Sudarshan Wadia v. Titan Industries Limited- Respondents
2008-07-02
A.S.PACHHAPURE, V.G.SABHAHIT
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Sabhahit, J. This appeal by the second defendant in O.S.No.3464/2000 on the file of XXX Addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore City is filed being aggrieved by the order dated 17.11.2001 allowing I.A.1 filed by the plaintiff and restraining defendant No.1-Bank from paying any money under the Bank guarantee dated 14.10.97 for Rs.1,25,00,000/- till the disposal of the suit. 2. The essential facts of the case leading upto this appeal with reference to the rank of the parties before the trial Court are as follows: The plaintiff filed O.S.No.3464/2000 on the file of City Civil Judge, Bangalore, seeking for recovery of Rs.53,36,717/. along with interest thereon at 18% p.a. from the date of suit to the date of payment and seeking permanent injunction restraining first defendant-Bank from making any payment under or pursuant to Bank guarantee dated 14.10.97. In the said suit plaintiff filed I.A. No.1 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC., seeking an order of interim injunction to restrain first defendant-Bank: from paying any money under Bank guarantee dated 14.10.97 for Rs.1.25,00,000/- pending disposal of the suit. 3. The plaintiff averred in the IA. that second defendant is the owner of flat bearing No.502. Jaladarsban Building, Chimbai Master, Vinayak Cross Road, Bandra West, Mumbai (hereinafter called ‘schedule premises’]. The plaintiff obtained leave and licence of the schedule premises under an agreement dated 1.3.94. for the purpose of housing plaintiffs guest house at Mumbai. The plaintiff initially gave deposit of Rs.15,00,000/- and agreed to pay monthly licence fee of Rs.6.500/- and also furnished Bank guarantee to ensure prompt vacating of the premises at the end of period of agreement. The plaintiff was put in possession of schedule premises and the same was used as guest house by the plaintiff. The period of agreement expired on 28.2.97 and second defendant entered into fresh leave and licence agreement for the period from 1.3.97 to 29.2.2000. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement would automatically came to an end on 29.2.2000. The plaintiff paid security deposit of Rs.42,35,000/- and also furnished Bank guarantee for Rs.1,25,00,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty-five lakhs only) issued by the first defendant for enforcing prompt vacating and handing over vacant possession of schedule premises on 29.2.2000 agreed to amendment of para-1 and deletion of proviso to para-2 of Bank guarantee subject to addition of para-14 in the leave and licence agreement.
Bank guarantee was amended but second defendant neglected to amend agreement. Amendment of Bank guarantee was intimated to the second defendant. It is further averred, that before the expiry of period of agreement, plaintiff wrote a letter to second defendant on 7.1.2000 intimating that agreement period is expired on February 29, 2000 and as plaintiff is interested in continuing the lease, second defendant was requested to inform acceptance by second defendant with fresh terms and conditions. Second defendant by letter dated 2.2.2000 informed the plaintiff that there is no meeting ground and it would be appropriate if the dues pertaining to first and second period of licence are discharged at the earliest. In response to said letter of second defendant, plaintiff addressed a letter to second defendant on 15.2.2000 intimating that in view of second defendant not agreeing to terms for renewing the licence, Mr. Kashy Cherian, Admin. Executive, Regional Office, Bombay to hand over possession of premises on 1.3.2000 and requested the second defendant to intimate particulars of his representative who will be taking over possession of premises and to hand over Bank guarantee and security deposit amount to Mr. K. Cherian. The second defendant in response to letter of plaintiff dated 15.2.2000 sent a reply letter dated 24.2.2000 informing that on account of Central budget excise, it was not possible for him to come to Bombay on 1.3.2000 to take possession and that suitable date in the third week of March, preferably on Saturday/Sunday may be fixed for handing/taking over possession of schedule premises. 4. It is further averred in the affidavit filed on behalf of plaintiff that plaintiff was willing to hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises on 1.3.2000, second defendant expressed his inability to take possession of schedule premises on 1.3.2000 and requested the plaint to fix a date in third week of March to hand over/take possession of schedule premises. However, the second defendant fraudulently sought to invoke Bank guarantee and pressurised the plaintiff to extend the bank guarantee and on extension of Bank guarantee upto 1.4.2000 withdrew the letter dated 8.3.2000 seeking invocation of bank guarantee. Thereafter, plaintiff addressed a letter to the second defendant intimating that plaintiff would vacate the premises by 31.3.2000 and arrangements be made for taking possession.
