JUDGMENT Mukul Mudgal, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for setting aside the Resolution and order dated 14th January 1978 passed by the respondent No. 4 Ishwar Nagar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the "Society") whereby the name of the petitioner had been removed from the list of members of the respondent No. 4 society as well as the confirmation of such an order through the Registrar, Cooperative Societies on 17th May, 1978 and the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 5th November, 1981 on a reference made by the petitioner by the nominee of the Registrar. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows: a) The petitioner Dr. P.N. Sharma (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner) was on 11th March 1961 vide membership No. 35 enrolled as a member of the respondent society. The Property No. A-19/A Kailash Colony, New Delhi was purchased by the Petitioner HUF for running a nursing home and in 1969 the nursing home started functioning. Later, the membership of the petitioner from Respondent No. 4 society was terminated on the ground that the petitioner owned another property, i.e., A-19/A, Kailash Colony, in Delhi, since as per Rule 25 (1)(c) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, upon owning another property the petitioner was not entitled to be a member of a Cooperative Housing Society. The petitioner was also expelled on 14th January 1978 by the society under Section 36(1) of Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") for being a persistent defaulter as he had not paid the dues demanded by the society. The action of the society expelling the petitioner was approved by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, on 17th May 1978. On 26th February 1980 one application was filed under Section 60 of the Act for reference of dispute to arbitration by the petitioner. The Reference was dismissed on 5th November, 1981 by the Deputy Registrar. This has led to the present writ petition. 3. On 26th February 1980 one application was filed under Section 60 of the Act for reference of dispute to arbitration by the petitioner. The Reference was dismissed on 5th November, 1981 by the Deputy Registrar. This has led to the present writ petition. 3. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner Shri Arun Mohan submitted as follows: a) On 31st March 1973, the law applicable to the present case was the Bombay Cooperative Society Act (7 of 1925) and the Rules applicable were the Delhi Cooperative Society Rules 1950, and the provisions of the above applicable statute /Rules, neither prohibited a member from owning or acquiring any other residential property nor deemed the interest in an HUF as being that of the member for purposes of membership. Therefore, the act of the Petitioner in acquiring a plot for constructing a nursing home in a residential colony in 1968 was not a breach of provisions of the 1925 Statute or the 1950 Rules. In short, on 31st March 1973, the Statute or the Rules did not prohibit a residential house owner from being a valid member of the Cooperative House Building Society. On 31st March 1973, A-19/A, Kailash Colony was a HUF property. It was not a residential house, but a fully constructed and functional nursing home. b) (i) The Petitioners membership was saved as an accrued right principle, under Section 98 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act (35 of 1972) which repealed the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1928. Section 98 of the Act reads as follows: Provided that the repeal shall not affect: .(a) xxxxx .(b) Any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act so repealed; or .(c) xxxxx .(d) xxxxx In S.N. Maira v. UOI 46(1992)DLT337 , the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: ...Therefore, we are of the view that the rights, privilege, obligations etc. which had been acquired by such members or had accrued to them under the 1925 Act having been specifically saved by Section 98 of the 1972 Act, the same could not have been taken away after the coming into force of 1972 Act. Therefore, we do not find any defect or illegality in the exercise of the right of vote by such member. Therefore, we do not find any defect or illegality in the exercise of the right of vote by such member. (ii) While the rule-making power is subservient to the statute could not take away the membership in 1972, the latter statute can always take away vested rights but its intention must be clear - taking away of a vested right cannot be implied. Besides, the wording of Section 98(b) clearly and specifically saves the rights or privileges of those members who were validly admitted when the old statute was enforced. Further, Section 98 (which is a statutory provision in contra distinction to an implied disqualification by the Rules) makes it clear that unless the act constituting such disqualification is of a point of time subsequent to the commencement of new Act (under which the Rules were framed), it cannot be enforced. So looked at, it cannot be said that the right of the Petitioner to receive that plot was lost or could be lost. (iii) Although Section 97 gives the power to frame Rules, but that power is a very limited one and the Rules are liable to a narrow construction. Section 97 reads as follows: 97. Rules - (1) The Lt. Governor may, for any cooperative society or class of cooperative societies, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: xxxxxx (v) the conditions to be complied with by persons applying for admission or admitted as members, for the election and admission of members, and