Judgment :- 1. Petitioner seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus directing the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner back to service, regularizing the period of absence with retrospective effect as on duty and direct payment of back wages till the date of reinstatement with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. 2. Brief facts which led to the filing of Writ Petition are as follows:- .(i) Petitioner was appointed as Assistant (Typist on11. 1986). Petitioner along with his family members are alleged to have collected deposit from the public and failed to repay the amount on demand, which resulted in filing of criminal case against the Petitioner and his family members under Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors Act. .(ii) Petitioner had been proceeded with departmental action by a Charge Memo dated 111. 1999 for the misconduct – (i) that he was unauthorisedly absent for 89 days from 28. 1999 till the date of charge sheet and thereby causing dislocation to the smooth functioning of the office; (ii) that the Petitioner collected money from the retired employees/public towards term deposit for the financial company established in the name of family members and failed to repay the same on demand and involved in a fraudulent activities. (iii) One Kamalakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer and various communications relating to the proceedings had been sent by registered post to the address in the Service record of the Petitioner. Those communications had been returned unserved. Petitioner was set exparte and proceedings were held on various dates. Witnesses and documents were examined during the hearing. Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 20.9.2001. Enquiry Officer held that both the charges of unauthorized absence and Petitioners involvement in collection of money were proved. After issuing second show cause notice, punishment of removal from service vide order dated 111. 2001 was imposed. (iv) Case of the Petitioner is that no communication was sent to him either preliminary or other regular hearings and the entire proceedings are vitiated due to violation of principles of natural justice. Enquiry proceedings is also vitiated on account of nonpayment of subsistence allowance to the Petitioner. Order of suspension was not at all served upon the Petitioner and violation of principles of natural justice would vitiate the entire proceedings. 3. Enquiry proceedings is also vitiated on account of nonpayment of subsistence allowance to the Petitioner. Order of suspension was not at all served upon the Petitioner and violation of principles of natural justice would vitiate the entire proceedings. 3. Respondents have filed counter stating that Petitioner had been given adequate opportunities to defend his case at each and every stage of proceedings of enquiry and even after several communications, Petitioner did not choose to appear. Further, according to the Respondents, order of removal from service is not arbitrary, but only bonafide, commensurate with the charges levelled against the Petitioner. 4. Challenging the punishment of dismissal from service, Mr. R. Karuppan, learned counsel for the Petitioner interalia raised the following contentions:- =Enquiry proceedings is vitiated as no reasonable opportunity was given to the Petitioner nor was served with any notice and the report of the Enquiry Officer is non-est; =Enquiry Officer Kamalakumar himself had given complaint against the Petitioner complaining about the deposit of Rs.10,000/-by United India Insurance Company Officers Association and the complainant himself cannot be the Enquiry Officer and the enquiry is vitiated by bias; =Order of punishment was passed by the Regional Manager who is the Appellate Authority and the impugned order is vitiated since Appellate Authority himself awarded the punishment; =No suspension order was served upon the Petitioner and because of the non payment of subsistence allowance, the punishment imposed on the Petitioner is vitiated. .5. Mrs. Rita Chandrasekaran, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent has submitted that the Charges are more grave in nature and that inspite of communications, the notices were returned unserved and the delinquent had purposely evaded the service. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submitted that after deliberately evading the service, it is not open to the Petitioner to contend that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity. Petitioner had been proceeded with the disciplinary action by Memorandum of Charges dated 111. 1999. Inspite of notices given to the Petitioner for his appearance, Petitioner was absent for the enquiry and the Petitioner was set exparte and regular hearing was conducted. 6. Challenging the enquiry proceedings and final orders, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that absolutely no notice was ever served upon the Petitioner for enquiry proceedings and conducting regular hearings exparte is in violation of principles of natual justice and therefore, enquiry and the final orders passed thereon are unsustainable. 6. Challenging the enquiry proceedings and final orders, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that absolutely no notice was ever served upon the Petitioner for enquiry proceedings and conducting regular hearings exparte is in violation of principles of natual justice and therefore, enquiry and the final orders passed thereon are unsustainable. Main contention of the Petitioner is that no opportunity was afforded to the Petitioner for conducting enquiry proceedings. 