JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Helen Dawgliani, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal has been preferred under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as the Act) by the appellant, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. against the judgment and order dated 12.10.2007 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Aizawl in MACT Case No. 86 of 2006 by which the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant-respondent No. 1 herein to the tune of Rs.5,92,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount. 3. A claim petition under Section 163A of the Act was preferred before the MACT, Aizawl by the claimant-respondent No. 1 against the appellant as Opposite Party No. 1 & Opposite Party No. 2 respectively for receiving injuries on her person on account of a vehicular accident which took place on 13.10.2004 at about 3.30 p.m. near Pang balkawn for which she suffered 80% permanent disability. It is her case that while she was travelling in a Bus bearing registration No. MZ-05-0130 from Bairabi to Kolasib belonging to Mr. K. Lalrinliana, the respondent No. 2, the vehicle met with an accident and as a result of which she sustained injury on her leg. The driver of the offending vehicle at the time had a valid driving licence issued by an appropriate authority. It is also her case that at the time of accident she was running a tea stall and earned Rs.3300/- per month. She, by preferring this application under the provision claimed Rs.6,00,000/- as compensation from the appellant and the owner of the vehicle, the respondent No. 2, herein. 4. Having filed this application due notices were sent and served. The claim was contested heavily by the appellant/Opposite Party No. 2. Evidence, both oral and documentary were received during the inquiry. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the learned Member, MACT, Aizawl awarded compensation as herein referred above. The Opposite Party No. 2, the appellant herein, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and award filed this present appeal seeking setting aside of the same. 5. Mr. Evidence, both oral and documentary were received during the inquiry. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the learned Member, MACT, Aizawl awarded compensation as herein referred above. The Opposite Party No. 2, the appellant herein, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and award filed this present appeal seeking setting aside of the same. 5. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellant at the very outset of the argument put emphasis that the amount awarded by the learned Member under the Heads--"Medical Expenditures" and "Fooding, Lodging, Bus & Taxi Fare etc." cannot be justified and awarded so since there is no evidence available to that effect. Under the head of Medical Expenditure, Rs.15,000/- was awarded by the Tribunal but in support of that claim the claimant failed to produce any supporting document such as the Cash Memo etc. That apart evidence is wanting that she had undergone treatment at different hospitals. In the same way, it is also argued that in support of the award amounting to Rs.70,000/- under the head "Fooding, Lodging, Bus & Taxi Fare etc." there is no supporting evidence. The learned Tribunal basing on the oral evidence of the claimant herself awarded both the amounts which are not justified and not based on evidence. Referring to the provisions of second schedule of the Act, Mr. Malhotra submits that for the purpose of having such an award under such heads supporting documents are required to be proved. When the claimant failed to prove her claim by adducing cogent and sufficient evidence, awarding of both the amounts is not sustainable. 6. In the context of the above submissions I would be failing in my duty if I do not appreciate the approach of Mrs. Helen Dawngliani, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. She fairly submits that the claimant is (not) entitled to have the amount under both heads since she failed to prove any document in support of her claim. Apparently, therefore, in view of the submission of Mr. A.R. Malhotra and Mrs. Helen Dawngliani for the respondent No. 1 this Court of the view that Tribunal erroneously awarded both the amount towards compensation. The claimant, accordingly, to the humble view of this Court is not entitled to such amounts. 7. The next issue, which has been raised by the Mr. A.R. Malhotra and Mrs. Helen Dawngliani for the respondent No. 1 this Court of the view that Tribunal erroneously awarded both the amount towards compensation. The claimant, accordingly, to the humble view of this Court is not entitled to such amounts. 7. The next issue, which has been raised by the Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellant is in regard to the monthly income of the claimant. Taking aid of the case law reported in (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kawllian Thanga and Anr.) it is submitted by him that the monthly income which has been shown and proved at Rs.3300/- is also not acceptable inasmuch as the factum of income has not been adequately proved by the claimant. It is further submitted by him that the income certificate issued by the President, Village Council, proved and marked as Exhibit-C-7 is not acceptable since the village council President, Bairabi is not authorized to issue such certificate. The income certificate Ext. C-7 is not based on acceptable information. In such a situation, it is submitted that it would be appropriate for the Court relying on the ratio laid down in the case between New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kawllian Thanga and Anr., the notional income should be taken and award can be calculated accordingly. 8. Per contra to the submission so advanced by Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Helen Dawngliani, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that at the relevant point of time the claimant-respondent No. 1 herein was running Tea Stall at Bairabi and her monthly income from that source was at Rs.3300/- per month. The village council President who issued Ext.-C-7 had every information about her business since he was the President of the Village Council of Bairabi at that time and there is nothing to disbelieve the Ext. C-7, the income certificate. That apart the claimant herself categorically stated in her evidence that she had the income at Rs.3300/- per month by running a Tea Stall at Bairabi which is a railway stoppage. The claimant had been cross-examined on this point. From the scrutiny of the cross-examination of this particular witness it is noticed that except a suggestion, this particular statement in respect of income was not rebutted and which can prompt the Court to disbelieve her statement. Mr. The claimant had been cross-examined on this point. From the scrutiny of the cross-examination of this particular witness it is noticed that except a suggestion, this particular statement in respect of income was not rebutted and which can prompt the Court to disbelieve her statement. Mr. A.R. Malhotra submitted that even though during the inquiry the Ext. C-7, the income certificate was not specifically denied, there can be no impediment in assessing the admissibility of the said document at the appellate stage. In support of his contention he also relied on the decision of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kawllian Thanga and Anr., wherein His lordship of this Hon'ble High Court in para 5 of the judgment held as under: 5. Mr. George Raju, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the method of calculation adopted by the learned Tribunal is wrong and arbitrary inasmuch as there is absolutely no proof on record to support that the deceased was earning Rs.40,000/- annually, as held by the learned Tribunal. The only documentary evidence in support of the claim is a certificate issued by the President of the Village Council marked Ext. C-4, which does not disclose the source of income or the nature of occupation of the deceased. Even the claimant, the elder brother of the deceased, in his deposition has stated nothing as to how the deceased was earning Rs.40,000/- annually or to what extent he was dependent on him. Though learned Counsel for the claimant-respondent strongly opposed this submission by submitting that the certificate being admitted without objection, cannot be called in question at the appellate stage, I do not find any force in the same. Even after a document is admitted in evidence, it remains to be appreciated with regard to its evidentiary value. It is not difficult for any person to obtain such a certificate from Village Council and by merely producing such a certificate the burden of proof, on the part of the claimant does not stand discharged. I am of the considered view that such a certificate alone without any supportive evidence that Village Council is competent to issue Income Certificate cannot be the basis for a taking a view that the deceased was earning Rs.40,000/- annually. In the absence of any such evidence regarding income, the notional income provided in the second schedule of the Act being Rs.15,000/- annually has to be accepted. In the absence of any such evidence regarding income, the notional income provided in the second schedule of the Act being Rs.15,000/- annually has to be accepted. Thus the multiplier chosen being 17, the amount of compensation should have been Rs.15,000/-17 : Rs.2,55,000/-. From this amount one third has to be deducted being personal expenses of the deceased and thus the net amount would come to Rs.1,70,000 (Rupees one lac seventy thousand) only. 9. Therefore, law permits to appreciate the admissibility of an income certificate at the appellate stage. Apparently there is no evidence on record to testify that the Village Council President had the requisite information to issue such a certificate. Now the pertinent issue to be decided in this case in respect of admissibility of the income certificate, Ext. C-4, whether the evidence of the claimant can be accepted in view of the facts situation as reveled by her. There is no denial that the claimant was running, at the relevant point of time, a Tea stall at Bairabi. If a person runs a Tea stall at an important place like Bairabi, which is apparently a railway stoppage, it would not be impossible on her part to earn Rs.100/- in average per day. So, in a month she would certainly earn Rs.3000/-. Daily income can vary, depending upon sale and, therefore, the claim of the claimant that she earned Rs.3300/- per month cannot be held to be unjustified. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence appearing in the face of the record, the notional income as emphasized by the A.R. Malhotra, the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be taken into consideration. This Court does not find any ground to refuse the claim of the claimant in the context of monthly income. 