JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By making this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), the petitioners, who are accused in Complaint Case No. 7709/2006, have put to challenge the order, dated 26.09.2006, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Kamrup, whereby cognizance of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'the N.I. Act') has been taken. The petitioners have accordingly sought for quashing of not only the impugned order, dated 26.09.2006, aforementioned, but the entire proceedings of the complaint case. 2. I have heard Mrs. M. Hazarika, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners, and Mr. D.K. Kothari, learned Counsel for the complainant-opposite party. 3. The material facts, leading to this criminal petition, may be set out thus: (i) A complaint was made by the opposite party herein, namely, National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd., popularly known was NAFED, a registered co-operative society, having its registered office at Ashram Chowk, New Delhi, and with its branch office, at Bhangagarh, Guwahati, carrying on mainly trading in agricultural and non-agricultural food products, such as, food grains, edible oil, spices, metal ore, metal scrap, chemicals, petroleum, etc. The accused persons procured, from time to time, various materials from NAFED and to discharge their lawful dues to NAFED, they issued a cheque for rupees one crore, under the seal of the accused No. 1, the cheque having been drawn on HDFC Bank, Defence Colony, New Delhi, in favour of NAFED. Upon receiving information that the said cheque was dishonoured by the HDFC Bank, Defence Colony, New Delhi, on 17.06.2006, the complainant sent a demand notice, dated 25.07.2006, by registered post with acknowledgment due, on 26.07.2006, to both the accused persons informing them about dishonour of the cheque and also demanding payment of the amount for which the cheque was drawn. Despite having received the notices so issued, the accused persons did not make payment as had been demanded. 4. On the basis of the facts, so alleged, the complainant sought for prosecution of the accused persons under Section 142 read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Despite having received the notices so issued, the accused persons did not make payment as had been demanded. 4. On the basis of the facts, so alleged, the complainant sought for prosecution of the accused persons under Section 142 read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act. (ii) Having found to have been established a prima facie case, under Section142 read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act, against the two accused, learned Court below passed the order, dated 26.09.2006, aforementioned, taking cognizance of the offence aforementioned and directing accordingly issuance of summons to the accused. As the accused did not appear, warrants of arrest were directed to be issued against them. It is as already indicated above, the order dated 26.09.2006, aforementioned, which is under challenge in this criminal petition. Though a number of grounds were taken in the criminal petition, the order, at the time of hearing, stood challenged on the sole ground of territorial jurisdiction of the Court, which has passed the impugned order and issued the processes to the accused petitioners. 5. Appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners, Mrs. Hazarika has submitted that the cheque, in question, was issued by the accused-petitioners in the name of NAFED and the amount, mentioned therein, was payable to NAFED at New Delhi and that all transactions, with regard to the business of the parties concerned, having taken place, at New Delhi, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, in question, and take cognizance of the offence aforementioned. Thus, according to Mrs. Hazarika, the prosecution of the accused-petitioners is without jurisdiction and the whole proceedings of the criminal case may, therefore, be set aside and quashed. 6. Responding to the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioners, Mr. Thus, according to Mrs. Hazarika, the prosecution of the accused-petitioners is without jurisdiction and the whole proceedings of the criminal case may, therefore, be set aside and quashed. 6. Responding to the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioners, Mr. Kothari, has submitted placing heavily reliance on K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr., that in the case at hand, the cheque, in question, was issued in favour of NAFED and, hence, NAFED's branch office, at Guwahati, was quite competent to get the cheque encashed and when the cheque bounced back on being dishonoured by the banker of the accused persons, notices as required under Section 138 N.I. Act, were duly served on the two accused-petitioners informing them about the dishonour of the cheque and also demanding payment of the amount covered by the cheque and as the amount, so demanded, was not paid, the complainant had no option, but to lodge complaint for prosecution of the two accused-petitioners. Mr. Kothari further points out that since the notices demanding payment were issued by the NAFED's branch office, at Guwahati, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kamrup, has, territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence aforementioned. 