7. By perusal of enquiry report, it comes to be known that after appointing Kamalakumar as Enquiry Officer, various communications relating to the proceedings such as constitution of Enquiry Authority, preliminary and other regular hearings had been sent by registered post to the last known address as per the service record of the Petitioner. But those communications are said to have been returned unserved with endorsement "left". Copy of notices were also displayed on the Notice Board of the Regional Office and the same was taken as proof of service. Report of Enquiry Officer would indicate the efforts taken for serving the notice to the last known address and notices were returned unserved. Notices were also displayed on the Notice Board of the Regional Office. In such circumstances, Petitioner cannot have grievance about the proceedings having been conducted exparte. When sufficient opportunity was given to the Petitioner to appear for disciplinary proceedings and when the Petitioner has not availed the opportunity, it is not open to him to contend that exparte proceedings has caused prejudice. .8. Criminal case was registered against the Petitioner and his family members by the Crime Branch, Madurai u/s.420 IPC and Secs.2, 3 and 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors Act. Petitioner was arrested by the Police on 12. 2000 and he was released on conditional bail on 20.4.2000. Since the Petitioner was in prison for more than 48 hours, as per the rule, Petitioner is deemed to have been suspended. There is no force in the contention of the Petitioner that non-serving of suspension order would vitiate the proceedings. 9. Dr. G.M.J. Kamalakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer by the order dated 24. 2001. After examining the witnesses and after conclusion of enquiry proceedings, Enquiry Officer has submitted his enquiry report on 20.9.2001. As a Treasurer of United India Insurance Officers Association, the said Kamalakumar had preferred a complaint on 18. 9. Dr. G.M.J. Kamalakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer by the order dated 24. 2001. After examining the witnesses and after conclusion of enquiry proceedings, Enquiry Officer has submitted his enquiry report on 20.9.2001. As a Treasurer of United India Insurance Officers Association, the said Kamalakumar had preferred a complaint on 18. 2002 to the Inspector of Police, Economic Offences Wing, Madurai that the Petitioner who was then working as Typist in the Regional Office has collected Rs.10,000/- from the Association in the name of B.S.R. Finance Company and that in spite of repeated request, the Association had not received either the principal or the interest. 10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently contended that Kamalakumar himself was the complainant and that he cannot function as Enquiry Officer and therefore, the enquiry conducted by Kamalakumar is vitiated by bias. Contending that no man can be a Judge of his own cause, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon 2000 (I) CTC 580 [In Re Pinochet]. Observing that if a party to litigation has financial or proprietary interest in outcome of such litigation he is liberally sitting as Judge in his own cause and is automatically disqualified to decide such cases, House of Lords held as under:- "29. The fundamental principle is that a man may not be a judge in his own cause. This principle, as developed by the courts, has two very similar but not identical implications. First it may be applied literally: if a judge is in fact a party to the litigation or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome then he is indeed sitting as a judge in his own cause. In that case, the mere fact that he is a party to the action or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome is sufficient to cause his automatic disqualification. The second application of the principle is where a judge is not a party to the suit and does not have a financial interest in its outcome, but in some other way his conduct or behaviour may give rise to a suspicion that he is not impartial, for example because of his friendship with a party. The second application of the principle is where a judge is not a party to the suit and does not have a financial interest in its outcome, but in some other way his conduct or behaviour may give rise to a suspicion that he is not impartial, for example because of his friendship with a party. This second type of case is not strictly speaking an application of the principle that a man must not be judge in his own cause, since the judge will not normally be himself benefiting, but providing a benefit for another by failing to be impartial." 11. The test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias, in AIR 1993 sc 2155 [Rattan Lal sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr.Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and others], the Supreme Court held as follows:- "11. ...... If a person has a pecuniary interest, such interest, even if very small, disqualifies such person. For appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1980) at page 262 has observed that a real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R.v. Sunderland Justices, (1901) 2 KB 357 (373) it has been held that the Court will have to judge the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. In R.v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256 (259) it has been indicated that answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In Halsbury Laws of England, (4th Edn.) Vol.2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575 : ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ). The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575 : ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ). This Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done." 12. In AIR 2002 SC 678 [Amar Nath Chowdhury v. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. and others], employee dismissed from service by Managing Director of Company as Disciplinary Authority. Appeal against the dismissal was also heard by the Managing Director. In such factual circumstances of the case, Supreme Court has held that the order of Appellate Authority was liable to be set aside on account of bias, since the Appellate Authority passed the order of dismissal from service. .13. It is fairly well settled that one of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa, which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a Judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kind and form. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. 14. In the present case what we are concerned having lodged the complaint as Treasurer of United India Insurance Officers Association, whether Enquiry Officer Kamalakumar became Judge of his own cause and whether there was any bias as to the subject matter. As pointed out earlier, Kamalakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer vide Order No. MDURO:PER:26:006:2001 dated 24. 2001 by the Disciplinary Authority/Dy. Manager, Regional Office, Madurai. Preliminary hearing was fixed on 15. 2001 and regular hearings were held on various dates. Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 20.9.2001. 15. As pointed out earlier, Kamalakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer vide Order No. MDURO:PER:26:006:2001 dated 24. 2001 by the Disciplinary Authority/Dy. Manager, Regional Office, Madurai. Preliminary hearing was fixed on 15. 2001 and regular hearings were held on various dates. Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 20.9.2001. 15. As a Treasurer of United India Insurance Officers Association, Kamalakumar lodged the complaint on 18. 2002 stating that an amount of Rs.10,000/- deposited by the Association with the Petitioner has not been repaid. Such complaint filed by Kamalakumar on 18. 2002 was long after the enquiry report. That too, the complaint was preferred by Kamalakumar not in his individual capacity but in his capacity as Treasurer of United India Insurance Officers Association. While so, it cannot be contended that the enquiry held much earlier was vitiated by bias. 16. The bias in disciplinary proceedings must be a real possibility as to a reasonable mind and not merely on suspicion or surmise based on no material. Bias should have existed even before the enquiry was held so as to vitiate the enquiry. As Treasurer of the Association, Kamalakumar has preferred a complaint on 18. 2002 whereas he has filed the report way back on 20.9.2001. Absolutely, there was no bias either before enquiry or during the enquiry proceedings. .17. The impugned order is assailed contending that the punishment was imposed by the Regional Manager who is the Appellate Authority. It was contended that since the Appellate Authority had imposed the punishment of dismissal from service, Petitioner has been deprived of opportunity of preferring an appeal before the Competent Authority and such deprivation would vitiate the impugned order. As per General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975 for the post of "Assistants and equivalent cadres and Record Clerks" for imposing major penalties, the Competent Authority would be Asst. Manager/Dy. Manager. Regional Manager is the Appellate Authority. In the present case, impugned order of dismissal from service was passed by the Appellate Authority/Regional Manager. But the point for consideration is whether the order of dismissal from service passed by the higher authority viz., Regional Manager would have effect of vitiating the final order. 18. It is no doubt true that when the disciplinary power is vested with specific authority, all steps starting from the initiation of the proceedings must be taken by that authority. It cannot be delegated to a subordinate authority. 18. It is no doubt true that when the disciplinary power is vested with specific authority, all steps starting from the initiation of the proceedings must be taken by that authority. It cannot be delegated to a subordinate authority. But in the present case, the higher authority viz., Regional Manager has passed the impugned order of dismissal from service. Since, the order was passed by the higher authority/appellate authority, it cannot be contended that Petitioner was deprived of his right in preferring the appeal. If the Petitioner intended to prefer appeal, he could have preferred the appeal to higher authority. 19. Learned counsel for he Petitioner nextly contended that non-payment of subsistence allowance would vitiate the enquiry. Since the Petitioner was in prison for more than 48 years, he was deemed to have been suspended on 22. 2000 in terms of conduct rules of Respondents company. Petitioner came out on bail on 20.4.2000 and he was dismissed from service on 111. 2001. Court has passed the order for payment of subsistence allowance which works out to Rs.60,669/-. 20. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that Petitioner was not paid the subsistence allowance having been kept under suspension and as such Petitioner was not in a position to face the proceedings and the enquiry was proceeded with in his absence. Placing reliance upon AIR 1973 SC 1183 [Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh], learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that when the employee was not in a position to attend the enquiry because of non-payment of subsistence allowance, the order of dismissal is to be held invalid. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contended that departmental enquiry conducted without payment of subsistence allowance is contrary to the provisions and is also violative under Art.311(2) of Constitution of India. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon (1993) 3 SCC 387 [State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale]. 21. Petitioners penalty of dismissal from service was passed on 111. 2001. Petitioner had given a letter on 011. 2001 to the Regional Manager giving his consent to the employer to adjust the dues if any towards General Insurance Corporation Employees" Co-op Thrift & Credit Society, Madras. To that effect, Petitioner had also given notarized affidavit on 011. 2001. 21. Petitioners penalty of dismissal from service was passed on 111. 2001. Petitioner had given a letter on 011. 2001 to the Regional Manager giving his consent to the employer to adjust the dues if any towards General Insurance Corporation Employees" Co-op Thrift & Credit Society, Madras. To that effect, Petitioner had also given notarized affidavit on 011. 2001. Both in the letter and his affidavit, Petitioner has stated as under:- "As I am under the period of suspension, I hereby give my consent to the employer to adjust the dues if any, in full towards the General Insurance Corporation Employees" Coop Thrift & Credit Society, Chennai out of the amount available in my credit from the following sources. a) Wage Revision Arrears kept pending for payment. b) Subsistence allowance. c) My contribution towards PF account as on date." .22. Earlier, Petitioner has filed Contempt Petition in C.P.No.508/2006 alleging willful disobedience of order of the Court in payment of subsistence allowance. Petitioners letter dated 011. 2001 and his notarized affidavit were produced before the learned single Judge. After hearing the parties, by the order dated 22. 2007, learned single Judge has observed that the amount payable towards subsistence allowance was Rs.60,669/-. As per the letter of the Petitioner, a sum of Rs.26,288/- was paid to the Society. After such payment, subsistence allowance to an extent of Rs.34,387/-remain in the books of accounts unclaimed by the Petitioner. In obedience of the order dated 19. 2003, Demand Draft dated 010. 2003 drawn in favour of the Petitioner for Rs.34,387/- was given to the Petitioner. At the request of Petitioner, fresh Demand Draft dated 02. 2005 was also issued. Referring to the consent letter of the Petitioner dated 011. 2001, learned single Judge has held that there was no willful disobedience of the order and dismissed the Contempt Petition. 23. By the letter dated 011. 2001 when the Petitioner had given his consent to adjust the wage revision arrears, subsistence allowance, Petitioners contribution towards PF account towards the amount payable to General Insurance Corporation Employees Coop Thrift & Credit Society, Madras, it is not open to the Petitioner to contend that the enquiry proceedings is vitiated due to non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is relevant to note that Petitioner had already received DD for a sum of Rs.34,387/-towards subsistence allowance payable to him. 24. It is relevant to note that Petitioner had already received DD for a sum of Rs.34,387/-towards subsistence allowance payable to him. 24. In the Petition, Petitioner has stated that inspite of his repeated request for payment of subsistence allowance, it was not paid. In Para 11 of the Writ Petition, Petitioner has averred that "he had sent his representation to the Respondent on 15. 2001 obviously hinting at grant of subsistence allowance". By perusal of the representation dated 15. 2001, it is seen that Petitioner did not actually ask for payment of subsistence allowance. 25. Only in his letter dated 05. 2002, Petitioner has sought for grant of subsistence allowance but even before that, enquiry was completed. Final order of dismissal from service came to be passed on 111. 2001. Even before that, Petitioner had given his representation dated 011. 2001 giving consent for adjustment of subsistence allowance and wage revision arrears towards the amount payable to the General Insurance Corporation Employees Co-op Thrift & Credit Society, Madras. In such circumstances, there is no force in the contention of the Petitioner that enquiry proceedings is vitiated due to non-payment of subsistence allowance. Admittedly, Petitioner was in prison for nearly more than two months and he was released on bail on 20.4.2000. Charges levelled against the Petitioner are grave in nature that he collected money from the retired employees/public towards term deposit for the finance company established in the name of his family members. .26. In service matters, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. Unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, High Court would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment. Having regard to the gravity of charges, the Management thought fit to impose punishment of dismissal from service. It cannot be said that the punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is disproportionate warranting interference exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution of India. 27. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed.