Judgment :- (1.) HEARD the learned advocates for the respective parties. (2.) THE facts of the case, very, briefly, are that the opposite parties filed Title Suit No. 133 of 2003 against the petitioner and the proforma opposite party praying inter alia for a declaration that a certain deed of lease is void, inoperative, fraudulent, collusive and forged and that the compensation awarded in respect of the property included in the said deed of lease should be awarded entirely in favour of the plaintiffs/opposite parties and that the defendant/petitioner has no right to claim any share in the said compensation amount. The plaintiffs/opposite parties also prayed for a decree for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant/petitioner from receiving any part of the aforesaid compensation amount which has since been deposited in the Court of the learned District Judge, Suri in connection with the pending LA Case no. 89 of 2001. The sum and substance of the allegations made in the plaint was that the purported deed of lease obtained in favour of the defendant/petitioner in respect of a certain debuttar property belonging to the opposite parties is vitiated by fraud, forgery and interpolation. According to the plaintiffs/opposite parties their power-of-attorney-holder, namely, Dulal Chandra Roy, who was a trusted employee of the sebaits of the deity concerned was instrumental in the perpetration of such fraud, forgery interpolation of the deed of lease in question. The opposite parties filed an application for injunction in the said suit for restraining the petitioner from withdrawing the compensation amount which has been deposited in the Court of the learned District Judge, suri as mentioned in the plaint. The said application was contested by the defendant/petitioner and the learned Trial Court by order dated 05.12.2005 rejected the said application for temporary injunction. (3.) BEING aggrieved by the said order dated 05.12.2005 the plaintiffs/opposite parties preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 17 of 2005. By order dated 26.04.2006 the learned lower Appellate Court allowed the said Misc. appeal and directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the compensation amount in relation to kha schedule property till the disposal of the suit. (4.) THE defendant has moved this Court by way of an application under article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the aforesaid order dated 26.04.2006. appeal and directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the compensation amount in relation to kha schedule property till the disposal of the suit. (4.) THE defendant has moved this Court by way of an application under article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the aforesaid order dated 26.04.2006. (5.) IT appears that the learned lower Appellate Court came to the finding, by making comparison of various deeds, that the power-of attorney-holder had no authority to make any correction in any deed. The learned lower Appellate Court has observed in the impugned order that "the main contention of the suit is that the intention and spirit of the shebaits in conforming the power of attorney were not to empower them to have any right, title and interest in any compensation amount. And every deed produced before this Court as a specimen copy from the side of the appellants clearly speaks that the first party would get the compensation amount, if any, but the second party has no such right. But it appears from the alleged deed that the total intention and the spirit of the shebaits in executing such deed has been frustrated. The intention of the shebaits were to keep reserve all benefits in their favour but the deed in question clearly speaks that it has gone against them. " By taking into consideration the materials on record, the learned lower appellate Court came to the finding that the learned Trial Court did not apply its mind while observing that there was no change of intention or spirit of the deed and the learned Trial Court proceeded on the basis of surmises and conjectures. It appears from a perusal of the impugned order that a point was taken before the learned lower Appellate Court by the petitioner that there is no urgency in the application for injunction and that the matter is subjudice before the learned District judge, Birbhum in the aforesaid LA case. The learned lower Appellate court found that there is no dispute that the compensation amount has been awarded and both the parties have appeared before the learned district Judge, Birbhum in the aforesaid LA case, but, the said deed of lease is the subject-matter of the present title suit. The learned lower Appellate court found that there is no dispute that the compensation amount has been awarded and both the parties have appeared before the learned district Judge, Birbhum in the aforesaid LA case, but, the said deed of lease is the subject-matter of the present title suit. The learned lower appellate Court was of the view that if at this stage the defendant/petitioner is allowed to withdraw the compensation amount it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and the plaintiffs/opposite parties will suffer irreparable loss. The learned lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs/opposite parties have a prima facie case and the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of the plaintiffs/opposite parties. (6.) THE arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant petitioner at the time of hearing of the present application was that keeping in view the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and considering certain provisions of the said Act, this Court should hold that the plaintiffs/opposite parties are not entitled to the order of injunction, as prayed for by them, and the learned Trial Court was right in rejecting the prayer for injunction. The said learned counsel referred to certain provisions of the said Act namely, sections 18, 30, 31, 32, 53 and 54. The said learned counsel submitted that, if necessary, the plaintiffs/opposite parties could have approached the appropriate authority under the said Act but the plaintiffs/opposite parties are not entitled to any order of injunction as prayed for by them. It may be recorded here that the learned counsel for the defendant/petitioner did not argue that the plaint should be rejected or that the suit is not maintainable. The learned counsel further submitted that compensation amount has been deposited in the Court of the learned district Judge, Birbhum, as aforesaid, and an appropriate notice dated 05. 07. 2001 has been given to the petitioner indicating that a certain sum of money has been deposited in the Court of the learned District judge, Birbhum for apportionment of compensation under section 30 of the said Act. A copy of such notice as produced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner be kept on record. 07. 2001 has been given to the petitioner indicating that a certain sum of money has been deposited in the Court of the learned District judge, Birbhum for apportionment of compensation under section 30 of the said Act. A copy of such notice as produced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner be kept on record. (7.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment reported at AIR 1953 Supreme Court 33 (Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali Sen and others) and laid emphasis on the following observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the said reports:- (1) "the land acquisition Court had thus jurisdiction to decide the question of title of the parties in the property acquired and that title could not be decided except by deciding the controversy between the parties about the ownership of the four anna share claimed by the Sens and Rajlakshmi. " (in paragraph 11 of the said reports). (2) "these two decisions, in our opinion, are conclusive on the point of res judicata raised in the present case and in these circumstances it has to be held that the question of title to the four annas share was necessarily and substantially involved in the land acquisition proceedings and was finally decided by a court having jurisdiction to try it and that decision thus operates as res judicata and estops the Sens and the mortgagees from re-agitating that matter in this suit. " (in paragraph 14 of the said reports). (3) "in view of the provisions of sections 9, 10, 18 and 30, Land acquisition Act, it is evident that if the mortgagee actually intervenes in the land acquisition proceedings and makes a claim for the compensation, and any question of title arises about the right of the mortgagor in respect to the land acquired which affects the claim for compensation he has every right to protect that title. " (in paragraph 1. 6 of the said reports). (4) "the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. " (in paragraph 19 of the said reports). " (in paragraph 1. 6 of the said reports). (4) "the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. " (in paragraph 19 of the said reports). (5) "the condition regarding the competency of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitations engrafted on the general rule of res judicata by section 11 of the Code and has application to suits alone. When a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the Court that heard and decided the former case was a court of competent Jurisdiction. It does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like revenue Courts, land acquisition Courts, administration Courts, etc. It is obvious that these Courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. We have not been able to appreciate the distinction sought to be made out by Mr. Ghose that had this matter been decided by a District Judge, then the decision of the Privy Council would have been res judicata but as it was decided by a special Judge the effect was different. The District Judge when exercising powers of a Court under the land Acquisition Act, in that capacity is not entitled to try a regular suit and his jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act is quite different from the jurisdiction he exercises on the regular civil side. " (in paragraph 20 of the said reports). (8.) ANOTHER judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the one reported at 20 CWN 1028 (Sm. Krishna Kalyani Dasi v. Mr. R. Braunfield and others). Attention of this Court was drawn to the following lines appearing at pages 1038 and 1039 of the said reports:-"it was contended on behalf of Mani Lal that as the conveyance stood in his name and as he was in possession, the Prince could not claim any compensation in the present proceedings so long as he did not establish his title by a regular suit. But the Court in a Land acquisition case can go into the question of title for the purpose of determining which of the contending parties is entitled to the compensation." (9.) THE learned counsel for the plaintiffs/opposite parties submitted that the land acquisition authorities are not entitled to decide the reliefs claimed in the suit filed by the opposite parties and that the land acquisition authorities can deal with the question of title incidentally and only for the purpose of apportionment of the compensation. The said learned counsel also submitted that in any event the Civil Court is not debarred from adjudicating the reliefs claimed in the suit irrespective of the pendency of the land acquisition proceedings. The said learned counsel submitted that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not argued that the suit is not maintainable, and that since the suit is maintainable the plaintiffs/opposite parties are entitled to the order of injunction. (10) THE learned counsel for the plaintiffs/opposite parties referred to sections 11, 12, 18, 29 and 30 of the said Act, and he also referred to the decision reported at (1993) 3 SCC 162 (D. R. Chawla and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi) while submitting that it is a settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be readily inferred and that there must be an explicitly expressed provision for such exclusion of Civil Courts jurisdiction or it may be a case of necessary implication. The said learned counsel submitted that since the plaintiffs/opposite parties have filed a comprehensive civil suit challenging the very deed of lease itself on the ground of fraud, forgery and collusion, it