Thereafter, plaintiff addressed a letter to the second defendant intimating that plaintiff would vacate the premises by 31.3.2000 and arrangements be made for taking possession. Since no reply was received, vacated the schedule premises on 31.3.2000 and intimated the second defendant and requested the second defendant to return security deposit of Rs.42,35 lakhs held by him and to return bank guarantee and addressed letters in that behalf on 7.4.2000. 17.4.2000 and 24.4.2000. Second defendant by letter dated 10.5.2000 raised certain fraudulent disputes regarding the interest claimed and expressed his wiliness to take possession on 20.5.2000. Second defendant failed to take possession of vacant premises as agreed in his letter on 20.5.2000 as he has to refund Rs.42.35 1akhs illegally withheld by him and return the bank guarantee. However, being not satisfied with his illegal conduct, second defendant sought invocation of bank guarantee which is wholly illegal and fraudulent in nature. The bank guarantee could be enforced only if possession was not handed over due to conduct of plaintiff. on 29.2.2000. Since second defendant himself expressed inability to take possession and went on postponing taking possession of schedule premises, bank guarantee could not be invoked and wherefore, I.A. is filed seeking for injunction as invocation of bank guarantee is wholly illegal and fraudulent in nature and encashment if permitted will cause irretrievable injury and injustice to plaintiff. 5. Defendant No.2 filed objections to the I.A. averring that application is frivolous. vexatious and not maintainable. Suit itself is not maintainable as no part of cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of Bangalore. The agreement was executed at Delhi, schedule property is situated at Bombay. At no stage. agreement was executed at Bangalore. Bank guarantee is executed by plaintiff having registered office at Hosur. Tamilnadu. Second defendant averred that a sum of Rs.42 1akhs was deposited and not Rs.42,35,000/- as averred in the plaint. Averment that plaintiff was willing to vacate schedule premises on 1.3.2000 was denied and it is averred that premises could be vacated only by handing over key at Delhi. Since plaintiff did not vacate schedule premises on 29.2.2000 defendant No2 is entitled to encash bank guarantee and forfeit security deposit as per terms of agreement. 6. The averment that schedule premises was vacated on 31.3.2000 is denied.
Since plaintiff did not vacate schedule premises on 29.2.2000 defendant No2 is entitled to encash bank guarantee and forfeit security deposit as per terms of agreement. 6. The averment that schedule premises was vacated on 31.3.2000 is denied. In view of unconditional bank guarantee executed to enforce prompt handing over of vacant possession of premises on 1.3.2000 any dispute between plaintiff and second defendant cannot preclude enforcement of bank guarantee. Fraud and irretrievable injury to plaintiff is denied and second defendant sought for dismissal of I.A.I. 7. Defendant No.1-Bank filed objections to I.A.I admitting execution of bank guarantee. In view of copy of documents supplied to bank-defendant No.2 expressed inability to take possession on 1.3.2000 and requested to fix time in third week of March, 2000. Bank guarantee was extended by one month, however, second defendant wrote letter to invoke bank guarantee and as matter is pending before Court, the further action could be taken till receipt of necessary orders from the Court. 8. The plaintiff filed rejoinder denying averment made against it by defendant No.2 in the objections and entitlement of defendant No.2 to enforce bank guarantee and reiterating the averment made in the I.A. 9. The trial Court after hearing the Counsel appearing for the parties and on consideration of material produced before it by order dated 17.11. 2001 allowed I.A.I and restrained defendant No.1-Bank from making payment of money under Bank Guarantee No.G/1302/970366 dated 14.10.97 till the disposal of suit. Being aggrieved by this order, defendant No.2 has preferred this appeal. The appeal was admitted and prayer for interim order was rejected by order dated 28.2.2002. The appeal was dismissed for non prosecution on 23.1.2004 and on application filed by appellant, said order was recalled and appeal was restored to the file of this Court by order dated 11.3.2004 and appeal was posted for hearing. 10. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff and reply arguments. 11. Having regard to the contentions urged, the points that arise for our determination in this appeal are: “1. Whether the impugned order passed py the trial Court allowing IA.I calls for interference in this appeal? 2. What order?” and we answer the above points as follows: Point No.1: In the negative.
11. Having regard to the contentions urged, the points that arise for our determination in this appeal are: “1. Whether the impugned order passed py the trial Court allowing IA.I calls for interference in this appeal? 2. What order?” and we answer the above points as follows: Point No.1: In the negative. Point No.2: In view of our answer to point No.1, the appeal is liable to be dismissed for the following: REASONS 12. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the suit filed in the City Civil Court at Bangalore itself is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction as the cause of action has accrued at Bombay and Delhi and no part of cause of action accrued at Bangalore and the suit is filed at Bangalore only to obtain an interim order and to harass defendant No.2. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SOUTH EAST ASIA SHIPPING CO. LTD., Vs. NAV BHARATH ASIA SHIPPING CO. LTD., & OTHERS (1996) 3 SCC 443 ). In the case of PATEL ROADWAYS LTD., Vs. PRASAD TRADING CO. ( AIR 1992 SC 1514 ) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that if no part of cause of action accrued at the place where suit is filed, the suit must be returned for presentation before appropriate Court. He has also relied upon the decision of this Court in NITCO CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS (P) LTD., Vs. SREE VENAKTESHWARA ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS (ILR 1993 KAR. 729) wherein Hon’ble Court has held that merely because bank guarantee has been issued from Bangalore, the same would not confer territorial jurisdiction. He has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BHAGWANDAN Vs. GIRIDHARILAL ( AIR 1966 SC 543 ) wherein the Hon’b1e Supreme Court has held that by intimating an offer, when the parties are not in the presence of each other, the offeror is deemed to be making the offer continuously till the offer reaches the offeree and the offeror thereby intimates his intention to enter into a contract on the terms of the offer. He has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BOARD OF TRUSTEES, CALCUTTA ( AIR 1995 SC 577 ). NATIONAL THERMAL POWER CORPORATION AND OTHERS ( AIR 1993 SC 998 ) and PATEL ROAD WAYS LTD.,BOMBAY Vs.
He has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BOARD OF TRUSTEES, CALCUTTA ( AIR 1995 SC 577 ). NATIONAL THERMAL POWER CORPORATION AND OTHERS ( AIR 1993 SC 998 ) and PATEL ROAD WAYS LTD.,BOMBAY Vs. PRASAD TRADING COMPANY (1991)4 SCC 270 ) in support of his contention that unless the Court has territorial jurisdiction, the question of choosing forum does not arise. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Bank guarantee was amended and any dispute between the plaintiff and the second defendant regarding vacating of premises would not in any way preclude the plaintiff from invoking bank guarantee and having regard to the admitted fact that the schedule premises was not vacated on 1.3.2000, the second defendant was justified in invoking the bank guarantee and the Court cannot restrain the plaintiff from invoking the bank guarantee except where prima facie case of fraud or irretrievable injury to the plaintiff with an order of temporary injunction is made out. In support of the contention, he has relied upon the following decisions: 1. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPRATION Ltd., Vs. SBI OVERSEAS BRANCH, BOMBAY (2000)6 SCC 385 . 2. ITC LTD., Vs. DEBTS RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL ( AIR 1998 SC 634 ). 3. UP Sf ATE SUGAR CORPORATION Vs. SUMAC INTERNATIONAL LTD., (1997) 1 SCC 568 ). 4. SVENSKA HINDELSBANKEN Vs. M/S. INDIAN CHARGE CHROME AND OTHERS ( AIR 1994 SC 626 ). 5. DWARIKESH SUGAR INDUSfRIES LTD., Vs. PREM HEAVY ENGINEERING WORKS (P) LTD., (1997)6 SCC 450 ). 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that since the plaintiff has been restrained to pay bank guarantee which is an unconditional order passed by the trial Court order, the order is arbitrary and capricious as to call for interference in this appeal. 14. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff submitted that though defendant No.2 has signed the contract at Delhi, the same was forwarded to the plaintiff at Bangalore and it was signed at Bangalore which is clearly evidenced by the documents and where a part of cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of Bangalore accrued, unless contract bas been executed by the plaintiff at Bangalore, the same would confer jurisdiction on the City Civil Court, Bangalore.
In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ABC LAMINART PVT.LTD., Vs.. A.P. AGENCIES, SALEM ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ) wherein it is held that making of the contract is part of the cause of action and a suit on contract can be filed at the place where it was made. He has also relied upon the decision of this Court in ANJANA MATCH WORKS Vs. MATCH GOA PRIVATE LTD., (1977 (2) MYS.L.J. 332) wherein it is held that, agreement drafted at Goa, defendant signed at Goa, agreement taken to Mysore where plaintiff signed the agreement the suit can be filed at Mysore since cause of action arose at Mysore. He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UNION BANK OF INDIA Vs. SEPPO RALLY OY AND ANOTHER (1999) 8 SCC 357 ) wherein it is held that when Bank guarantee was issued by a branch of a Bank at Sahranpur, the suit for wrongful invocation can be filed at Sahranpur. He has also relied upon the decision of this Court in MUNIRANGAPPA Vs. AMIDAVALA VENKATAPPA (AIR 1965 MYSORE 316) wherein it is clearly laid down that even if fraction of a cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of a Court that Court will have jurisdiction. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff further submitted that the plaintiff was ready to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the schedule premises to defendant No.2 on 1.3.2000 and defendant No.2 has expressed his inability to be present on 1.3.2000 who received possession of the schedule premises and requested the plaintiff fix a date in third week of March and wherefore, possession could not be handed over on 1.3.2000 solely due to the contract of the second defendant and not due to any act on the part of the plaintiff who was willing to hand over possession on 1.3.2000.
The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the second defendant having requested that fixing a date in the third week of March, 2000 for taking possession and to invoke bank guarantee by a letter dated 8.3.2000 and letter issued to the plaintiff to vacate the bank guarantee suit 1.3.2000 and thereafter to recall the intimation sent for invoking the bank guarantee and even thereafter second defendant made enquiry as to the amount due to be paid by him if the premises was vacated on 15.5.2000 or 1.6.2000 and particulars also sent to the second defendant by letter dated 5.5.2000 and plaintiff disputed the same as plaintiff has chosen to suppress all the above facts and has invoked encashment of bank guarantee by letter dated 23.5.2000 and therefore, there is fraud on the part of the second defendant by invoking bank guarantee and that possession could not be handed over on 1.3.2000 and invoking the bank guarantee on 25.3.2000 is also the suppression of material fact and the plaintiff would be put to irretrievable loss if the bank guarantee is invoked. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the second defendant has admitted that he has received advance amount of Rs.42 lakhs and is withholding the bank guarantee and wherefore, order returning first defendant from making any payment to the second defendant under the bank guarantee is justified. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff also submitted that cause of action on behalf of the plaintiff has taken place from Bangalore, Bank guarantee was to be claimed at Bangalore and letter written by the appellant seeking change of date to receive possession was also received by the appellant at Bangalore and wherefore the City Civil Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant order of temporary injunction. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that having regard to the decision of this Court in the case of RANGAMMA Vs. KRISHNAPPA (1968 (1) Mys.LJ 552) and in the case of N.R.DONGRE &; OTHERS Vs. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION & ANOTHER (1996) 5 SCC 714 ) the scope of interference in this appeal is limited and only where the order is found to be capricious or arbitrary the order would not warrant interference and learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the order passed by the trial Court is justified and does not call for interference in this appeal. 15.
