1. Collector Land Acquisition Jammu has filed an appeal questioning Principal District Judge, Jammus award of 06 September, 2003 made on a reference under Section 18 of the State Land Acquisition Act, fixing Rs.3.50 lacs per kanal as the market value of respondents land which had been acquired by it fixing its market value at Rs.1.50 lacs per kanal, along with an application seeking condonation of 149 days delay in filing the appeal, in this Court. 2. It is stated in the application that applicant had come to know about the District Judges award on 24 February, 2004 when a notice for its execution had been received by it from the Executing Court, and thereafter requisite steps to collect documents and arrange for the Court fee required for filing the appeal. 3. Condonation of delay in filing the appeal has been sought by the appellant on the ground that being an impersonal machinery, the appellant had to route the concerned files through various channels before taking final decision of filing appeal against the award and huge amount of money had to be arranged for purchasing Court fee stamps which had to accompany the memo of appeal, and this process could not have been avoided in view of the procedure prevalent in its office. 4. Opposing appellants prayer for condonation of delay, respondent has stated in his objections that the appellant was duly represented by his counsel all through the proceedings before learned District Judge and was present even on the date when the award had been pronounced. The appellant was, therefore, fully aware about the issuance of award by the learned District Judge and allegation appearing in the appellants application to the contrary that it had come to know about the passing of the award on 24 February, 2004 was incorrect. 5. According to the respondent, appellant had not projected any plausible reason to seek condonation of delay in filing the appeal and its application was, thus, liable to be rejected. 6. Mr. 5. According to the respondent, appellant had not projected any plausible reason to seek condonation of delay in filing the appeal and its application was, thus, liable to be rejected. 6. Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant-Collector, submitted that the counsel engaged by the applicant had not informed the Collector about the issuance of the award by learned District Judge, Jammu and that it was only on 24 February, 2004 that the applicant had come to know about the passing of the award whereafter requisite steps had been taken without any loss of time to file appeal against the award. He says that learned District Judges award was erroneous because the market value of the acquired land, as fixed by the Collector had been doubled by the District Judge without any justifiable reasons in support thereof and in this view of the matter, delay in filing the appeal needs to be condoned in the interests of justice so that the appeal was heard and decided on merits. 7. Mr. Manhas, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that appellants omission to file appeal within the prescribed period of limitation vests a valuable right in the respondent to enjoy the fruits of the award and the respondent cannot be deprived of this right on mere ipsi dixit of the appellant who had not come to the Court with clean hands and had failed to give any cause much less sufficient cause explaining the delay in filing the appeal. Learned counsel relies on Jammu Development Authority versus Beli Ram, reported as 2002 KLJ, 223 to justify his submission for rejection of appellants application. 8. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. The records bear testimony to the fact that appellant had been contesting the proceedings before learned Principal District Judge, Jammu and its counsel had been present when the learned District Judge had pronounced the award. 9. Appellant has not stated anywhere in its application that its counsel had not informed it about the issuance of award by learned District Judge, Jammu. 9. Appellant has not stated anywhere in its application that its counsel had not informed it about the issuance of award by learned District Judge, Jammu. In the absence of any such averment in the application, appellant has to be presumed to have known about the passing of the award when it was duly represented by its counsel before the learned District Judge both at the time of its hearing the reference as also at the time of the pronouncement of the award. The statement appearing in appellants application that it had come to know about the passing of award on 24 February, 2004 cannot thus be believed. 10. There is yet another reason for not believing this statement of the appellant because the affidavit which the appellant had been permitted to place on records as its evidence in support of his submission that its counsel had not informed it about the prouncement of the award by learned District Judge, Jammu too does not say that Mr. A.G. Sheikh who had been contesting the reference on behalf of the Collector before District Judge, Jammu had not informed the appellant about the pronouncement of the award. All that the affidavit says is that the appellant had not received the copy of the judgment/award passed by learned District Judge until March, 2004. 11. A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also for repose. The Limitation Act is not an equitable piece of legislation but is statute of repose. The right undoubtedly available to a litigant becomes unenforceable if the litigant does not approach the Court within the time prescribed therefor. It is in this context that it is often said that law helps only the diligent. A litigant is expected to seek the enforcement of a right available to him within a reasonable time of the cause of action and this reasonable time is reflected by the Legislature in its wisdom by various articles of the Limitation Act. Failure of a litigant to have recourse to the remedy provided under the statute, within the limitation prescribed therefor would vest such a valuable right in his adversary which cannot be easily interfered with unless, however, sufficient cause is assigned by a diligent litigant seeking condonation of delay in availing the remedy available to it under law. 12. Failure of a litigant to have recourse to the remedy provided under the statute, within the limitation prescribed therefor would vest such a valuable right in his adversary which cannot be easily interfered with unless, however, sufficient cause is assigned by a diligent litigant seeking condonation of delay in availing the remedy available to it under law. 12. The expression "sufficient cause" appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act essentially means as adequate or enough cause. There cannot be any straight jacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. Cause offered by a litigant to seek condonation of delay is required to be viewed for consideration keeping in view the fact that condonation of delay may not render a specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose. In any event the cause shown seeking condonation of delay must necessarily have an acceptable value on the basis whereof the right accrued to the other party because of the expiry of period of limitation may be interfered with so as to do complete justice to the parties. 13. Proceeding on the premise that the appellant had due notice of the pronouncement of District Judges award on 06 September 2003 when its counsel was present in the Court, I am not inclined to accept its case that it did not have notice of the award before 24 February 2004. 14. Although explanation given by the appellant in taking time in routing its file through different channels and in arranging money for purchase of Court fee after 24 February, 2004 may be irrelevant in the absence of any explanation by it as to what had prevented it from filing appeal within the prescribed period of limitation when the award had been pronounced in presence of its counsel on 06 September, 2003, yet I do not find any justifiable explanation for appellants delaying the filing of appeal for yet another more than two months after it is stated to have come to know of the pronouncement of the award by District Judge, Jammu on 24 February, 2004. It had not even applied for getting a certified copy of the award till 17 April 2004. It had not even applied for getting a certified copy of the award till 17 April 2004. All this indicates that the appellant had not been diligent in defending the reference and taking steps to file appeal against the award of the District Judge within the prescribed period of limitation or even within reasonable time thereafter. 15. Although merits of the appeal are not required to be gone into while considering application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal, yet in order to deal with the submissions of Mr. Sharma that the learned District Judge had erred in enhancing the market value of the acquired land, as fixed by the Collector, I had gone through the award of learned District Judge with a view to examine as to whether or not discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in condoning delay in filing the appeal warrants its exercise in favour of the appellant. 16. Perusal of the award indicates that the learned District Judge had arrived at the market value of the land in question on the basis of sufficient evidence placed on records by the respondent and additionally on the ground that market value of similar land acquired by the Collector before issuance of notification for acquisition of land in question was Rs. 3 lacs per kanal. Appellant-Collector had not led any evidence except placing reliance on the average rates of sales recorded by the concerned Patwari in his records, which evidence had been properly evaluated and appreciated by learned District Judge in the light of the evidence which the respondent had produced in the case. Reading of the award of learned District Judge does not demonstrate any such illegality or irregularity on the face of it which may warrant exercise of discretion in appellants favour to condone, otherwise unexplained delay. Drawing support from the maxim Lex vigilantibus, non dormientibus, subvenit i.e. Law aids the watchful, not the sleeping, I do not find any sufficient cause to have been made out by the appellant on the basis whereof 149 days delay in filing the appeal be condoned. 17. Appellants application, thus, merits to be rejected. It is, accordingly, dismissed along with the appeal, being barred by time. No costs.