10. The third issue, which has been brought before this Court for consideration, is in respect of percentage of disability suffered by the claimant-respondent No. 1. Before the Tribunal, the doctor who issued Ext. Nos. C-9 and C-10, the medical certificates showing 80% disability was examined. In his evidence he categorically stated that the claimant as a result of injury, suffered 80% permanent disability. Ext. C-9, the medical certificate speaks of fracture (L) tibia of the leg which had been operated twice and he assessed thereby 80% permanent disability. By Ext. Nos. C-9 and C-10, the medical certificates showing 80% disability was examined. In his evidence he categorically stated that the claimant as a result of injury, suffered 80% permanent disability. Ext. C-9, the medical certificate speaks of fracture (L) tibia of the leg which had been operated twice and he assessed thereby 80% permanent disability. By Ext. C-10, another medical certificate issued by him also speaks of functional disability to the extent of 80%. Mrs. Helen Dawngliani, while arguing her case submits that since the claimant had suffered fracture in her leg to the extent of 80% disability she had to close her Tea Stall. Evidence offered by the doctor does not seem to have suffered by any substantial rebuttal that the claimant did not suffer 80% disability. Denying the argument so advanced by Mrs. Helen Dawngliani, Mr. A.R. Malhotra referring to the cross-examination of the doctor concerned submits that the permanent disability has been assessed on the basis of functional disablement, which is not acceptable. It is not brought on to the record through evidence that presently the claimant is bedridden or she is unable to do her ordinary persuits. Admittedly the doctor who issued the medical certificates and deposed before the tribunal in support of the medical certificates Ext. Nos. C-9 & 10 is not an orthopaedic surgeon. There is no evidence on record to show that the claimant had been examined by a medical board for the purpose of assessing the percentage of permanent disability. Thus, taking into consideration all the matters in its entirety, this Court is of view that fracture (L) of tibia though operated twice perhaps cannot result 80% permanent disability. Therefore, the percentage of permanent disablement is found to be in a higher side. Mrs. Helen Dawngliani in support of her contention in respect of permanent disablement referred the case between Dr. K.G. Poovaiah v. General Manager/Managing Director Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation reported in (2001) 11 SCC 167, where in their lordships of the Apex Court in para-5 of the judgment having considered the facts situation and evidence on record and other materials held as under: 5. There is no reason to doubt the testimony of the appellant so far as his monthly income is concerned. Being a medical man aged about 36 years on the date of accident, the monthly salary received by him cannot be said to be exaggerated. There is no reason to doubt the testimony of the appellant so far as his monthly income is concerned. Being a medical man aged about 36 years on the date of accident, the monthly salary received by him cannot be said to be exaggerated. He has candidly admitted that he has not assessed to tax. A salary of Rs.3000/- per month to a medical practitioner cannot be said to be on the higher side. We, therefore, accept his statement in this behalf. We also accept the assessment at Rs.40,000/- for pain and suffering. However, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of earning capacity is very much on the lower side. The injury to the right hand, which has left a permanent disability and which has affected the functioning of the limb and in particular the fingers, is a serious handicap to a medical practitioner. Patients would be reluctant to go to him for treatment and, therefore, the loss of earning capacity would be substantial. Even if we were to assure that it would reduce his earning capacity by 50% and even if we go by his earnings at the date of the accident, the monthly loss would come to Rs.1500/- i.e. Rs.18,000/- per annum. If this monthly loss of earning is multiplied by 10 years purchase factor the compensation would work out to Rs.1,80,000/-. To that must be added the compensation allowed under certain other 'heads, namely pain and suffering, loss of amenities, medical expenses, etc. The total amount comes to Rs.2,38,000/-. 11. There is no denial that the claimant did not suffer a fracture injury on her leg and also there is no denial in respect of her permanent disability to certain percentage. But the percentage of disability as testified by the doctor, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be accepted at such percentage and held as justified. In all probability the percentage of permanent disability should not be more than 60%. 12. Having considered all the matters in entirety, this appeal is partly allowed. The amount of compensation so awarded by the judgment and award impugned stands reduced to Rs.3,80,160/- (Rupees three, lakhs eighty thousands one hundred sixty) only, which shall earn interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of presentation of the claim petition till the date of realization. 13. The amount of compensation so awarded by the judgment and award impugned stands reduced to Rs.3,80,160/- (Rupees three, lakhs eighty thousands one hundred sixty) only, which shall earn interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of presentation of the claim petition till the date of realization. 13. There shall be no order as to cost.