JUDGMENT : A.K. Parichha, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal against the Judgment of Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Keonjhar passed in T.A. No. 21/95/14 of 1996 confirming the Judgment and decree recorded by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Keonjhar in T.S. No. 15 of 1991. 2. The present Respondent as Plaintiff filed the suit claiming title over the suit land on the plea that he purchased the same from the recorded tenant by means of Ext. 1 and possessed it thereafter. On the other hand, the Defendant claimed that he is in possession of Ac. 0.10 decimals put of the purchased land of the Plaintiff by constructing house thereon since more than 50 years and thereby has acquired title over the same by adverse possession. The Trial Court decreed the right, title of the Plaintiff over the suit land and also ruled that he is entitled to recover possession of the suit land along with house constructed thereon. The said decree was confirmed in the appeal and hence the present second appeal. 3. The following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration in this appeal. (i) Whether the observation of the first Appellate Court that in view of the amendment in Section 23-B(2) of the OLR Act the Defendant has to prove his adverse possession over the suit land for a period of 30 years is legally correct? (ii) Whether the observation in the impugned Judgment that the Appellant is not a man belonging to the Scheduled Tribe is an error on record and such finding has materially affected the result of the appeal? 4. Mr. Mohanty, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the amended period of limitation provided in Section 23-B(2) of the OLR Act is applicable only to the proceedings under Sections 23-A and 23-B of the OLR Act and not to the cases under the civil law and other laws. According to him, in suits filed before Civil Court, the period of limitation as contemplated under the Limitation Act will apply and therefore, the Appellant having already remained in continuous, open and hostile possession for more than 12 years had acquired title over the suit land by adverse possession as per Article 65 of the Limitation Act. In support of his stand, he relies on the cases of Butu Naik v. Ainla Naikani and Anr. In support of his stand, he relies on the cases of Butu Naik v. Ainla Naikani and Anr. 71 (1991) C.L.T. 281, Goutam Kumar Mohapatra alias Barik Vs. Kara Patra and Others, and Trilochan Dandsena and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Others, Mr. Mohanty also argued that the decree of the Appellate Court clearly shows that the Appellant is a person belonging to Scheduled Tribe and therefore the first Appellate Court committed error on record in saying that the Appellant does not belong to Scheduled Tribe. He states that once both the parties belong to Scheduled Tribe, there is no question of any bar of acquiring in title by adverse possession by one of the parties. In this regard, he relied on the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Ors. 98 (2004) CLT 19in paragraph-27 of the Judgment. Mr. S.S. Das, Learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, supports the impugned Judgment and states that not only the amended period of limitation of Section 23-B in the matter of adverse possession is applicable, but in view of the ruling of the Apex Court in Amrendra Pratap Singh (supra) a non-tribal person can never acquire title over the land of a tribal person by way of adverse possession irrespective of the length of his possession over that property. Mr. Das states that whether the Appellant belongs to Scheduled Tribe or not is a question of fact and evidence and the matter is not open for discussion in the second appeal. 5. Mr. Das states that whether the Appellant belongs to Scheduled Tribe or not is a question of fact and evidence and the matter is not open for discussion in the second appeal. 5. Before entering into the contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the parties, it will be beneficial to recount the provisions of Sections 23-A and 23-B of the OLR Act: 23.A. Eviction of person in unauthorized occupation of property-where any person is found to be in authorized occupation of the whole or part of a holding of a raiyat belonging to a Scheduled Caste or of a raiyat belonging to a Scheduled Tribe within any part to the State other than a Scheduled Area, by way of trespass or otherwise, the Revenue Officer may either on application by the owner or any person interested therein, or on his own motion and after giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, order eviction of the person so found to be in unauthorized occupation and shall cause restoration of the property to the said raiyat or to his heir in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 23. 23-B. Burden of proof and amendment of limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceedings u/s 23-(1) If any proceedings u/s 23, the validity of the transfer of any holding or any part thereof is called in question, or if such proceedings are for the recovery of possession of such holding, or part thereof, the burden of providing that the transfer was valid shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, lie on the transferee. (2) In the Limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceeding u/s 23-B, [and u/s 23-A] in the Schedule, after the words "twelve years" occurring in the Second Column against Article 65 the words, brackets and figures "but thirty years in the case of immovable property belonging to a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Scheduled Caste, specified in relation to the State of Orissa in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 or the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, as the case may be, "shall be inserted." Section 23-B(2) after the amendment says that the amended period of limitation i.e., 30 years applies to the proceedings under Sections 23-A and 23-B. Whether this amended provision is applicable to other kinds of litigations involving the land of tribal person or whether it is confined only to the proceedings initiated by the Revenue authorities under Sections 23-A and 23-B of the Act was the subject matter of consideration in the case of Butu Naik (supra), in paragraph 5 of that Judgment, the following observation was made: 5. The next question is, what is the requisite period of possession in respect of such land to perfect title by adverse possession, whether twelve years or thirty years. Section 23-B as it stands now was inserted in the Act In 1976 by Act 44 of 1976. In Sub-section (2) of this Section it is provided that in the Limitation Act, 1963 in its application to proceedings u/s 23, in the schedule, after the words "twelve years" occurring in the second column against Article 65, the words, brackets and figures "but thirty years in the case of immovable property belonging to a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Scheduled Caste, specified in relation to the State of Orissa in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 or the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, as the case may be" shall be inserted. It has been held by this Court in the case of Siani Nag v. Gobardhan Ganda reported in 62 (1986) CLT 281 that Section 23-B(2) has application only to a proceeding u/s 23 of the Act and it is not applicable to a proceeding u/s 23-A of the Act. It has been held by this Court in the case of Siani Nag v. Gobardhan Ganda reported in 62 (1986) CLT 281 that Section 23-B(2) has application only to a proceeding u/s 23 of the Act and it is not applicable to a proceeding u/s 23-A of the Act. It follows therefore that the period of thirty years which is introduced in Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by amendment under Sub-section (2) has no application to a proceeding u/s 23-A. In such a case therefore, the period of limitation is twelve years provided under Article 65. In the present case, while the transfer was effected in 1963, the proceeding u/s 23-A was Initiated in 1976 i.e., beyond twelve years from the date of transfer. Therefore, the Petitioner-transferee, having remained in unauthorized occupation of the land for more than twelve years, had perfected his title to the property by adverse possession and the Sub-divisional officer had no jurisdiction to disturb his possession. 6. By the time this observation was made, amendment of Act, 8 of 1991 had not come and Section 23-A was not within the ambits of Section 23-B(2) of the Act, but the observations clearly indicate that the amended period of limitation of 30 years is applicable only to the proceedings mentioned in Section 23-B(2) of the Act and not to the proceedings initiated under any other provision of the OLR Act or proceeding initiated under any other Act. In the case of Trilochan Dandsena (supra) a Full Bench of this Court also observed that the period of 12 years contemplated by Article 65 of the Limitation Act has been enhanced to 30 yeas by way of amendment for the limited purpose of proceedings u/s 23 of the Act only. The observations made in the above noted cases give a strong hint that the amended provision of limitation contemplated in Section 23-B(2) has application only to the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities under Sections 23-A or 23-B of the OLR Act. 7. In the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh (supra) the Apex Court in paragraph-27 ruled that a non-tribal person cannot claim title by way of adverse possession in respect of a land of a tribal person irrespective of the length of possession over that property. 7. In the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh (supra) the Apex Court in paragraph-27 ruled that a non-tribal person cannot claim title by way of adverse possession in respect of a land of a tribal person irrespective of the length of possession over that property. The Court however observed that a tribal person may acquire title by adverse possession over the immovable property of another tribal person, in view of paragraph 7-D of the 1956 Regulations read with Article 65 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once all these views are considered together the inevitable conclusion is that the period of limitation of 30 years contemplated u/s 23-B(2) of the Act is applicable to proceedings under Sections 23-A and 23-B of the Act only and it can be used as defence for the person against whom, such proceeding is initiated. But a non-tribal person cannot come forward with a case that he has acquired title by way of adverse possession over the land of a tribal person. So far as the claim of a tribal person that he has acquired title over the land of another tribal person by way of adverse possession, the limitation contemplated u/s 23-B of the Act will have no application, but the general provision of Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply. 8. (Sic) The next question for consideration is whether the Appellant is a tribal person or not. This issue is purely a factual Issue and the Courts of facts are only competent to decide the issue. However, if the Courts of fact commit error on record or record the finding based on no evidence, then such findings can be interfered in second appeal. In the present case, no evidence was led by any of the parties on this score, but Learned first Appellate Court made an observation in paragraph-2 of the Judgment that the Plaintiff is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, but there is no evidence that the Defendant is a Scheduled Tribe person. It can be seen from the decree drawn up by the same first Appellate Court that the present Appellant has been shown as a man belonging to Scheduled Tribe and he was exempted from payment of Court fees in the first appeal on that ground. It can be seen from the decree drawn up by the same first Appellate Court that the present Appellant has been shown as a man belonging to Scheduled Tribe and he was exempted from payment of Court fees in the first appeal on that ground. So from the very record of the first Appellate Court, it is apparent that the Appellant and Respondent both belong to the Scheduled Tribe. In that situation, there is no legal bar for the Defendant Appellant to claim title over the suit property by way of adverse possession. In that case the limitation provided under Article 65 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act 1963 wilt apply. Whether the Appellant has remained in open, continuous and hostile possession over the suit land beyond the statutory period is a question of fact and evidence and has to be decided from the evidence led by the parties. For this decision, it is necessary that the matter should go back to the first Appellate Court. 9. Therefore, the Judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court is set aside and the appeal is remitted back to the 1st Appellate Court for re-adjudication of the appeal according to the evidence on record, taking note of the legal position noted supra. 10. The result, the appeal is allowed on contest, but In the peculiar circumstances without any cost. Final Result : Allowed