JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. What is a writ of certiorari?. When can a High Court issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari? What is the difference, if any, between the High Court's power to issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of a Writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, on the one hand, and its power to issue a writ of certiorari or a direction or order in the nature of a Writ of certiorari under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, on the other?. Whether a writ of certiorari can be issued against a decree, which has been passed by a Court, which had no civil jurisdiction?. Whether a writ of certiorari can be issued, in such a case, by a High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 and, if so, when? Whether a decree passed by court, 'X', which is subordinate to a High Court, 'Y', can be challenged in a High Court, 'Z', on the ground that the decree, which has been passed by the court, 'X', is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the court, which had been passed the decree, had no civil jurisdiction and that the decree is likely to be executed within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, 'Z'? Can, in such circumstances, the High Court, 'Z', quash the decree by issuing a writ of certiorari in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226? What is a Fast Track Court? Whether a Fast Track Court, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, can exercise civil jurisdiction? These are some of the important questions, which this set of writ petitions have raised. 2. All these writ petitions, which involve identical facts and raise same questions of law, have been heard, at the request of learned Counsel for the parties, analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. Background Facts: 3. Keeping in view extreme poverty of the tribal populace in the hill states of the North-East Region, Govt. 2. All these writ petitions, which involve identical facts and raise same questions of law, have been heard, at the request of learned Counsel for the parties, analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. Background Facts: 3. Keeping in view extreme poverty of the tribal populace in the hill states of the North-East Region, Govt. of India, on the recommendation of the Agricultural Price Commission, adopted, way back in the year 1971-72, a policy, whereunder it was decided that the food grains, covered by the Public Distribution System (PDS), which are required to be released from the stocks of the Union Government, should be delivered at the Principal Distribution Centres (PDCs) in the hill States. The reason for adopting the policy was that in hill States, the food grains were required to be moved by road to the interior places, which are not connected with rail-heads or had limited rail-heads. It was, therefore, decided that the Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'), which is established under the Food Corporation Act, 1964, should open go-downs at the PDCs, wherever possible in the hill States, and since food grains could not have been carried to these PDCs by rail heads, the same would be carried by road and the cost of transportation to these centres, which the State Government may incur, shall be reimbursed by the Corporation. As the transportation of carriage of food grains were required to be done by the State Governments with the help of private contractors, it was also decided, at some point of time, that the allotment of carriage contract would be by the State Governments. The policy, adopted in this regard, also envisaged off loading of the stocks of the food grains at the fair price shops en route PDCs. The reimbursement was subject to the condition that the reimbursement charges shall not exceed the transportation charges, which would have been payable, had the stocks been moved from the base depots to the approved PDCs. The policy, adopted in this regard, also envisaged off loading of the stocks of the food grains at the fair price shops en route PDCs. The reimbursement was subject to the condition that the reimbursement charges shall not exceed the transportation charges, which would have been payable, had the stocks been moved from the base depots to the approved PDCs. The reimbursement of the transportation charges of the food grains, as conceived under the relevant policy, stood divided, broadly speaking, into two parts, namely, (i) Road Reimbursement Charges: These charges were to be paid to the State Government for lifting of food grains from rail heads carrying the same to the base depots; (ii) Hill Transport Subsidy: These charges covered the expenses, incurred by the State Government, for moving the stocks from the base depots, approved by the Corporation, to the approved PDCs. 4. The subsequent official circulars issued, in this regard, laid down the procedure for the State Government to obtain reimbursement from the Corporation. After this policy was adopted, Deputy Commissioners, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, submitted bills, raised by the carriage contractors, to the Corporation's offices at the District level, where the bills were checked and, then, the bills were forwarded to the Regional Office of the Corporation, where it was rechecked and final payments ordered. At times, the Regional Office made advance payment to the State Government in order to enable it to disburse the amount to the carriage contractor/transporters and after such disbursement of the amount, payment vouchers, pertaining to the bills, were submitted by the State Government to the Corporation's office and, thereafter, the bills were finally passed and adjusted against advance payments. In course of time, the Corporation and the Government of India alleged that the State Government had received payments in excess of what they ought to have received. The excess payments, so made, were sought to be recovered from the amounts, which became due and payable to the State Government by way of reimbursement of transportation charges. The process of recovery led to a dispute between the State Government on the one hand, and the Government of India and the Corporation, on the other. The transportation of the food grains has, however, continued to be carried out, because the policy has not been withdrawn and/or rescinded. The process of recovery led to a dispute between the State Government on the one hand, and the Government of India and the Corporation, on the other. The transportation of the food grains has, however, continued to be carried out, because the policy has not been withdrawn and/or rescinded. The carriage contractors, having not received the payments for the bills, sought to recover the same by instituting civil suits and some of them filed writ petitions. The present controversy arises out of the money decrees, which have been passed in some of such civil suits. 5. The facts, which are material for the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions may, in a nutshell, be set out as under: (i) The private Respondents herein, who all stand impleaded as Respondent No. 4, instituted, as Plaintiffs, Money Suit Nos. 02/2007, 04/2007, 06/2007, 07/2007, 08/2007, 09/2007, 10/2007 and 11/2007 in the Court of Deputy Commissioner, Kurung Kumey, Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng, Deputy Commissioner, West Siang, Deputy Commissioner, East Kameng, Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng, Deputy Commissioner, East Kameng, and Deputy Commissioner, Papumpare, seeking decree of recovery of diverse sums of money with interest, etc., their case being, briefly stated, thus: The Plaintiffs were appointed, under different orders issued by the Director of Civil Supplies, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, as State Miller-cum-Carriage Contractor of wheat for the financial year 2003-2005. Under the relevant scheme of the Public Distribution System (in short, 'PDS'), it was envisaged that since it was difficult for the Government to distribute wheat in the difficult hilly terrains in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, because, apart from distance, facilities for milling were not available in the hilly terrains of the State, the State can get the wheat, which are allotted for the purpose of public distribution, milled at convenient places, by engaging private contractors, who can, on obtaining the wheat, get the same milled and, then, carry the same to their respective destination for distribution. The scheme stipulated that apart from the milling charges, the carriage contractor would be paid transportation cost, the transportation cost being payable by the State Government and the expenses, so incurred by the State Government, would be reimbursed by the Govt. The scheme stipulated that apart from the milling charges, the carriage contractor would be paid transportation cost, the transportation cost being payable by the State Government and the expenses, so incurred by the State Government, would be reimbursed by the Govt. of India, for, it is the responsibility of the Government of India to help the State Government in public distribution of the essential commodities and this reimbursement was in the form of a subsidy known as Hill Transport Subsidy (HTS). Separate deeds of agreement were accordingly signed by the Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Director of Supplies, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, on the other. In accordance with the terms and conditions, which had been agreed upon, the Plaintiffs carried the wheat to their respective agreed destinations and delivered the same to the authorities concerned. After verifying and upon being satisfied that the bills were correct. Director of Supplies submitted the bills to the Senior Regional Manager of the Corporation through District Managers/Area Managers of the Corporation at Tezpur, Dibrugarh and North Lakhimpur. The bills, so verified, were, then, submitted to the Senior Regional Manager/General Manager of the Corporation at Guwahati. Alleging that the bills were not being paid by the Government though they had carried the food grains to their agreed destinations, the Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to payment of the bills and sought for decreeing the suit(s) with such relief(s) as already indicated hereinabove. (ii) Though the State Government and also the officers of the Corporation had filed their written statements, they chose not to challenge the validity of the claims of the Plaintiffs nor did they specifically deny that the claims, which the Plaintiffs had made with regard to their nonpayment of dues, were not sustainable. The State Government's pleaded case, in their written statements, was that it was due to paucity of funds and non-release of Hill Transport Subsidy by the Corporation since the year 2004 that the State Government had not been able to make the payments, though the State Government was willing to make the payments as soon as the funds became available. The State Government's pleaded case, in their written statements, was that it was due to paucity of funds and non-release of Hill Transport Subsidy by the Corporation since the year 2004 that the State Government had not been able to make the payments, though the State Government was willing to make the payments as soon as the funds became available. (iii) It may be noted that though the Corporation was not made a party to the suits, the various officers responsible for verifying the bills and also for making payments were made parties to the suit and these officers are amongst the Petitioners in this set of writ petitions. (iv) The pleaded case of the officers, who had represented the Corporation, and participated, in the suits, was that the Corporation was responsible to release the food grains to the State Government as per allocation orders of the Government of India as well as the Corporation's Headquarters and sub-allocation was, thereafter, required to be made by the State Government. In terms of the relevant scheme, whereunder the bills, in question, were raised, had been checked and according to the prescribed procedure, the bills, upon being re-checked by the Corporation, had already been forwarded to the concerned district officers for releasing payment to the State Authorities after observing all official formalities and that upon making requisite payments to the contractors, the State Government would be entitled to receive Hill Transport Subsidy in the form of reimbursement of the amounts, which may be paid by the State Government to the carriage contractors/transporters. The further pleaded case of the officers of the Corporation, who had participated in the suits, was that since it was the State Government, which had engaged the Plaintiffs for transportation of the commodities covered by the PDS, it was the duty of the State Government to make the payments for the work done by the Plaintiffs and that the Corporation's liability is to reimburse the State Government for the expenses, which the State Government may incur in making payments to the carriage contractors and, thus, no case had been made out against the Corporation, making it liable to make payment to the Plaintiffs directly, and, hence, as far as the Corporation is concerned, the suits may be dismissed. (v) In course of time, the suits, in question, were transferred by the Deputy Commissioner, Yupia, to the Fast Track Court at Yupia Having held to the effect that the money decrees, sought for in the suits were in respect of admitted bills and that non-availability of funds, as pleaded by the State Government, was not a valid ground for non-payment of the bills, the learned trial Court decreed the suits. Petitioners' Case: 6. By making these writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Corporation have sought for issuance of writ(s) setting aside the decrees aforementioned on the ground that the Court, which has passed the decrees, is not a Court, which is vested with the power to exercise civil jurisdiction, the case of the writ Petitioners being, in brief, thus: (i) By notification, dated 04.06.2002, the State Government, in exercise of its powers, conferred by Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established, in consultation with the High Court, Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Court (Fast Track Court) at Namsai, Yupia and Basar with their respective jurisdiction as specified in the said notification. By a subsequent letter, dated 27.06.2002, the State Government directed all the Deputy Commissioners of the State to transfer the sessions cases with relevant records, which had been pending for more than two years, to the Fast Track Courts (hereinafter referred to as 'the FTC). Thereafter, vide order, dated 28.08.2003, the Secretary (Law and Judicial), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, issued a WT message to the Deputy Commissioners, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, requesting them to urgently transfer all civil cases with relevant records, which had been pending for more than two years, to the FTCs in terms of the scheme as approved by the Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India reported in (2002) 5 SCC 1 . (ii) The writ Petitioners contend that since the FTCs have been constituted for trial of sessions cases, the transfer of the civil cases to them was wholly illegal and the FTCs had, therefore, derived no jurisdiction to deal with civil cases and pass decrees binding the parties concerned. (ii) The writ Petitioners contend that since the FTCs have been constituted for trial of sessions cases, the transfer of the civil cases to them was wholly illegal and the FTCs had, therefore, derived no jurisdiction to deal with civil cases and pass decrees binding the parties concerned. The writ Petitioners also contend that the tribal areas of the State of Arunachal Pradesh stand excluded from the operation of Section 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure and no District/Additional District Judge, having been appointed in terms of the provisions of Articles 233 and/or Article 236 of the Constitution of India, and the State Government having also not issued any notification extending the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to any of the areas of the State concerned, the civil proceedings and civil trials, in the State, are governed by the provisions of Section 4 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945 (in short, 'the Regulations') in force. The corporation has not been impleaded as a party in the suit. There was no specific admission by the Corporation with regard to the claims of the Plaintiffs. Mere appearance, in the suits by the Corporation's Officers, did not give the FTC the power to try the suit and pass binding decrees on the Corporation. The suits have been decreed without framing any issue. The Deputy Commissioner, Yupia, has no jurisdiction to transfer a civil case to the FTC inasmuch as there is no specific provision, made in the Regulations, for transfer of a civil case by the Deputy Commissioner. (iii) It is the further case of the writ Petitioners that the audit, carried out in respect of the payments of various bills, relating to Hill Transport Subsidy (in short, 'the HTS'), had revealed excess payments having been made by the Corporation. Hence, the excess payments, so made, were ordered by the Union Government to be adjusted against further payments, which would be required to be made to the State Government by way of reimbursement in terms of the relevant policy. In the meanwhile, a Public Interest Litigation, bearing PIL No. 50/2004, alleging various anomalies with regard to HTS was filed and the matter is, now, being investigated by the CBI. The State Government, being aware of the said PIL, ought not to have admitted the disputed/doubtful claims of the Plaintiffs. In the meanwhile, a Public Interest Litigation, bearing PIL No. 50/2004, alleging various anomalies with regard to HTS was filed and the matter is, now, being investigated by the CBI. The State Government, being aware of the said PIL, ought not to have admitted the disputed/doubtful claims of the Plaintiffs. The Corporation, having not been made a party, could not contest the suits effectively. Without constituting any of the FTCs as a Court having civil jurisdiction, the State Government could not have issued any direction to the Deputy Commissioners, to transfer civil cases or suits to the FTCs. The scheme, stipulated in Brij Mohan Lal's (supra), cannot be applied to the Tribal States. This apart requisite notification is required to be issued extending the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Civil Procedure to the tribal areas. The FTC, in question, could not have, without framing any issue, decided and decreed the suits involving huge sums of money. State Government's Case: 7. The State Government has resisted the writ petitions by filing their affidavit, the State Government's case being as under: (i) The FTC is competent to try civil suits inasmuch as the trial Judge, having been appointed as Additional Deputy Commissioner, is competent to try civil cases under the Regulations. The writ petition is not maintainable inasmuch as an application under Article 226 is not maintainable against a judicial order passed by a competent civil court. The present writ petition having been made under Article 226 of the Constitution and there being no prayer to convert the same into a petition under Article 227, the present writ petitions must fail. The writ petitions have been filed at the principal seat of Gauhati High Court against a decree passed by a Court in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, though there is a permanent bench at Itanagar and when there is no order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, in terms of the Gauhati High Court Rules, the present writ proceedings could not have been initiated and continued at the principal seat and the same shall either be dismissed or transmitted to the Permanent Bench, at Itanagar, in terms of the standing orders in force. (ii) The Petitioners are guilty of having intentionally suppressed material facts from this Court. (ii) The Petitioners are guilty of having intentionally suppressed material facts from this Court. The records reveal that in respect of Money Suit No. 2 of 2007, which was pending in the Court of Deputy Commissioner, West Siang District, the Plaintiff had filed a petition, at Itanagar Bench of the High Court, seeking transfer of the said suit to the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Yupia, for trial and disposal. Notices were issued to all the Respondents including the Corporation. The Petitioners in the writ petition appeared in the said transfer application, but did not contest the same and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, an order was passed, on 23.3.2007, by the High Court transferring the money suit as had been prayed for. The said order of transfer was never assailed by any of the parties including the Corporation and has, therefore, attained finality and cannot be reopened collaterally in the present proceedings; but these facts have been deliberately suppressed by the Corporation. Exercise of power under Article 226 is not available for judicial review of an order, passed, on the judicial side, by a co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court. The present proceedings would require a judicial review of an order passed by Itanagar Bench of the High Court transferring a civil suit in exercise of the High Court's power of transfer. Such a course is not permissible in an application under Article 226. The writ petition, therefore, deserves dismissal. (iii) Upon transfer of the money suits aforementioned, the Corporation had appeared in the trial court and submitted its written statements. At no stage of the trial, any objection with regard to jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised. In any case, no consequent failure of justice has been pleaded, in the writ petition, as a result of transfer of the suits to the FTC. The writ petitions do not disclose that the transfer of the suits or the decrees passed therein have infringed any fundamental or legal rights of the Petitioners. The Petitioners have also not shown as to what prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners, because of the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the FTC. Altogether three FTCs have been established in the State of Arunachal Pradesh having both civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. The Petitioners have also not shown as to what prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners, because of the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the FTC. Altogether three FTCs have been established in the State of Arunachal Pradesh having both civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. The FTCs are manned by Additional Deputy Commissioners, who are empowered to try civil cases under the Regulation. Under the Notification, dated 04.06.2002, the FTCs have also been constituted as Additional Sessions Judge's Courts. The territorial jurisdiction, vested in the FTC, by notification, dated 04.06.2002, is wider than that of Additional Deputy Commissioners of the districts concerned. In terms of the 11th Finance Commission's recommendations, advertisement, dated 13.07.2001, was issued for recruitment to the post of Additional Deputy Commissioner with the power of ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge on contract basis. The Selection Committee was headed by a sitting Judge of the High Court and this Committee recommended names, on 06.10.2001, against the three posts of the Presiding Officers of the FTCs. Vide order, dated 04.06.2002, three Additional Deputy Commissioners were appointed with the power of ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge in Additional Sessions Court (FTC). Subsequently, the designation of FTCs was changed by the High Court and they are presently known as Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTC. Since the constitution of the FTCs, civil cases are being regularly transferred from the courts of the Deputy Commissioners either on their own or on the orders passed by the High Court. The appointments of the Presiding Officers of the FTCs were in consonance with not only the provisions of Articles 233 and 236 of the Constitution of India, but also in keeping with the mandates of the Apex Court's in Brij Mohan Lal (supra). (iv) The Central Government/Corporation made payments for three years during the year 2001-2003 in accordance with the 2001 relevant policy; but they, suddenly, stopped payments of all claims from January, 2004, and started making arbitrary and unilateral adjustments of recovery against purported excess payments. This issue is, now, being examined by a High Powered Committee, which has been constituted by the Government of India, wherein representatives of both the State Government and the Corporation have been included and this High Powered Committee is also engaged in sorting out the issues pertaining to the non-payment of pending bills for the period 2004-2007. This issue is, now, being examined by a High Powered Committee, which has been constituted by the Government of India, wherein representatives of both the State Government and the Corporation have been included and this High Powered Committee is also engaged in sorting out the issues pertaining to the non-payment of pending bills for the period 2004-2007. Denial of payment of dues has resulted into immense resentment amongst the genuine transporters, who had carried out the works of transportation in terms of the agreements. The transfer of the civil suits, in question, and the trial held by the FTC was in terms of the Regulation read with the spirit of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as applicable to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Private Respondent's Case: 8. The private Respondents, who are Plaintiffs in the suits, have also resisted the writ petitions by filing their affidavits, their case, in brief, is: (i) The writ petitions suffer from suppression of material facts. As many as eight money suits, involving similar issues and common Defendants, were tried and decreed by the trial Court i.e. FTC, Yupia. Out of these eight suits, two suits, namely, Money Suit No. 06/2007 and 07/2007 were transferred by the High Court to the FTC, at Yupia, for trial and disposal. These orders of transfer were made by the High Court on the basis of transfer applications made by the Plaintiffs in the said suits. These transfer applications were not resisted by the Defendants, who are, now, Petitioners in the present writ petitions. The writ Petitioners have, thus, wilfully and intentionally suppressed material facts with mala fide intention to mislead this Court. There is efficacious and alternative remedy available to the writ Petitioners, because they can, in terms of the provisions of the Regulations, prefer appeals against the money decrees. (ii) As the Deputy Commissioner, Yupia, was arrayed as Defendant No. 7, he could not have adjudicated upon the lis, for, any such adjudication would have been in contravention of the principles of fair trial. The trial of the money suits, in question, did not infringe any fundamental or legal right of the writ Petitioners. The writ Petitioners have not even whispered that they have suffered any prejudice on account of fact that the FTCs have been vested with the jurisdiction to try civil cases. The trial of the money suits, in question, did not infringe any fundamental or legal right of the writ Petitioners. The writ Petitioners have not even whispered that they have suffered any prejudice on account of fact that the FTCs have been vested with the jurisdiction to try civil cases. Though the Petitioners filed their written statements in the suits, they had categorically admitted the claim of the Plaintiffs. Thus, when the parties were not at issue on any question of fact or law, no issue was required to be framed, particularly, when the writ Petitioners had clearly admitted, in their written statements, that the bills had been verified by them and that the same had been forwarded for payment. Thus, the correctness and legitimacy of the bills were never questioned by the Corporation. The writ Petitioners cannot, now, cast any doubt on the legitimacy or correctness of the Plaintiffs' claims. Having accepted that the claims of the Plaintiffs were correct and legitimate, the writ Petitioners cannot, now, question the correctness of the bills. No public interest can be said to be involved in the writ petitions nor can any public interest be said to have suffered due to FTC's functioning as civil court. 9. I have heard Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, and Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, appearing for the State Respondents. I have also heard Mr. A.M. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the private Respondents: Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners: 10. Presenting the case on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Senior Counsel, has submitted, by referring to the notification, dated 04.06.2002, that the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, were established for the purpose deciding sessions cases or all such cases, which are triable by a Court of Session, and for exercising all such powers, appellate as well as revision, which are exercisable by a Court of Sessions. No notification, points out Mr. Phukan, has ever been issued by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh empowering the FTCs to exercise powers of a civil court. It is, thus, clear, contends Mr. Phukan, that the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is not vested with civil jurisdiction and cannot, therefore, exercise civil jurisdiction. In the present case, submits Mr. No notification, points out Mr. Phukan, has ever been issued by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh empowering the FTCs to exercise powers of a civil court. It is, thus, clear, contends Mr. Phukan, that the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is not vested with civil jurisdiction and cannot, therefore, exercise civil jurisdiction. In the present case, submits Mr. Phukan, since the decrees have been passed by the FTC, Yupia, without having any civil jurisdiction, the decrees are, ex facie, without jurisdiction and, hence, the decrees, in question, need to be quashed by issuing writ (s) of certiorari. 11. Referring to the objection raised by the Respondents on the ground that the impugned decrees having been passed by a Court in respect of cases, which arose in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, has no jurisdiction to entertain any of these writ petitions made under Article 226, Mr. Phukan points out that when cause of action or a part thereof arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226. It is, however, a different matter, further points out Mr. Phukan, that the High Court, in a given case, may take the view that notwithstanding the fact that it has jurisdiction, it is not appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction. It is one thing to say, submits Mr. Phukan, that a High Court or a Bench of the High Court has no jurisdiction, but quite another to say that the High Court or a Bench of the High Court, though has jurisdiction, should not, in a given case, exercise jurisdiction. The whole controversy, therefore, contends Mr. Phukan, boils down to the question as to whether cause of action or any part thereof for filing this set of writ petitions has arisen within the territorial limits of the State of Assam. If the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the limits of the territory of the State of Assam, the Principal Se(sic) at Guwahati, of this High Court would be competent to entertain the present writ petitions made under Article 226. 12. In support of the Petitioners' case that the cause of action for making the writ petitions had arisen, at least, in part, within the State of Assam. Mr. 12. In support of the Petitioners' case that the cause of action for making the writ petitions had arisen, at least, in part, within the State of Assam. Mr. Phukan submits that it is the case of the Plaintiffs-Respondent No. 4 that the bills, in question, had been checked and verified by the Corporation's offices situated at various places, in the State of Assam. Since the verification of the bills, raised by the Plaintiffs-private Respondents was conducted in Assam and, in terms of the decrees passed, in the suits, the decrees can be executed against those writ Petitioners, who are in the State of Assam, despite the fact that the decrees are nullity in the eyes of law, it becomes transparent, contends Mr. Phukan, that the decrees have put in peril the interests of the Petitioners within the State of Assam and can cause serious injury to them. In such circumstances, contends Mr. Phukan, the cause of action for maintaining the writ petitions has clearly arisen, at least, in part, within the State of Assam. In the face of these facts of the present case, the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, of this High Court must be treated to have, according to Mr. Phukan, requisite jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions. 13. Assailing the impugned decrees, Mr. Phukan has submitted that in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the exercise of civil jurisdiction is under the Regulations; whereas the decrees, in question, have been passed by taking recourse to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. This makes the decrees aforementioned, according to Mr. Phukan, wholly without jurisdiction and non est in law. 14. It is further pointed out by Mr. Phukan that the suits have been decided without framing any issue, though it was the specific stand of the Corporation's officers that the Corporation's liability is to disburse such amount(s) to the State Government, which the State Government may, in terms of the relevant policy, pay to the carriage contractors. As the decrees have been passed against the Corporation too, the Corporation would, now, be required, points out Mr. Phukan, to make the payments and satisfy the decrees. In the face of the defence, which the corporation had taken, an issue, submits Mr. As the decrees have been passed against the Corporation too, the Corporation would, now, be required, points out Mr. Phukan, to make the payments and satisfy the decrees. In the face of the defence, which the corporation had taken, an issue, submits Mr. Phukan, ought to have been framed by the learned Court below to determine as to when the liability of the Corporation to make payments, if any, would arise. No such issue was, points out Mr. Phukan, framed in the suit and without framing any issue, in this regard, the learned Court below, has fastened the Corporation with the liability to make payments. The imposition of such liability is, according to Mr. Phukan, wholly against the terms of the relevant policy and cannot be sustained. Such an imposition of liability, being wholly without any authority of law, is, according to Mr. Phukan, judicially reviewable under Article 226. 15. It is the submission of Mr. Phukan that when a Court, which has no civil jurisdiction, entertains a civil suit and passes a decree, such a decree is without jurisdiction and must be treated as nullity in law and in such a case, there is no legal impediment in setting aside and quashing such a decree by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. In such a case, contends Mr. Phukan, it is not necessary that the aggrieved person must take recourse to the statutorily available provisions for appeal made against such a decree. 16. Elaborating his above submission, Mr. Phukan points out contends that it is only the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, who can, under the Regulations, decides civil cases and no such power can be exercised by a person merely because he has been appointed to preside over the FTC as an Additional Sessions Judge. 17. Mr. Phukan further has submitted that there has been serious complaints made against some officers and contractors with regard to the payment(s), which had been received by the contractors for carrying PDS items, and these complaints have led to investigation by the CBI and a PIL is also pending on this subject in this Court. Submissions of Behalf of The State Government: 18. Submissions of Behalf of The State Government: 18. Appearing on behalf of the State Government, learned Advocate General has submitted that the present set of writ applications suffer from suppression of material information inasmuch as the Petitioners, nowhere, mentioned in any of the writ petitions that out of the eight suits filed by the private Respondents, two of the suits were transferred from the Deputy Commissioner's Court, at Yupia, to the Fast Track Court, at Yupia, by the orders of the High Court. Without disclosing such a vital piece of information to this Court, the Petitioners, points out learned Advocate General, have sought to get the impugned decrees set aside on the ground that the Fast Track Court, at Yupia, had no jurisdiction to try civil suits. If this contention of the writ Petitioners is upheld by this Court, it would amount to deciding the issue contrary to the views, which another Co-ordinate Bench of this High Court have taken, for, the transfer of the suits to the Fast Track Court by Permanent Bench, at Itanagar, is an acknowledgment of the fact by a Co-ordinate Bench of this High Court that the Fast Track Court, at Yupia, has, indeed, civil jurisdiction. 19. The learned Advocate General has also pointed out that since there is a Permanent Bench, at Itanagar, for deciding the cases, which may arise within the territorial limits of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, no writ petition could have been filed at the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, challenging the validity of the decrees passed, in the suits, by a subordinate court within the territorial limits of the State of Arunachal Pradesh. According to the learned Advocate General, a decree passed, in a suit, by any subordinate court, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is judicially reviewable, if required, by the Permanent Bench at Itanagar and, hence, the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, has no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petitions. Entertaining such a writ petition would be, according to learned Advocate General, contrary to the Presidential Proclamation issued, in this regard, on 18.07.2000, establishing a Permanent Bench at Itanagar. 20. Entertaining such a writ petition would be, according to learned Advocate General, contrary to the Presidential Proclamation issued, in this regard, on 18.07.2000, establishing a Permanent Bench at Itanagar. 20. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that in terms of order of transfer made by the Permanent Bench, at Itanagar, in respect of Suit No. 2 of 2007, all the parties concerned had appeared in the suit and at no stage of the proceedings in the said suit, any objection to the jurisdiction of the Fast Track Court to try the suit was raised. In such circumstances, when the Deputy Commissioner has transferred the remaining suits to the Fast Track Court, at Yupia, no illegality, according to the learned Advocate General, can be said to have been committed. 21. Referring to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned Advocate General has pointed out that when no objection to the jurisdiction of the Fast Track Court was raised, in the trial court, at the earliest possible opportunity and when the Petitioners have not shown as to how failure of justice consequent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Fast Track Court has occurred, the Petitioners must be treated to have waived their rights, if any, to raise the question of jurisdiction of the trial court or its competence to try the civil suit. The Petitioners have also not been able to point out, submits learned Advocate General, as to what fundamental or legal right of the Petitioners has been violated in the present case. In the absence of any such averments in the writ petition and, particularly, in the absence of any material showing that prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners as a result of exercise of civil jurisdiction by the Fast Track Court, the High Court's powers, under Article 226, may not be invoked. 22. The learned Advocate General has pointed out that decrees, in question, can be assailed in appeals in terms of the provisions of the Regulations and also in keeping with the spirit of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a situation, submits Mr. Dutta, there is no scope for the High Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, when there is adequate and efficacious statutory remedy available to the Petitioners. In such a situation, submits Mr. Dutta, there is no scope for the High Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, when there is adequate and efficacious statutory remedy available to the Petitioners. In the appeals, which the Petitioners may prefer, the Petitioners may, points out the learned Advocate General, not only assail the decrees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but also on merits. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Petitioners have not been able to make out, contends the learned Advocate General, any case for exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 in respect of the decrees impugned in the writ petitions. 23. The learned Advocate General submits that under the notification, dated 04.06.2002, aforementioned, three Fast Track Courts have been established, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, having both civil as well as criminal jurisdiction and these Fast Track Courts are manned by Additional Deputy Commissioners, who have the power to try civil cases under their respective jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction of the Fast Track Court is wider than that of the Deputy Commissioners under the Regulations. 24. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that in terms of the 11th Finance Commission recommendations, an advertisement was published, on 13.07.2001, for recruitment to the posts of Additional Deputy Commissioner with power of Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge on contract basis. The Selection Committee, under the Chairmanship of a sitting Judge of the High Court, made recommendations, on 06.10.2001, against the three vacant posts and on the basis of these recommendations, three Additional Deputy Commissioners were appointed, with the power of Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, by virtue of the notification, dated 04.06.2002. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate General that the designation of the Fast Track Courts was changed by the High Court to Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC). It is further submitted by the learned Advocate General that since the establishment time of the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, civil cases have been regularly transferred from the Courts of the Deputy Commissioner either on the orders of the High Court or by orders of the respective Deputy Commissioner. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate General that since the establishment time of the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, civil cases have been regularly transferred from the Courts of the Deputy Commissioner either on the orders of the High Court or by orders of the respective Deputy Commissioner. This has resulted in expeditious disposal of civil cases resulting into wider satisfaction in the litigants over the judicial process of the State and this prevailing situation may not be disturbed. 