ORDER: The petitioner is aggrieved by order of Court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in R.A.No.168 of 1998, dated 06.11.2002. In exercise of appellate powers under Section 20 of Andhra Pradesh (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereafter called, the Act), the learned Chief Judge, confirmed the order of learned Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad, dated 03.04.1998 in R.C.No.436 of 1993, whereby and whereunder petitioner was directed to vacate the premises bearing mulgi No.3-5-1145/1 situated at Kachiguda 'X' Roads, Hyderabad. Though the jural relationship is denied by petitioner, for the sake of convenience, petitioner is referred to as tenant and the respondent is referred to as landlord in this order. Respondent (landlord) is resident of Alberts, Canada, and he sued for eviction of tenant through his General Power of Attorney (GPA) Sri Thakur Ratan Singh. The eviction was sought on the ground that the tenant failed to pay rents from April, 1992 and committed willful default in payment of rent. The eviction was opposed on the ground of suppression of facts, and on the ground that respondent herein is not owner of the premises in occupation of tenant as he lost his case in C.S.No.14 of 1958 in all the Courts. The learned Rent Controller as well as appellate authority decided these issues against the tenant and ordered eviction. 2. The admitted factual background, in brief, is as follows. Civil suit No.14 of 1958 was filed before High Court of A.P., by Dilidar-un-nissa Begum for partition of properties of Nawab Khurshid Jah, the Royal Noble, closely related to Nizam of Hyderabad. The petition schedule mulgi and other properties were included as item No.30 of IV Schedule in the suit. When the suit was pending, Saraswathi Prasad Singh through his GPA Thakur Ratan Singh purchased four mulgies (shops) under registered sale deed, dated 15.03.1962 from Jameel-un- nissa Begum, Showkat-un-nissa Begum, Daulat-un-nissa Begum, Yousuf-un-nissa Begum and Meher-un-nissa Begum. These five ladies were defendant Nos.19, 20, 26, 28 and 29 in C.S.No.14 of 1958. It may also be noted that these five persons initially purchased the property from one Shamsuddin Khan; defendant No.10 in C.S.No.14 of 1958. The landlord then got impleaded as defendant No.125 seeking a final decree in his favour to the extent of property purchased from the five defendants referred to hereinabove. It may also be noted that these five persons initially purchased the property from one Shamsuddin Khan; defendant No.10 in C.S.No.14 of 1958. The landlord then got impleaded as defendant No.125 seeking a final decree in his favour to the extent of property purchased from the five defendants referred to hereinabove. Here, it may also be noted that Misbahuddin Khan and Ghousuddin Khan were arrayed as defendant Nos.51 and 52 in the said suit. 3. In 1961, Dilidar-un-nissa Begum, the plaintiff and other defendants claiming possession of properties in Schedule IV and IV(a) filed Application No.264 of 1961 under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to record memorandum of compromise. This Court passed orders in C.S.No.14 of 1958 in terms of memorandum of compromise. Clause 7 of memorandum of compromise recorded by this Court is to the effect that parties to the memorandum admit that item No.30 of IV Schedule attached to the plaint, belongs to defendant Nos.51 and 52, who are exclusive owners of the same. A compromise decree was passed on 28.06.1963 in terms of memorandum of compromise. 4. The respondent herein along with twenty six (26) others filed O.S.A.No.1 of 1965 against above noted preliminary decree, insofar as Schedule IV and IV(a) properties are concerned. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal on 15.04.1971. It may be mentioned here that all the appellants in O.S.A.No.1 of 1965 were alienees of defendant No.10, Shamsuddin Khan and entire appeal was against the finding that item No.30 belongs to defendant Nos.51 and 52 and based on the claim that item No.30 was not part and parcel of estate of Nawab Khurshid Jah. A Division Bench of this Court delivered Judgment on 15.04.1971 affirming the Judgment and preliminary decree passed by learned single Judge on 28.06.1963. Feeling aggrieved by the same, appellants in O.S.A. preferred civil appeal No.2021 of 1971 before Hon'ble Supreme Court. The same was dismissed on 07.08.1991. 