is only fit and proper that the Civil Court should decide the reliefs prayed for in the suit filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties. (11.) IN Raj Lakshmi Dasis case (supra), cited on behalf of the petitioner, the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that the Land acquisition Court has the jurisdiction to decide the question of title of the parties in the property acquired and that a plea of res judicata on general principle can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like the Land Acquisition Courts even though, such Courts may not be entitled to try a regular suit and they only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute. This reported decision clearly states that once a decision is taken by a competent Court, even if it exercises a special jurisdiction conferred on it by a statute to decide on a particular matter, such decision will operate as res judicata. (12.) IN the instant case, however, the question of res judicata does not arise as yet since no reference has been made under section 30 of the said Act as yet and, consequently, no decision has been rendered by any Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not argued that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties is not maintainable. That apart, from a reading of the various sections which have been mentioned by the learned advocates for the respective parties it does not appear to this Court that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to try the suit has been expressly barred or even by necessary implication there is any bar to entertain the said suit before the Civil Court. It is only if a reference is made either under section 18 or section 30 of the said Act to the Court and the said Court renders decision on such reference, then in that event only a party may be estopped from raising the same dispute by way of a separate suit. Since in the instant case no reference has been made as yet by the land Acquisition authority under the said Act and, consequently, no decision has been rendered by any Court, it cannot be said that there is any bar in proceeding with the suit concerned. (13.) IN Krishna Kalyani Dasis case (supra) it has been observed that the Court in a land acquisition case can go into the question of title for the purpose of determining which of the contending parties is entitled to the compensation. There cannot be any dispute with regard to such proposition of law but the question here is whether or not the plaintiffs/opposite parties are entitled to any order of injunction in the suit they have filed. (14.) IN the present context, if reference was to be made either under section 18 or under section 30 of the said Act then in that event such reference would have been for the purpose of apportionment of the compensation or to decide the question as to whom such compensation or part thereof is payable. (14.) IN the present context, if reference was to be made either under section 18 or under section 30 of the said Act then in that event such reference would have been for the purpose of apportionment of the compensation or to decide the question as to whom such compensation or part thereof is payable. Only for the purpose of deciding the question of validity and/or legality of the lease deed, without being related to the question of apportionment of compensation and/or entitlement to compensation, could not have been the subject matter of reference under the said Act. But the suit filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties goes to the very root of the matter and the plaintiffs/opposite parties have challenged the deed of lease on the ground of fraud, forgery and collusion and, of course, the petitioners alleged entitlement to any part of the compensation has also been challenged in the said suit. Thus, the suit is a comprehensive one and the decision in the suit may have many ramifications and such ramifications may not be confined to the subject of compensation amount only. (15.) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the petitioner, even if the suit filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties is maintainable yet no order of injunction should be passed in view of the pendency of the land acquisition proceedings. This is an argument which is difficult to appreciate. Once a suit is found to be maintainable there cannot be any reason for preventing a party to the suit to pray for appropriate interim orders in such suit in the aid of the final relief claimed in the suit itself. In the present case, since the petitioner cannot take the plea of res judicata, as there has been no reference to, and, consequently no decision has been rendered by, any Court, and also view of the fact that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties is not barred under any law, this Court is of the view that the Civil Court before which the suit has been filed is entitled to pass appropriate orders of injunction, if necessary. Mere pendency of the land acquisition proceedings cannot prevent the plaintiffs in the suit from seeking appropriate orders before the Civil Court. Mere pendency of the land acquisition proceedings cannot prevent the plaintiffs in the suit from seeking appropriate orders before the Civil Court. (16.) THE learned lower Appellate Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the materials on record has found that the plaintiffs/opposite parties have a prima facie case and the balance of convenience and inconvenience are in their favour. That apart, it appears from a perusal of the impugned order and the case of the plaintiffs/opposite parties, that the allegations made by the plaintiffs/opposite parties against the defendants in the suit are quite serious in nature. This Court is of the view that no interference is called for with the impugned order. However, the learned Trial Court should make all endeavour to dispose of the suit as early as possible without granting any unnecessary adjournment to any of the parties. (17.) THIS Court is of the view that there is no merit in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is, accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of usual formalities. Application dismissed.