25. Though a feeble attempt was made to show that the impugned decrees encroach upon the subject matter of the PIL No. 50/2004, which is being heard by a Full Bench of this High Court, the learned Advocate General has clarified that the PIL does not pertain to the periods, which are covered by the impugned decrees. The learned Advocate General has pointed out that the Central Government and the Corporation had made payments of the bills for three years between 2001 and 2003, but stopped payment of all claims from January, 2004, on the ground that excess payments had been made during the said period of three years and they accordingly started making unilateral adjustment/recoveries against the excess payments, which the Corporation claimed to have made. It is the submission of the learned Advocate General that so far as the private Respondents are concerned, they, having worked as carriage contractors, had submitted their bills and the correctness and veracity of these bills were not questioned by either the State or the Central Government or even by the Corporation and yet they were not being paid their dues. In such circumstances, points out the learned Advocate General, the private Respondents were bound to go to the civil courts for recovery of their dues. The State Government, in such a case, submits the learned Advocate General, could not have contended that the dues were not payable to the contractors. What the State Government, therefore, pleaded, according to the learned Advocate General, was that though it was liable to pay the dues, which the contractors had been claiming, making of such payment was not possible, because of financial constraints and, hence, support from the Central Government was necessary. What the State Government, therefore, pleaded, according to the learned Advocate General, was that though it was liable to pay the dues, which the contractors had been claiming, making of such payment was not possible, because of financial constraints and, hence, support from the Central Government was necessary. In such circumstances, submits the learned Advocate General, when the contractors showed to the learned Court below that they were entitled to receive the dues, which they had been seeking recovery of, the learned trial Court was quite justified in passing the decrees and the State Government, being conscious of its constitutional and legal duties, could not have questioned and do not, now, question the validity of the decrees passed by the FTC. 26. To a pointed query made by this Court, Mr. Phukan, has, however, in his usual fairness, candidly submitted that so far as the cases, covered by the impugned decrees are concerned, these pertain to the periods which are not being inquired into by the CBI nor are the claims made, with regard to these periods, by the carriage contractor/transporters are subject-matter of inquiry in the said Public Interest Litigation. 27. The learned Advocate General has pointed out that since the time order has been passed by this Court, in this set of writ petitions, staying the execution of the decrees, which stand challenged on the ground that FTC has no civil jurisdiction, it has brought to almost grinding half the progress of civil suits, in the FTCs, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, and it is for this reason that the State Government had sought for expeditious hearing of these writ petitions so that every one concerned comes to know as to whether the FTCs have or do not have the powers to try civil suits. Submissions on Behalf of The Private Respondents: 28. Mr. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the private Respondents, has, by and large, made submissions in tune with the submissions made by the learned Advocate General. What Mr. Submissions on Behalf of The Private Respondents: 28. Mr. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the private Respondents, has, by and large, made submissions in tune with the submissions made by the learned Advocate General. What Mr. Mazumdar has, however, pointed out is that the FTCs, in the light of the decision in Brij Mohan Lal's case (supra), are courts, which have been established under a specific scheme of the Central Government and though FTCs were, primarily, meant to deal with criminal cases, it has been, in terms of the mandate of the Apex Court in Brij Mohan Lal's case (supra), has started functioning as a civil courts too and, in these circumstances, on being appointed as Additional Deputy Commissioners with power to exercise criminal jurisdiction, the Presiding Officers of the FTCs are equally competent, in the light of the provisions of the Regulations, to act as civil courts. Thus, the FTC, at Yupia, presided over by an Additional Deputy Commissioner, is competent to entertain civil suits. The impugned decrees, therefore, cannot, according to Mr. Mazumdar, be regarded as decrees passed by a court, which suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 29. It is also submitted by Mr. Mazumdar that in the case at hand, as far as private Respondents are concerned, they have been appointed, in terms of a policy of the Central Government, by the State Government as transporters for the purpose of carrying essential commodities and when the private Respondents had carried the commodities in accordance with the relevant agreements, not only the State Government, but also the Central Government and the Corporation are jointly and severally liable to make payment of the dues of the private Respondents. The decrees, in the present case, having been passed, according to Mr. Mazumdar, on admitted liabilities of the State Government, Central Government and the Corporation, there is no infirmity in the decrees passed by the FTCs, Yupia. This apart, in the suits, which have resulted into the decrees, not only the Union Government, but also the General Manager of the Corporation was made party. In these circumstances, the Corporation cannot, now, contend that they are not bound by the decrees, when Corporation's officers and functionaries had not disputed the correctness or veracity of the bills raised by the private Respondents and/or the entitlement of the private Respondents to receive payment for the bills raised. In these circumstances, the Corporation cannot, now, contend that they are not bound by the decrees, when Corporation's officers and functionaries had not disputed the correctness or veracity of the bills raised by the private Respondents and/or the entitlement of the private Respondents to receive payment for the bills raised. Far from this, points out Mr. Mazumdar, the officers and functionaries of the Corporation conceded that the bills had been rechecked by their officers and the same, having been found genuine and correct, were forwarded for payment to the appropriate authorities. In such circumstances, the Corporation cannot, contends Mr. Mazumdar, turn back and deny their liability by terming the decrees, in question, as decrees having been passed without jurisdiction. 30. Before entering into the merit of the rival submissions made before this Court, it is pertinent to point out that at one stage of the hearing of these writ petitions, this Court, for a moment, formed the view that these writ petitions may have to be referred to a larger Bench for taking appropriate decision in the matter. When this view was expressed in the open Court, the learned Advocate General pointed out to this Court that the establishment and functioning of the FTCs is governed by the Apex Court's decision in Brij Mohan Lal's case (supra) and if this Court, on examination of the materials on record and the law relevant thereto, finds that the FTCs are functioning in keeping with the directives of the Apex Court as passed in Brij Mohan Lal's case (supra), there would be no need or reason for referring the writ petitions to a larger Bench. The submissions, so made on behalf of the State Government, were not objected to by the Petitioners. In these circumstances, if this Court finds, on a careful consideration of the relevant materials on record, that the FTCs in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, have the power to try the civil cases, the question of referring the matter to a larger bench does not arise, particularly, when the legality or validity of the appointments of the Presiding Officers of the FTCs as Additional Deputy Commissioners is not under challenge in this set of writ petitions. Bearing in mind what I have indicated hereinbefore, let me, now, proceed. 31. Bearing in mind what I have indicated hereinbefore, let me, now, proceed. 31. In view of the fact that the challenge to the maintainability of the writ petitions is posed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of this High Court, it is imperative that this Court determines the layout of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts and of the permanent Bench of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 32. Article 226, as it stands today, reads as follows: 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 33. While considering the question of territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article226, it is necessary to bear in mind that Clause (2) of Article 226 did not, originally, exist. In the absence of Clause (2) of Article 226, when the question arose as to whether a High Court could invoke its jurisdiction, under Article 226, to issue writs based on the ground that the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Constitution Bench, while interpreting Article 226 (as it stood then) observed, in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 , as follows: .... The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226, which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises, but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. 34. Thus, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), the Supreme Court had expressed the view, in no uncertain words, that in the absence of a specific provision in Article 226 on the lines of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. In other words, what the Supreme Court, in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), had held was that in the absence of a specific provision, in Article226, suggesting that the cause of action would attract jurisdiction to enable a High Court to issue, under Article 226, writs, the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction, under Article 226, on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. According to what Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) laid down was that a High Court can exercise jurisdiction, under Article 226, only if the person or authority to whom the writ is sought to be issued is located within the territorial limits of the High Court. Extended logically, the decision in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), conveyed that even if cause of action or part thereof had arisen within the territorial limits of a High Court, the High Court could not have issued writs unless the person or authority to whom the writ was sought to be issued stood located within the territorial limits of the High Court. This view was followed in subsequent cases. 35. When the question was, once again, raised as to what are the limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and if, on the ground of cause of action having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a High Court will be constitutionally competent to issue writ, the Apex Court, in Lt. Col. 35. When the question was, once again, raised as to what are the limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and if, on the ground of cause of action having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a High Court will be constitutionally competent to issue writ, the Apex Court, in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1961 SC 532 , following its earlier decisions in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra) and K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission, 1954 S.C.R. 738, observed thus: .... Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. 1144 and K.S. Rashid and Sons v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission, [1954] S.C.R. 738. that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Article 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one. 36. The Supreme Court further observed and held in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) as follows: Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories?. It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Article 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. 37. From a close reading, of what had been laid down in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra), and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), it becomes clear that there were considered to be two-fold limitations on the powers of the High Courts to issue writs under Article 226, namely, (i) that the seat of the person or authority to whom the writ is issued must be within the territorial limits of the High Court meaning thereby that the writs could not have been issued by a High Court to run beyond its territorial jurisdiction and (ii) that cause of action could not be a ground for the High Courts to assume jurisdiction unless the person or authority to whom the writ is sought to be issued stands located within the territorial limits of the High Court. 38. The consequence of the views, expressed in Saka Venkata Subba Rao and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), was that it was only the High Court of Punjab, which could exercise jurisdiction, under Article226 of the Constitution, against the Union of India and other instrumentalities of the Union Government located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, Clause (1-A) came to be inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, conferring thereby on the High Courts jurisdiction to entertain a petition, under Article 226, against the Union of India or any other body or authority located, in Delhi, if the cause of action arose, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction. Clause (1-A) was, later on, renumbered as Clause (2) of Article 226. 39. Clause (1-A) was, later on, renumbered as Clause (2) of Article 226. 39. Thus, Clause (2) was introduced to Article 226 with the object of enlarging the scope of the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts; hence by virtue of Clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 226 on the High Courts to issue writs can, now, be exercised by a High Court if the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits. In other words, in the context of territorial jurisdiction, the maintainability or otherwise of a writ petition in a High Court, now, depends on the answer to the question as to whether the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, whose interference is sought. If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the High Court will have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and not otherwise. 40. The fall-out of the above discussion is that with the insertion of Clause (2) to Article 226, a High Court can, now, exercise its writ jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of the High Court even if the seat of the Government or the authority concerned to whom the direction, order or writs, sought to be issued, is not located within the territorial limits of the High Court. Conversely put, what Clause (2) of Article 226 conveys is that if the cause of action has not arisen, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a High Court, the High Court will not have the power to issue writ or writs even if the seat of the Government or of the authority concerned is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. 41. After an in-depth study of the subject of territorial jurisdiction of a High Court as postulated under Article 226, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kr. Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 , laid down as follows: (1)5. 41. After an in-depth study of the subject of territorial jurisdiction of a High Court as postulated under Article 226, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kr. Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 , laid down as follows: (1)5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause -- notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is, at best, case in the writ petition. 42. It may be pointed out that in Naveenchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is, at best, case in the writ petition. 42. It may be pointed out that in Naveenchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 , which arose out of an application made, under Article 226, in the Bombay High Court, for quashing of an FIR lodged in the State of Meghalaya, the Apex Court, while relying, amongst others on its decision in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), has observed, From the provisions in Clause (2) of Article 226, it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. 43. Thus, the language used in Clause (2) of the Article 226 and the authorities cited above leave no room for doubt that a High Court can, now, invoke its powers under Article 226 only if the cause of action arises wholly or in part within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court and not otherwise irrespective of the fact as to whether the person or authority to whom the writ, sought to be issued, is located within or outside the territorial limits of the High Court. 44. I may, at this stage, pause and refer to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which Mr. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel, and the learned Advocate General, rely upon. This Section, while laying down the place of suing, reads as follows: 20. 44. I may, at this stage, pause and refer to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which Mr. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel, and the learned Advocate General, rely upon. This Section, while laying down the place of suing, reads as follows: 20. Other suits to be instituted where Defendants reside or cause of action arises: Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction -- a) The Defendant, or each of the Defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; Or (b) Any of the Defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, or the Defendants who do not reside, or carry of business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 45. From a careful reading of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes clear that Section20 envisages three different conditions in which a suit will lie within the territorial jurisdiction of a court. While Clause (a) and (b) of Section 20, inter alia, refer to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant or Defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain, Clause (c) refers to a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 46. What follows from a minute analysis of Section 20 is that a suit can be instituted under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, where the Defendant or Defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain; but Clause (c) determines the place of suit on the basis of the cause of action. 46. What follows from a minute analysis of Section 20 is that a suit can be instituted under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, where the Defendant or Defendants reside or carry on business or personally work for gain; but Clause (c) determines the place of suit on the basis of the cause of action. From a careful reading of Clause (2) of Article 226, which makes cause of action the basis for the High Court to assume territorial jurisdiction, it clearly follows that while considering the question as to whether a High Court will issue writ or not, it is not material as to whether the person or authority, against whom the writ sought to be issued, is located within the territorial limits of the High Court or not. What would be material, in order to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court, is that the cause of action must be shown to have arisen, either wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, which invokes its powers under Article 226. 47. In Kusum Ignots and Alloys Limited (supra) it has been held, in no uncertain words, that even if a small part of the cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of a High Court, such a High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 48. Having settled that the foundation for exercise of power, under Article 226, to issue any writ of certiorari or pass any order (s) or direction (s), in the nature of a writ of certiorari, lies on the cause of action, which may, wholly or in part, arise within the territorial limits of the High Court, whose interference is sought, let me, for a moment, pause and determine as to when Article 227 can be resorted to for the purpose of issuing a writ of certiorari or for the purpose of passing an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari. Article 227 reads as under: Art. 227. -- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2). . . (3). . . Article 227 reads as under: Art. 227. -- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2). . . (3). . . (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 49. From a careful reading of the provisions of Article 227, it becomes clear that Article 227 confers on a High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction except such courts or tribunals, which are constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Article 227, we must bear in mind, aims at enabling the High Court to exercise supervisory control over the courts and tribunals situated within the territorial limits of a High Court. 