5. In the meanwhile, defendant Nos.51 and 52 (Misbahuddin Khan and Ghousuddin Khan) sold Najeeb Bagh and Ram Dhan Choudhary Bagh to Smt G.Kalavathi, W/o G.Venkata Swamy, under registered sale deed, dated 12.06.1967. After exchange of legal notices with her, Saraswathi Prasad Singh filed O.S.No.1620 of 1996 on the file of the Court of the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for declaration of title based on adverse possession. After exchange of legal notices with her, Saraswathi Prasad Singh filed O.S.No.1620 of 1996 on the file of the Court of the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for declaration of title based on adverse possession. The rival claimant Smt G.Kalavathi also filed O.S.No.416 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for recovery of possession of different items of property including petition schedule property in rent control case. 6. In eviction case being R.C.No.436 of 1993, the main plea of the landlord was that the tenant committed wilful default from April 1992. The tenant demurred. He also denied the ownership and title of Saraswathi Prasad Singh referring to factual background, which is noticed hereinabove. Though the landlord did not deny this, rejoinder was filed pointing out that having obtained lease from Saraswathi Prasad Singh, petitioner herein is estopped from denying the title, that earlier he himself filed R.C.No.623 of 1977 for deposit of rents in the Court (the order was marked as Ex.X3), that the landlord filed R.C.No.54 of 1979 for eviction of tenant and the same was compromised on the latter agreeing to enhance the rent to Rs.160/- and that the landlord also filed small cause suit being S.C.No.8 of 1979 for recovery of arrears of rent (this was marked as Ex.P.8). In all these, there was no denial of title or ownership. The tenant, however, produced evidence to show that Saraswathi Prasad Singh had no title as decided by this Court and Supreme Court, and that landlord himself filed a suit for declaration of his title, and even if rent is not paid, the same does not amount to wilful default. As noticed supra, both the authorities did not agree with submission of tenant and ordered eviction overruling his objections. 7. In this civil revision petition, learned counsel for petitioner/tenant Sri T. Dhanurbhanudu, submits that in a case where the landlord fails to establish the title or where his title itself was void and illegal, the rent controller ought to have first decided the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. Without doing so, both authorities below ordered eviction and therefore, the order is without jurisdiction and unsustainable. Without doing so, both authorities below ordered eviction and therefore, the order is without jurisdiction and unsustainable. According to him, there was considerable evidence to show that the High Court and the highest Court of the land found Sarswathi Prasad Singh has no title to the property in view of the preliminary decree in C.S.No.14 of 1958, dated 28.06.1963. Secondly, he submits that in a case of this nature, even if the tenant has paid rents for some time prior to knowledge of defective or non-existent title of the landlord, if he stops paying rent on the ground of non-existent title in the landlord, such denial does not amount to mala fide denial. He placed reliance on M.M.Quasim v Manohar Lal Sharma, Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v Naragani Govinda Sehararao and Jamsheed Hussain v Azeez Hussain. 8. Learned counsel for respondent/landlord, Sri T.S.Praveen Kumar representing Sri Papa Reddy made the following submissions. Exs.X2 to X5 and rental agreement Ex.P.5 would belie the contention of the tenant and that denial of title of respondent is not bona fide. Even if petition schedule property was decided to be exclusive property of one of defendants in C.S.No.14 of 1958, as confirmed by Division Bench as well as Supreme Court, the tenant having paid the rents without any objection at any point of time cannot now be permitted to turn around and deny the title of Saraswathi Prasad Singh. As per Section 2(vi) of the Act, petitioner herein is tenant of petition schedule premises and as the respondent regularly received the rent, which was paid willingly, the tenant cannot be permitted to take a different plea when admittedly the rent was not paid from April 1992, it amounts to wilful default. 9. The important question around which other incidental questions revolve is whether Saraswathi Prasad Singh could have claimed ownership and could have validly filed an eviction petition under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act. After perusing entire record and giving anxious consideration to rival submissions and precedents relied on, this Court is of considered opinion that answer to this question, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and admitted factual position, must be against respondent. There are reasons more than one for arriving such a conclusion, which are enumerated in ensuing paragraphs. 10. The term 'landlord' is defined in Section 2(vi) of the Act. The same reads as follows. There are reasons more than one for arriving such a conclusion, which are enumerated in ensuing paragraphs. 10. The term 'landlord' is defined in Section 2(vi) of the Act. The same reads as follows. 2(vi) 'Landlord' means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant; Explanation:- A tenant who sub-lets a building shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant. 11. The definition of landlord is very wide. It has two parts. The first part is definition part which describes 'landlord' means the owner of a building. The second part is 'inclusive' part. As per this, a person who is entitled to receive the rent, whether as an owner or any other legally competent person. Broadly stated the concept of ownership includes the right to possess and such a right in rem operates against everybody. That is to say if a person claims to be a rightful owner, he must show that he is having a right against whole world to occupy a building. In the absence of any such plea or evidence, a person cannot claim to be owner or landlord of the building covered by the Act. 12. Supreme Court considered a similar question in M.M.Quasim v Manohar Lal Sharma (supra) while interpreting Section 2(d) read with Section 11(1)(c) of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Act No.3 of 1947). The definitions of term 'landlord' in Bihar as well as A.P. Act are in pari materia. The apex Court posed the question as follows. 'Where a suit is claimed by a person claiming to be landlord on the ground that he in good faith requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation, would he still be entitled to a decree for possession. On this ground, even if, during the course of proceedings, his interest in the suit premises has come to an end and on the date of final decree, he had no subsisting interest in the suit premises. On this ground, even if, during the course of proceedings, his interest in the suit premises has come to an end and on the date of final decree, he had no subsisting interest in the suit premises. In other words, how should the Court approach a proceeding under the Rent Act while taking into consideration the subsequent events, which would non-suit the plaintiff'. The Supreme Court held that if during the pendency of proceedings, it is shown that person who sought eviction lost his interest or his right comes to an end, an eviction petition would not lie. The Supreme Court also held that subsequent events have to be taken into consideration while resolving dispute at appellate stage. The observations which are apt to be quoted are as follows. Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11(l)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression "landlord" in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression "landlord" for the purpose of Section 11(l)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. ... The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. ... For the purposes of Section 11(l)(c) the expression 'landlord' could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. (emphasis supplied). 13. Admittedly Saraswathi Prasad Singh purchased the property from five ladies under a registered sale deed, dated 15.03.1962. By that time, petition schedule property formed part of item No.30 of IV Schedule in a royal partition suit being C.S.No.14 of 1958 between the heirs of Nawab Khurshid Jah. The vendors of respondent were defendant Nos.19, 20, 26, 28 and 29. To the extent of obtaining a sale deed it may be fine, but was it competent to their vendors to execute such sale deed? They were not at all competent to execute a sale deed in respect of undivided share when the property was allegedly meant for partition. Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 operates as an absolute bar. During the pendency of any suit or proceeding of the Court, the property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree which may be made by the Court. Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 operates as an absolute bar. During the pendency of any suit or proceeding of the Court, the property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree which may be made by the Court. Any transfer of immovable property lis pendence, is non est in the eye of law and in certain given circumstances can be treated as a fraudulent transfer. Therefore, when the vendors of Saraswathi Prasad Singh, had themselves no transferable title, at that stage, there could not have been valid transfer in favour of landlord. 14. The vendors of respondent cannot even claim that they had undivided share or amorphous or incohate right to alienate properties including petition schedule property. Hence, purchaser cannot claim the benefit of principle of feeding by estoppel adumbrated in Section 43 of Transfer of Property Act. Be it noted that, preliminary decree was passed in C.S.No.14 of 1958 on 28.06.1963, and petition schedule property is specifically excluded and all the parties to compromise decree including the vendors of Saraswathi Prasad Singh agreed that the entire item No.30 of IV Schedule (including petition schedule property) belongs to defendant Nos.51 and 52, who subsequently sold the property to Smt G.Kalavathi under registered sale deed, dated 12.06.1967. Therefore, alienation by Jameel-un-nissa Begum and four others in favour of landlord is also hit by Section 7 of Transfer of Property Act and is invalid transfer. It is needless to mention that against preliminary decree, dated 28.06.1963, respondent and others filed O.S.A.No.1 of 1965, which was dismissed on 15.04.1971. Their civil appeal being C.A.No.2021 of 1971 was also dismissed by Supreme Court on 07.08.1991. Therefore, Saraswathi Prasad Singh cannot claim that he has a right against the entire world in respect of petition schedule property. In such a case, even if the tenant had been a party to earlier suits or proceedings in Courts and before Rent Controller, the same does not estop him from taking the plea with regard to right of respondent. Admittedly, tenant paid rent up to March 1992 and thereafter stopped paying it. It only shows till Supreme Court decided the matter on 07.08.1991 and thereafter for some time rent was paid and then it was stopped. Admittedly, tenant paid rent up to March 1992 and thereafter stopped paying it. It only shows till Supreme Court decided the matter on 07.08.1991 and thereafter for some time rent was paid and then it was stopped. Such non payment to landlord who has no right at all does not amount to wilful default. The submissions made by learned counsel for landlord with regard to these aspects cannot be accepted. 15. Yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored is the suit filed by respondent and the suit filed by Smt G.Kalavathi which are still pending. The respondent filed suit for declaration of title and his rival claimant filed suit for possession. This would clinchingly show that even if respondent filed suit based on sale deed, dated 02.02.1962 or rent agreements and earlier orders of the rent controller and small cause court, he cannot claim to have retained the status of landlord for the purpose of rent control case. Such a conclusion would go contrary to M.M.Quasim (supra) ratio. This is also one of the important factors, which justify the stand of tenant that he stopped paying the rent to landlord as the latter had no title to the property. The tenant is entitled to take such a plea. The right of the tenant protected by Rent Control Act to deny the title of the person claiming to be landlord is recognised under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Act. In the face of this, the tenant's estoppel under Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has no application. It is only when it is shown that the denial of title of landlord by tenant is not bona fide, it becomes a cause or reason for eviction. In this case, by any stretch of imagination, the denial of title of respondent by tenant cannot be treated as mala fide. Indeed, in connected civil revision petitions, this Court has already rejected such plea with reference to the property which was also included in item No.30 of IV Schedule in C.S.No.14 of 1958 and which was allotted to defendant Nos.51 and 52 therein. 16. A reference may be made to order of this Court in C.R.P.Nos.508 of 2000 and batch. The facts in the said batch of revisions may be noticed in brief. 16. A reference may be made to order of this Court in C.R.P.Nos.508 of 2000 and batch. The facts in the said batch of revisions may be noticed in brief. One B.Laxmaiah filed large number of eviction petitions under the Rent Control Act against various persons who were in occupation of one room asbestos roofed tenaments in the locality known as Najeeb Bagh. Some of them were allowed and some of them were dismissed. On Appeal, learned Additional Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, in R.A.Nos.423 of 1994 and batch and R.A.No.477 of 1994 and batch, by common order, dated 29.09.1999 held in favour of occupants of properties holding that there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenants who are parties to eviction petitions. Laxmaiah filed revision petitions and contended that having purchased the property under registered sale deed, dated 08.01.1954 from Shamshuddin Khan, he is an absolute owner. This Court while referring to various proceedings related to C.S.No.14 of 1958 including the original side appeal as well as civil appeal, held as follows. 'In the light of the Judgment and decree in C.S.No.14 of 1958 which stood confirmed by Supreme Court, the appellate Court, in my view, rightly held that the petitioner has no title to the property inasmuch as he cannot claim better title than his vendor'. It was argued that Laxmaiah obtained ex parte decree of declaration of title in O.S.No.31 of 1963 and therefore, the same gets crystalised and cannot be defeated by decree in C.S.No.14 of 1958. This was not accepted by this Court for the following reasons. However, the learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the judgment in O.S.No.14 of 1958 merged into the decree of the first appellate Court i.e., the High Court in the year 1971 and later on the judgments of both the Courts got merged in the decision of the apex Court in Civil Appeal No.2021 of 1972 in the year 1991. Therefore, the judgment in C.S.No.14 of 1958 must for all intents and purposes be regarded as the later decision and therefore, prevails over the ex parte judgment and decree in O.S.No.31 of 1963. I am inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. The judgment in C.S.No.14 of 1958 attained finality much later to the judgment in O.S.No.31 of 1963. I am inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. The judgment in C.S.No.14 of 1958 attained finality much later to the judgment in O.S.No.31 of 1963. It may be that the confirmation of the decree of the original Court has the effect of putting seal of approval to the decree passed by the original Court and in that sense allows the judgment to be operative from the date of the original Court's pronouncement. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the judgment so long as it has not attained finality keeps the controversy alive and it is only after the judgment of the appellate Court that its validity and efficacy gets established. Viewed from this angle, apart from the principle of merger, the crucial date for determining the precedence in between the two conflicting decrees is the date of appellate Court's judgment. 17. This Court then noticed that Laxmaiah suppressed the factum of decree in C.S.No.14 of 1958 and that the same takes precedence over all other Court orders, and therefore, occupants therein cannot be evicted on the ground of denial of title or on the ground of wilful default, even if they had paid rents for some time and later stopped. A reference was made to the decision of Supreme Court in Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v Naragani Govinda Sehararao (supra), wherein it was held that if the tenant stopped paying rent on a bona fide belief that he was entitled to purchase the property under lis, such default cannot be treated as intentional, deliberate, calculated or conscious with full knowledge of its consequences. Therefore, all the questions raised herein have been answered by this Court in other revision petitions referred to herein above in respect of the part of the same property. As observed by this Court in C.R.P.No.508 of 2000 and batch, "the refusal to pay the rents to landlord whose title to the property came under cloud by virtue of adverse Judgment affecting the title of the vendor of Saraswathi Prasad Singh cannot be said to be a wilful act". 18. As observed by this Court in C.R.P.No.508 of 2000 and batch, "the refusal to pay the rents to landlord whose title to the property came under cloud by virtue of adverse Judgment affecting the title of the vendor of Saraswathi Prasad Singh cannot be said to be a wilful act". 18. The last aspect of the matter is that the learned Rent Controller while dealing with the Judgment of Supreme Court in civil appeal No.2021 of 1971, dated 07.08.1991 observed that the Judgment of Supreme Court will not come in the way of adjudication in the case in favour of landlord for the reason that even a person with defective title can be treated as landlord. The appellate authority did not however advert to this aspect. Be that as it is, ignoring the Judgment of the superior Courts by the lower Courts in the system of hierarchy is objectionable indiscipline of law. In this context, a reference may be made to Assistant Collector, C.E., Chandan Nagar v Dunlop India Limited4, wherein Supreme Court observed as under. We desire to add and as was said in Cassel & Co. Ltd. v Broome5, we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that "in the hierarchical system of courts" which exists in our country, "it is necessary for each lower tier", including the High Court, "to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers". "It is inevitable in hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme Appellate Tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary.... But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted."7 The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the court above. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassel & Co. Ltd. v Broome (supra) commenting on the Court of Appeal's comment that Rookes v Barnard6was rendered per incuriam. Lord Diplock observed: The Court of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House in Rookes v. Barnard8 by applying to it the label per incuriam. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassel & Co. Ltd. v Broome (supra) commenting on the Court of Appeal's comment that Rookes v Barnard6was rendered per incuriam. Lord Diplock observed: The Court of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House in Rookes v. Barnard8 by applying to it the label per incuriam. That label is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or to the right of a Judge of the High Court to disregard a decision of the Court of Appeal. It is needless to add that in India under Article 141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India and under Article 144 all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. 19. In the result, for the above reasons, the order of learned Principal Rent Controller, dated 03.04.1998 in R.C.No.436 of 1993 and the order of the Court of learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, dated 06.11.2002 in R.A.No.168 of 1998 confirming the order of original authority are set aside. The rent control case being R.C.No.436 of 1993 stands dismissed. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed with costs.