JUDGMENT V. DHANAPALAN, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order, dated 6.10.2005, passed in W.P. No. 32285 of 2005. 2. Though what was challenged in the writ petition was only a show cause notice and the appellant was terminated from service during the pendency of this writ appeal, considering the long pendency of the matter and in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this Court, exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordered the amendment of prayer with regard to termination of the appellant in the writ appeal. 3. The second respondent is a Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act and being managed by the Special Officer appointed by the Government. It is functioning under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, the rules framed there under and the bye-laws. The object of the society is to carry out the duty of banking services to the agricultural sector at the primary level. The same is being carried on strictly in accordance with the directions issued by the Government from time to time and the Government exercises control over the functioning of the said Society. 4. There are totally seven posts in the second respondent society comprising one Secretary, one Assistant Secretary, one Senior Assistant, two Assistants, one Attender and one Watchman/Sales Assistant. 5. In the vacancy of Attender, which existed on 19.1.1999, the appellant was appointed and she was brought under the regular time scale of pay by proceedings, dated 3.5.2000, and she has been discharging her duties since then. 6. While so, one Tmt. Muragathambigai, who was appointed as a Sales Woman in the Society, claiming that she should have been appointed as the Attender and not the appellant from outside, challenged the same by raising a dispute before the first respondent and the first respondent, by his proceedings dated 26.5.2000, purported to cancel the appointment of the appellant. Aggrieved against the same, the President of the Society had filed a revision under Section 153 of the Co-operative Societies Act before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, but the said revision was also dismissed by an order dated 4.7.2001. Pursuant to the said order, the services of the appellant were sought to be terminated by proceedings dated 18.8.2001 by the Society. Against the proceedings dated 26.5.2000 and 4.7.2001, the appellant filed W.P. Nos. Pursuant to the said order, the services of the appellant were sought to be terminated by proceedings dated 18.8.2001 by the Society. Against the proceedings dated 26.5.2000 and 4.7.2001, the appellant filed W.P. Nos. 10183 and 16179 of 2001, which were dismissed on 30.1.2003 and aggrieved against the same, the appellant preferred W.A. Nos. 1509 and 1510 of 2003, which were disposed of on 4.4.2003 by a Division Bench, holding that the case of the appellant was covered by the judgment which was rendered in the case of L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others 2003-I-LLJ-284, further observing that pending the fixation of cadre strength, the services of the appellant should not be terminated and further continuance of his service would depend upon the result of the enquiry to be held. It was also observed therein that while making the enquiry, the claim of Maragathambigai with regard to her entitlement for promotion, provided her appointment was valid, on the basis of seniority, could also be considered. 7. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the Division Bench, by proceedings dated 27.6.2003, the first respondent passed orders, stating that on 4.7.1995, the cadre strength was fixed and sent for approval by the Government under Rule 149(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, and the same was pending for consideration of the Government; the Society was an ‘A‘ Group Society and the appellant had all the qualifications which were required for the purpose of appointment to the post of Attender on the date on which she was appointed and, hence, she might continue in employment as Attender. It was further stated that Maragathambigai was not senior in the post of Sales Woman and there was another person by name S. Govindaraj, who was working as Salesman in the said Society and therefore she was not entitled for promotion. On the basis of the said order, the appellant is continuing in service as Attender. 8. When the matter stood thus, the second respondent submitted a statement in Form-I, stating that the total strength of the Society was 7 inclusive of one Attender and requested the first respondent to approve the same. On the basis of the said order, the appellant is continuing in service as Attender. 8. When the matter stood thus, the second respondent submitted a statement in Form-I, stating that the total strength of the Society was 7 inclusive of one Attender and requested the first respondent to approve the same. Till-date, special bye-laws have not been framed with regard to the fixation of staff strength and the appellant is continuing in service pursuant to the orders passed on 4.4.2003 in W.A. Nos. 1509 and 1510 of 2003. 9. That being the position, the first respondent issued a notice dated 30.9.2005, stating that the matter was examined in the light of the orders passed in L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others (supra), and the appointment of the appellant was against the rules since there was only one Attender sanctioned for the Society whereas already there were two Attenders and her appointment as a third Attender was in excess and the said appointment was made even without a vacancy. The said notice, according to the appellant, is arbitrary, illegal, unjust and unsustainable in law and deserves to be quashed. 