JUDGMENT This appeal by the appellants-defendants 3 and 4 under Section 96 CPC is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 20.3.1991, in O.S. No.7 of 1988, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Miryalaguda, whereunder and whereby preliminary decree was passed declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the plaint 'A' schedule lands. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. 3. The averments of the plaint in brief are as follows: The plaintiff being minor represented by his mother Gouru Shakuntala filed the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties on the ground that he is entitled to half share and that the registered partition deed No.1 126/65, dated 24.7.1965, does not bind the plaintiff. The 1st defendant is a stepmother and the 2nd defendant is the father of the plaintiff. Though the plaintiffs mother Shakuntala was married to 2nd defendant after enforcement of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act') in the presence of 1st defendant (first wife) alive, the plaintiff shall be deemed to be the legitimate son of the 2nd defendant in view of the marriage Amendment Laws of 1976. The plaintiff was born on 10.4.1966. The plaintiff shall be deemed to have acquired a co-parcenary interest in the ancestral properties of the 2nd defendant when he was conceived in his mother's womb. The plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule agricultural lands were originally held by the 2nd defendant's father late Gouru Gurvaiah and subsequently devolved upon the 2nd defendant consequent on the death in the year 1949 and therefore, they were the ancestral properties and the plaintiff acquired co-parcenary interest. On 24.7.1965 defendants 1 and 2 colluded together and brought into existence a collusive registered partition deed No.1126/ 65 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Miryalaguda with false recitals, allotting plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule lands to the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant and also parted with the possession of the land in favour of the 1st defendant. Though the 1st defendant a member of the joint family of 2nd defendant, she is not a coparcener and she never had any right in the plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties. Therefore, the said document is inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff. Though the 1st defendant a member of the joint family of 2nd defendant, she is not a coparcener and she never had any right in the plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties. Therefore, the said document is inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff. The 1st defendant shall be deemed to have acquired only the interest on the 2nd defendant in the plaint schedule lands and thus, the 2nd defendant got only half share and the plaintiff is entitled to half share. Hence the suit. 4. The 2nd defendant filed written statement admitting the relationship inter se and stated that he married Shakuntala, mother of the plaintiff at Wadapalli in Laxminarasimha Swamy Temple on 20.5.1963 according to the customs prevailing in their community. The plaintiff is the legitimate son of 2nd defendant. He also admits plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule lands are the ancestral properties of 2nd defendant. He also admits that the plaintiff is the co-parcener. With regard to registered document between the defendants 1 and 2, his contention is that it is not a collusive ' one. As the 2nd defendant did not begot male child even after passing of 25 years and to continue his line of family, the 2nd defendant wanted to marry the mother of the plaintiff. Therefore, the 1st defendant agreed to give her consent for the marriage of 2nd defendant with the mother of the plaintiff. Even the 2nd defendant was prepared to give half share to the 1st defendant in order to obtain consent of the 1st defendant for second marriage of the 2nd defendant with the mother of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant agreed to give half share in the ancestral property. Therefore, he prays to decree the suit. 5. Defendants 3 and 4 who are the contesting parties stated that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. Mother of late Anthamma is a proper' and necessary party. Plaintiff, Shakuntala and 2nd defendant are in collusion and to defeat the rights of these defendants filed the present suit. The plaintiff is not the son of the 2nd defendant and Shakuntala is not the wife of the 2nd defendant and they denied the relationship between them. They stated that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule lands were not got by the 2nd defendant from his father and are not the ancestral properties in the hands of the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff is not the son of the 2nd defendant and Shakuntala is not the wife of the 2nd defendant and they denied the relationship between them. They stated that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule lands were not got by the 2nd defendant from his father and are not the ancestral properties in the hands of the 2nd defendant. These properties ceased to be the ancestral properties as the 1st defendant has contributed more than Rs.15,000/- of her 'Streedhana' in developing the said properties and she was recognized by the 2nd defendant as co-owner. The registered partition deed No.1126/65 on the file of sub-registrar, Miryalaguda is a bona fide transaction and it was effected between the co-owners. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any partition. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is the legitimate son of the 2nd defendant ? 2. Whether the plaintiff had acquired co-parcenary interest on 5.7.1965 as claimed in the plaint ? 3. Whether the suit 'A' and 'B' schedule properties are the Hindu Joint Family Co-parcenary properties of plaintiff and the 2nd defendant ? 4. Whether the registered partition deed, dated 24.7.1965 between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant was collusive transaction and not binding on the defendant Nos.1, 2 and the plaintiff ? 5. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties and cause of action ? 6. Whether the suit is correctly valued and Court fee paid is sufficient ? 7. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation ? 8. Whether the age and surname of the plaintiff as described in the plaint is correct ? 9. To what reliefs the parties are entitled to ? 7. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A 1 to A6 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.Bl to B27 were marked. 8. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record passed preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the properties. Challenging the same, this appeal has been preferred. 9. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.Bl to B27 were marked. 8. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record passed preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the properties. Challenging the same, this appeal has been preferred. 9. It is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants that in pursuance of Section 16 of the Act, even though the plaintiff is a legitimate son of Shakuntala born through Gourn Saidaiah, he does not acquire any right to the property, but acquires right to his parents, for which the parent has a share. He relied on various decisions, which will be referred to at appropriate time. 10. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that even the illegitimate sons are entitled for equal share with natural sons, that there cannot be any partition between the wife and husband in respect of ancestral properties, that the defendants have no taken any plea that the plaintiff is not entitled to file the suit on the ground of illegitimacy, that the contents of Ex.A5partition deed remained unproved', that as the property is admittedly ancestral property, the 1st defendant cannot be a co-owner, that once EX.A5 is not proved, it can be said that the 2nd defendant' is the owner and hence, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 11. Though several issues have been framed in the trial Court, only one legal point has been raised by both the Counsel in this appeal. Therefore, the only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled to any share in the plaint schedule properties ? 12. The case of the plaintiff is that as Gouru Saidaiah, who was examined as D.WA did not beget any male children and in order to continue the family progeny with the consent of the 1st defendant, he married P.W.2 in the temple of Lord Narasimha Swamy at Wadapally on 20.5.1963 and that plaintiff was born to them on 10A.1966. 12. The case of the plaintiff is that as Gouru Saidaiah, who was examined as D.WA did not beget any male children and in order to continue the family progeny with the consent of the 1st defendant, he married P.W.2 in the temple of Lord Narasimha Swamy at Wadapally on 20.5.1963 and that plaintiff was born to them on 10A.1966. Thereafter, DW 4 executed a registered deed of partition on 24.7.1965 dividing equal share to himself and the 1st defendant in order to defeat the interest of the plaintiff On the other hand, it is the specific case of the defendants 3 and 4 that P.W.2 is not the wife of D.WA and that PW.1 was not born to PW.2 through DWA and even assuming for a moment that PW.1 is the son of PW.2 through DWA, inasmuch as 1st defendant, who is the legally wedded wife of D.WA was alive at the time of alleged marriage, the second marriage itself is void, that it was contrary to Section 5 of the Act and hence, plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6 can be said to be the illegitimate children and they have no right in the property . 13. PW.2 and D.Ws 4 and 5 speak about the second marriage of P.W.2 with D.WA. D.WA stated that his marriage with PW.2 was performed on 20.5.1963 in the temple of Laxminarasimha Swamy, Wadapally as per the customs prevailing in their community. He admitted that the 1st defendant i.e., first wife was alive and she had given consent and that she also attended the marriage of P.W.2 with him. He also stated that mother of the 1st defendant was also present at the time of marriage. On the other hand, the 1st defendant i.e., first wife of the 2nd defendant stated that she has not given any consent to the marriage of P.W.2 with the 2nd defendant. D.W.5, who is the purohit stated that he performed the marriage and also speaks about the various rituals that have been performed in the marriage. P.W.2 stated that her marriage with the 2nd defendant was performed and through him, she begot three daughters and one son namely, the plaintiff. D.W.5, who is the purohit stated that he performed the marriage and also speaks about the various rituals that have been performed in the marriage. P.W.2 stated that her marriage with the 2nd defendant was performed and through him, she begot three daughters and one son namely, the plaintiff. Basing on the evidence, the trial Court gave a finding that the marriage between P.W.2 and D.WA is established and also it was established beyond shadow of doubt that P.W.2 is the second wife of D.WA and the plaintiff and the defendants 5 and 6 are the children. Even the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants did not deny or dispute with regard to the second marriage of P.W.2 with the 2nd defendant. His only contention is that illegitimate child cannot claim as of right any share in the joint family property, but he is entitled to claim share in the self-acquired properties of his parents. 