JUDGMENT An agreement was executed on 24.02.2000 between U.P). Jal Vidyut Nigam, Lucknow, the predecessor in interest of the petitioners and the respondent for the construction work relating to Penstock, Anchor and Saddle blocks and Power House Building at Pilangad, M.H.S. (2x1125 kw) in District Uttarkashi. 2. Disputes having arisen between the parties with respect to the aforesaid agreement and the execution of the aforesaid work, on 27.09.2005, this Court in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act for short) appointed Sri Justice I.P. Vashistha (Retd.) as the single Member Arbitral Tribunal. Later on, Sri Justice I.P. Vashistha was replaced by Sri Justice V.N. Mehrotra by an order dated 23.12.2005 passed by this Court. The learned arbitrator gave his Award on 28.05.2007. 3. Whereas the petitioners herein dissatisfied with the Award, filed an application U/s 34 of 1996 Act in the Court at Dehradun, the respondent herein also dissatisfied with the Award, filed an application U/s 34 of 1996 Act on 24.08.2007 in the Court of District Judge, Uttarkashi. In the proceedings initiated by the respondent U/s 34 (Supra) before the District Judge, Uttarkashi, the petitioners herein raised a preliminary objection to the effect that District Judge, Uttarkashi did not have jurisdiction in the matter and that jurisdiction in the matter was vesting in the District Court at Dehradun only. Vide the impugned order dated 26.03.2008, the learned District Judge, Uttarkashi has overruled the aforesaid objection raised by the petitioners with respect to jurisdiction and has held that the District Court, Uttarkashi indeed has jurisdiction in this matter. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present petition Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the aforesaid impugned order. 5. Mr. Vinay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners took me through the agreement dated 24.02.2000 executed between the parties. According to him, because the office of the General manager of the petitioner Corporation is at Dehradun and because at Dehradun certain decisions had to be taken, the Courts at Dehradun alone have jurisdiction in the matter and the Courts at Uttarkashi did not have any jurisdiction in the matter at all. He has also referred to Section 42 of the 1996 Act. He has also referred to Section 42 of the 1996 Act. According to him, because Section 34 application was filed bys the petitioners prior in point of time before the District Judge, Dehradun, in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, all subsequent applications and proceedings including the Section 34 Application by the respondent, ought to have been filed at Dehradun. 6. Under Section 34 of 1996 Act, recourse to a Court against an arbitral Award may be made only by filing an application for setting aside the arbitral Award. Sub-section (2) of Section 34 of 1996 Act gives jurisdiction to a Court to set aside an arbitral Award upon any one or more of the grounds mentioned therein. “Court” has been defined in Section 2(e) of 1996 Act, which reads thus : 2.(e) “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction in a district, and to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court or a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 7. It is admitted case of the parties that the agreement dated 24.02.2000 was executed at Lucknow. It is not the case of the parties that this agreement was executed at Dehradun. It is also undisputed case of the parties that the work in question had been executed in Uttarkashi district. Merely because the office of the General Manager of the petitioner Corporation is at Dehradun and also because certain decisions were to be taken there, this did not at all give any territorial jurisdiction to the Courts at Dehradun. In view of the clear definition of the expression “Court” occurring in Section 2(e) of 1996 Act, read with Section 20 C.P.C., there is no manner of doubt that Section 34 application by any party dissatisfied or aggrieved with the Arbitral award in question had to be instituted and filed only in such Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction cause of action or part thereof had arisen or accrued. 8. 8. I have absolutely no hesitation in holding and declaring that no part of cause of action in the present case had arisen or accrued or it can be said to have arisen or accrued at Dehradun because neither the agreement dated 24.02.2000 was executed at Dehradun nor was the work in question to be executed or had actually been executed at Dehradun. Part of cause of action, undoubtedly, had accrued in Lucknow, where the aforesaid agreement was executed, but that is a different story altogether. Leaving Lucknow aspect apart, the entire cause of action in this case had arisen and accrued at Uttarkashi where the work had been executed and, therefore, Uttarkashi Court indeed alone had jurisdiction to entertain and decide Section 34 Application. Dehradun Court had no jurisdiction at all to entertain and decide Section 34 Application. 9. The learned District Judge, Uttarkashi has taken the correct view that Section 34 Application was maintainable in his Court and that he had the jurisdiction to receive, entertain and decide that application. 10. The petition filed by the petitioners herein is dismissed with costs of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) to be paid in the Legal Aid Fund within four weeks from today.