for the payment to be made and the interest to be acquired before the exercise of the right of membership; Section 97 is a general provision to make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, but does not give power to frame Rules which take away earlier accrued rights. Further, the phrase, purposes of the Act includes Section 98 of the Act. Section 97(2)(v) is only to frame rules qua members being admitted and as distinct from disqualifying a member who had a prior disqualification, but no disqualification after the crucial date, i.e., 2nd April 1973 can be based upon such a rule. (iv) Since the Act itself does not provide for extinguishment of a preexisting right, the Rules cannot do so. Section 97(2)(v) is only to frame rules qua members being admitted and as distinct from disqualifying a member who had a prior disqualification, but no disqualification after the crucial date, i.e., 2nd April 1973 can be based upon such a rule. (iv) Since the Act itself does not provide for extinguishment of a preexisting right, the Rules cannot do so. In Federation of Cooperative G/H Society v. Union of India 1993(26)DRJ156 , while declaring Rule 41-A as ultra vires, this Court held as follows: 89. It was contended by Shri Mahajan that this Rule 41-A was promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 97 (2)(v). The said provision reads as under: 97 Rules (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely; (v) the conditions to be complied with by persons applying for admission or admitted as members, for the election and admission of members, and for the payment to be made and the interest to be acquired before the exercise of the right of membership. This provision has nothing to do with Section 97(1) which gives power to the Lt. Governor to make Rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. It is in this connection that Clause (v) / (iv) of Rule 97 (2) provides for rules being made which may specify conditions to be complied with by the persons applying for admission to a society. This rule has to be read along with Section 20(1) of the Act. Section 20(1) inter alia, gives a right to an individual who is competent to contract to become a member of a cooperative society. No rule under Section 97(2)(v) can be so framed as to take away this right which is conferred by the substantive provision viz., Section 20(1). Clause (v) of Section 97(2), read in this context, can only relate to the provision being made regarding the procedural requirement to be complied with by a person applying for admission as member of a cooperative society. 90 The problem may be viewed from another angle. Whereas Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides for persons who may become members of a society but Sub-section (2) of Section 20 gives an overriding power to the Lt. 90 The problem may be viewed from another angle. Whereas Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides for persons who may become members of a society but Sub-section (2) of Section 20 gives an overriding power to the Lt. Governor to declare what persons or class of persons are to be disqualified from being admitted or continuing as members of a society. It is pertinent to note that Sub-section (2) enables the Lt. Governor to exercise powers only in those cases where the interest of any person or class of persons conflicts or is likely to conflict with the objects of the society or class of society. For example, under Rule 25(c) (ii) no person is eligible for membership of a housing society if he deals in purchase or sale of immoveable properties either as member or as agent in the Union Territory of Delhi. No power is given to the Lt. Governor under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 to debar any other person from becoming a member of a cooperative society. The restriction on the right conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 20 is only contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 20 and the right under Section 20(1) can certainly not be curtailed by framing of a rule in exercise of the powers under Section 97 of the Act- (v) Rule 25 reads as follows: 25. Disqualification for Membership - (1) No person shall be eligible for admission as a member of a cooperative Society if he- .a. has applied to be adjudicated an insolvent or is an undischarged insolvent; or .b. has been sentenced for any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral turpitude and dishonesty and a period of five years has not elapsed from the date of expiry of the sentence; c. in the case of membership of a housing society. (i)he owns a residential house or a plot of land for the construction of a residential house in any of the approved or unapproved colonies or other localities in the Union Territory of Delhi, in his own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his dependent children, on lease hold or freehold basis provided that disqualification as laid down in Sub-rule (1) (c)(1) shall not be applicable in case of persons who are only co-sharers of joint ancestral properties in congested localities (slum areas) whose share is less than 65.72 sq. meters (80 sq. yards) of land; (ii) xxxxx (iii) xxxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or the bye-laws of the cooperative society, if a member becomes, or has already become, subject to any disqualifications specified in Sub-rule (1), he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualifications were incurred." It is clear from the wording of such clause that it applies only at the time the person is seeking admission, i.e., where he wants to become a member and not at any point of time subsequent thereto. At best, it may apply to an overt act by the member after 2nd April 1973. The intention of the rule is not to disqualify old members. 