7. The main controversy, in the light of what have been noted above, centers round the question as to whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court, at Guwahati, has the territorial jurisdiction, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to take cognizance of the offence under Section 142 of the N.I. Act or not. 8. For the purpose of finding a correct answer to the question posed above, what is necessary to bear in mind is that it is Section 177 Cr.P.C. which prescribes the ordinary place of enquiry and trial. Section 177 lays down: Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 9. From a careful and cautions reading of the provisions of Section 177, it becomes transparent that the legislature has very thoughtfully used the expression 'ordinarily', in Section 177, making thereby clear that the requirement that every offence shall be tried by the Court, within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, is not an inflexible principle. 9. From a careful and cautions reading of the provisions of Section 177, it becomes transparent that the legislature has very thoughtfully used the expression 'ordinarily', in Section 177, making thereby clear that the requirement that every offence shall be tried by the Court, within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, is not an inflexible principle. The use of the expression 'ordinarily' in Section 177 is, thus, indicative of the fact that the territorial jurisdiction has not been made an invariable principle for the purpose of assumption of jurisdiction by a Court. In fact, Section178, which deals with places of enquiry or trial, clearly lays down that when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas, an offence was committed, or where an offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into, or tried by, a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 10. What emerges from the above discussion is that though ordinarily, an offence shall be enquired into, and tried, by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, the Code also makes it possible for an offence to be enquired into, and tried by, a Court within whose local jurisdiction part of the offence took place or when the offence consists of several acts, it can be enquired into, and tried, in any of the local areas, where any of such acts was done. 11. In the backdrop of the law, as discussed above, with regard to place of enquiry or trial, when one turns to Section 138 of the N.I. Act, what strikes one is that an offence, under Section 138, consists of several acts. The provisions, contained in Section 138, involve several acts as components of the offence, namely, (i) drawing of the cheque, (ii) presentation of the cheque, (iii) return of the cheque unpaid by the drawer's bank, (iv) giving of notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within thirty days from the receipt of such notice. In every case, it is not necessary that all these five acts must have been done at the same locality or within the local area of one given Court. In every case, it is not necessary that all these five acts must have been done at the same locality or within the local area of one given Court. In fact, it is possible that each of these five acts could have been done at five different places or local areas. It is, however, a combination of all these five acts, which is sine qua non for constituting an offence under Section138. No wonder, therefore, that Clause (d) of Section 178 of the Code specifically lays down that where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, such an offence may be enquired into, and tried, by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local area. 12. What follows from the above discussion is that if the five different acts, indicated above, were done in five different local areas, any of the Courts, exercising jurisdiction in one of such five local areas, can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138. It would really be for the complainant to choose any one of such five local areas within the jurisdictional limit of which any of these five acts was done. These aspects of law have been succinctly dealt with in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr. (supra), wherein the Apex Court has, in no uncertain words, held that the complainant can choose any of the local areas, where any of these five acts, which form the components of the offence under Section 138, was done. 13. In the light of the law as discussed above, when I revert to the facts of the present case, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that the cheque, in question, was, admittedly, issued in favour of NAFED and there is nothing in law, which stops or prohibits the registered office of a company from sending such a cheque to its branch office for realization of the cheque amount. It is accordingly from NAFED's branch office, at Guwahati, that the cheque was sent for encashment to the drawers bank at New Delhi and when the cheque was dishonoured, notices were sent to the accused-petitioners, from Guwahati, demanding payment of the cheque amount and when the payment was not made, the complaint, in question, was made at Guwahati. It is accordingly from NAFED's branch office, at Guwahati, that the cheque was sent for encashment to the drawers bank at New Delhi and when the cheque was dishonoured, notices were sent to the accused-petitioners, from Guwahati, demanding payment of the cheque amount and when the payment was not made, the complaint, in question, was made at Guwahati. It, thus, becomes abundantly clear that several acts, constituting offence under Section 138, were done at Guwahati and, under such circumstances, the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, must be held to have the jurisdiction to try the alleged offence the accusations, made by the complainant, are true and correct or not. Viewed thus, it is clear that the prosecution of the accused-petitioners, at Guwahati, cannot be said to be bad in law. 14. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order directing issuance of processes against the accused-petitioners. This criminal petition, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.