Judgment : 1. This writ petition is directed against the award of the Labour Court dated 25. 1999 in I.D. No. 133 of 1996 whereby the claim preferred by the petitioner against the first respondent for reinstatement was rejected. 2. Factual matrix necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are as under: (a) The petitioner was appointed as Skilled Simplex Machine Tender in the first respondent Company and he was working in the said establishment with effect from 22. 1990, without any break, for a period of five years and he had also put in 300 days of continuous service every (sic) year for the said period of five years. The petitioner was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 2,080/-. (b) Since the first respondent Company refused to implement the various labour legislations, the petitioner represented to the management about the need to implement such welfare schemes and further called upon the management to regularize the employment of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said act, the petitioner was terminated from his service on 14. 1995 without any reason or notice. (c) The matter was taken up by the petitioner before the Conciliation officer and finally, the Conciliation Officer submitted a Failure Report on 11. 1995 and accordingly, the petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute before the Labour Court in I.D. No. 133 of 1996, seeking reinstatement in service with full back wages as well as continuity in service and other attendant benefits. (d) The said dispute was resisted by the first respondent and ultimately, the claim preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Labour Court as per the award dated 16. 1999 in I.D. No. 133 of 1996 and aggrieved by the said proceeding, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the Labour Court failed to consider the evidence produced by the petitioner in its proper perspective and shifted the burden on the petitioner to prove that he had worked in the first respondent Company for a period of 240 days per year, instead of directing the Company to produce the material documents to prove otherwise. According to the learned counsel, evidence produced before the Labour Court was sufficient to come to a conclusion that the petitioner had worked there continuously and as such, his termination was unsustainable in law. 4. According to the learned counsel, evidence produced before the Labour Court was sufficient to come to a conclusion that the petitioner had worked there continuously and as such, his termination was unsustainable in law. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent contended that no materials, much less acceptable materials, were produced before the Labour Court to show that the petitioner was appointed in the service of the first respondent and as such, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the claim preferred by the petitioner. 5. The claim of the petitioner before the Labour Court was to the effect that he had put in more than five years of service in the first respondent Company and he was working more than 300 days per year and as such, he was entitled to be regularized in the Company but on the other hand, without any reason, he was terminated and as such, the very termination was illegal, warranting order of reinstatement with full backwages. 6. The said plea was opposed by the management by disputing the very status of the petitioner as a permanent employee and it was their case that the petitioner was only a casual worker and he was offered work as and when need arose and it was only the petitioner who did not report for duty and voluntarily left the service. It was their further contention that since the petitioner was only a casual worker, no action was taken against him and the alleged termination was only an afterthought. 7. In order to prove the case of the petitioner, he was examined as WW-1 and the staff of the first Respondent was examined as M.W.1 and Exhibits W-1 to W-5 and Exhibits M-1 to M-21 were marked on the side of the petitioner as well as first respondent respectively. 8. Since it was the claim of the petitioner that he was a permanent workman in the service of the first respondent from 22. 1990, initial burden to prove such employment was on the petitioner and the burden shifts to the management only after discharge of such initial burden by the petitioner. In order to prove his status as an employee, the petitioner had produced documents in Exhibit W-1 to Exhibit W-4 and those documents were produced as if they were all issued by the Management. Exhibit W-1 is dated 18. In order to prove his status as an employee, the petitioner had produced documents in Exhibit W-1 to Exhibit W-4 and those documents were produced as if they were all issued by the Management. Exhibit W-1 is dated 18. 1994, purporting to be a certificate of merit issued by the first respondent. Exhibit W-2 is found to be a letter dated 210. 1994 which was typed in the letter head of the first respondent and the sane appears to have been sent by one Rajendran, examined as M.W.1, to Kumaran Mills Unit No. 2, for allotment of work to the petitioner. Exhibit W4 is the Xerox copy of the time card purported to have been given to the petitioner for the month of May, 1994. All these documents were disputed by the Management. 9. In order to show that the document produced by the petitioner were all cooked up for the purpose of the case, Management produced the time card of the permanent workers as well as sports certificates issued by the Management to other workers. Similarly, copy of the attendance register, list showing the bonus paid to the permanent workers as well as annual leave with wages register etc. were all produced and marked on the side of the first respondent. 10. The Labour Court found that the certificate produced by the petitioner in Exhibit W1` there were alternations which led the Labour Court to reject the said document. The document in Exhibit W-2 was found to have been signed by M.W.1 Rajendran and when he was examined before the Labour Court he had denied the very signature as found in Exhibit W-2. The petitioner has also produced Exhibit W-4 stated to be the time card issued to him. It was the case of the petitioner that at the end of every month, the management used to get back the time card and it will be replaced by fresh card. However, it was the case of the Management that the time card used to be in the custody of the employer. When the petitioner was cross examined on behalf of the first respondent, he admitted that the time card issued to him was taken back by the Management but he also admitted that all other employees were having their time card in their possession and it was not taken back by the employer. When the petitioner was cross examined on behalf of the first respondent, he admitted that the time card issued to him was taken back by the Management but he also admitted that all other employees were having their time card in their possession and it was not taken back by the employer. Therefore, Exhibit W-4 was also disbelieved by the Labour Court. 11. In order to substantiate the case of the Management they have produced Exhibits M-1 to M-3 stated to be the Original Time Card issued to three other permanent employees and on a comparative study with the time card produced by the petitioner, the Labour Court found that the time card produced by the petitioner differed in material particulars and as such, the said document was also disbelieved by the Labour Court. The Labour Court also found from the documents exhibited on the side of the first respondent that they have been maintaining the attendance register, list showing the bonus paid to the permanent workers as well as annual leave with wages register and all other statutory registers and none of the registers showed the petitioner as employee of the first respondent. In such circumstances, on the basis of the pleadings as well as evidence adduced by the parties, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove that he was an employee under the first respondent. 