Judgment :- This writ petition is directed against the order dated 12. 1999 on the file of the third respondent revising the order of the first respondent dated 1. 1999, whereby the petitioner was reduced to the rank of Sub Inspector from the post of Inspector for a period of one year. 2. The factual details as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition are as under:- The petitioner was employed as Inspector of Police in the Central Reserve Police Force and while so departmental proceedings were initiated against him for the following charge:- "That the said No.680420584 Insp. K. Kunchai of D/113 Bn, CRPF, while functioning as officiating OC D/113 Bn at Kalyanpur Post, Tripura, committed an act f remissness in discharge of his duty as a member of the force u/s 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949, in that, Inspector K. Kunchai OC D/113 Bn, CRPF stationed at a distance of 1 KM, failed to rush to the spot of incident immediately with reinforcement for providing security to village. The conduct of Inspector K. Kunchai is thus becoming of a senior S.O. who by not promptly reacting to situation brought a bad name to force." 3. The memorandum of charges along with annexures were issued to the petitioner on 8. 1997 and he was directed to submit his explanation with respect to the charge. Accordingly the petitioner submitted his objection on 112. 1997 and on consideration of the memorandum of charges as well as the explanation submitted by the petitioner, enquiry officer was appointed to conduct the departmental enquiry. After conducting the enquiry with due opportunity to the petitioner to take part in the proceedings, the enquiry officer submitted his report absolving the petitioner of the charges made against him. The said report was considered by the first respondent and he disagreed with the enquiry report. Accordingly the first respondent as per proceedings dated 1. 1999 imposed a punishment of stoppage of one increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect on the petitioner. The said order was taken up in appeal before the third respondent. The said report was considered by the first respondent and he disagreed with the enquiry report. Accordingly the first respondent as per proceedings dated 1. 1999 imposed a punishment of stoppage of one increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect on the petitioner. The said order was taken up in appeal before the third respondent. While considering the appeal the third respondent found that the punishment imposed on the petitioner was not proportionate to the extent of misconduct and as such the third respondent was of the opinion that the punishment should be enhanced and accordingly by exercising the power vested in him under Rule 29(d) of CRPF Rules, 1955 a show cause notice was issued to petitioner to show cause as to why the punishment shall not be enhanced commensurate with the gravity of charge. In response to the said show cause notice, the petitioner submitted his explanation. However the third respondent rejected the said explanation and as per order dated 12. 1999 ordered reduction of the rank of the petitioner from Inspector to Sub Inspector for a period of one year. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition. .4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the procedure adopted by the respondents were quite contrary to CRPF Rules inasmuch as if the enquiry report was not acceptable to the first respondent, he should have conducted a de novo enquiry with a second show cause notice to the petitioner. It was further contended that the third respondent has not taken into consideration all the objections filed by the petitioner in respect of his proposal to invoke Rule 29(d) of CRPF Rules and as such the very order passed by the third respondent enhancing the punishment deserves to be set aside. 5. Even though the petitioner has canvassed arguments on merits with respect to the charge framed against the petitioner as well as the ultimate punishment imposed on him by the third respondent, I am of the view that it was not necessary to go into the issue on merits inasmuch as the very writ petition challenging the order of the third respondent is not maintainable before this court. 6. The alleged misconduct was committed by the petitioner during his service as Inspector of Police in Tripura. 6. The alleged misconduct was committed by the petitioner during his service as Inspector of Police in Tripura. The enquiry was stated to have been conducted at Hyderabad and the second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner at Hyderabad. The punishment of stoppage of increment as per order dated 1. 1999 was awarded by the first respondent stationed at Hyderabad. The statutory appeal was preferred by the petitioner to the Inspector General of Police at Hyderabad. The order of reduction in rank was also passed by the Inspector General of Police at Hyderabad. The address of the petitioner as found from the cause title shows that the petitioner was a resident of Hyderabad. During the time of filing the writ petition, the petitioner was stated to have been working at Kotrangal in Rajouri District of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore the entire cause of action has arisen outside the jurisdiction of Tamil Nadu. No part of the cause of the action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu so as to enable the petitioner to file the writ petition before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On a perusal of the materials available on record, it is clear that not even a part of cause of action has arisen in the State of Tamil Nadu so as to enable the petitioner to file the writ petition before this court challenging the order passed by the first respondent, as modified by the order of the third respondent. .7. The misconduct was committed during the time of the service of the petitioner at Tripura and during 1999 when the writ petition was filed before this court, the petitioner was admittedly working in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. So it was nothing but a forum-shopping. Though not even a part of the cause of action has arisen in this State, the petitioner has filed the writ petition before this court for the reasons best known to him. 8. The Apex Court in EASTERN COALFIELDS v. KALYAN BANERJEE ( 2008(3) SCALE 514 ) held that only that court will have jurisdiction within which the entire cause of action had arisen and after considering the earlier decided cases on the point held thus:- 6. 8. The Apex Court in EASTERN COALFIELDS v. KALYAN BANERJEE ( 2008(3) SCALE 514 ) held that only that court will have jurisdiction within which the entire cause of action had arisen and after considering the earlier decided cases on the point held thus:- 6. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus is conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 226(2), however, provides that if cause of action had arisen in more than one court, any of the courts where part of cause of action arises will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 7. Cause of action, for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, for all intent and purport, must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It means a bundle of facts, which are required to be proved. The entire bundle of facts pleaded, however, need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved is material facts whereupon a writ petition can be allowed. The question to some extent was considered by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another [ (2004) 6 SCC 254 ] stating: "18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court." As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [ AIR 1976 SC 331 ] and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and others [ (1995) 4 SCC 738 ] to hold: "26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority." 8. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) has been followed by this Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. and Others [ (2006) 3 SCC 658 ] stating: "26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India 14 a three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that with a view to determine the jurisdiction of one High Court vis--vis the other the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be made and the facts which have nothing to do therewith cannot give rise to a cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. In that case it was clearly held that only because the High Court within whose jurisdiction a legislation is passed, it would not have the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the High Courts where cause of action arises, will have jurisdiction." 9. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Another [ (2006) 6 SCC 207 ], this Court held: "12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates Assn. v. Union of India)" 10. In Uttaranchal Forest Rangers Assn. (Direct Recuirt) and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [ (2006) 10 SCC 346 ], this Court held: "44. The second impugned order dated 12-4-2004 is further vitiated for the following reasons: .(a) Forum. The seniority list under challenge in the second writ petition was the seniority list of the Uttaranchal State Government of 2002 and such challenge could not have been made before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. .(b) Parties.None of the direct recruits who would be directly affected by the order were made parties to the writ petition. Therefore the High Court did not have the benefit of competing arguments in the matter. Even though, the Principal Secretary of the State of Uttaranchal was made a party, the said party was never served. The only respondent which was heard was the State of U.P. which had no stake in the matter at all since all of the writ petitioners before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court were employees of the State of Uttaranchal on the relevant date. The only respondent which was heard was the State of U.P. which had no stake in the matter at all since all of the writ petitioners before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court were employees of the State of Uttaranchal on the relevant date. It is, therefore, evident that the relevant material was not placed before the Allahabad High Court for the purpose of deciding the writ petition. Accordingly, the permission had to be taken from this Court by the present appellants to prefer the SLPs." These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court will have jurisdiction within which, the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 11. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma Area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the Head Office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the Head Office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent." 9. The Apex Court in AMBIKA INDUSTRIES v. C.C.E. (2007(8) SCALE 488) observed that the decisions operating in the field and which have been taken note of in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India ( 2004(168) ELT 3 ) would clearly go to show how the situs doctrine had been given a go-bye by making constitutional amendments. 10. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys case cited supra the Apex Court also referred to the fact that at one point of time writ petitions against Union of India were filed only before the Punjab and Haryana High Court as the said Court exercised territorial jurisdiction over Delhi, which was the seat of the Central Government. Experiencing difficulties, clause 1A of Article 226 was introduced and the constitution underwent a change by way of insertion of clause 2 of Article 226. Even if a small faction of the cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of a particular court, such court would have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum conveniens has also to be considered. 11. Even if a small faction of the cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of a particular court, such court would have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum conveniens has also to be considered. 11. The order impugned in this writ petition clearly shows that the entire cause of action has arisen beyond the territorial limits of this court and not even a part of the cause of action has arisen here so as to enable this court to exercise jurisdiction. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the writ petition challenging the order of the third respondent dated 12. 1999 revising the order of the first respondent dated 1. 1999 is not maintainable before this court. Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed. However, dismissal of this writ petition will not prevent the petitioner from approaching the appropriate court for redressal of his grievance. No costs.