JUDGMENT : Both these appeals arise out of common judgments delivered by the trial Court in two suits and thereafter by lower Appellate Court in two appeals concurrently against the appellant before this Court. Regular Civil Suit No. 1408 of 1983 was filed by present appellant for specific performance of agreement against present respondents while Regular Civil Suit No. 1687 of 1983 was filed by present respondent No.1 against the appellant for recovery of possession on the basis of title. Second Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, vide judgment dated 1.11.1985 dismissed Regular Civil Suit No. 1408 of 1983 and decreed Regular Civil Suit No. 1687 of 1985. The present appellant then filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1987 and 439 of 1987 challenging this common judgment. Regular Civil Appeal No. 439 of 1987 challenged decree granted in Regular Civil Suit No. 1687 of 1983 while Regular Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1987 challenged dismissal of his suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 1408 of 1983. By common judgment dated 30.12.1993, 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, dismissed both these appeals. The appellant thereafter has filed Second Appeal No. 33 of 1994 against adjudication in Regular Civil Appeal No. 439 of 1987 and Second Appeal No. 68 of 1994 against adjudication in Regular Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1987. Second Appeals have been admitted on 27.1.1994 on identical grounds i.e. by mentioning that grounds No. 4, 5, 6, 8 & 9 in memo of appeals are substantial questions of law. No specific question as such has been formulated by this Court at this juncture. 2. The suit property and its description is not in dispute between parties. The contention of present appellant was that there was an agreement dated 21.3.1978 (Exh. 40) executed in his favour by respondent – Santosh whereby a plot of land to be allotted to him by Nagpur Improvement Trust on lease deed was agreed to be sold by Santosh to present appellant after such lease deed. He also contended that various payments were made by him from time to time and he invested total amount of Rs.40,000/-to Rs.45,000/-upon construction of a house on said property as he was placed in possession by the respondent. The suit was opposed by present Respondent – Santosh, who denied any such agreement and further contended that the appellant was his licensee only. The suit was opposed by present Respondent – Santosh, who denied any such agreement and further contended that the appellant was his licensee only. He also denied alleged payments made by the appellant to him or to Nagpur Improvement Trust and contended that all payments were made by him. In turn, by filing separate suit as mentioned above, he also sought possession on the basis of lease deed executed in his favour by Nagpur Improvement Trust. The trial Court has found that though agreement Exh. 40 was having signature of Santosh, Santosh never entered into any agreement for sale with present appellant and brother of Santosh by name Vitthal colluded with present appellant and helped him to prepare a false case of agreement between appellant and present respondent. In view of these findings, the trial Court dismissed suit for specific performance and decreed the suit of respondent – Santosh. The appellate Court has maintained these findings. 3. In this background, I have heard Shri Khamborkar, learned counsel for the appellant in both matters and Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned Counsel for respondent No.1 – Santosh. 4. After inviting attention to grounds as mentioned above, in memo of Second Appeal, Shri Khamborkar, Advocate for the appellant has contended that as signature of Santosh on Exh. 40 was proved and accepted by both the Courts, burden was upon Santosh to show that he did not enter into any agreement for sale. He argues that the evidence tendered by appellant on record conclusively established that agreement was written by a scribe in presence of parties and it was also signed by Santosh in presence of witnesses. He states that the alleged enmity between Vitthal and Santosh has not been established and as such the reasons given by the Courts below to disbelieve the receipts of payments produced by present appellant on record are not in existence. He contends that as agreement Exh. 40 is erroneously rejected, the question of law about its rejection arises and it needs to be answered in favour of present appellant. 5. About the decree given to present respondent, the learned counsel contends that if above question is answered in favour of the appellant, the decree asking the appellant to surrender possession to present respondent -Santosh automatically falls to ground. However, in the alternative, he has pointed out that the suit filed by present respondent described appellant as his licensee. 5. About the decree given to present respondent, the learned counsel contends that if above question is answered in favour of the appellant, the decree asking the appellant to surrender possession to present respondent -Santosh automatically falls to ground. However, in the alternative, he has pointed out that the suit filed by present respondent described appellant as his licensee. He contends that there is absolutely no evidence on record to show how the licence of present appellant was terminated by the respondent. He states that there is no notice served by the respondent upon the appellant informing him that his licence has been determined and calling upon him to vacate that by particular date. He points out that the Courts below have erroneously treated reply Exh. 91 dated 17.7.1983, forwarded by present respondent to legal notice of appellant, as a notice determining the licence. He states that said notice at Exh. 55 was issued by the appellant demanding specific performance and reply Exh. 91 is sent by advocate for the respondent to advocate for the appellant. He, therefore, states that said reply cannot be treated as service of notice upon the appellant. He further argues that in said reply also there is a request made to the advocate for the appellant and there is no legal call given to present appellant asking him to vacate. He, therefore, states that use of said reply Exh. 91 as a substitute for notice to vacate is illegal. He urges that a substantial question of law as to propriety of said use of Exh. 91 in the circumstances of the case also falls for consideration in this Second Appeal. He states that this question also needs to be answered in favour of appellant and also needs to be allowed independently. 6. In reply, Shri Wankhede, Advocate for respondent No.1 has pointed out that the Courts below have accepted the case that relationship of present respondent -Santosh with his real brother Vitthal was not cordial and Vitthal handed over a blank signed stamp paper of respondent to present appellant. He contends that an agreement for sale is required to be proved not only through document but by leading evidence of other facts also and all facts have been considered by Courts below to come to the conclusion that there was no such agreement between the parties at any point of time. He contends that an agreement for sale is required to be proved not only through document but by leading evidence of other facts also and all facts have been considered by Courts below to come to the conclusion that there was no such agreement between the parties at any point of time. He states that as said finding is concurrently reached, no substantial question of law arises on that account and Appeal No. 68 of 1994 filed by present appellant needs to be dismissed. 7. In answer to the arguments advanced in Second Appeal No. 33 of 1994, Shri Wankhede, Advocate contends that the circumstances in which the appellant came to occupy the suit property have already come on record. He states that when the appellant demanded specific performance, the said specific performance was denied by sending him a reply through advocate vide Exh. 91. He contends that in said reply the fact that the appellant was licensee and the fact that he has to vacate the suit premises are all mentioned. According to him, Exh. 91 has been rightly treated as a notice determining the licence of present appellant. He, therefore, states that no substantial question of law arises even on that count. 8. With the assistance of both counsel, I have perused common judgment of trial Court and also of lower appellate Court. The trial Court has at the end of para 13 of its judgment found that agreement Exh. 40 bears the signature of present respondent No.1 – Santosh. However, it thereafter proceeded to find out whether there was any evidence on record to show that the terms and conditions or arrangement envisaged therein was acted upon or implemented between the parties. It noticed that the appellant did not plead that he had paid amount of Rs.4,000/-to respondent – Santosh for depositing it in Nagpur Improvement Trust and accordingly the respondent – Santosh deposited it. It further found that the endorsement of receipt of amount of Rs.1,360/-made on Exh. 40 was not signed by Santosh at all. It has noticed that in Exh. 40, it was mentioned that on 21.3.1978, present appellant deposited amount of Rs.3,461.37 ps. for the dues till 21.3.1978 while witness for appellant by name Kisan (scribe) deposed at Exh. 60 that agreement was executed between 11 to 12 O' Clock in the noon and at that time, no money was paid. It has noticed that in Exh. 40, it was mentioned that on 21.3.1978, present appellant deposited amount of Rs.3,461.37 ps. for the dues till 21.3.1978 while witness for appellant by name Kisan (scribe) deposed at Exh. 60 that agreement was executed between 11 to 12 O' Clock in the noon and at that time, no money was paid. It found that this evidence of witness Kisan was not consistent with the contents of agreement Exh. 40 and therefore payment of Rs.3,461/-by the appellant to Nagpur Improvement Trust became doubtful. It also found that when amount of Rs.1,360/-was paid by the appellant, the amount was accepted by Vitthal brother of present appellant as per story of appellant. The respondent was very much present there but then his signature was not obtained on endorsement of said amount on Exh. 40. The trial Court expressed surprise over not obtaining the signature of respondent though he was present at that time. In view of these glaring facts which came in evidence on record, the trial Court has found the story of respondent that he had given a blank signed stamp paper to his brother for procuring loan which Vitthal made over to present appellant to be more probable. It also found that the amounts were paid by present respondent to Nagpur Improvement Trust from time to time and one receipt dated 21.3.1978 was not given by Vitthal to respondent and Vitthal later on gave said receipt to present appellant. The appreciation of evidence by trial Court has been upheld by learned lower appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or error in application of mind either by the trial Court or by lower appellate Court to the facts which have come on record. Though there was signature of present respondent on Exh. 40, in view of dispute raised, it was necessary to find out whether Exh. 40 was really put to use by the parties and the evidence on record clearly demonstrated that said terms and conditions were not depicting correct picture. 9. The Courts below, therefore, were justified in holding that there was no agreement for sale between the parties. The finding is concurrent and I, therefore, find that no substantial question of law arises in this Second Appeal on that count. 10. The fact that present appellant is licensee of present respondent has been mentioned concurrently in both judgments. 9. The Courts below, therefore, were justified in holding that there was no agreement for sale between the parties. The finding is concurrent and I, therefore, find that no substantial question of law arises in this Second Appeal on that count. 10. The fact that present appellant is licensee of present respondent has been mentioned concurrently in both judgments. The reply Exh. 91 dated 17.7.1983 has been forwarded by counsel for present respondent No.1 to counsel for present appellant. The reply is with reference to notice dated 25.6.1983 (Exh. 55) sent by present appellant to respondent – Santosh. The reply has been forwarded by RPAD and its receipt by addressee (advocate) mentioned therein is not in dispute. It is obvious that reply was not forwarded for use of advocate but it was forwarded to advocate of appellant for use of present appellant. Accordingly, the reply has been used by the appellant and the same came to be filed in present litigation. The appellant relied upon it to point out his entitlement to claim specific performance. The contention that reply, therefore, is not meant for present appellant is incorrect and cannot be accepted. In said reply, the advocate for the respondent has stated that his client requests client of addressee (advocate) to vacate the plot within a period of a month from receipt. The words appearing after receipt are “of this notice” and the words are not “of this reply”. It is, therefore, obvious that the advocate sending the reply had given a notice to advocate for the appellant informing him that his client has to vacate within a period of a month from its receipt. The word “request” used in said reply does not make any difference because it is only the mode of address or manner of communication. Legally, the intention to get the plot vacated has been unequivocally expressed and communicated. Not only this, but later on it has also been informed that “else my client has issued ready instructions to file a suit for possession of plot against your client”. Thus, the consequence of not vacating the plot have also been stipulated. It, therefore, cannot be argued that by this communication, the licence of present appellant was not determined. In fact, the last para of reply Exh. 91 is nothing but a notice terminating the licence of present appellant. Thus, the consequence of not vacating the plot have also been stipulated. It, therefore, cannot be argued that by this communication, the licence of present appellant was not determined. In fact, the last para of reply Exh. 91 is nothing but a notice terminating the licence of present appellant. I, therefore, find that the Courts below again have rightly appreciated said document and have correctly held that licence of appellant was duly terminated. 11 At this stage, Shri Khamborkar, Advocate for the appellant has tried to urge that there is no compliance with provisions of Section 60 of Indian Easements Act. However, from pleadings as also from arguments before lower Court and also from arguments advanced before me, it is apparent that no question of application of provisions of Section 60 of Indian Easements Act was raised at any point of time by present appellant. 12. In the circumstances, I find nothing wrong with the judgments delivered by the Courts below. No case is made out warranting any interference in Second Appeals. The same are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.