50. Thus, the difference between Articles 226 and 227, in respect of territorial limits, lies in the fact that while Article 226 is based on cause of action, Article 227 is based on the High Court's power of supervisory control over the courts and the tribunals situated within its territorial jurisdiction. It is, therefore, clear that Article 226 is far more expansive than Article 227. That is to say, an inferior court, in the context of Article 226, would mean a court, which is inferior to the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; whereas an inferior court, in the context of Article 227, would mean such a court, which is under the supervisory control of the High Court as a result of the fact that the inferior court is situated within the territorial limits of such a High Court. 51. Bearing in mind the fact that the basis for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is the 'cause of action' and not the seat of power of the authority to whom writ is intended to be issued, it may, now, be pointed out that in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Synergy Composites Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. 51. Bearing in mind the fact that the basis for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is the 'cause of action' and not the seat of power of the authority to whom writ is intended to be issued, it may, now, be pointed out that in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Synergy Composites Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2005 (3) GLT 1 (to which I was a party), a Division Bench of this Court, having considered the question as to whether a writ petition was maintainable, at Shillong Bench, of the Gauhati High Court, for adjudication, in the face of the contention that no cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Shillong Bench, had this to say in respect of Presidential Notification establishing a Permanent Bench at Shillong. 46. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that under the Presidential Notification, dated 04.02.95, aforementioned, the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court shall exercise jurisdiction to issue writ under Article 226 only when the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Meghalaya. If the cause of action does not arise within the State of Meghalaya, the Shillong Bench shall have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226. The mere fact that the Chief Justice has the power to withdraw a case from the Shillong Bench for the purpose of its hearing, at Guwahati, does not mean that if no cause of action has arisen within the State of Meghalaya, a writ petition can still be filed at Meghalaya and the Chief Justice can, at his discretion, withdraw such a writ petition and fix it for hearing at the Principal Seat at Guwahati. The proviso to paragraph 2 of Notification, dated 04.02.1995, aforementioned being an exception to the general power of the High Court, at the Shillong Bench, indicates that when a validity instituted case has arisen at the Shillong Bench, the Chief Justice can withdraw such a case from the Shillong Bench and can direct that the matter be heard at the Principal Seat at Guwahati. This does not, however, mean, we must emphasize, that if cause of action, either wholly or in part, has not arisen in given case within the State of Meghalaya and no case has been validly instituted at the Shillong Bench, the High Court, at Shillong Bench, can entertain such a writ petition under Article 226 merely on the ground that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, in exercise of the powers contained in the proviso aforementioned, withdraw such a case to the Principal Seat at Guwahati for hearing. (47) What follows, as a corollary, from the above discussion is that it is the permanent bench at Shillong, which has to decide whether a cause of action in a given case has arisen or not within the territorial limits of the State of Meghalaya and if it is found by this Division Bench that the cause of action, in the present case, has not arisen, wholly or in part, within the State of Meghalaya, the permanent bench at Shillong will have no jurisdiction to entertain such a writ petition or give relief to the parties concerned. 52. From what have been laid down in Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. (supra), it becomes clear that unless cause of action, in part or as a whole, can be shown to have arisen within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, will have no jurisdiction to entertain any writ petition, except in the manner and to the extent as the presidential notifications, establishing Permanent Benches vis-a-vis the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, permit. 53. Having indicated the position of law that no writ petition can be entertained at the Principal Seat, under Article 226, if the cause of action has not, wholly or partly, arisen within the State of Assam, I am, now, required to turn to the question as to whether any cause of action can be said to have arisen, in the present case, within the State of Assam, so as to attract jurisdiction of the principal seat of this High Court. 54. 54. Before, however, this Court determines the question as to whether cause of action, in the present case, has arisen, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, it is necessary to bear in mind as to what a writ of certiorari is and as to whether a High Court can issue a writ of certiorari or pass an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari, either under Article226 or 227 or both, to set aside or quash a decree, appealable, if the decree has been passed by a Court, which suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 55. A writ of certiorari was, historically speaking, a royal demand for information. By issuing a writ of certiorari, the King commanded that necessary information be provided to him. Since the year 1280, writ of certiorari were commonly used for obtaining information and for correcting errors, in the judicial proceedings, on the basis of applications of ordinary litigants. By taking resort to a writ of certiorari, a superior court may quash the decision of an inferior court, tribunal or any other body, which is susceptible to judicial review. When a repository of a power exceeds its authority or if a power is exercised without lawful authority, such purported exercise of power may be pronounced invalid by means of a writ of certiorari. The lawful exercise of statutory power presupposes compliance not only with substantive, formal and procedural conditions laid down for its performance, but also with implied requirements governing the exercise of discretion. The superior courts, under the scheme of our Constitution, have a, somewhat, similar inherent jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals. If an inferior court or a tribunal or a public authority or any other body has exceeded or acted without jurisdiction or has failed to act fairly or in accordance with the rules of natural justice or if it has committed an error of law in reaching a decision, its decision may be set aside by issuing a writ of certiorari. 56. 56. A vague attempt has been made, on behalf of the Petitioners, to contend that it is only under Article 226 that a High Court can issue a writ of certiorari or a direction or order in the nature of a writ of certiorari to call for the records and examine if a judicial order has been passed with or without jurisdiction and it is for this reason that the present applications have been made under Article 226 and not under Article 227. The logic, for the submissions so made, appears to be that in exercise of its supervisory control under Article 227, a High Court merely calls for the record of the proceedings of a subordinate court and examines the correctness of the order(s) passed therein; but if the High Court is satisfied, in such a case, that the order, which is put to challenge, shall be interfered with, it takes aid of Article 226 to set aside the judicial order(s) and pass, in an appropriate case, correctional order(s). The basis for this submission is, as already indicated hereinbefore, is that it is Article 226 only, which mentions that the High Court has the power to issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari. 57. Let us test the above argument by taking it to its logical conclusion. If this argument is conceded to, the effect would be that Article 227 would not be treated to contain wholesome power or a complete code of power. The further effect of this argument would be that a High Court's exercise of supervisory control, under Article 227, would be dependant upon, or by deriving strength from, Article226. 58. It needs to be borne in mind, as already pointed out above, that historically, a writ of certiorari was nothing, but a command from the King to furnish to him information regarding an order or proceedings of a Court or a body, which exercise judicial powers, and, at times, judicial discretion. A writ of certiorari is, therefore, nothing, but a direction from the superior court to its inferior court or tribunal to submit its record of proceedings for scrutiny or examination by the superior court to test the correctness or validity of the proceeding or of any order or direction passed therein. A writ of certiorari is, therefore, nothing, but a direction from the superior court to its inferior court or tribunal to submit its record of proceedings for scrutiny or examination by the superior court to test the correctness or validity of the proceeding or of any order or direction passed therein. When the Constitution was framed, the Constitution-makers enabled the High Courts to exercise, by virtue of Article 226, such powers, which a writ of certiorari carried, In fact, Article 226 was couched in such a wide language that it enabled the High Courts to issue not only a writ of certiorari, but even a direction or order in the nature of a writ of certiorari. Having framed Article 226, the Constitution-makers brought in Article 227, which vested in every High Court the power of supervisory control over its subordinate courts and tribunals. When the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory control, under Article 227, calls for the record of a judicial proceeding and examines the same, it essentially exercises the same very power, which a certiorari proceeding, in England, carried and even, now, carries. When, on examining the record of the judicial proceedings, the High Court finds that the order is wrong, it can set aside the order. Traditionally, the High Courts did not, in exercise of their powers under Article 227, pass correctional orders. In course of time, however, the High Courts have, under Article 227, started not only setting aside or quashing the order, which it finds fit to be interfered with, but have also started passing, in appropriate cases, correctional orders. Though not mentioned, in specific terms, that under Article 227 too, a writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Courts, the fact remains that calling for the records of a judicial proceeding, examination thereof and passing of necessary order(s) thereon is nothing but exercise of certiorari jurisdiction by the High Courts even under Article 227 and it is by exercising this power that the High Court maintain supervisory control over the subordinate courts. In exercising these powers in its supervisory control, which is in the nature of certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court does not depend upon, or derive strength from Article226, for, the power of calling of the records, examination thereof, quashing the order and passing of correctional orders therein, in a case of necessity, are all exercised and are exercisable under Article227 itself and aid of Article 226 need not be taken. It is in this light that the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , needs to be read, wherein a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that a writ of certiorari would not, ordinarily, be issued against a judicial order by taking resort to Article 226. In course of time and on the strength of the Constitution Bench decision, in Hari Vishnu Katnath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1995 SC 223 , the Supreme Court has clarified, in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 , as we would, later, notice, that a writ of certiorari can be issued in respect of a judicial order in exercise of powers under Article 226 too. 59. While considering the above, it needs to be emphasized that before the introduction of Clause (1)(A), which has subsequently become Clause (2), of Article 226, the High Court, which exercised the supervisory control under Article 227, was the only competent High Court to exercise powers, under Article 226, to issue a writ of certiorari, for in the absence of Clause (2) of Article 226, certiorari jurisdiction was exercisable by only that High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction, the seat of power of the authority, i.e., the subordinate court, whose order was questioned, stood situated. Because of Clause (2) of Article 226, even a High Court, which has no supervisory control on an inferior court, may, now, exercise powers under Article, 226. It is for this reason that when a judicial order is interferable in exercise of power under Article 227, resort to Article 226 cannot be, ordinarily, had. Because of Clause (2) of Article 226, even a High Court, which has no supervisory control on an inferior court, may, now, exercise powers under Article, 226. It is for this reason that when a judicial order is interferable in exercise of power under Article 227, resort to Article 226 cannot be, ordinarily, had. Logically, therefore, when a judicial order is challenged under Article 226 before a High Court, which does not have supervisory control over the inferior court, which has passed the judicial order, it has to question itself as to whether it should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, when an effective remedy, under Article 227, is available to the aggrieved party. If the arguments, sought to be advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, is acceded to, the effect would be that Article 227 cannot be held as wholesome provision, there can never be an application under Article 227 independent of Article 226 and the High Courts too would be debarred from exercising any power in the nature of certiorari jurisdiction without taking help of, or support from, its powers under Article 226. 60. What follows from the above discussion is that a writ of certiorari cap be issued under Article 226and even under its supervisory power under Article 227, a High Court can exercise such power(s), which are exercisable in certiorari jurisdiction, though the basis for exercise of powers under Article227 is, as already pointed out above, quite distinct and different from Article 227 in the sense that a High Court assumes jurisdiction under Article 226 if cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits, whereas the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 227 on the basis of its supervisory control on the courts and tribunals located within its territorial jurisdiction. Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Hari Vishnu Katnath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 223 , and some other judicial pronouncements in the realm of issuance of writs of certiorari, the Apex Court, in Surya Dev Rai and Ors. v. Ram Chander Rai reported in (2003) 6 SCC 676, has, speaking through Lahoti, C.J., explained, in the following words, the parameters of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in exercise of its powers under Article 226: 10. v. Ram Chander Rai reported in (2003) 6 SCC 676, has, speaking through Lahoti, C.J., explained, in the following words, the parameters of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in exercise of its powers under Article 226: 10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court the power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well settled. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kathnath v. Asmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 : (1955) 1 SCR 1104 . The four propositions laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor, AIR 1961 SC 1087 : (1961) 3 SCR 855 as under (AIR p. 1094, para 15). The High Court was not justified in looking into the order of 02.12.1952, as an appellate court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Katnath v. Ahmad Ishaque and the following four propositions were laid down -- 1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction: 2. Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; 3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous; 4. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision.... * * * 12. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision.... * * * 12. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an appellate court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior court. 13. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals AIR 1955 SC 398, the parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction, calling upon the issuance of writ of certiorari were so set out by the Constitution Bench: (AIR pp. 412-13, paras 26-27). The common law writ, now called the order of certiorari, which has also been adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction. Where the errors cannot be said to be errors of law apparent on the face of the record, but they are merely errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inference or in other words errors which a court sitting as a court of appeal only, could have examined and, if necessary, corrected and the Appellate Authority under the statute in question has unlimited jurisdiction to examine and appreciate the evidence in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction and it has not been shown that in exercising its powers the Appellate Authority disregarded any mandatory provisions of the law but what can be said at the most was that it had disregarded certain executive instructions not having the force of law, there is no case for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226. 14. 14. The Constitution Bench in T.C. Basappa v. T. Naeappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 held that certiorari may be and is generally granted when a court has acted (i) without jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the court itself may not have been legally constituted or suffering from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. Certiorari may also issue if the court or tribunal, though competent has acted in flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. An error in the decision of determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following factors being available if the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law but mere wrong decision is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. * * * * * * 19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. Authority in abundance is available for the proposition that an error apparent on the face of record can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale. It was held that the alleged error should be self-evident. An error, which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or an error in a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivable be two opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a writ of certiorari the High Court may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or court but may not substitute its own findings or directions. 61. In a writ of certiorari the High Court may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or court but may not substitute its own findings or directions. 61. The fall-out of the above observations, made in Surya Dev Rai (supra), is that there are, at least, four circumstances in which a writ of certiorari may be issued by a High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226, the four circumstances being as under: I. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when an authority assumes jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists; II. Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, for, when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of natural justice; III. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous; IV. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error, which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision. 62. In effect, Surya Dev Rai (supra) recognizes the fact and is an authority for the proposition that in the four distinct circumstances, as enumerated hereinabove, a High Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari against a decision or order of an inferior Court or Tribunal. 63. Let me, now, turn to the question whether a writ of certiorari can be issued by High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. 63. Let me, now, turn to the question whether a writ of certiorari can be issued by High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. In this regard, it is worth noticing that in exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court, in effect, commands the court or tribunal, as the case may be, to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court so as to enable the High Court to determine if, on the face of the record, the inferior court or tribunal has committed any error of jurisdiction in the sense whether it has acted without jurisdiction or while acting in exercise of its jurisdiction, it has violated the principles of natural justice or whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record, i.e., when a finding or decision is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. A writ of certiorari is not available against a wrong, but against an error, which is a patent error. 64. As far as Article 227 is concerned, there can be no dispute and there is, in fact, no dispute that the High Court can, in an appropriate case, issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of a writ of certiorari in exercise of its supervisory control if any of the conditions precedent, as discussed hereinabove, is present, in an order or decision of an inferior court, necessitating the High Court's inference in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 65. In fact, in the State v. Navjot Sandhu reported in (2003) 6 SCC 641 , the Supreme Court had culled out the principles governing the exercise of powers under Article 227. Taking into account what had been culled out as the parameters of the powers of the High Courts under Article 227 in Navjot Sandhu (supra), the Supreme Court, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), observed thus: The principles deducible, well settled as they are, have been well summed up by a two-Judge Bench of this Court recently in State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 , SCC pp. 656-57, para 28. 656-57, para 28. This Court held: (i) the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature; (ii) The supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with an interlocutory order; (iii) The power must be exercised sparingly, only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. 66. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that the Apex Court has clarified, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), that while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court proceeds on the assumption that the Court, which has the jurisdiction over a subject-matter, has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly and that the High Court would not, therefore, assign to itself, while exercising the power of certiorari, the role of an appellate Court and step into appreciating or evaluating the evidence and/or substitute its own findings in the place of those arrived at by the inferior court. In short, while acting on the certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, though the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate Court, it remains free to exercise the powers of issuing writ of certiorari if the conditions precedent for exercise of such powers exists. 67. As to when a High Court can interfere with a judicial order in exercise of its powers under Articles226 and/or 227 is elaborately dealt with and succinctly summed up, in Surya Dev Rai (supra), as follows: .... (3) Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (1) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction--by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (ii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction, which it does have or the jurisdiction, though available, is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of Certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceeding such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonable and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Courts, in India, unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order of proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 68. What surfaces from the above observations, made in Surya Dev Rai (supra), is that the High Court can, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 as well as in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, is duty bound to interfere, set aside and quash any order or decision of an inferior court if such an order has been passed or such a decision has been rendered by assuming jurisdiction, where the inferior court had no jurisdiction. 69. In fact, in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Limited and Ors. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 658 , the Supreme Court, at para 25, has pointed out, referring to Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , that a writ of certiorari would not, ordinarily, be issued against a judicial order. 69. In fact, in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Limited and Ors. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 658 , the Supreme Court, at para 25, has pointed out, referring to Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , that a writ of certiorari would not, ordinarily, be issued against a judicial order. While considering the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra), it needs to be borne in mind that two important questions, which were raised in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra). One question was: whether a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction can be said to have infringed fundamental rights of a person, who is affected by such a judicial order, and the other question, which was raised, was whether an order passed in a suit, which is tried on the original side by the Bombay High Court, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Constitution Bench, in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra), clearly pointed out that a judicial order passed by a competent Court cannot be held to have infringed fundamental rights and the remedy against such a judicial order lies in appeal and not by way of writ jurisdiction and, further, the High Court, being a superior court, cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction even when it tries a suit as a court of original jurisdiction. Having indicated as to what Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra) conveys with regard to exercise of writ jurisdiction, it is also necessary to point out that in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), the Court has also taken note of the fact that in Surya Dev Rai (supra), it has been held on the strength of the Constitution Bench decision in Hari Vishnu Katnath (supra) and Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra reported in (2002) 4 SCC 388 , that issuance of a writ of certiorari is possible even against a judicial order by a High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, that is, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), has further taken note of the fact that even in Ranjeet Singh v. Surendra Prakash reported in (2000) 3 SCC 388, the Court has echoed the same views as in Surya Dev Rai (supra). The Supreme Court, in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), has further taken note of the fact that even in Ranjeet Singh v. Surendra Prakash reported in (2000) 3 SCC 388, the Court has echoed the same views as in Surya Dev Rai (supra). In Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed out that the powers, under Article227, can be exercised only by such a High Court within whose jurisdiction the order of the subordinate court has been passed unless it is established that the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, whose interference is sought for in exercise of power under Article 226, and that while entertaining an application under Article 226 or 227, the High Court must bear in mind the doctrine of Forum Non-Convenience. 70. From a careful reading of what have been observed and held, in Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), what clearly surfaces is that though, ordinarily, a writ of certiorari would not be issued against a judicial order, there is, in an appropriate case, no complete bar on the powers of the High Court to interfere with a judicial order in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 or in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 71. At any rate, what cannot be disputed, in the face of the authorities discussed above, is that a writ of certiorari can be issued or an order or direction can be passed in the nature of a writ of certiorari even against a judicial order in exercise of powers under Articles 226 as well as 227. While exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 would depend on answer to the question as to whether cause of action has or has not arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court, whose interference is sought, the foundation for exercise of power under Article 227 would lie on the question as to whether the inferior court, which has passed the order, is a court, which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, whose interference is sought for under Article 227. In either case, the High Court can set aside an order of an inferior Court if the order suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 72. I may, now, point out that in Ledgard v. Bull 13 Ind. App. In either case, the High Court can set aside an order of an inferior Court if the order suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 72. I may, now, point out that in Ledgard v. Bull 13 Ind. App. 134 (P.C.), the Privy Council has held that a decree passed by a court, which lacks inherent jurisdiction to try the suit is bad in law. Inherent lack of jurisdiction means that the court could not have entertained the suit, because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction. The decision of the Privy Council, in Ledgard's case (supra), is an authority for the proposition that consent or waiver can cure defect of those jurisdiction, which are other than inherent lack of jurisdiction, for, consent or waiver cannot cure inherent lack of jurisdiction. (See Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath reported in AIR 1962 SC 199 ). 73. I may also, at this stage, point out that the jurisdiction of a Court may be classified into several categories, namely, (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in any case, at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity. [See Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Limited and Anr. reported in (2005) 7 SCC 791 ]. 74. With consent and waiver of jurisdiction, Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10; para 317; points out, thus, 317. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity. [See Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Limited and Anr. reported in (2005) 7 SCC 791 ]. 74. With consent and waiver of jurisdiction, Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10; para 317; points out, thus, 317. Consent and waiver.--Where, by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular claim or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a Court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. Where the court has jurisdiction over the particular subject matter of the claim or the particular parties and the only objection is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the court ought to exercise jurisdiction, the parties may agree to give jurisdiction in their particular case; or a Defendant by entering an appearance without protest, or by taking steps in the proceedings, may waive his right to object to the Court taking cognizance of the proceedings. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. A statute limiting the jurisdiction of a court may contain provisions enabling the parties to extend the jurisdiction by consent. 75. Referring to Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634 , the Supreme Court, in Chiman Lal Modi (supra), has pointed out that in Bahrein Petroleum Co. (supra), it has been held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, which is, otherwise, incompetent to try the suit and that it is well-settled where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing, for, a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its validity can be set up, whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. In fact, in Bahrein Petroleum Co. (supra), the Apex Court held that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. 76. In fact, in Bahrein Petroleum Co. (supra), the Apex Court held that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. 76. Chiman Lal Modi (supra) also refers to Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction ... strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. 77. In the present case, the Petitioners' grievance is that the Court, which passed the impugned decrees, lacked jurisdiction to decide civil disputes. Thus, the Petitioners challenge the decrees on the ground of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court, which has passed the decrees. If what the Petitioners contend is true, the impugned decrees, being without jurisdiction, will be nullity in the eyes of law. The fact that the Petitioners had not raised objections, in the trial Court, with regard to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not at all material inasmuch as raising of objection would be material, when the objection is with regard to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the court and not when the challenge to the jurisdiction is on the ground that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, which it adjudicates. In other words, the mere fact that the Petitioners had not raised any objection with regard to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of the learned trial Court, when the suits were being tried by the learned Court below, would not legally bar the Petitioners from agitating the matter subsequently, for, consent or waiver, in a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction, would not cure the defect of jurisdiction and would not confer jurisdiction upon the Court, which did not, otherwise, have jurisdiction. 78. 78. What surfaces from the above discussion is that if this Court holds that the impugned decrees have been passed by a Court, which was statutorily not competent to entertain a civil case or a civil suit or had no civil jurisdiction, it would be within the discretion of this Court to interfere with the decrees, in question, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 if this Court concludes that the cause of action, as a whole or in part, has arisen when the territorial limits of the State of Assam provided, of course, if this Court further holds that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this discretionary jurisdiction needs to be exercised. 79. Let me, now, turn to the question as to whether existence of a right of appeal against a decree, as provided under the Regulations, can be treated to be a bar to the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227. 80. While considering the question of existence of alternative remedy available against a decree, as provided under the Regulations, what is necessary to point out is that in the face of the decision of the Constitution Bench, in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India reported in 1997 (1) GLT (SC) 1 : (1997) 3 SCC 261 , there can no longer be any doubt that the power of judicial review under Article 226 and the power of superintendence under Article 227 form part of the basic structure of the Constitution and the Parliament, while having the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, cannot take away or abridge the power so conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227. When no constitutional amendment restricting the power of judicial review and/or superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is possible, the question of a statute, such as, the Regulations, limiting, restricting and/or abolishing and/or setting at naught the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and/or the power of superintendence vested in the High Court by Article 227 cannot arise at all, though the exercise of such powers cannot be arbitrary and must be exercised within the contours of the settled principles, which the Courts have evolved. 81. 81. Having held that the powers of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and of supervision under Article 227 form part of basic structure of the Constitution, let me, now, turn to the question as to whether the existence of alternate remedy is an absolute bar to the exercise of the powers so conferred on the High Court. While dealing with their aspect of the matter, it is imperative to note that the proposition of law is well settled that where a particular statute provides a self-contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the enactment, the statutory remedies provided therein must be availed of and recourse should not be, ordinarily, allowed to be taken to writ jurisdiction. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J, in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkes for (1859) 6 CBNS 336 at p. 356. The rule so laid down by Willes, J, was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. 1919, AC 368 and was reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105. 82. While considering the above proposition, it is equally important to bear in mind that the principle treating the existence of alternate remedy as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226and/or 227 has been a rule of self-imposed restriction, a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, had placed a bar on the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain certain petitions if any other remedy for redress was provided by or under any other law, the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, has removed this restriction. The fall out of this removal further strengthens the principle that there is no rule of law completely barring exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 merely because there exists an alternate remedy, though the fact remains that to the exercise of powers under Articles 226 and227, existence of alternate remedy has been treated by the Courts as a self-imposed restriction, albeit, of a limited nature. 83. 83. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , the Court, while considering the scope of Article 226 in a case, wherein alternative remedy had existed, observed as under: the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restriction.... But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain well imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy of relief, which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by the statute. Ordinarily, the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226 where the Petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy.... The High Court does not, therefore, act as a Court of Appeal against the decision of a Court or Tribunal to correct errors of facts and does not, by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226, trench upon an alternative remedy provided by a statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved Petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the matter provided by a statute, the High Court, normally, will not permit by entertaining under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created by the statute to be bypassed and leave the party applying to it to seek resort to that machinery so set up. 84. The rule requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies before the grant of writ had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Court -- it was a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the High Court to grant, in an appropriate case, relief under this Article. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the High Court to grant, in an appropriate case, relief under this Article. (See Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad, AIR 1962 SC 1694 : 1963 (1) SCR 98 ; Zila Parishad, Moradabad v. Kundan Sugar Mill, AIR 1968 SC 98 : 1968 (1) SCR 1 ; Collector of Customs v. A.C. Bava, AIR 1968 SC 13 : 1968 (1) SCR 82; Union of India v. T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 : 1958 SCR 499 ; N.T. Veluswami v. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 623 and MGA Brothers v. Shantilal, AIR 1966 SC 197 : 1966 (1) SCR 284 . [See also Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta, AIR 1961 SC 372 , Wazir Chand and Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 415 , and Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta v. National Tobacco Co. Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 ]. 85. I may also refer to Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court has clarified the position of law in the following words: The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 86. From what have been observed and laid down, in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), it becomes clear that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226, in. at least, three contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, or (ii) where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or (iii) where the order or proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of an enactment is under challenge. 87. In the present cases, when the Petitioners contend, as already indicated above, that the condition precedent for exercise of civil jurisdiction was wholly lacking inasmuch as the Court, which passed the impugned decrees, had no statutory power to try civil suits, it becomes transparent that according to the Petitioners, the impugned decrees were without any authority of law. When such is the contention of the Petitioners, the fact that there are provisions for appeal, in the relevant statute, cannot bar the High Court from exercising its powers under Article 226 if the High Court is, otherwise, satisfied that the submissions made by the Petitioners, as indicated hereinbefore, are well founded. 88. The authorities cited above clearly show that the power of the High Court under Articles 226and/or 227 cannot be restricted by a statute. The restraint of not interfering with an order, which is adhered to by the High Courts, is really a self-imposed restriction and this restriction will not stand in the way of exercise of writ jurisdiction if the grounds for exercise of such powers exist. The restraint of not interfering with an order, which is adhered to by the High Courts, is really a self-imposed restriction and this restriction will not stand in the way of exercise of writ jurisdiction if the grounds for exercise of such powers exist. In other words, notwithstanding the relief provided, within the scheme of an enactment, against an order passed by a Court or Tribunal, the High Court can still exercise jurisdiction of issuing writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and/or 227, when the Tribunal or the Court, subordinate to the High Court, is found to have acted without jurisdiction i.e. by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law or when it acts under a statute, which is ultra vires. Though a mere erroneous decision is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227, yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari may be resorted to, though this power should be invoked sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 89. What surfaces from the above discussion is that in the case at hand, notwithstanding the fact that the Regulations make provisions for appeal against the original decision of a Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner in a civil case, the remedy under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution would still be available to a judgment-debtor if he can show that the Court, which had passed the decrees, suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction to entertain civil cases. 90. 90. Having pointed out as to when a High Court can, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, issue a writ of certiorari or an order or direction in the nature of certiorari vis-à-vis its power to issue a writ of certiorari on the basis of its supervisory control in terms of Article 227, what needs to be further pointed out and reiterated is that in the case at hand, interference of the High Court is sought for under Article 226 and not under Article 227. As the basis for. exercise of power under Article 226 is cause of action, let me, now, determine the question as to whether the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, can be said to have jurisdiction in the present case. 91. What logically follows from the question, posed above, is that unless this Court finds that the cause of action, in part or as a whole, has arisen within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, shall have no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petitions merely on the ground that one or some of the writ Petitioners reside within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, for, residence of a Petitioner or of a Respondent is immaterial and irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether a High Court or a Permanent Bench of a High Court or the Principal Seat of a High Court has or does not have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226. The foundation for the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is, as already indicated above, dependent on the question as to whether cause of action, in a given case, has or has not arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court or of the Bench, whose interference is sought for. 92. Coming to the question as to what 'cause of action' means, it may be pointed out that cause of action implies a right to sue. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted, inter alia, to mean every fact, which would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Thus, the material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. It has, however, been judicially interpreted, inter alia, to mean every fact, which would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Thus, the material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. Negatively put, it would mean that everything, which, if not proved, gives the Defendant an immediate right to judgment, would form part of cause of action, [Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 ]. 93. The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence, which may be set up by the Defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the Plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. [Chand Kour v. Pratap Singh reported in (1887-88) 15 JA 1566]. 94. In ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 , the Supreme Court has made it clear that the answer to the question as to whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to certain a writ petition must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial, the relevant observations, made in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), read as under: ... therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 95. What becomes transparent from the above discussion is that the expression "cause of action means a bundle of facts, which, if traversed, a Plaintiff must prove to entitle him to receive a judgment in his favour. The cause of action bears no relation to the defence, which may be set up by the Defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief(s) sought for. The cause of action is nothing, but the media upon which the Plaintiff or the Petitioner seeks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. For determining, therefore, the question as to whether a court has territorial jurisdiction or not, the court must take into account all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, however, embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the facts pleaded. Thus, the question as to whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. (See Naveenchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 . 96. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567 , the Supreme Court has held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts, pleaded in support of cause of action, that those facts constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute, which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. Facts, which have no bearing on the lis or the dispute involved in a case, do not give rise to a cause of action and cannot confer territorial jurisdiction on a High Court enabling it to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226. 97. In the light of what is indicated by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Adani Exports Limited reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567 and Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra), it is more than clear that any controversy, in a writ petition, with regard to territorial jurisdiction has to be settled by the High Court on the basis of the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action without, of course embarking upon an enquiry as to whether the facts pleaded are or are not correct. 98. While considering the case of Naveenchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 , it needs to be also noted that in Naveenchandra N. Majithia's case (supra), a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. One of the prayers made in the writ petition, was to issue a writ of mandamus to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. It was also averred therein that the bulk of investigations has to be carried out at Mumbai. The writ petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court solely on the ground that the complaint, in question having been filed at Shillong, in the State of Meghalaya, the Petitioners could not have sought for quashing of the complaint by the Bombay High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Apex Court in, Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra), pointed out that the High Court had dismissed the petition without taking into consideration the alternative prayer in the writ petition for transfer of the investigation. Moreover, Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra), is a case involving criminal investigation. A criminal case, we may bear in mind has a direct bearing on the personal freedom and liberty of a citizen, who has been guaranteed the protection, under Article 21 of the Constitution, that he would not be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. A criminal case, we may bear in mind has a direct bearing on the personal freedom and liberty of a citizen, who has been guaranteed the protection, under Article 21 of the Constitution, that he would not be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The factors, which may be of relevance in a criminal matter, while deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226, may not be same in a civil dispute. These aspects of Naveenchandra N. Majithia (supra) have been taken note of and succinctly pointed out in Adani Exports Limited (supra). 99. In the backdrop of the law, as discussed above, when one turns to the facts of the present case, what becomes clear that in the case at hand, the grievance of the Petitioner is that the court, which passed the decrees, in question did not have the authority in law to adjudicate upon or decide any suit or civil action. Thus, in the face of the pleadings in the writ petitions, it becomes abundantly clear that according to the writ Petitioners, the decrees, which stand impugned in the present writ petitions, are all nullity in the eyes of law inasmuch as these decrees have been passed by a court, which had no statutory authority or jurisdiction to decide the lis. Whether, in reality, what the Petitioners contend is true or not is a question, which would be relevant for the purpose of determination of the merits of the writ petition; but, for the purpose of deciding as to whether the principal seat, at Guwahati, would have the jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petitions or not, this Court has to proceed on the premises that the averments made, in the writ petitions, are correct. When the averments, so made in the writ petitions, are assumed to be correct, the logical conclusion would be that the impugned decrees, having been passed without authority of law and without jurisdiction, are non-est and such decrees cannot be allowed to cause adverse affect to the interest of the Petitioners, who are judgment-debtors under the impugned decrees. When the averments, so made in the writ petitions, are assumed to be correct, the logical conclusion would be that the impugned decrees, having been passed without authority of law and without jurisdiction, are non-est and such decrees cannot be allowed to cause adverse affect to the interest of the Petitioners, who are judgment-debtors under the impugned decrees. In this regard, it is noteworthy that apart from the fact that some of the judgment-debtors-writ Petitioners are located within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, the bills which form the subject matter of the suit, were, admittedly, checked at various of the offices of Petitioner Corporation within the State of Assam. Thus, a part of the cause of action had, indeed, arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, and the decrees, in question, pose potential threats to the Petitioners. Since the Petitioners are exposed to injury on account of the decrees, which the Petitioners claim to have been passed without jurisdiction, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the impugned decrees having posed threats of injuries to the Petitioners-judgment debtors, give rise to cause of action, at-least in part, within the territorial limits of the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, enabling this Court to decide if the decrees can be allowed to survive or not. Viewed in this light, it becomes transparent that the Principal Seat, at Guwahati, does have, in the present case, jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions under Article 226. The fact that the Petitioners had appeared in the present suits and/or had raised no objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court, which has, eventually, passed the decrees, is inconsequential, for, it is trite that consent or waiver cannot confer jurisdiction on a authority or court, which does not, otherwise, have jurisdiction under the statute, which governs the lis or the adjudicatory process. 100. Having held, in the light of the averments made in the writ petitions, that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions, let me, now, address the question as to whether these writ petitions suffer from suppression of facts, which are material, and, if so, what shall be the consequence of suppression of such material facts. 101. 100. Having held, in the light of the averments made in the writ petitions, that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions, let me, now, address the question as to whether these writ petitions suffer from suppression of facts, which are material, and, if so, what shall be the consequence of suppression of such material facts. 101. In the case at hand, the accusation made by the Respondents is that despite the fact that out of the eight suits, which had been instituted, in the court of the Deputy Commissioner, Yupia, two of the suits have been transferred by the Permanent Bench, at Itanagar, of this High Court to the Fast Track Court at Yupia and though, when the matter with regard to transfer application had been considered by the High Court, the writ Petitioners were present or were represented by their counsel, the writ Petitioners have not disclosed this fact to this Court, while making this set of writ petitions. 102. What is, now, important to note is that the fact that all the parties to the suits were present and were heard at the time of making of the transfer orders is not in dispute. The fact that out of the eight suits (decrees passed wherein form the subject-matter of these writ petitions), two suits were transferred to the FTC, at Yupia, by the orders of the High Court is also not in dispute nor is it in dispute that this fact has not been stated in the writ petitions. For omission to mention these facts in the writ petitions, no explanation has been offered by the writ Petitioners and no explanation is discernible, in this regard, from the materials on record. 103. It is, thus, clear that, with the help of the present set of writ petitions, the Petitioners were seeking an order, which would have run contrary to the decision of a Coordinate-Bench of this High Court without even disclosing to this Court, at the Principal Seat, that the issuance of writs of certiorari, in the present set of cases, would run contrary to the orders of transfer, which had been made, in the suits aforementioned by the Permanent Bench, at Itanagar. In fact, allowing these writ petitions would, as correctly submitted by the learned Advocate General, virtually amount to judicial review of the said orders of transfer made by a Coordinate-Bench of this Court, particularly, when the decrees in the present set of writ petitions, too, have arisen out of the suits, which were transferred to the Fast Track Court, at Yupia, by this High Court. Though consent does not confer jurisdiction if a court has no jurisdiction, suppression of such a vital information, as is the case at hand, is independent of the question of jurisdiction. In short, what the Petitioners have sought to do is to obtain writs of certiorari, in the present set of writ petitions, which, if issued, would have run contrary to the orders of transfer aforementioned and when no explanation exists or is offered for non-disclosure of the factum of the orders of transfer of two of the suits aforementioned, there can be no escape from the conclusion that these writ petitions suffer from suppression of material facts; and once this Court is satisfied that the writ petitions suffer from material fact, it is enough to dismiss the writ petitions. 104. In R. v. V. Kensington, I.T.C. reported in (1917) 1 KB 486, the Court summed up the law relating to inappropriate conduct, in presenting a writ petition, in the following words: ... the prerogative writ is not a matter of course, the applicant must come in the manner prescribed and must be perfectly frank and open with the Court. It has been for many years, the rule of the Court and one which it is of greatest importance to maintain that where an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement, he should make full and fair disclosure of material facts -- facts not law. He must not mistake the law if he can help it -- the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts and the penalty, by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect. 105. 105. The decision, in Kensington, I.T.C. (supra), has been followed in many Indian decisions. The exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226, is substantially equitable in nature. One, who does not come to the Court of equity with clean hands, is not entitled to obtain equitable relief. When a writ petition makes false or misleading statement or when a writ Petitioner deliberately suppresses the material facts, such a writ petition may be dismissed at the very threshold. 106. In Trilokchand Motichand v. S.P. Munshi reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 , the Apex Court held that the Petitioner has no right to move the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental rights on a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement and the Court must dismiss such a petition. In State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery reported in AIR 1977 SC 718, the Apex Court refused to grant relief on the ground that the applicant misled the Court. The purpose of prerogative writ is to remedy a wrong and not promote one. It will not be granted in the aid of those, who do not come to the Court with clean hands. 107. It is to be borne in mind that though judicial review is basic feature of the Constitution, the remedy of judicial review is a discretionary remedy, which is substantially equitable in nature. In an appropriate case, a court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and one of such cases can be, where there is suppression of material fact. What needs to be noted is that suppression of every fact is not relevant; what is relevant for declining the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, under Article 226, is suppression of material facts. What would be a material fact, the suppression whereof could disentitle a person from seeking a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Material fact would mean such facts, which are material for the purpose of determination of the lis. As a corollary, therefore, material fact, in a given case, would be such fact, which would be material for grant or denial of a relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not deny discretionary relief. As a corollary, therefore, material fact, in a given case, would be such fact, which would be material for grant or denial of a relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not deny discretionary relief. (See Arunima Baruah v. Union of India reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 , and Prestige Lights Limited v. State Bank of India reported in (2007) 8 SCC 449 ). The relevant observations made in Arunima Baruah (supra) run as follows: 33. The object underlying the above principle has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in In Re: R.V. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136, in the following words: It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should made a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it--the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside, any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. (Emphasis supplied) 34. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court (Page 3367) by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible. 35. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible. 35. In the case on hand, several facts had been suppressed by the Appellant-Company. Collusive action has been taken with a view to deprive the Respondent-Bank from realizing legal and legitimate dues to which it was otherwise entitled. The Company had never disclosed that it had created third party's interests in the property mortgaged with the Bank. It had also shifted machinery and materials without informing the Respondent-Bank prejudicially affecting the interest of the Bank. It has created tenancy or third party's right over the property mortgaged with the Bank. All these allegations are relevant when such Petitioner comes before the Court and prays for discretionary and equitable relief. In our judgment, the submission of the Respondent-Bank is well-founded that Appellant is not entitled to ask for an extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution from the High Court as also equitable remedy from this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. A party, whose hands are soiled, cannot hold the writ of the Court. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was not in error in refusing relief to the Appellant-Company. 108. In the present case, the Petitioners are seeking quashing of the impugned decrees on the ground that the Court, which has passed the decrees, did not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the lis. If it were so, the orders, transferring the suits, could not have been made by the High Court, because no transfer of any suit is permissible to a court, which has no jurisdiction under the law to decide the lis. By making these writ applications, the Petitioners essentially want an order, which would run contrary to the transfer order. This, in turn, would mean that the Petitioners were asking for a decision, which would have run contrary to the decision rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this High Court. Such contradictory orders cannot be passed by a High Court. The Petitioners, therefore, owed a duty to disclose to this Court the fact that out of the eight suits, as many as two suits were transferred by the High Court to the FTC, Yupia, for trial. The Petitioners did not, however, do so. Such contradictory orders cannot be passed by a High Court. The Petitioners, therefore, owed a duty to disclose to this Court the fact that out of the eight suits, as many as two suits were transferred by the High Court to the FTC, Yupia, for trial. The Petitioners did not, however, do so. Thus, the Petitioners, I entertain not even a shred of doubt in my mind, have suppressed from this Court, while seeking its interference under Article 226, that it was inviting this Court to pass an order, which would have run contrary to the decision of the Coordinate Bench, at Itanagar. Viewed thus, it is clear that the Petitioners have suppressed material facts from this Court and this Court would be, within the ambit of its powers, if it dismisses the writ petitions. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that this Court has formed the view that these writ petitions can be dismissed for suppression of material facts, it is, to my mind, necessary that this Court resolves the controversy as to whether the Fast Track Courts, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, have or do not have the power to try civil cases, i.e. civil suits. 109. It is an admitted position that until the date of passing of the decrees, there have had not been complete and effective separation of the Judiciary from the Executive in the State of Arunachal Pradesh and it is the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945 (in short, the Regulation), which regulate the administration of justice--both civil as well as criminal in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. While Chapter-III of the Regulations deals with criminal proceedings, Chapter-IV deals with civil proceedings. 110. While considering as to how the administration of criminal justice or civil justice shall be administered in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, it is pertinent to note that Regulation 2, which contains various definitions, makes it clear that the expression' Deputy Commissioner' includes an 'Additional Deputy Commissioner'. Hence, wherever the expression, Deputy Commissioner' occurs in the Regulations, in the realm of criminal or civil justice, the expression, 'Deputy Commissioner', shall be deemed to include 'Additional Deputy Commissioner'. 111. The relevant provisions, under Chapter-III, read as under: Criminal Proceedings 15. Criminal Justice, shall be administered by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the village authorities. 16. Hence, wherever the expression, Deputy Commissioner' occurs in the Regulations, in the realm of criminal or civil justice, the expression, 'Deputy Commissioner', shall be deemed to include 'Additional Deputy Commissioner'. 111. The relevant provisions, under Chapter-III, read as under: Criminal Proceedings 15. Criminal Justice, shall be administered by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the village authorities. 16. The Administrator may appoint an Additional Deputy Commissioner for the trial of particular cases when he thinks, fit and may direct that such (Additional Deputy Commissioner, shall for the purpose, exercise all or any of the powers of the Deputy Commissioner. 17. The Deputy Commissioner shall be competent to pass any sentence warranted by law. 18. That Assistant Commissioner shall exercise any powers not exceeding those of a Magistrate of the 1st Class, as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, with which they may be invested by the Administrator. 19. The village authorities may try any case involving jurisdiction any of the under mentioned offences in which the person of village or persons accused is or are resident within their authorities jurisdiction: Theft, including theft in the building. Mischief, not being mischief by fire or any explosive substance Simple hurt, Criminal trespass or house trespass. Assault or using criminal force. 112. From a careful reading of Regulations 15 to 19, what becomes clear is that criminal justice shall be administered by four different and distinct authorities, namely, Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and the Village Authority. While no special empowerment is necessary for a Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner and/or Village Authorities to administer criminal justice according to the limits of their powers as vested in them by the Regulations, an Additional Deputy Commissioner, in the light of the provisions of Regulations 16, needs to be appointed, for the purpose of trial of particular cases, by the Administrator. This shows that for the trial of criminal cases, an Additional Deputy Commissioner needs to be appointed by the Administrator. In short, thus, Regulation 16 requires special empowerment of an Additional Deputy Commissioner in order to enable him to try criminal cases. 113. When, however, one turns to the civil proceedings, it is interesting to note that the relevant provisions contained in Regulations 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40, which fall under Chapter-IV, read as under: Chapter-IV Civil Proceedings 36. In short, thus, Regulation 16 requires special empowerment of an Additional Deputy Commissioner in order to enable him to try criminal cases. 113. When, however, one turns to the civil proceedings, it is interesting to note that the relevant provisions contained in Regulations 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40, which fall under Chapter-IV, read as under: Chapter-IV Civil Proceedings 36. Civil Justice shall be administered by the Deputy Commissioner the Assistant Commissioner and the Village authorities. 37. The Deputy Commissioner may try suits of any value. The Assistant Commissioner may try suits not exceeding Rs. 1000 in value. 38(1) The Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner shall in every case in which both parties are indigenous to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh endeavour to persuade them to submit to arbitration by a Panchayat. (2) If the parties agree each party shall nominate an equal number of members of the Panchayat and the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner shall either choose, or direct the Panchayat to choose, a further person as umpire. (3)* * * (4)* * * (5)* * * (6) The decision so recorded shall be enforceable as if it was a decision of the court recording it and shall be final. 39. (1) In cases in which neither or only one of the parties is indigenous to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner may, with the consent of both parties, order that the case be referred to arbitration by a Panchayat, and the provisions of Sub-section (2) to (5) inclusive of Section 38 shall then apply except that the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner shall give the parties an opportunity to object to the decision. (2) Any such objection must be made within ten days i.e. of the date on which the decision of the Panchayat or umpire is recorded and if made, shall be considered by the Deputy Commissioner whose decision shall be final. (3) If no such objection is made the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section38 shall apply. 40. The village authority shall try all suits without remit the value, in which both the parties are indigenous to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh and live within their jurisdiction and which are not submitted to arbitration under the provisions of Section 38. (3) If no such objection is made the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section38 shall apply. 40. The village authority shall try all suits without remit the value, in which both the parties are indigenous to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh and live within their jurisdiction and which are not submitted to arbitration under the provisions of Section 38. All other suits which are not submitted to arbitration under the provisions of Section 39 shall be tried by the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner. 114. Regulation 36 shows that the civil justice shall be administered by Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and the Village Authorities. Since the expression 'Deputy Commissioner' shall include under Regulation 2, 'Additional Deputy Commissioner' it become clear that while the Deputy Commissioner may try suit of any value, an Assistant Commissioner may try suits not exceeding Rs. 1,000/- in value. Since the expression 'Deputy Commissioner' includes an 'Additional Deputy Commissioner', it logically follows that an 'Additional Deputy Commissioner' may also try suits of any value. Unlike Regulation 16, which relates to criminal justice, there is nothing in Chapter-IV, which requires an Additional Deputy Commissioner to be specially empowered to try a civil suit of any value. 115. What further logically follows from the above discussion is that an Additional Deputy Commissioner can try suit of any value as an original court; but if he has to exercise power in respect of criminal justice, he needs to be empowered by the Administrator and upon creation of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, it is the Governor of the State, who becomes the appropriate authority in this regard. 116. Bearing in mind the scheme of the Regulations as regards the civil justice vis-àvis criminal justice in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, let me, now, turn to the question as to what an FTC is? 117. The right of speedy trial has been recognized as a fundamental right and delay in disposal of cases, particularly, criminal adversely affects the administration of justice. The 11th Finance Commission, therefore, allocated a substantial sum of money (502.90 crores) under Article 275 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of setting up of 1734 numbers of courts in various States to deal with long pending cases, particularly, sessions cases. The 11th Finance Commission, therefore, allocated a substantial sum of money (502.90 crores) under Article 275 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of setting up of 1734 numbers of courts in various States to deal with long pending cases, particularly, sessions cases. One of the suggestions given by the Finance Commission, while making the allocations, was that since the funds allocated was for a limited period and that too, as a special scheme for reducing the pendency, States may consider re-employment of retired Judges for limited period for disposal of pending cases since the courts, which were to be constituted with the financial support to be received from such allocation, were to be ad hoc in the sense that these courts would be not a permanent addition to the number of the courts till then existing within a particular State. As allocation of funds, so made by the Finance Commission, stipulated time-bound utilization of the funds within a period of five years, State Governments were asked to take necessary steps to establish such courts. The scheme (with the help of the allocation of funds so made) which was, eventually, evolved, came to be known as Fast Track Courts. The constitutionality of the setting up of these courts came to be challenged in various High Courts and also the Supreme Court. This controversy has come to set at rest with the decision of a three-Judges Bench in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 1 . In Brij Mohan Lal (supra), the Apex Court pointed out that delay in disposal of cases adversely affects the administration of justice and that one of the reasons for delay is lack of adequate number of judges and that the FTC scheme fulfills this constitutional obligation of the States. Thus, while upholding the constitutional validity of the FTC scheme, the Apex Court issued certain directions, which are enumerated in para 10 of this judgment. These directions are of great relevance in the present case. Para 10 is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: 10. Keeping in view the laudable objectives with which the Fast Track Courts Scheme has been conceived and introduced, we feel the following directions, for the present, would be sufficient to take care of initial teething problems highlighted by the parties: Directions by the Court: 1. Para 10 is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: 10. Keeping in view the laudable objectives with which the Fast Track Courts Scheme has been conceived and introduced, we feel the following directions, for the present, would be sufficient to take care of initial teething problems highlighted by the parties: Directions by the Court: 1. The first preference for appointment of judges of the Fast Track Courts is to be given by ad hoc promotions from amongst eligible judicial officers. While giving such promotion, the High Court shall follow the procedures in force in the matter of promotion to such posts in Superior/Higher Judicial Services. 2. The second preference in appointments to Fast Track Courts shall be given to retired judges who have good service records with no adverse comments in their ACRs, so far as judicial acumen, reputation regarding honesty, integrity and character are concerned. Those who were not given the benefit of two years extension of the age of superannuation, shall not be considered for appointment. It should be ensured that they satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 233(2) and 309 of the Constitution. The concerned High Court shall take a decision with regard to the minimum-maximum age of eligibility to ensure that they are physically fit for the work in Fast Track Courts. 3. No Judicial Officer who was dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired or made to seek retirement shall be considered for appointment under the Scheme. Judicial Officers who have sought voluntary retirement after initiation of Departmental proceedings/inquiry shall not be considered for appointment. 4. The third preference shall be given to members of the Bar for direct appointment in these Courts. They should be preferably in the age group of 35-45 years, so that they could aspire to continue against the regular posts if the Fast Track Courts cease to function. The question of their continuance in service shall be reviewed periodically by the High Court based on their performance. They may be absorbed in regular vacancies, if subsequent recruitment takes place and their performance in the Fast Track Courts is found satisfactory. For the initial selection, the High Court shall adopt such methods of selection as are normally followed for selection of members of the Bar as direct recruits to the Superior/Higher Judicial Services. 5. They may be absorbed in regular vacancies, if subsequent recruitment takes place and their performance in the Fast Track Courts is found satisfactory. For the initial selection, the High Court shall adopt such methods of selection as are normally followed for selection of members of the Bar as direct recruits to the Superior/Higher Judicial Services. 5. Overall preference for appointment in Fast Track Courts shall be given to eligible officers who are on the verge of retirement subject to they being physically fit. 6. The recommendation for selection shall be made by a Committee of at least three Judges of the High Court, constituted by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court in this regard. The final decision in the matter shall be taken by the Full Court of the High Court. 7. After ad hoc promotion of judicial officers to the Fast Track Courts, the consequential vacancies shall be filled up immediately by organizing a special recruitment drive. Steps should be taken in advance to initiate process for selection to fill up these vacancies much before the judicial officers are promoted to the Fast Track Courts, so that vacancies may not be generated at the lower levels of the subordinate judiciary. The High Court and the State Government concerned shall take prompt steps to fill up the consequential as well as existing vacancies in the subordinate Courts on priority basis. Concerned State Government shall take necessary decisions within a month from the receipt of the recommendations made by the High Court. 8. Priority shall be given by the Fast Track Courts for disposal of those Sessions cases which are pending for the longest period of time, and/or those involving under-trials. Similar shall be the approach for Civil cases i.e. old cases shall be given priority. 9. While the staff of a regular Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge includes a Sessions Clerk and an Office Peon, work in Fast Track Courts is reported to be adversely affected due to shortage of staff as compared to regular Courts performing same or similar functions. When single Orderly or Clerk proceeds on leave, work in Fast Track Courts gets held up. The staff earmarked for each such Court are a Peshkar/Superintendent, a Stenographer and an Orderly. When single Orderly or Clerk proceeds on leave, work in Fast Track Courts gets held up. The staff earmarked for each such Court are a Peshkar/Superintendent, a Stenographer and an Orderly. If the staff is inadequate, High Court and the State Government shall take appropriate decision to appoint additional staff who can be accommodated within the savings out of the existing allocations by the Central Government. 10. Provisions for the appointment of Public Prosecutor and Process Server have not been made under Fast Track Courts Scheme. A Public Prosecutor is necessary for effective functioning of the Fast Track Courts. Therefore, a Public Prosecutor may be earmarked for each such Court and the expenses for the same shall be borne out of the allocation under the head 'Fast Track Courts'. Process service shall be done through the existing mechanism. 118. From the directions, given in Brij Mohan Lal (supra), what become clear is that FTCs are not permanent courts in the sense that these courts would not be a permanent addition to the number of courts already existing within a particular State. These courts would be a class of courts, which would be set up with the allocation of funds made available by the 11th Finance Commission, to expedite justice delivery system - both civil as well as criminal. The persons, to be appointed as presiding officers of these courts, would not necessarily be only from the judicial service of the State concerned, for, there would be three modes of recruitment, namely: (i) from the judicial service by giving ad hoc promotion; (ii) by re-employment of retired judicial officers, whose past conduct deserve such re-employment; (iii) and from the members of the Bar. 119. Sub-para (4) of para 10 of the decision, in Brij Mohan Lal (supra), shows that the members of the Bar should be, preferably, in the age group of 35 to 45 year so that they may be continued against regular posts if the FTC ceases to function. The performance of the member of the Bar, so appointed to preside over the FTCs, would be subject to periodical review by the High Court based on their performance and they may even be absorbed in regular vacancies if and when subsequent recruitment takes place and their performance in FTCs is found satisfactory. The performance of the member of the Bar, so appointed to preside over the FTCs, would be subject to periodical review by the High Court based on their performance and they may even be absorbed in regular vacancies if and when subsequent recruitment takes place and their performance in FTCs is found satisfactory. Thus, an Advocate, appointed as a presiding officer of a FTC, would not be a member of the judicial cadre of the State, who can be considered, in course of time, for absorption in the judicial cadre if the relevant recruitment rule, so permit What also becomes clear from the various directions, issued by the Apex Court, in Brij Mohan Lal (supra),is that the FTCs are not permanent courts inasmuch as these courts have been established under a given scheme. In the State of Arunachal Pradesh since there is no separation of Judiciary from the Executive and it is an Executive Officer, who also exercises judicial powers, both civil as well as criminal, a person has to be either a member of the Bar or a member of the Executive Service, ad hoc, temporary or permanent, in order to enable such a person to exercise powers of the presiding officer of a FTC, which would be competent to deal with both, civil as well as criminal cases. Hence, the fact that some of the presiding officers of the FTCs, in Arunachal Pradesh, are beyond the cadre strength of the Deputy Commissioner or Additional Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, is of no material consequence. 