20. ...Having come to this conclusion, there seems to be little difficulty in holding that the said rule cannot apply in the cases where properties are acquired by transmission / devolution. We feel that Rules 25 and 35 of the said Rules have to be read in different contexts. The former takes care of the cases of acquisition of membership or its transfer and the latter the cases of transmission etc. The view, which we have taken, we feel, will give a harmonious construction to the provisions of the said Rules and bye-laws, referred to above. A contrary view, in our opinion, will not only make bye-law 9 redundant but may also lead to unreasonable and anomalous results. For example, member on being granted membership of a housing cooperative society constructs a house on the plot subleased in his favour. He registers his only heir as his nominee. During his life time the said heir also himself/herself acquires a residential house of a plot of land for construction of residential house. For example, member on being granted membership of a housing cooperative society constructs a house on the plot subleased in his favour. He registers his only heir as his nominee. During his life time the said heir also himself/herself acquires a residential house of a plot of land for construction of residential house. It will be extremely unreasonable if on the death of the member, the said heir is told that he/she having incurred disqualification as per Rule 25, membership and property of the deceased could not be transferred in his/her favour. More so when the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws are silent on the question as to what will happen to the property after the death of the member in such a situation. We feel the latter part of bye-law 9 is intended to take care of such a situation. If the Court has not applied Rule 25 to those members who inherited a house after (and not before) becoming a member, or such a member married a lady who owned a house, the Rule cannot operate to disqualify a member who was a valid member and also owned a house prior to 2nd April 1973 but did not acquire any house thereafter. The respondents do not contend that after 2nd April 1973, the petitioner did any act which would disqualify him. Rule 25 is not about expulsion or cessation of membership. It is only about disqualification for admission to membership. Even the disqualification is neither from membership nor of membership. (vi) The words residential house is distinct from a residential plot. The term residential house in Rule 25 (1) (c) means what is used as a residential house and cannot include what is a Nursing Home being run in a residential colony like banks or schools. Secondly, since there was no overt act on part of the Petitioner by which he acquired or came to own any residential house, and since there was a mere continuing of the ownership of the past on the date on which these Rules came into force, i.e., 2nd April 1973, there can be no ground for disqualification. Thirdly, the plot A-19/A, Kailash Colony on 2nd April 1973 was not a plot because it was already constructed upon as a full-fledged hospital and not a residential house. It was a nursing home, which had been functioning for several years prior thereto. Thirdly, the plot A-19/A, Kailash Colony on 2nd April 1973 was not a plot because it was already constructed upon as a full-fledged hospital and not a residential house. It was a nursing home, which had been functioning for several years prior thereto. Fourthly, the purpose of Sub-rule (2) is only to override the bye-laws of a cooperative society. (vii) Then, Sub-rule (2) also contains a key when it says if a member becomes, or has already become, subject to any disqualifications specified in Sub-rule (1), he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualifications were incurred. Obviously, if the Rule is prospective in operation, then the disqualification will have to be reckoned as of the date the Rule was in existence. Construing it as referring to a date in the past is giving it a retrospective operation. Therefore, Rule 25 is only of eligibility for admission as a member and nothing further. The decision in Daulat Ram Mehndirratta case AIR1982Delhi470 , has been countered by the counsel for the petitioner on the following grounds: i) The case is distinguishable on facts. ii) Per Incuriam. iii) is impliedly overruled by later Supreme Court pronouncements on the legal principles of repeal by later statutes. 4. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4/society, Sh. Arun Kathpalia, in reply submitted that the petition is not maintainable because: a) Where the law provides an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal etc., the High Court should not entertain any petition in exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. b) The petition was directed against the Resolution dated 14th January 1978 passed by the respondent society expelling the petitioner from the membership of the society because of i) Non payment of call money and development charges despite repeated demands; and ii) Non-furnishing of an affidavit/ declaration/undertaking to the effect that neither the petitioner nor any of his dependent relatives own, in full or in part, a plot of land or a house in Delhi and that his membership is valid and in accordance with the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, Rules and