Judgment S.D.Anand, J. 1. Appellants Gobind Ram and Prem Sagar (husband and father-in law respectively of deceased Suman) are in appeal against their conviction under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Suman, daughter of PW 14 Urmila, was married to appellant Gobind Ram in the year 1994. From the very day the marriage took place, the appellants used to mal-treat Suman on account of her inability to fulfill their dowry demands. Even the convening of a brotherhood Panchayat did not yield any fruitful result. On the relevant day, about 15-20 minutes before the impugned episode, Suman went over to PW 13 Jyoti and informed her that she was being belaboured by her husband and father-in-law. She was actuated to go to her as they were related to each other. (It is in the testimony of PW 13 Jyoti that her mother-in-law is real Bua of Suman i.e. Suman was daughter of maternal uncle of husband her husband.) At the relevant time, Suman was spotted in the street while she was ablaze. Appellant Gobind Ram and Jyoti PW 13, in their effort to put out the fire, sustained burns. In her dying declaration (recorded by PW 3 Shri C.B. Sheoran, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak), Suman made a categorical averment that she had been set afire by both the appellants. She also made a precise averment that her husband (appellant Gobind Ram) would not give her funds to run the household, would harass her and that both the appellants had been harassing her in spite of the fact that her father had given sufficient dowry. 3. It is on the above allegations that the appellants were prosecuted by the police. 4. At the trial, the prosecution version was testified on oath by PW 13 Jyoti and PW 14 Urmila (mother of the deceased lady). PW 1 Sumir Kumar, Record Keeper, PW 8 Amir Chand Taneja, PW 9 HC Ram Dhari, PW 11 HC Ram Kishan, PW 12 Retired UGC Ganga Ram are witnesses whose testimony is formal in character. PW 15 SI Harbans Lal is the Investigating Officer of the case. 5. The dying declaration of the deceased lady had been recorded by PW 3 Shri C.B. Sheoran, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. PW 2 Dr. PW 15 SI Harbans Lal is the Investigating Officer of the case. 5. The dying declaration of the deceased lady had been recorded by PW 3 Shri C.B. Sheoran, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. PW 2 Dr. R.S. Poonia had medico legally examined Jyoti PW 13 and also appellant Gobind Ram and found superficial burns on their persons. PW 4 Dr. R.P. Sharma had medico legally examined Suman. He noticed that 100% superficial and deep burns were present all over her body and that probable duration of the injuries was within six hours. On presentation of application Ex. PJ by the police to obtain his opinion about whether Suman was fit to give her statement or not, he reported (Ex. PJ/1) that Suman had already been referred to PGI MS Rohtak. PW 5 Dr. Jitender Kadiyan ( a PG student in PGI MS, Rohtak) certified to the police, vide his opinion Ex. PK/1 on police application Ex. PK, that Suman was fit to make a statement. He also made endorsement Ex. PF/1 on application Ex. PF that Suman remained conscious and fit to make a statement throughout the duration her dying declaration was recorded by Shri C.B. Sheron. PW 6 Dr. Vimal Sharma (alongwith Dr. Ajay Goyal, since deceased), conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of Suman and had opined that the cause of death was due to extensive burns and the complications on account thereof. The burns were described to be ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. 6. The learned Trial Judge placed implicit reliance upon dying declaration of the deceased and also the statements of PW 13 Jyoti and PW 14 Urmila. The defence plea, including the plea of alibi raised by Prem Sagar appellant, was declined. The Trial Judge refused to rely upon the testimony of DW1 Santosh Devi. On that premise, the trial Court convicted both the appellants for offences under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The following sentences were awarded: i) Under Sections 302 read with : Imprisonment for life and a Section 34 IPC fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each. ii) Under Section 498-A IPC : Rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- each. The following sentences were awarded: i) Under Sections 302 read with : Imprisonment for life and a Section 34 IPC fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each. ii) Under Section 498-A IPC : Rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each. 7. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 8. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 9. It is to state the obvious (otherwise) that the quest of the Court to arrive at a correct and just conclusion in a case of this type is, by and large, hedged not only by the four walls of the matrimonial house but also disinclination on the part of those living in the neighborhood of the matrimonial house to depose the truth. In fact, our experience tells us that there is a noticeable, indefensible though, refrain on the part of those (living in the vicinity) who would otherwise be natural witnesses of the day-to-day goings on at the matrimonial house. It is they only who are in a position to inform the Court about the exact and correct picture of whatever may have transpired in their presence or come to their notice. Their apathy to inform the law makes the adjudicatory exercise by the Court fairly onerous. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellants, at the very out set, sharply focussed the criticism on the validity of the dying declaration. He advocated a plea that the deceased just could not have been in a position to make a statement in view of the medical evidence on the file as she had sustained 100 per cent burns. In support of the argument that the dying declaration surrounded by suspicious circumstances need not form the basis of a conviction, the learned Counsel cited Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur 2007 (4) RCR (Criminal) 439, Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of A.P., and Sadhu Ram and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan. 11. As already indicated in an earlier part of the judgment, the dying declaration was recorded by Shri C.B. Sheron, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. He initially obtained the medical opinion about the fitness or otherwise of Suman to make statement. v. State of Rajasthan. 11. As already indicated in an earlier part of the judgment, the dying declaration was recorded by Shri C.B. Sheron, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. He initially obtained the medical opinion about the fitness or otherwise of Suman to make statement. After obtaining the opinion certifying her fitness to make a statement, he proceeded to record it. Even after concluding it, he obtained a certification from the Medical Officer (Dr. Jitender Kadiyan PW) to the effect that the patient remained conscious and oriented throughout the statement. That endorsement Ex. PF/1 was reiterated by Dr. Kadian in his testimony on oath. We are not unmindful of the statement made by Dr. Kadiyan that he did not mention that the patient throughout remained fit to make a statement. At the same, we find nothing sinister in that part of the averment made by the witness, in view of his consistent stand that the patient throughout remained conscious and oriented. The present is, thus, a case in which a fairly senior Judicial Officer recorded the impugned dying declaration and a medial officer certified in writing that the maker thereof was fit to make a statement and remained conscious and oriented throughout the period the statement was recorded. By the very nature of things, the aforementioned Judicial Officer and the Medical Officer are independent witnesses who had no reasons to make a false certification or prepare a false record. 12. In the course of the cross-examination directed at PW 14 Urmila, a suggestion was put to her that the dying declaration mentioned aforementioned had been made by Suman on her tutoring. The suggestion in the context was that Urmila PW 14 had already reached PGI MS, Rohtak where Shri C.B. Sheron turned up for recording her dying declaration. She denied the suggestion as incorrect. By the very nature of things, the question of tutoring would come in only when a person is in a position to take the cue from whosoever is indulging in the exercise of tutoring. It is not the suggestion that the dying declaration, purported to have been made by Suman, had in fact been made by her mother i.e. PW 14 Urmila. It was not even put to PW 5 Dr. Jitender Kadiyan or PW 3 Shri C.B. Sheron that mother of Suman was available at the time her dying declaration was recorded. It is not the suggestion that the dying declaration, purported to have been made by Suman, had in fact been made by her mother i.e. PW 14 Urmila. It was not even put to PW 5 Dr. Jitender Kadiyan or PW 3 Shri C.B. Sheron that mother of Suman was available at the time her dying declaration was recorded. The present is, thus, a case in which the suggestion put to PW Urmila is by itself suggestive of a stance on the part of the appellants conceding the factum of the impugned dying declaration having been made by Suman. 13. In all fairness, we must notice the judicial pronouncements relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur (supra) is not applicable inasmuch as there was evidence in that case that the victim had sustained 63 injuries and that some of the injuries could result in the patient going into Coma. All that the Apex Court held in that case was that the recording of a dying declaration by a Judicial Magistrate by itself is not a proof of truthfulness thereof and the dying declaration has still to pass the test of scrutiny of the court. The facts involved in that case are not common with the present case, particularly when the court noticed in that case that the Judicial Magistrate had neither obtained the relevant certification from the Medical Officer nor had he verified the case sheet. The prosecution had also not explained why the doctor on duty in the casualty department was not examined. 14. In Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of A.P. (supra) too, the facts were entirely different. In that case, two dying declarations of the deceased were recorded. In one dying declaration recorded by a police officer, the deceased had indicated that she had been set on fire by her husband and mother-in-law while she was lighting a stove for preparing coffee. However, in her dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, she had stated that she was in the process of sweeping, when her mother-in-law and husband poured kerosene on her, lit a match stick and set her on fire. 15. In Sadhu Ram case (supra) as well, the facts were entirely different. However, in her dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, she had stated that she was in the process of sweeping, when her mother-in-law and husband poured kerosene on her, lit a match stick and set her on fire. 15. In Sadhu Ram case (supra) as well, the facts were entirely different. In that case, in the course of the inquest proceedings, the solitary witness had indicated that the deceased died on account of burn injuries suffered in an accidental fire. However, at a subsequent point of time-though on that very day, he gave an entirely different version by indicating that when he went to the site of the incident, he found two dead bodies hanging from the hook, with rope around their neck. It was under these circumstances that the Apex Court held that the variation could not be reconciled and the credibility of the solitary witness stood impeached. 16. We are only reiterating the law of the land by recording that though a dying declaration can form the sole basis for a conviction, due care and caution must be exercised in deciding the weight to be attached to a dying declaration because there could be any number of circumstances affecting the truthfulness thereof. The Court has to ensure that the dying declaration is not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. 17. We must, at this stage, notice an attempt, abortive though, made by appellant Prem Sagar to put forward a plea of alibi. As would be apparent from a perusal of the cross-examination directed at PW 14 Urmila (mother of the deceased), it was put to her that appellant Prem Sagar is a heart patient and he used to get treatment at Bombay. She denied the suggestion as incorrect. It is also in her statement that appellant Gobind Ram has only one brother, namely, Krishan, who is residing at Bombay. There is nothing whatsoever on the file to indicate the exact nature of the problem which appellant Prem Sagar was having. Further, there is also nothing whatsoever to indicate what type of specialised treatment was Prem Sagar appellant receiving at Bombay. As a matter of common observation, facilities for treatment of heart patients are available aplenty at Delhi. There are a number of heart hospitals where world famous doctors are available. Further, there is also nothing whatsoever to indicate what type of specialised treatment was Prem Sagar appellant receiving at Bombay. As a matter of common observation, facilities for treatment of heart patients are available aplenty at Delhi. There are a number of heart hospitals where world famous doctors are available. If there was any particular kind of treatment which was available at Bombay, it was for Prem Sagar appellant to aver and prove it. In that case, the onus would have been upon him to prove that he was actually undergoing treatment, which was available at Bombay only, on the relevant date. In the absence of any evidence to that effect, it cannot be held that he was undergoing any treatment at Bombay. 18. Yet another attempt was made by appellant Prem Sagar to prove that he was separate in mess and residence from his son i.e. appellant Gobind Ram. In that behalf, separate ration card of appellant Gobind Ram was proved. However, that evidence does not at all enable appellant Prem Sagar to prove the fact sought to be proved thereby. It has transpired in evidence that appellant Prem Sagar is residing in a part of that very house where appellant Gobind Ram and deceased were living. It is in evidence that wife of appellant Prem Sagar is already dead. He has only two sons i.e. appellant Gobind Ram and Krishan and the latter is residing at Bombay. It would be illogical for a man belonging to that strata of society to aver that he was separate from his son i.e. appellant Gobind Ram in mess and residence. In order to succeed on such a plea, it was incumbent appellant Prem Sagar to prove how exactly was he obtaining his meals. 19. As per the scheme of things under the Indian law, an accused is entitled to keep quiet and let the prosecution do the talking in the form of substantive evidence and to prove the charge. The raising of a plea of alibi, which ultimately proves false, does prove want of bona fides on the part of the accused raising that plea. We do not, however, suggest that the non proof of a plea of alibi would, per se, warrant conviction of that accused. The raising of a plea of alibi, which ultimately proves false, does prove want of bona fides on the part of the accused raising that plea. We do not, however, suggest that the non proof of a plea of alibi would, per se, warrant conviction of that accused. All that we propose saying, by noticing the above facts, is that appellant Prem Sagar has not been able to prove his non-availability at the relevant time at the spot. In the light thereof, we find no reasons to dis-believe the dying declaration made by deceased Suman attributing a precise role to appellant Prem Sagar as well. Insofar as the sustaining of burns by appellant Gobind Ram is concerned, it does not enable him to plead for exoneration on the projected presentation that, he, had tried to save Suman when she set herself ablaze. 20. The facts and circumstances are adequate enough to negate the suggestion of a suicide. Suman was a mother having a female child. The mother in her just could not entertain thought of self extinguishment as the interest of a minor child would always be upper most in the mind of a mother. It would require a particular notice in the context that the burns found on the person of Gobind Ram appellant were superficial in character. On the other hand, the sustaining of burns by PW 13 Jyoti would go a long way to buttress the prosecution presentation that she was actually available at the spot. She being a relation of Suman tried to extinguish the fire. 21. In all fairness to the cause of justice, we must notice that the finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge for the commission of the offence under Section 498-A IPC by the appellants cannot be affirmed. The parties had been married for about more than seven years. The prosecution witnesses made a precise averment that a complaint with regard to the dowry demand made by the appellants had been registered with the Women Cell. It is also the plea that a brotherhood Panchayat had also been convened in that context. The defence suggested the falsity of those facts. The prosecution did not take any steps to requisition the relevant record from the Women Cell. Further, the prosecution also did not make any endeavour to examine any witness to buttress the plea regarding the convening of a brotherhood Panchayat. The defence suggested the falsity of those facts. The prosecution did not take any steps to requisition the relevant record from the Women Cell. Further, the prosecution also did not make any endeavour to examine any witness to buttress the plea regarding the convening of a brotherhood Panchayat. In the light thereof, the conviction of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC cannot be upheld and the appellants are acquitted of the charge under Section 498-A IPC. 22. These observations of ours, and also the reasoning recorded in support thereof, must converge to only one conclusion that the appeal deserves to be allowed in part to the extent it relates to the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 498-A IPC. However, the finding deserves affirmation insofar as conviction of the appellants for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is concerned and it is ordered accordingly. 23. Disposed of accordingly.