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2008 DIGILAW 351 (ALL)

SALAHUDDIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2008-02-18

SUDHIR AGARWAL, SUSHIL HARKAULI

body2008
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 16.12.1998 whereby a minor punishment of ‘Censure’ was awarded to him, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the same. 2. The petitioner was working as Executive Engineer in Rural Engineering Services, Faizabad Division in the year 1990 in respect whereto Technical Audit Cell of the Department made an inquiry and submitted report pointing out several irregularities committed by the petitioner in discharge of duties which constituted misconduct. A show cause notice alongwith technical audit report was issued to the petitioner on 26.5.1992 which was replied by him vide letter dated 7.5.1993. The State Government after considering the same, imposed minor punishment of “Censure” vide order dated 16.12.1998. Aggrieved thereto, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 3. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that before passing the impugned order of punishment, no inquiry was conducted against him in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, as applicable in U.P., (hereinafter referred to as “1930 Rules”) at the relevant time, and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He further contended that the impugned order has been passed on accountof mala fide reasons inasmuch as, Sri Markandey Chand, the then Minister, Department of Rural Engineering Services bore harassing attitude towards the petitioner and therefore, the impugned order was passed imposing the said punishment and as such, it is vitiated in law. Lastly it is contended that nothing has been found proved against the petitioner and for this reason also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. Lastly it is contended that nothing has been found proved against the petitioner and for this reason also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. Admittedly, in the year 1993, the procedure for disciplinary inquiry governing the petitioner was regulated by 1930 Rules, as applicable in the State of U.P. “Censure” being a minor penalty, the procedure prescribed in 1930 Rules is not that of Rule 55 which would be applicable but Rule 55-B would have been applicable in this case which reads as under : “55-B. (a) Whenever the punishing authority is satisfied that good and sufficient reasons exist for adopting such a course it may impose the penalty of— (i) censure, or (ii) stoppage at an efficiency-bar : Provided that it shall not be necessary to frame formal charges against the Government servant concerned or to call for his explanation. (b) In all cases where a punishing authority imposes the penalty of— (i) withholding increments in the time-scale at stages where there is no efficiency bar, or (ii) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders, formal proceeding embodying a statement of the offence or fault, the explanation of the person concerned and the reasons for the punishment shall be recorded : Provided that it shall not be necessary to record such proceedings in cases where a Government servant’s increment in the time scale of his pay, at any stage other than an efficiency bar, is stopped due to his integrity remaining uncertified.” 5. It is not disputed that in accordance with Rule 55-B, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner alongwith a copy of technical audit report which contain allegations of acts and omissions constituting misconduct on the part of the petitioner and he was given opportunity to submit his reply. The petitioner in fact submitted reply on 7.5.1993 wherein purchase of material beyond requisite quantity was not disputed but was sought to be explained that due to expediency of work it was necessary and it had not caused any loss to the Government. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner found that the irregularities committed by the petitioner have not been denied, he was guilty and, therefore, minor penalty of ‘Censure’ has been imposed. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner found that the irregularities committed by the petitioner have not been denied, he was guilty and, therefore, minor penalty of ‘Censure’ has been imposed. As such, it cannot be said that the procedure prescribed in law for imposing minor penalty has not been followed by respondent No. 1. The contention of the petitioner that a regular inquiry as prescribed under Rule 55 ought to have been made, is incorrect inasmuch as, for imposing minor penalty, said procedure has no application whatsoever, and therefore, the contention is rejected. 6. The next submission that the impugned order is result of mala fide of the then Minister of the Department, we find that the person against whom mala fide has been alleged has not been impleaded. It is well settled law that the plea of mala fide cannot be entertained by the Court if the person against whom mala fide is alleged is not impleaded eo-nomine. The Apex Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 in para 55 of the judgment, the Apex Court held : “It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded eo-nomine as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegations would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegation of mala fides or bias alleged against them.” (emphasis added) 7. In AIR 1996 SC 326 , J.N. Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, in para 21 of the judgment, it has been held as under : “Further in the absence of impleadment of the..........the person who had allegedly passed mala fide order in order to favour such junior doctor, any contention of mala fide action in fact i.e. malice in fact should not be countenanced by the Court.” 8. In JT 1996 (8) SC 550, A.I.S.B. Officers Federation and others v. Union of India and others, in para 23, the Hon’ble Apex Court has said where a person, who has passed the order and against whom the plea of mala fide has been taken has not been impleaded, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide. The relevant observation of the Apex Court relevant are reproduced as under : “The person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.” (emphasis added) 9. In AIR 2003 SC 1344 , Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, it has been held as under : “That allegations regarding mala fides cannot be vaguely made and it must be specified and clear. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations.” (emphasis added) 10. In view of the above, since the person against whom the plea of mala fide has been levelled is not impleaded, we have no hesitation in declining the contention of the petitioner to assail the impugned order on the ground of mala fide. 11. Now coming to the last submission that nothing has been proved against the petitioner warranting any punishment, we find that a Technical Audit Cell conducted an inquiry and found certain irregularities committed by the petitioner. The said report alongwith show cause notice was duly served upon the petitioner giving an opportunity to explain the flaws pointed out in the aforesaid report with respect to the petitioner and, thereafter, the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order. Nothing has been placed before this Court to show that the findings that the petitioner was guilty of certain irregularities are perverse or based on no material on record. Nothing has been placed before this Court to show that the findings that the petitioner was guilty of certain irregularities are perverse or based on no material on record. On the contrary, the petitioner’s reply itself shows that he admits of having purchased certain material without following the procedure since the matter was urgent and sought to defend his action by contending that it has not caused any loss to the Government. The fact remains that he has not observed the procedure prescribed for undertaking the said work and, therefore, it cannot be said that to that extent, the petitioner having been found guilty, the finding is perverse or contrary to the material on record. 12. No other argument has been advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. ————