ex.P-5, he recovered the knife, M.O.3 in the presence of P.W.12 under the mahazar, Ex.P-6. He examined the other witnesses and recorded their statements. On 11. 2002, he took the appellant to the shop where the knife was purchased and recovered the bill book & bill, Exs.P-11 & P-12 under the mahazar, Ex.P-13. He remanded the appellant to judicial custody. He thereafter gave requisition to the Magistrate for conducting test identification parade and accordingly, conducted the identification parade on 111. 2002 in the Central Jail, Pondicherry. He thereafter recovered the attendance register, Ex.P-8 from the office of the Director of Health and Family Welfare, Pondicherry. 6. P.W.24, the successor Investigating Officer, examined the post-mortem doctor, P.W.18 and recorded his statement. He sent the seized material objects through the Court for chemical examination. After completing investigation on 111. 2003, he laid the charge sheet against the accused for the offence under Section 302, IPC before the Court. 7. To bring home the charges against the appellant, the prosecution examined 24 witnesses, marked 30 exhibits and produced 13 material objects. 8. When the appellant was questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code as to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, he denied them as false and pleaded not guilty. On the side of the defense, four witnesses were examined and three documents were marked. However, the learned Trial Judge found the appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him for the offence as stated above. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant, in challenging the said conviction and sentence, has submitted that though the prosecution laid the charge sheet against the appellant based on the statements of the witnesses namely, P.W.1 as the author of the First Information Report and P.Ws.2 to 4 as the eye-witnesses to the occurrence, they have turned hostile. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant, in challenging the said conviction and sentence, has submitted that though the prosecution laid the charge sheet against the appellant based on the statements of the witnesses namely, P.W.1 as the author of the First Information Report and P.Ws.2 to 4 as the eye-witnesses to the occurrence, they have turned hostile. Hence the prosecution case rests only on the evidence of P.Ws.5 & 6 to speak about the motive, P.W.12 regarding the confession and recovery of M.O.3 and P.W.15, the Cashier of a shop, where the appellant had purchased the knife, M.O.3. So far as the motive aspect is concerned, both the evidence of P.Ws.5 & 6 cannot be believed, as there are lots of contradictions in their evidence and in addition to that, their evidence is only hearsay and they were not personally aware of any motive between the appellant and the deceased. So far as the confession and recovery are concerned, the learned counsel would submit that though P.W.12 has spoken about the confession of the appellant and the consequential recovery made on 11. 2002, the Investigating Officer-P.W.23 has come forward with a categorical version that the recovery based on the confession was effected on 11. 2002 and on which date the appellant had signed the mahazar, Ex.P-6. Further the learned counsel submitted that the seizure alone couldn’t be the sole ground for conviction in a case of circumstantial evidence. He would also submit that the evidence of P.W.15-Cashier to establish that the appellant had purchased the knife, M.O.3 from the shop at 12.00 noon on 11. 2002 under the cover of exhibits, Exs.P-11 & P-12 and the mahazar, Ex.P-13 cannot be believed, as the receipts do not contain the signature of the owner apart from the signature of P.W.15. He would further submit that in any case it is the categorical evidence of P.W.15 that he saw the appellant along with the police when they came to the shop, necessarily meaning that the recovery of exhibits P-11 & P-12 was made only in the presence of the appellant to falsely implicate him and the prosecution has not come forward with a true version as to the recovery. 10. So far as yet another circumstance put forth against the appellant that he had attended the office and signed the attendance register at 8.45 a.m., on 11. 10. So far as yet another circumstance put forth against the appellant that he had attended the office and signed the attendance register at 8.45 a.m., on 11. 2002, when it is the practice in the office that all the staff members should sign the attendance register four times namely, in the morning, 1.00 p.m., 2.00 p.m., and at 5.45 p.m., and he had not signed after 8.45 a.m., on the date of occurrence establishing his involvement in the offence, the learned counsel would submit that by that fact alone, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant in a case of circumstantial evidence, as the prosecution has not established at what point of time the appellant was transferred to the Health and Family Welfare Department when he was said to have been working in the office of the Inspector General of Police. For all these reasons the learned counsel submitted that as the prosecution has failed to prove the entire circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court without there being any missing link, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the learned Public Prosecutor (Pondicherry) has submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.5 & 6 relating to the motive has been correctly appreciated and accepted by the Trial Court. He would also submit that the confession and recovery have been established through the evidence of P.Ws.12 & 23 and the fact that the appellant had purchased the knife only for committing the murder has been established through the evidence of P.W.15. Lastly the fact that the appellant, though attended the office, had signed only once instead of four times and he was not present in the office after 8.45 a.m., on 11. 2002 has been spoken to by P.W.14. Hence the learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved its case. 12. We have considered the rival submissions with great care and caution. Though the prosecution has come forward with P.Ws.1 to 4 as the eye-witnesses and more particularly, P.W.1 as the author of the First Information Report and on which basis investigation had commenced in this case, they were treated as hostile. That apart, there is no indication in any portion of their evidence to support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution only to rely upon the circumstantial evidence. 13. That apart, there is no indication in any portion of their evidence to support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution only to rely upon the circumstantial evidence. 13. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each and every incriminating circumstance available against the accused without there being any missing link. The foremost circumstance would be the motive. The prosecution must establish the motive beyond reasonable doubt in a case of circumstantial evidence. In order to prove the circumstance relating to the motive, the prosecution has examined P.Ws.5 & 6. P.W.5 is the son of the deceased. He has spoken that at about 10.00 p.m., on 11. 2002, the appellant rang up the deceased and demanded 10 sovereigns of jewels and Rs.50,000/-. On the next day, the deceased was murdered. Therefore he suspected that only because the appellant demanded money and jewels, he could have committed the murder. He himself was not definite about the motive. That apart, the demand of jewels and money by the appellant was informed to him by the deceased and P.W.5 had no personal knowledge about the motive and the evidence in this regard is only hearsay. Moreover, the evidence of P.W.5 is not trustworthy as, on the date of occurrence, the appellant was working in the Directorate of Health and Family Welfare Department and on the other hand, P.W.5 would say that the appellant was working in the office of the Inspector General of Police. Further he came to know that the deceased was murdered by the appellant at about 2.35 p.m., on 11. 2002 when he saw a huge crowd surrounding the body of the deceased while he returned after viewing a midday movie. There is absolutely no evidence to show that P.W.5 in fact has viewed a movie and came to the scene of occurrence on his way back. Though he has referred that he and one of his friends have gone to the scene of occurrence, strangely, he has not divulged the name of such friend and nobody has been examined to prove that both P.W.5 and his friend have gone to the movie. Further, in one place he has admitted that his fathers name is Tamilchelvan and on the other hand, he has given the name of P.W.6-Navaroj as his fathers name. Further, in one place he has admitted that his fathers name is Tamilchelvan and on the other hand, he has given the name of P.W.6-Navaroj as his fathers name. All the above would show that P.W.5 has not spoken the truth in the Court and his evidence cannot be believed to sustain the conviction. 14. P.W.6 was examined on the ground that he was living with the deceased at the relevant point of time though he married one Rita. On the date of occurrence, he was not in station as he was in Tuticorin. Again the motive aspect as spoken to by him is only hearsay namely, he was informed by the deceased with regard to the demand of jewels and money by the appellant and he had no personal knowledge about the same. P.W.6 has also come forward with a false version and his evidence cannot be also believed for the simple reason that in chief examination he has spoken in one place that he was living with the deceased at the relevant point of time, in cross examination he has stated in two places that he did not live with the deceased and was living with his wife by name Rita. Further, we do not find any reason as to why the appellant should ask the deceased to part with the jewels and money and there is absolutely no evidence on this aspect. Hence both the evidence of P.Ws.5 & 6 as to the motive would not be sufficient to hold that the prosecution has established the motive aspect. Hence the first circumstance relating to the motive has not been established. 15. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the arrest, confession of the appellant and the recovery. The confession and recovery have been spoken to by P.W.15. According to Ex.P-6, recovery mahazar, the confession was said to have been given by the appellant on 11. 2002 and this is spoken to by P.W.15. Equally the recovery of M.0.3-knife was also on 11. 2002 as spoken to by P.W.15. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W.23, the Investigating Officer goes to show that the recovery based on the confession of the appellant was affected only on 11. 2002. The above contradiction is fatal to the prosecution case, as the recovery must also be established in cases like this. 2002 as spoken to by P.W.15. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W.23, the Investigating Officer goes to show that the recovery based on the confession of the appellant was affected only on 11. 2002. The above contradiction is fatal to the prosecution case, as the recovery must also be established in cases like this. Further, according to the prosecution, M.O.3 contained blood, but the Serologists report does not corroborate the blood group, as the blood was disintegrated. Moreover, the learned Trial Judge himself has observed that though the shirt worn by the appellant at the time of occurrence contained human blood of the deceased, the Investigating Officer has failed to recover the shirt and therefore directed initiation of departmental proceedings against the said Investigating Officer for his failure to recover the shirt of the appellant, throwing a serious doubt as to the involvement of the appellant in the offence. The prosecution case need not be disbelieved solely on the ground of mere irregularity or laxity in the investigation when such irregularity and laxity do not materially affect the case. Further when such irregularity or laxity affects the very substratum of the prosecution case, the Court cannot ignore such laxity and the failure on the part of the Investigating Officer. In this case, the bloodstained shirt of the appellant would play a vital role and could have been a strong circumstance to implicate the appellant but, strangely, the Investigating Officer has not seized the same, throwing a serious doubt about the prosecution case. Hence the prosecution has not proved the recovery aspect. 16. So far as the purchase of knife, M.O.3 from the shop where P.W.15 was working as Cashier is concerned, it is to be kept in mind that the prosecution has filed the exhibits P-11 and P-12 namely, the bill book and the cash bill relating to the purchase of knife, M.O.3 in question. In our opinion, the said exhibits cannot be believed as there is no signature of the salesman much less the signature of P.W.15, the Cashier, in the bill and also there is no indication as to whom the knife was sold. In the absence of such indication, it cannot be presumed that the knife was purchased by the appellant only. In our opinion, the said exhibits cannot be believed as there is no signature of the salesman much less the signature of P.W.15, the Cashier, in the bill and also there is no indication as to whom the knife was sold. In the absence of such indication, it cannot be presumed that the knife was purchased by the appellant only. In addition to the above, it is the categorical evidence of P.W.15 that he saw the appellant only when he was brought to the shop by the police, thereby indicating that P.W.15 came to know of the appellant only for the first time when the seizure of Exs.P-11 & P-12 was effected, which would falsify his evidence that at about 12.00 noon on 11. 2002, the appellant came and purchased the knife. The evidence of P.W.15 also appears to be highly artificial as he has been put up as a witness to bring one more circumstance in view of the fact that the appellant was said to have purchased the knife at 12.00 noon on 11. 2002 and committed the murder at 1.30 p.m., on the same day. In the event the appellant had already pre-determined to commit the murder due to the motive as spoken to by P.Ws.5 & 6, he would have arranged for a knife well in advance and would not wait just prior to 1/2 hours to purchase the knife from a shop to commit the murder. In this case, if the prosecution had examined the shop owner, it would have thrown much light to its case. Hence the prosecution has not established the circumstance that the appellant had purchased the knife, M.O.3 for the commission of the offence. 17. The last circumstance would be the failure on the part of the appellant to sign the attendance register four times as spoken to by P.W.14. Of course, a perusal of Ex.P-8, the attendance register shows that on 11. 2002, though the appellant has signed at 8.45 a.m., he has not signed thereafter for the whole day. According to P.W.14, the appellant did not attend the office after signing the register at 8.45 a.m. This circumstance by itself cannot be a ground for sustaining the conviction, especially in a case of circumstantial evidence where the burden is heavy on the prosecution to bring home each and every circumstance implicating the appellant without there being any missing link. According to P.W.14, the appellant did not attend the office after signing the register at 8.45 a.m. This circumstance by itself cannot be a ground for sustaining the conviction, especially in a case of circumstantial evidence where the burden is heavy on the prosecution to bring home each and every circumstance implicating the appellant without there being any missing link. It is also to be noted that both P.Ws.5 & 6 claim to have acquainted the appellant as they know him personally, but strangely they have not been questioned as to the identity of the appellant in the Court and both the witnesses have not identified the appellant in the Court. 18. For all the above reasons, we are of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt, as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted of the charge of murder and the Criminal Appeal is allowed. Bail bonds executed by the appellant shall stand terminated. Fine amount, if any, paid is ordered to be refunded.