Bye-laws. c) Under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") an appeal against the resolution of expulsion would lie under Section 76. c) Under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") an appeal against the resolution of expulsion would lie under Section 76. The petitioner instead of preferring an appeal proceeded to challenge the order by way of a reference under Section 60 of the Act which was dismissed because the petitioner stood disqualified in terms of Rule 25 of DCS Rules, 1973, and was not eligible to remain a member of the cooperative society. d) The issue whether a person who is member of HUF which owns or has been allotted a residential plot is eligible to become a member of a Cooperative House Building Society or not stands settled by decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Mohan v. RCS 64(1996)DLT683 , where it was held that a person having a share in a HUF property is not eligible for membership and is liable to be disqualified under Section 25(1)(c) of the Act. A similar view has also been taken by the Honble SC in case of O.P. Choudhary v. Rehabilitiation Ministry Employees Cooperative House Building Society [2003]3SCR309 , it was held as follows no person shall be eligible for admission as a member of the society in question if he owns a residential house or a plot of land for construction of a residential house in any of the approved or unapproved colonies or other localities in the Union Territory of Delhi either in his own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his dependent children on leasehold or freehold basis. The proviso appended to this sub-rule makes an exception in case of persons who are only co-sharer of joint ancestral properties in congested localities (slum areas), and whose share is less than 66,72 sq. m (80 yds) of land. Even if a persons share in a joint property is less than 66.72 sq. m. he would not be eligible to be a member of the housing society unless the said property is situated in congested localities (slum areas) In the present case the petitioners share alone in the property would he more than 250 sq. yds. and the property is in Kailash Colony, which is not a slum area and therefore, the exclusion and ineligibility is absolute. yds. and the property is in Kailash Colony, which is not a slum area and therefore, the exclusion and ineligibility is absolute. e) The contention of the petitioner that a residential property being used for commercial purposes cannot be treated as a residential property for the purposes of Rule 25 is wholly untenable. This is because A-19/A, Kailash Colony, is used for residential purpose as has been stated by the petitioner in his supporting affidavit to the writ petition. In any case if the petitioner has used the residential property for purposes other than the designated purposes it constituted and is illegal and the restrictions under Rule 25 would not apply. The import of Rule 25 as discussed in Daulat Rams case (supra) is as follows: It is respectfully submitted that this is not the meaning or the import of Rule 25. The purpose and intent of conditions imposed by Rule 25 is to serve "the pre-eminent purpose of equitable distribution so as to enable the need of housing to be satisfied for as large a number of persons as possible. This condition prevented the richer sections to concentrate the housing plots amongst themselves. The huger for housing plots being in millions the only rational manner is to make allotment to those who are without any land/house. Such a condition is pre-eminent just. 5. We have considered the rival pleas. In so far the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the written submissions are concerned, it is apparent that he has raised many pleas most of which were not urged before us. The only plea however which was urged and which we need to consider is that the premises of A-19/A, Kailash Colony, New Dlehi, was a HUF property and was not being used for residential purposes, but for commercial purposes, i.e., for running a nursing home and therefore, the petitioner could not be barred from owning a residential plot in the respondent No. 4 society. 6. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the Petitioners membership was saved as an accrued right under Section 98 of the Act. The reason why this plea must fail is that Section 98 of the Act would not save a member from becoming ineligible for membership as has been specifically ruled by the Full Bench of this Court in Daulat Rams case (supra). The reason why this plea must fail is that Section 98 of the Act would not save a member from becoming ineligible for membership as has been specifically ruled by the Full Bench of this Court in Daulat Rams case (supra). The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: 7. ...In such a situation the petitioner would have to comply with the requirement of amended bye-laws which made eligibility for a member dependent upon a person not owning a dwelling house in Delhi. Position would be different if there was no amendment of the bye-laws. But once the bye-laws are amended the petitioner would have ceased to be a member from the date of amended bye-laws. Section 98(b) which saves the right, privileges or obligations accrued or incurred under the Act repealed namely 1912 Act, cannot avail the petitioner because he is not claiming any right which he had under the old Act. His right under the old Acts were governed by the bye-laws of the society which no doubt permitted him to become a member in 1958 but when they were amended in 1966 the petitioner became ineligible to remain a member and hence ceased to be a member. Now