120. In the present case, how the members of the FTCs have come to be selected is not really in dispute. As the affidavit filed by the State Government reflects, a Selection Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of a sitting Judge of this High Court. This Selection Committee made its recommendations, on 06.10.2001, against three vacant posts of the presiding officers of FTCs, which were to be established, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The recommendations, so made, were approved by the High Court. The letter, dated 06.10.2001, of the Registrar, (I and E), Gauhati High Court, issued, in this regard, is of great relevance and is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: The Gauhati High Court (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) No. HC VIII. The recommendations, so made, were approved by the High Court. The letter, dated 06.10.2001, of the Registrar, (I and E), Gauhati High Court, issued, in this regard, is of great relevance and is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: The Gauhati High Court (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) No. HC VIII. 114/2001/3769/A. From: Shri A.C. Upadhyay, Registrar (I and E) Gauhati High Court: Guwahati- 781001 To The Secretary, Law and Judicial Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. Dated 6th Oct., 2001 Subject: The proceedings of the selection committee for recruitment/appointment of the candidates to the post of Additional Deputy Commissioner with the powers of Ad hoc Additional Session Judge on contract basis held on 16th August, 2001 in the Gauhati High Court, Guwahati under the Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S. Singh, Judge, Gauhati High Court. Sir, I am directed to say that the High Court is pleased to approve the recommendations made by the Selection Committee mentioned above on the subject for appointment of candidates for Fast Track Courts to be established in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The following candidates have been selected and recommended by the Selection Committee for their appointment to the post of Addl. Deputy Commissioner with the powers of Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge on contract basis against 3 (three) clear vacant posts in terms of the related advertisement and scheme thereof: (1)Ms. OyingApum (2) Sri Goto Ete, and (3) Sri Tayum Son. Further, the following candidates have been kept in the panel by the Selection Committee with the direction that such panel list shall expire after a period of 1 (one) year from the date of selection i.e. 1.8.2001 automatically. (4) Sri Tumken Bagra (5)SriMukPertin (6) Sri Pisi Jawlai Singpho and (7) Sri Matheim Dinggi I am, further to say that the appointment order in respect of Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judges in the State may not be issued till the appointments of the supporting staff for the Fast Track Courts are made and accommodation for housing the Fast Track Courts and also for housing the supporting staff is made available. The Notification of appointment orders may be issued as and when intimation is given to Hon'ble Court in this regard. This may kindly be treated as Most Urgent. Yours faithfully, Sd/ - Registrar (I and E) 121. The Notification of appointment orders may be issued as and when intimation is given to Hon'ble Court in this regard. This may kindly be treated as Most Urgent. Yours faithfully, Sd/ - Registrar (I and E) 121. After the letter, dated 06.10.2001, aforementioned was issued by the High Court, two important acts were done by the Government, namely, issuance of a notification, dated 04.06.2002, and issuance of an order, dated 04.06.2002. For the sake of clarity, the notification and the order are also reproduced below: Government of Arunachal Pradesh Law and Justice Department Itanagar Order of The Governor Notification No. JUD-60/2001 Dated Itanagar, the 4th June, 2002 The exercise of the powers conferred under Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, in consultation with the Gauhati High Court is pleased to establish the following Ad hoc Session Courts (Fast Track Court) at Namsai, Basar and Yupia with their respective jurisdiction specified below with immediate effect – Sl. Fast Track Jurisdiction No. Court (1) Namsai Tirap, Changlang, Lohit, Upper Dibang Valley and Lower Dibang Valley District. (2) Basar West Siang, East Siang, Upper Siang and Upper Subansiri District. (3) Yupia Lower Subansiri, Kurung Kumey, Papum Pare, East Kameng, West Kameng and Tawang District. Sd/- C.P. Mansai Secretary (Law and Justice) Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. No. JUD-60/2001 Dated Itanagar, the 4th June, 2002 Copy to: 1. The PS to Hon'ble Chief Minister, Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. 2. The PS to All Ministers, Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. 3. The PS to Chief Secretary, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. 4. The Registrar General, Gauhati High Court, Guwahati. 5. All Deputy Commissioners, Arunachal Pradesh. 6. The Deputy Registrar, Itanagar Bench of Gauhati High Court, Naharlagun. 7. The Director of Information and Public Relation, Arunachal Pradesh, Naharlagun with a request to publish the same in Extra Ordinary Issue of Arunachal Pradesh Gazette on priority. 8. Office Copy. Sd/- C.P. Mansai Secretary (Law and Justice) Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. Government of Arunachal Pradesh Law and Justice Department Itanagar ORDER No. JUD-60/2001 Dated Itanagar, the 4th June, 2002. The Governor of Arunachal Pradesh with the approval of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court is pleased to appoint Miss Oying Apum, Deputy Secretary (Law) to the post of Addl. Deputy Commissioner with the powers of Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge in the Addl. The Governor of Arunachal Pradesh with the approval of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court is pleased to appoint Miss Oying Apum, Deputy Secretary (Law) to the post of Addl. Deputy Commissioner with the powers of Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge in the Addl. Sessions Court (Fast Track Court) at Yupia on contract basis with fixed pay of Rs. 19,000/- (Rupees nineteen thousand) only p.m. w.e.f. date of joining the post upto the period of 31.3.2005, as per Eleventh Finance Commission grants. Further Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is pleased to transfer her service to the said post upto the period of 31.3.2005. During this period the officer will retain her lien with the parent department as per rules in force. Other terms and conditions, which are not specified herein, shall be governed by the rules and orders of the Govt. as applicable from time to time. The Expenditure is debitable under Head of Account Code No. 05 Finance Commission Recommendations 2014 Admn. of Justice, Minor Head 800 other Expenditure Sub head (05) 2662 Establishment expenses object Head 01 Salaries (PLAN) Demand No. 47. Sd/ - (C.P. Mansai) Secretary (Law and Judicial) Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. 122. From the notification, dated 04.06.2002, what becomes clear is that three Fast Track Courts (i.e. FTCs) were established for the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh. The FTC, at Yupia, has jurisdiction over more than one district, namely, Namsai, Basar and Yupia. Similarly, the FTCs, set up at Namsai and Basar, have their own specified territorial limits of jurisdiction. Thus, the presiding officer of the FTC, at Yupia, cover more than one district and could try cases, which could have been tried by the Deputy Commissioners or Additional Deputy Commissioners in the districts of Lower Subansiri, Kurung Kumey, Papum Pare, East Kameng, West Kameng and Tawang District. 123. Similarly, from the order dated 4.6.2002, quoted above, what transpires is that Ms. Oying Apum, who was at the relevant point time, working as Deputy Secretary Law, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, was posted as Additional Deputy Commissioner with the power of Ad hoc Additional Judge in the Additional Sessions Court, FTC, at Yupia, on contract basis with fixed pay and her services were accordingly transferred to the post of Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge making it clear that the officer will retain her lien with the parent department as per the rules in force. 124. 124. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that the letter, dated 06.10.2001, issued by the Registrar, Gauhati High Court, shows that the recommendation included advocates as well as executive officers. We are presently concerned with the appointment of Ms. Oying Apum, who as presiding officer of the FTC, at Yupia, has decided the suits and passed the decrees, in question. Her appointment is, admittedly, under the order, dated 04.06.2002, which stands quoted above. This was followed by a letter, dated 27.06.2002, issued by the State Government, directing all the Deputy Commissioners to transfer sessions cases, which had been pending for more than two years, to the FTCs. This is how the FTCs started dealing with sessions cases and it was, later on, by WT Message, dated 28.08.2003, that the Government, acting upon the directions issued in Brij Mohan Lal (supra), ordered transfer of civil cases, which had been pending for more than two years, to the FTC inasmuch as the Apex Court had authoritatively laid down that the FTCs could deal with not only criminal, but civil cases too. Not surprising, therefore, that the said WT Message refers to Brij Mohan Lal (supra), while ordering transfer of civil cases to the FTC. In fact, in the face of the decision in Brij Mohan Lal (supra), the authority of the FTCs to deal with civil cases is not even questioned. What is really questioned is as to whether the FTC, Yupia, has the jurisdiction to try civil cases and it is this question, which this Court needs to decide. 125. In the backdrop of what has been discussed above, it is of paramount importance to note that none of the present Petitioners challenge the legality or validity of the appointment of Ms. Oying Apum as the presiding officer of the FTC. This Court is, therefore, not required to determine the correctness or otherwise of her appointment. What, however, the materials on record speak loud and clear is that while Ms. Oying Apum was working as Deputy Secretary (Law), she was posted as Additional Deputy Commissioner with the power of Addl. Sessions Judge. In effect thus, the appointment of Ms. This Court is, therefore, not required to determine the correctness or otherwise of her appointment. What, however, the materials on record speak loud and clear is that while Ms. Oying Apum was working as Deputy Secretary (Law), she was posted as Additional Deputy Commissioner with the power of Addl. Sessions Judge. In effect thus, the appointment of Ms. Oying Apum as the Ad hoc Sessions Judge of FTC was in terms of the provisions of the Regulations, for, she is essentially an Additional Deputy Commissioner with the power to administer criminal justice, in terms of the Regulations, in her capacity as an Additional Deputy Commissioner. What needs to be also noted is that Ms. Oying Apum has not been appointed as a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, because there is no post of Additional Sessions Judge or, for that matter, of Sessions Judge in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The powers of the Sessions Judge are exercised by the Executive Officers in terms of the Regulations, as already discussed above. 126. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that unlike the provisions, contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Code of Civil Procedure, no specific notification is required for a Deputy Commissioner or Additional Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner to exercise civil jurisdiction. Similarly, no specific notification is required for a Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner to exercise criminal jurisdiction. However, it is only when an Additional Deputy Commissioner is required to exercise criminal jurisdiction that specific order authorizing such an officer to exercise such a power has to be passed and this is precisely what has been done the present case. A Deputy Secretary of Law, namely, Ms. Oying Apum, has been posted as Additional Deputy Commissioner. The moment a person is appointed or posted as Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, he can exercise all such powers, both criminal as well as civil, which are conferred on him under the Regulation by virtue of the office, which he holds. Viewed thus, it is clear that a person, such as, Ms. Oying Apum, on being appointed as an Additional Deputy Commissioner, could have very well exercised all such powers, which can be exercised, under the Regulations, by an Additional Deputy Commissioner. Viewed thus, it is clear that a person, such as, Ms. Oying Apum, on being appointed as an Additional Deputy Commissioner, could have very well exercised all such powers, which can be exercised, under the Regulations, by an Additional Deputy Commissioner. When such a person, having been appointed as Additional Deputy Commissioner, is appointed to preside over the FTC, it logically follows that such a person can exercise civil jurisdiction by virtue of his/her appointment as an Additional Deputy Commissioner. In order to, however, enable such an Additional Deputy Commissioner to exercise criminal jurisdiction, a special order is needed in terms of Regulation 16 and it is this requirement, which the order, dated 04.06.2002, aforementioned fulfills by making it clear that Ms. Oying Apum, on being posted as Additional Deputy Commissioner, has been empowered to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 127. Coming to the question as to whether a Deputy Commissioner has, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the power to transfer a civil case, under the Regulations, to an Additional Deputy Commissioner without such a specific power having made available to the Deputy Commissioners under the Regulations, it is worth pointing out that Regulation 52 States that the High Court, the Court of Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner shall be guided by the spirit, but shall not be bound by the letter of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in disputes between persons, who are not indigenous to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Regulation 52 makes it explicit that the spirit of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to all the civil proceedings in the State of Arunachal Pradesh if both the parties to a civil suit are not indigenous. Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives power to a District Judge to transfer a suit from one court to another. Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives power to a District Judge to transfer a suit from one court to another. Though there is no equivalent provisions, embodied in the Regulations, for making transfer of suits by the Deputy Commissioner, who stands on the same footing as does a District Judge, the spirit of Section 24would be applicable to the judicial proceedings even under the Regulations and, hence, a Deputy Commissioner, in the light of the provisions of Regulation 52, must be held to have the power to transfer suits from one court to another if both the parties to the suits are not indigenous persons and this power would, obviously, include the power to transfer a suit by a District Judge from his own court to an Additional Deputy Commissioner, particularly, when an Additional Deputy Commissioner is included within the expression "Deputy Commissioner" and can try suits of any value as can be done by a Deputy Commissioner. I do not, therefore, notice any infirmity in the order(s) passed by the Deputy Commissioner, in the present cases, transferring the suits, in question, to the FTC, at Yupia, which is presided over by an Additional Deputy Commissioner, who has the jurisdiction to try civil suits both in terms of the Regulations and also in the light of the decision in Brij Mohan Lal (supra). In the case at hand, since the State and its instrumentalities, such as FCI, cannot be regarded as an indigenous person, it logically follows that the aid of Regulation 52 could have been taken, in the present cases, by the Deputy Commissioners concerned to pass order(s) of transfer of suits to the FTC, at Yupia, whose territorial jurisdiction, in the light of the order, dated 04.06.2002, aforementioned, was not limited to the district of Papumpare, Yupia, but also extended to the districts of Lower Subansiri, Kurungkumey, East Kameng, West Kameng and Tawang. 128. 128. Having made it, thus, clear that the impugned decrees had been passed by a Court, which had the power, authority and jurisdiction to entertain civil cases, it is also noteworthy that by taking resort to Article 226, a High Court will be able to quash a decree, passed by a Court, which, though inferior to High Courts in general, is not under the supervisory control of that High Court, within whose territorial limits the cause of action, in part or as a whole, has arisen. This is possible, because the powers, under Article 226, will be exercisable on the basis of cause of action and not on the basis or supervisory control inasmuch as the decree, in such a case, is not passed by any inferior court, which is subordinate to the High Court, whose interference is sought for. 129. The question, therefore, which concerns us is this: Should a High Court issue a writ of certiorari quashing a decree passed by an inferior court without jurisdiction merely on the ground that the decree, which is under challenge, is passed without jurisdiction and is likely to adversely affect the interest of the person, who seeks the High Court's interference, under Article 226, with such a decree on the ground that the decree is likely to be executed within its territory, though the decree is wholly without jurisdiction?. 130. Though exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary, it is never exercised arbitrarily. Exercise of writ jurisdiction is based on sound legal principles. Thus, when an aggrieved person can take resort to Article 227 and thereby get a decree, passed, without jurisdiction, set aside by the High Court within whose supervisory control, the court, which passed the decree, is situated a High Court, under Article226, will not, ordinarily interfere with such a decree merely on the ground that cause of action to challenge the decree has arisen within its territorial limits, for, ordinarily, it is the High Court, having the supervisory control, which shall deal with such a decree and not the High Court, which is approached only on the ground that cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limits of such a High Court. When an effective remedy of getting a writ of certiorari issued by taking resort to Article 227 is available to an aggrieved judgment-debtor, the judgment-debtor, in such a case, much satisfy the High Court, while approaching it for the purpose of obtaining a writ of certiorari under Article 226, as to why it has chosen to file a petition under Article 226 and not under Article 227. If no ground is shown at all or no good ground is shown by a judgment-debtor for not availing the remedy under Article 227, it will be sound exercise of its jurisdiction by a High Court not to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. In other words, since the basis of Article 226 is cause of action, and not supervisory control a judgment-debtor, who seeks interference under Article 226, must satisfy the High Court why Article 227 is not being taken resort to. 131. I may further point out that if cause of action, wholly or in part, does not arise within the territorial limits of a High Court, the question of exercising power, under Article 226, does not arise at all. Conversely, merely because of the fact that cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limits of a High Court, the High Court will not issue a writ of certiorari in exercise of its power, under Article 226, against a judicial order or a decree. In such a case, having satisfied itself that it has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Article 226, the High Court has the additional burden of asking the judgment-debtor as to why it has not availed the alternative remedy under Article 227 and approached the High Court, which has the supervisory control over the inferior court, whose decree is impugned, as a decree issued without any authority or law. The judgment-debtor cannot contend that since the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court, whose interference, under Article 226, is sought for, the High Court should issue writ of certiorari, because the decree is without jurisdiction. The judgment-debtor cannot contend that since the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court, whose interference, under Article 226, is sought for, the High Court should issue writ of certiorari, because the decree is without jurisdiction. One must reiterate that exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary and this discretion would have to be exercised on sound judicial principles, one of such well recognized principles being that when a remedy is available to the aggrieved person under Article 227, no High Court would, ordinarily and barring exceptional cases, exercise jurisdiction under Article 226. Cause of action merely gives jurisdiction to exercise power under Article 226; but when an alternative remedy, in the form of Article 227, is available, High Courts would not let the judgment-debtor by pass the remedy available to him under Article 227unless the judgment-debtor makes out a special case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226inasmuch as it is, ordinarily, for the High Court, which has the supervisory control over an inferior court, to determine if the subordinate Court has exceeded its authority or has acted without any authority in passing the decree impugned before it. 132. In the backdrop of the law, as discussed above, when one turns to the facts of the present case, it becomes clear that in the case at hand, the grievance of the Petitioner is that the Court, which has passed the decrees, in question, did not have authority in law to adjudicate upon or decide any suit. No other fact has been stated, in the writ petitions, to indicate as to why the principal seat, at Guwahati, should interfere with the impugned decrees in exercise of powers under Article 226 and not the Permanent Bench, at Itanagar in exercise of powers under Article 227. This apart, as I have already held that the FTC, at Yupia, has the jurisdiction to try civil suits; hence, the impugned decrees cannot be said to be without the authority of law. Further-more, the writ petitions, as already discussed above, suffer from material suppression of facts, which, otherwise also, disentitle the Petitioners from seeking any relief. 133. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I find that these writ petitions are wholly without justification and merit. These writ petitions, therefore, fail and shall accordingly stand dismissed. Further-more, the writ petitions, as already discussed above, suffer from material suppression of facts, which, otherwise also, disentitle the Petitioners from seeking any relief. 133. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I find that these writ petitions are wholly without justification and merit. These writ petitions, therefore, fail and shall accordingly stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I, however, direct the parties to bear their own respective costs. Petition dismissed