10. The said notice, according to the appellant, is arbitrary, illegal, unjust and unsustainable in law and deserves to be quashed. 10. The case of the second respondent is that the appellant was appointed as Attender by the erstwhile elected board of management on 19.4.1999; the cadre strength, fixed by the Government, cannot be increased by the erstwhile management; in the appellant bank, which is of ‘A‘ class, only one Attender is allowable; when already three Attenders were employed by the bank, the board appointed the appellant as the fourth Attender; one of the prior employed Attenders one D. Raja died on 8.7.2003 and another K. Ramalingam died on 27.5.2003; the third person Ramachandran is working as Attender; when it was known that the appellant was appointed in excess of the cadre strength, the first respondent issued show cause notice, dated 30.9.2005; against the said show cause notice, the appellant filed W.P. No. 32285 of 2005 and the same was dismissed on 6.10.2005, on the ground that the show cause notice could not be challenged by way of writ petition; the appellant filed this writ appeal, challenging the order passed in the said writ petition; the appellant was appointed in excess of the cadre strength and as such her appointment is illegal under Rule 149 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules and G.O. 2(D) No. 68 Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 12.11.1993, and the circular of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Rc.158681/93/ASCS-3, dated 2.12.1993 and, hence, the appointment of the appellant was illegal even on the date of appointment. 11. It is also the case of the second respondent that erstwhile board of management and the employees of the second respondent bank entered into a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 17.12.1998, in which only one Attender found place; after entering into the settlement, the appellant was appointed in utter disregard of the settlement; therefore, the second respondent bank cannot afford to have employees in excess of the cadre strength and, as such, the appointment of the appellant is illegal and the dismissal order, dated 11.11.2005, is in accordance with law. 12. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that considering the need for the services of an Attender and to cope with the increase in work load in the bank, the second respondent had decided to fill up the vacancy in the post of Attender and, accordingly, the appellant was appointed on 19.4.1999; by proceedings, dated 3.5.2000, the second respondent had declared the probation of the appellant and confirmed the services; the appellant was the only Attender as the other Attenders viz., K. Ramalingam and P. Ramachandran, who were in service at the time when the appellant was appointed, had been promoted as Clerks and the other Attender by name Raja died on 8.7.2003 and, therefore, the order of termination, dated 11.11.2005 is liable to be set aside. 13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and given our rapt attention to the rival submissions. 14. It is seen from the settlement, dated 17.12.1998, entered into between the erstwhile Board of management and the employees of the second respondent bank under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act that the cadre strength of the second respondent bank is 7, of which the post of Attender is only one. The appellant was appointed as Attender in the second respondent Bank on 19.4.1999, which was pursuant to 17.12.1998, the date of settlement. It is also seen from the Employees‘ Attendance Register of the second respondent Bank for the month of April, 1999, that the appellant joined on 19.4.1999. Pertinent it is to note that as on 19.4.1999, i. e., the date of joining of the appellant, in addition to the appellant, already, two more persons, namely, K. Ramalingam and D. Ramachandran were working as Attenders in the second respondent bank, which makes it clear that there are totally three Attenders, in excess of the cadre strength, when there is only one post of Attender. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that as on the date of appointment of the appellant, appellant was the only Attender is dispelled. In view of the excess cadre strength, the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant possesses the required qualifications at the time of appointment and, hence, her service has to be continued also has no basis. 15. In view of the excess cadre strength, the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the appellant possesses the required qualifications at the time of appointment and, hence, her service has to be continued also has no basis. 15. In G.O. 2(D) No. 68 Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 12.11.1993, column (x) refers to cadre strength, wherein it is stated that the Government accept the norms for fixing the cadre strength of the Primary Agricultural Co-operative Banks as contained in recommendation Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and order accordingly. In addition, in sub-column (ii) of Column-I of the circular of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Rc.158681/93/ASCS-3, dated 2.12.1993, addressed to all the Regional Joint Registrars, which deals with Cadre strength (Recommendation Nos. 3 to 7), goes to the effect that the cadre strength for all the three classes of Primary Agricultural Co-operative Banks recommended by the Committee and accepted by the Government has to be adopted by the Primary Agricultural Co-operative Banks as indicated in Annexure-I. A reading of the Annexure-I shows only one post of Attender for the second respondent bank. The above said G.O. and the Circular are much prior to the appointment of the appellant as Attender in the second respondent bank. Therefore, it could be seen that the appellant was appointed in utter disregard of the norms fixed. As such, one more contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the cadre strength is not approved and Rule 149 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, is violated is untenable. 16. Adverting to the order of termination, dated 11.11.2005, the respondents, as per the directions of this Court in W.A. Nos. 2501 and 2502 of 2001 (batch) in the case of L. Justine v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies L. Justine v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies L. Justine v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies ( supra), and that of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1413 of 2003, with a view to give one more opportunity, issued a show cause notice, dated 30.9.2005, to the appellant, calling upon her to show cause as to why her services should not be terminated. After receiving the said show cause notice, the appellant submitted her explanation on 10.10.2005. The said explanation was considered as per the directions of this Court and not accepted. After receiving the said show cause notice, the appellant submitted her explanation on 10.10.2005. The said explanation was considered as per the directions of this Court and not accepted. It is also stated in the impugned order of termination that at the time when the appellant was appointed i. e., on 19.4.1999, as per the cadre strength of the bank, only one post of Attender was allowable and even though already two Attenders were working in the bank, the appointment of the appellant had been improperly made without there being any vacancy and, therefore, it was ordered that the appellant, whose appointment had been made contrary to the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed there under, was relieved with effect from the forenoon of 15.11.2005, thereby holding the appointment of the appellant as illegal. 17. Though the case of the appellant is that her case has been covered by the findings in L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co -operative Societies and Others ( supra), in view of the findings of the Supreme Court in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies AIR 2004 SC 4504 : (2004) 7 SCC 112 : (2005) 1 MLJ 6: 2004-III-LLJ-780, the observations, findings and directions given by a Division Bench of this Court in L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Others L. Justine and Another v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Others ( supra) at paragraph 19 (i) and last portion of the paragraph 19 (v) and the finding with regard to regularisation of service of employees recruited prior to 12.3.2001, have been overruled. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in State of Mysore v. S. V. Narayanappa AIR 1967 SC 1071 : 1967 (1) SCR 128 ; R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmaiah AIR 1972 SC 1767 : (1972) 1 SCC 409 : 1972-I-LLJ-565, and B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka AIR 1979 SC 1676 : (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1979-II-LLJ-209, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by the Supreme Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of the judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) , AIR 2006 SC 1806 : (2006) 4 SCC 1 : (2006) 2 MLJ 326: 2006-II-LLJ-722. 18. In the instant case, admittedly, the post is not available on the date of appointment of the appellant. Therefore, when there is no sanctioned post available, if the appointment is made, that appointment may not be construed as irregular appointment, but is an illegal appointment. It is also well settled that the legal proposition now is that regularisation, if any already made, need not be reopened, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be the mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules. Regularisation cannot be said to be the mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules. No regularisation is, thus, permissible in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution if the appointments have been made in contravention of the statutory rules. Hence, it cannot be construed that the appointment of the appellant is an irregular appointment as there is no vacant post on the date of appointment, and, instead, it can only be termed to be an illegal appointment. As such, we hold that the appointment of the appellant is illegal and not irregular and she is not entitled for regularisation. Further, in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) ( supra), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the High Court, acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue direction for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself is made regularly and in terms of the Constitutional scheme and merely because an employee has continued under cover of an order of the Court, which is a litigious employment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. 19. Though the services of the appellant were confirmed by the order of the second respondent, dated 3.5.2000, in view of the excess cadre strength and the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court as above, the very appointment of the appellant becomes ab initio void. 20. Following the settled position of law, referred to above, and in view of our discussion supra, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal. Therefore, this writ appeal is dismissed. However, it is open to the appellant to make a claim for absorption, in which event, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the long service put in by the appellant, we direct the respondents to consider the claim of the appellant for the vacancies, that may arise in future. No costs. Writ appeal dismissed.