12. The initial burden is always on the workman to show that he was in the service of the management and that he had worked for more than 240 days a year, proceeding the date of termination. It is open to the workman to discharge the said burden on the basis of materials which would show prima facie that the employee was in the service of the management for the required number of days in a particular year. When the employee was able to prove such material fact, the burden naturally shifts on the management to prove otherwise. 13. Even though the initial burden on the workman was not so heavy, but still, the fact remains that a person who complains of illegal termination should prove his factum of employment so as to enable the Labour Court to look into the issue as to whether his termination was illegal. 13. Even though the initial burden on the workman was not so heavy, but still, the fact remains that a person who complains of illegal termination should prove his factum of employment so as to enable the Labour Court to look into the issue as to whether his termination was illegal. Therefore, for the purpose of considering the issue as to whether the termination was illegal, the primary requirement of the service of the employee has to proved in the manner known to law. Even though no straight jacket formula could be adopted in the matter of proof that the employee had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination, it would be open to the employee to produce the available materials and on a conjoint reading of all the documents as well as evidence adduced on the side of the employee, prima facie case has been made out that the petitioner had worked for the required number of days, it would be open to the Labour Court to direct the management to prove otherwise by way of acceptable materials. 14. The Apex Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik 2005 (9) Scale 274 referred to a catena of decisions on the point that burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment, and observed thus: “7. In a large number of cases the position of law relating to the onus to be discharged has been delineated. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani it was held as follows: “2. In the instant case, dispute was referred to the Labour Court that the respondent had worked for 240 days and his service had been terminated without paying him any retrenchment compensation. The appellant herein did net accept this and contended that the respondent had not worked for 240 days. The Tribunal vide its award dated 8. 1998 came to the conclusion that the service had been terminated without giving retrenchment compensation. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days, the Tribunal stated that the burden was on the management to show that there was justification in termination of the service and that the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a year. 3. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days, the Tribunal stated that the burden was on the management to show that there was justification in termination of the service and that the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a year. 3. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an industry or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that the had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hegde appearing for the Department states that the State is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds en the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today. 9. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan the position was against reiterated in para 6 as follows: “It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year concerned. This claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. This claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. These aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240 days as claimed. 11. In Manager Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani (2005) 5 SCC 100 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court again considered the matter and held that the initial burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had completed 240 days of service. The Tribunal’s view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous. In Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh (2005) 7 Supreme 165 it was held as follows: 13. So far as the question of onus regarding working for more than 240 days is concerned, as observed by this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani the onus is on the workman.” The position was examined in detail in Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh (2005) 7 Supreme 307 and the view expressed in Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, Siri Niwas and M.P. Electricity Board cases was reiterated. 12. In a recent judgment in R.M. Yellatti v. Asst. Executive Engineer JT 2005 (9) SC 340 the decisions referred to above were noted and it was held as follows: 17. Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere nonproduction of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case. 15. The Apex Court in Surendranaaar District Panchayat v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai 2005 (8) Scale 627 considered a similar matter wherein the documents produced by the employer clearly showed that the workman had not worked continuously in the preceding year and in the said factual context, observed thus: 8. On the face of the aforesaid authorities, the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in placing the burden on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days with the employer. On the face of the aforesaid authorities, the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in placing the burden on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days with the employer. The burden of proof having been on the workman, he has to adduce evidence in support of his contention that he has complied with the requirement of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, apart from examining himself in support of his contention the workman did not produce any material to prove the fact that he worked for 240 days. In fact the employer had produced before the Labour Court the attendance register of the workman and the muster roll clearly showing that the workman had not worked continuously in the preceding year with the employer or that he had worked with the employer for 240 days in the preceding 12 months prior to his alleged retrenchment.” 16. In the present case, the petitioner had miserably failed to prove that he was in the service of the first respondent and that he had worked continuously for 240 days in a year prior to his retrenchment. The materials produced by the petitioner as well as the first respondent were considered by Labour Court and ultimately, the Labour Court concluded that the petitioner failed to discharge the initial burden and accordingly, the claim was rejected. 17. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned only with the decision making process, and under the guise of such corrective jurisdictions, the Court is not expected to disturb the findings of the authorities on merits. 18. The Apex Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Mohd. Narsullah Khan (2006) 2 Scale 121 after referring to the earlier decision of the Apex Court in respect of scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, observed thus: “11. By now it is a well established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not Act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority.” 19. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any merit in the contention of the petitioner and as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.