14. Clause (i) of Section 5 of the Act lays down, for a lawful marriage, the necessary condition that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage. A marriage in contravention of this condition, therefore, is null and void. On this aspect, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants relied on a decision reported in Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivaram Adhav and another, AIR 1988 SC 644 , wherein it was held thus: "We, therefore, hold that the marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law.", Since the marriage of P.W.2 with D.WA is void, the plaintiff and the defendants 5 and 6 were the illegitimate children.' The rights of an illegitimate son are the subjects of special rules in the Mitakshara. Under the Hindu Law, the moment a son in born, he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Subsection (3) of Section 16 of the Act reads thus: "16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages:- (1) ... (2) ... His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Subsection (3) of Section 16 of the Act reads thus: "16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages:- (1) ... (2) ... (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage which is null and void or Which is annulled by a decree of nullity under Section" 12, any rights in or to the property of any person, other than the parents, in any case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents." A perusal of the above provision makes it clear that children born of void marriage shall be deemed to be a legitimate as if the marriage has been valid notwithstanding the fact that the marriage is declared to be a nullity whether before or after the birth of a child. Now the question is whether by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the Act, the plaintiff is entitled for a share in the ancestral property. Even the case of the plaintiff is that the properties in question are the ancestral properties. As the plaintiff was born on 10.4.1966, he shall be deemed to have acquired interest in the ancestral properties. 15. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties were originally held by 2nd defendant's father late Gouru Guruvaiah and subsequently devolved upon the 2nd defendant after his father's death in the year 1949 and therefore, they are his ancestral properties. As a matter of fact, the trial Court also gave a finding that the plaintiff can get right in the ancestral property of the 2nd defendant. Both the Counsel have categorically stated that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties were originally acquired by the father of the 2nd defendant and those properties were devolved upon the 2nd defendant after the death of his father in the year 1949. It is nobody's case that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the 2nd defendant. It is nobody's case that plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the 2nd defendant. Now it has to be seen whether the plaintiff and the defendants 5 and 6 are entitled to a share in the ancestral properties or coparcenary properties of the family. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants placed strong reliance on the decision reported in Jinia Keotin and others v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi and others, 2003 (2) ALD 87 (SC) = (2003) 1 SCC 730 , wherein it was held thus : "An illegitimate child cannot succeed/claim a share in the joint Hindu family property. Such illegitimate child would only be entitled to a share in the self-acquired property of the parents." 17. He also placed reliance on the decision reported in Jagarlamudi Sujata and another v. Jagarlamudi Jagadish Krishna Prasad and others, AIR 1992 AP 291 , wherein it was held thus : "Therefore, I agree with the contentions of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the right of the illegitimate children who have been made legitimate by the virtue of the amendment to Section 16(1) of the Act are concerned only with the property left by their parents i.e., they succeed to the property on the death of their parents." From the above decisions, it is clear that an illegitimate child cannot claim share in the joint family, but such an illegitimate child can only be entitled to share in the self-acquired properties of the parents. 18. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents placed reliance on the decision reported in Bhanwar Singh v. Puran and others, (2008) 3 SCC 87 , wherein it was held thus : "Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided for devolution of interest in the coparcenary property. Section 8 lays down the general rules of succession that the property of a male dying intestate devolves according to the provisions of the Chapter as specified in clause (1) of the Schedule. In the Schedule appended to the Act, natural sons and daughters are placed as Class 1 heirs but a grandson, so long as father is alive, has not been included. In the Schedule appended to the Act, natural sons and daughters are placed as Class 1 heirs but a grandson, so long as father is alive, has not been included. Section 19 of the Act provides that in the event of succession by two or more heirs, they will take the property per capita and not per stripes, as also tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants." 19. He also relied on another decision reported in Sheela Devi and others v. Lal Chand and another, (2006) 8 see 581, wherein it was held thus : "The principle of law applicable in this case is that so long a property remains in the hands of a single person, the same was to be treated as a separate property, and thus such a person would be entitled to dispose of the coparcenery property as the same where his separate property, but if a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alteration whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alteration so made by his father before he was born or begotten. But once a son is born, it becomes a coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein." From the above decisions, it is clear that when the property remains in the hands of a single person, the same shall be treated as a separate property. It is also clear that once the son is born, it becomes a coparcenary property and he would acquire an interest therein. 20. Although the 2nd defendant had no sons and as a matter of fact, he married P.W.2 as the first wife did not beget any male issue and the plaintiff was born on 1 10.4.1966, undoubtedly, he is an illegitimate child of the 2nd defendant and P.W.2. Therefore, the property continues to be in the hands of a single person. In view of the above decision, it can be said that though the coparcenary property is devolved upon the 2nd defendant as a sole surviving coparcener, it can be treated as self-acquired property of the 2nd defendant. Even the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants would also indicate that if it is a self-acquired property, the illegitimate children are entitled for share in the properties of his father. 21. Even the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants would also indicate that if it is a self-acquired property, the illegitimate children are entitled for share in the properties of his father. 21. He also relied on another decision reported in Rasala Suryaprakash Rao and others v. Rasala Venkateswara Rao and others, AIR 1992 AP 234 , wherein it was held thus: "In conclusion we hold that by virtue of Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, as amended in 1976, the illegitin1ate son can be equated with his natural sons and treated as coparceners for the properties held by the father whether the property be originally joint family property or not. The only limitation is that during the life time of the father, the illegitimate son of a void marriage is not entitled to seek a partition. He can seek a partition only after the death of the father." But the above decision runs contra to the decision reported in Jinia Keotin 's case (supra). Therefore, the above decision has no application to the present facts of the case. 22. In Bhanwar Singh's case (supra), it was further held thus : "In any event, it had rightly been held that even in such a case, having regard to Section 8 as also Section 19 of the Act, the properties ceased to be joint family property and all the heirs and legal representatives of Bhima would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. In a case of this case, the joint coparcenary did not continue." From the above decision, it is clear that when the properties ceased to be joint family property and when the property remains in the hands of a single person though it is a coparcenary property, it can be treated as separate property and in such a case, certainly by virtue of Section 16(1) of the Act, illegitimate children are entitled for a share on the properties of the father though not they have any right in the ancestral property. Therefore, the plaintiff and the defendants 5 and 6 are entitled to a share in the plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties. 23. Therefore, the plaintiff and the defendants 5 and 6 are entitled to a share in the plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties. 23. With regard to the registered partition deed, dated 24.7.1965, though no arguments have been advanced, a finding has been recorded by the trial Court that EX.A5 was not binding on the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff There cannot be any partition of ancestral property between the wife and husband. There can be a partition of property in lieu of maintenance of any pre-existing right that can be conferred on the partition deed upon a wife. There is no evidence to show that EX.A5 was executed in pursuance of preexisting right. A share was given to the 1st defendant who is the first wife of the 2nd defendant. Therefore, EX.A5 is not binding on the defendant as D.W.4 himself admitted that he has to execute EX.A.5 in favour of the 1st defendant as the 1st defendant gave consent to D.W.4 to marry P.W.2. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no merits in the appeal and therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 24. Accordingly, the appeal Suit IS dismissed confirming the judgment and decree, dated 20.3.1991, in O.S. No.7 of 1988, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Miryalaguda. There shall be no order as to costs.