let us examine the implication of Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972, and the Rules framed under it being Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973. Prior to the coming into force of Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 (hereinafter to be called 1972 Act) Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, had been extended to Delhi and was in force. There was no provision under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act that a person cannot be a member of more than one cooperative societies or that he owns a residential house or a plot of land in Delhi. Section 92 of 1972 Act while repealing the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act provided that every society registered under the said Act shall be deemed to be registered under the corresponding provisions under the 1972 Act and its bye-laws shall so far as the same are not inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act continue to be in force until altered or rescinded. Section 97 provided for the framing of the Rules by the Lt. Governor. Section 97 provided for the framing of the Rules by the Lt. Governor. Section 97(2)(v) read as under: The condition to be complied with by persons applying for admission or admitted as members for the election and admission of members, and for the payment to be made and the interest to be acquired before the exercise of the right of membership. Consequently, the plea of the counsel for the petitioner on this ground, cannot be sustained, particularly, when the Full Bench of this Court has held to the contrary. 7. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that as per the provisions of Section 25(1)(c) of the Act, a person having a share in a HUF property is not eligible for membership and is liable to be disqualified. He has reiterated the judgment in Daulat Rams case (supra): Of course rules can be framed to prescribe conditions to be complied by persons applying for admission or admitted as members which means persons who already stand admitted. But this does not mean that the rule as such to operate with retrospective effect in that it is taking away some vested right. Both the Benches held that as a person would cease to be a member on the coming into force of the Rules on account of his having been a member or having owned a plot earlier to the coming into force of Rules 1973, Rule 25 has to be considered as if it was retrospective in effect. With respect we feel that both the Division Benches fell into error in assuming that Rule 25(1)(c) or Rule 25(2) is retrospective in operation. Merely because a person who had become a member of the society at a point of time when the disqualification mentioned in Rule 25 was not in existence and because of the said rule would now cease to be a member of the society does not necessarily mean that the said rule is retrospective. A statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Further, this Court is fully bound by the reasoning of the Full Bench of this Court in Daulat Rams case (supra) that signifies the import of Rule 25. A statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Further, this Court is fully bound by the reasoning of the Full Bench of this Court in Daulat Rams case (supra) that signifies the import of Rule 25. It is true that there is a need of housing to be satisfied for a large number of persons and in order to enable this need the certain sections must be preventive from concentrating multiple housing plots amongst themselves. However, there is nothing either in Rule 25 or the reasoning in the judgment that prevents a person from owning a property that is being used for commercial purposes. Rule 25 in no manner provides for ineligibility of membership if a member owns or comes to acquire a plot of land in a residential locality and constructs a structure thereupon which is to be used for commercial purposes and not for residential purposes. In the present case, the acquired plot of land in the residential locality was being used as a nursing home for commercial purposes. Similarly, the view taken by the Honble Supreme Court in O.P. Choudharys case (supra) is not applicable to the present case as the court has recognized the ineligibility of a member to the membership of the society if "he owns a residential house or a plot of land for the construction of the residential house in any of the approved or unapproved colonies or other localities in the Union Territory of Delhi, either in his own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his dependent children or lease hold or freehold basis". In light of the above observations of the Supreme Court and in view of the factual matrix of the case it is to be noted that apart from the above property at A-19/A, Kailash Colony, New Delhi, neither the petitioner nor his wife or any of his dependent children has been shown to own or said to have purchased a residential house or a plot of land for construction of a residential house. 8. A perusal of the Rule 25 shows that the term residential house in Rule 25 (1) (c) does not include expressly or impliedly a commercial entity such as a nursing home. 8. A perusal of the Rule 25 shows that the term residential house in Rule 25 (1) (c) does not include expressly or impliedly a commercial entity such as a nursing home. The mere fact that such a nursing home is being run in a residential locality does not change the character of the nursing home as being used for commercial purposes even though the plot may be situated in a residential colony. At best it may be a municipal wrong to be redressed by the MCD under the Municipal laws but does not give the Society any right to treat such user and ownership of such commercial property as a disqualification under Rule 25. It may also be emphasized here that the words residential house is distinct from residential plot. Therefore to conjure an expanded meaning of the term residential house in the present context is not necessary. 