15. We have given anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, scrutinized material adduced by the parties before the trial Court and perused the averments made in the I.A., objections by defendants, rejoinder and order passed by the trial Court in the light .of principles laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 16. The contents of bank guarantee and agreement for leave and licence clearly reveal that Bank guarantee for Rs. 1,25,00,000/- (Rupees one crore and twenty five lakhs only) was executed by defendant of bank at the instance of plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2 as performance guarantee to guarantee prompt handing over of vacant schedule premises at the end of agreement period on 1.3.2000. 17. The agreement period to leave and licence of schedule premises upto 29.2.2000 and was executed by plaintiff at Bangalore as agreement had been sent to Bangalore for execution by plaintiff even though defendant No.2 executed agreement at Delhi and wherefore part of cause of action has accrued at Bangalore and wherefore, even without going into details of other part of cause of action which occurred at Bangalore, it can be said that at the stage of considering I.A. 1 prima facie case in favour of territorial jurisdiction of Bangalore Court is made out. 18. It is also clear from the perusal of correspondence made between plaintiff and defendant No.2 and contents of agreement and bank guarantee that Bank guarantee was executed for performance of clause in the agreement that vacant possession of schedule property would be promptly handed over on 1.3.2000. The letter written by defendant No.2 would clearly reveal that though the plaintiff had expressed willingness to vacate schedule premises on 1.3.2000 said date was not convenient to defendant No.2 who was working as Joint Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise on account of central budget exercise and expressing his inability to reach Bombay on 1.3.2000, he has by letter dated 24.2.2000 requested plaintiff another suitable date in the third week of March, preferably on a Saturday/Sunday may please be fixed for handing/taking over possession of the flat. However, second defendant sought to enforce Bank guarantee by letter dated 8.3.2000 and since Bank guarantee was extended till 1.5.2000; said letter dated 8.3.2000 invoking bank guarantee was withdrawn as per fax sent to plaintiff on 16.3.2000 by defendant No.2.
However, second defendant sought to enforce Bank guarantee by letter dated 8.3.2000 and since Bank guarantee was extended till 1.5.2000; said letter dated 8.3.2000 invoking bank guarantee was withdrawn as per fax sent to plaintiff on 16.3.2000 by defendant No.2. Thereafter, plaintiff by letter dated 28.3.2000 informed defendant No.2 that they would be vacating schedule premises on 31st March and requested him to be personally present or send his representative to take possession of the flat and return security deposit of Rs.42 lakhs and return bank guarantee and defendant No.2 was informed that they would vacate schedule premises on 1.3.2000 and would not be liable to pay rent and incidental charges from 1.4.2000. Reminder was sent to defendant No.2 to take vacant possession of schedule premises. In response to said letters second defendant has sent a letter dated 24.4.2000 seeking for details, the net amount desired by plaintiff at the time of handing over possession in the event of possession being taken on 15.5.2000 or 1.6.2000. Said details were furnished to defendant No.2 by letter dated May 5, 2000. However, defendant No.2 instead of taking possession of schedule premises as offered in letter dated 25.4.2000 invoked encashment of bank guarantee by letter dated 23.5.2000. Suppressing the fact that vacant possession of schedule property could not be taken on 1.3.2000 due to inability of defendant No.2 and not due to conduct of plaintiff and it was only at the instance of second defendant vacant possession could not be handed over. Defendant No.2 has admitted that he has recovered security deposit of Rs.42 lakhs which is returnable at the time of taking vacant possession of premises and wherefore, at the stage of consideration of I.A.I prima facie case of fraud by defendant No.2 and irretrievable injury to plaintiff in case bank guarantee is invoked is made out and the trial Court was justified in allowing I.A.I. In view of the above reasoning based on material on record, we hold that no ground is made out for interfering with the impugned order passed by the trial Court and accordingly, we answer point No.1 in the negative. 19. POINT NO.2: In view of our answer to point No.1, we answer this point by holding that the appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, we pass the following order: The appeal is dismissed.
19. POINT NO.2: In view of our answer to point No.1, we answer this point by holding that the appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, we pass the following order: The appeal is dismissed. Order passed by the Court of XXX Addl.City Civil Judge, Bangalore in O.S.No.3464/2000 allowing I.A.I filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 by plaintiff dated 17.11.2001 is confirmed. Since the suit is of the year 2000, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously and at any rate not later than nine months from the date of receipt of this order or production of certified copy of the order whichever is earlier. Let the lower Court records be transmitted to the trial Court forthwith along with this order.