9. It has been brought to the notice of the Court by the counsel for the petitioner that the Petitioner came to acquire the property A-19/A, Kailash Colony in 1968 and the Rules in question came into force in April 1973. Since there was no overt act on the part of the Petitioner by which he came to own any residential house after the said rules came into force, there can be no ground for disqualification. Besides, the said property on 2nd April, 1973 was not a residential plot as it had already been constructed upon as a nursing home which had been functioning for the years before the Rules came into force. Therefore, the act of the Petitioner in acquiring a plot for constructing a nursing home in a residential colony in 1968 was neither a breach of provisions of the 1925 statute (BCSA) nor the DCSR, 1950. These rules does not contain any prohibition on a member for admission as a member of the cooperative society if he owns or acquires any other property which is being used for commercial purposes, even though the plot may be situated in a residential locality. Hence, the statute or the rules do not in any way prohibit an owner of a plot of land which is not being used for residential purposes from being a member of the cooperative society. 10. The pleadings in the writ petition in this respect are significant and are reproduced as under: 11. Hence, the statute or the rules do not in any way prohibit an owner of a plot of land which is not being used for residential purposes from being a member of the cooperative society. 10. The pleadings in the writ petition in this respect are significant and are reproduced as under: 11. That the Petitioner had become a member of Respondent No. 4 as far back as on 11.3.1961 vide Membership Card No. 35 of the same date. He had not infringed any law or bye-law of Respondent No. 4 and had also made all the payments. The property No. A-19/A, Kailash Colony, New Delhi, was acquired and the super-structures thereon were constructed with the funds belonging to the Joint Hindu Family consisting of himself, his wife and children. The said property is being used purely for professional and commercial purposes and is not a residence of the Petitioner. The Joint Hindu Family, which owns the said property, is a separate and distinct legal person. This has been countered in the Counter Affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4Society as under: 11. First part of the para 11 is admitted as correct. It is further submitted that demand of the respondent Society for the admission fee and the value of two shares was duly met by the petitioner. Rest of the para is denied for want of knowledge. Thus, it is evident that from the aforementioned pleadings there is only a bare denial of this plea and the same has not been specifically denied which does not in law constitute a denial. This plea has been countered by Sh. Kathpalia by referring to the affidavit in support of the writ petition where the petitioner describes himself as the resident of A-19/A, Kailash Colony. He submitted that the address in this affidavit is sufficient to disbelieve the plea of the petitioner that he was not a resident of Kailash Colony property. Mr. Mohan submitted that no doubt the petitioner has described himself as the resident of A-19/A, Kailash Colony in the supporting affidavit but this is inadvertent, as being a doctor running a nursing home, he remained invariably in his workplace for very long hours. 11. Mr. Mohan submitted that no doubt the petitioner has described himself as the resident of A-19/A, Kailash Colony in the supporting affidavit but this is inadvertent, as being a doctor running a nursing home, he remained invariably in his workplace for very long hours. 11. In our view, the pleadings stand on a stronger footing than the affirming affidavit and consequently we accept the plea of Shri Mohan that the address of A-19/A, Kailash Colony was given by inadvertence and hold that there is no denial in law by the respondent No. 4 of the averment, that the Kailash Colony plot was being used for commercial purposes. Furthermore, since the writ petition has been pending in this Court since 1982, to entertain the plea of alternate remedy being a bar to the entertainment of the petition at this stage would not be in the interest of justice. Furthermore, the position of law that the user of a property for commercial purposes would not constitute a violation of Rule 25 inviting disqualification has been laid down by this Court for the first time and thus, this Court is justified in entertaining this writ petition directly from the order of the Deputy Registrar without directing the appellant to avail of the alternative appellate remedy. 12. In light of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed, resolution and order dated 14th January, 1978 passed by the respondent No. 4, Ishwar Nagar Cooperative House Building Society and the order of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies dated 17th May, 1978 and the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 5th November, 1981 whereby the name of the petitioner had been removed from the list of members of the respondent No. 4-society, is quashed and set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed