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2008 DIGILAW 360 (KAR)

Sesappa poojary v. P. K. Karunakara

2008-07-09

ANAND BYRAREDDY

body2008
Judgment :- (This Miscellaneous First Appeal is field under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act against the Judgment and Award dated 24.03.2006 passed in MVC. No.681/2005 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Members, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal – VII, Hospel, awarding a compensation of Rs.2,30,000/- with interest at 6% p.a from the date of petition till realization.) All these appeals are considered together having regard to the common question of law that are raised. 2(a). In the appeal in MFA. 1293/2006, the appellants are the parents and minor sister of a deceased victim of a motor accident. The father was aged about 48 and the mother was aged 39, at the time of accident. The offending vehicle was a bus, belonging to the second respondent. The deceased was aged about 13 and was studying in the 8th standard. While walking home after school hours, the bus had run over the boy and he died of the injuries. The appellants claimed a compensation of Rs.4,00,000/- before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘theTirbunal’ for brevity). To establish that the child was bright and healthy and was doing well in his studies, Certificates issued by the School as regards his grades, extra – curricular and sports activities were produced. (b) TheTribunal has, upon adjudication, proceeded to award a global compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-. The Tribunal in doing so, has relied upon the judgment reported in 2005 ACJ 69 and 2004(4) KCCR 2329. The appellants seek enhancement of compensation. One of the grounds urged is that the mother of deceased child had undergone an operation to prevent further child birth and therefore, she is incapable of having any more children and which aspect has been completely overlooked by the Tribunal. 3.(a) In the appeal in MFA.1453/2007, the appellant is an Insurance Company which was the insurer of a vehicle involved in a motor accident. The parents of a victim, a boy aged about 16 at the time of accident, had claimed compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The same having been granted. The father of the boy was 39 and the mother was 35, at the time of the presentation of the Claim Petition. The parents of a victim, a boy aged about 16 at the time of accident, had claimed compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The same having been granted. The father of the boy was 39 and the mother was 35, at the time of the presentation of the Claim Petition. It transpires that while the deceased child was walking along the road with his friends, he was hit from, behind by the offending vehicle and had succumbed to the injuries that he sustained. (b) The parents claimed compensation before the Tribunal, on the footing that he was bright and healthy child who was receiving an annual scholarship of Rs.600/- from the first year of his schooling. It was also claimed that he was employed as a coolie after school hours and that he was earning Rs.2,000/- per month. There was material evidence placed on record to establish that the child was in fact, receiving a scholarship and that he had been awarded Certificated of Talent Examination in science for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 and there were also Certificates to indicate that he had participated in Sports. A witness was also examined to state that he was employing the child after his school hours as a coolie. (c) The Tribunal had accepted the evidence and has opined that the child had bright prospects in life an he was already earning Rs.2,000/- per month and that within five years, he was capable of earning at least Rs.3,000/- and has proceeded to adopt a notional income of Rs.24,000/- per annum and ‘16’ as the multiplier, in arriving at the total compensation payable as being Rs.3,96,000/-, including the loss towards estate and loss of love and affection at Rs.5,000/- each and funeral expenses at Rs.2,000/-. It is this which is under challenge. (d) The appellant – Insurance Company has contended that the adoption of the notional income at Rs.3,000/- was without basis. Further that there ought to have been a deduction of 50% of the notional income towards the personal expenses of the deceased. And that the multiplier adopted ought to have been 13 instead of 16, having regard to the age of the younger of the parents. 4.(a) In the appeal in MFA.8823/2006, the insurer of the offending vehicle involved in the motor accident seeks to challenge the award in favour of the parents of the deceased. And that the multiplier adopted ought to have been 13 instead of 16, having regard to the age of the younger of the parents. 4.(a) In the appeal in MFA.8823/2006, the insurer of the offending vehicle involved in the motor accident seeks to challenge the award in favour of the parents of the deceased. That as on 28.2.2005, a minor child of respondents 1 and 2, aged about 5 years, while playing outside their home, was run over by the vehicle insured by the appellant, and he had succumbed to the injuries. The father, aged 26 and the mother, aged 23, had claimed a compensation of Rs.2,00,00/-in respect of the death, Rs.50,000/- towards mental shock and agony, Rs.50,000/- towards love and affection and Rs.25,000/-towards funeral expenses. In all, a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/-. The Tribunal, in granting compensation, has adopted a notional income of Rs.15,000/- per annum and has applied ‘15’ as the multiplier and awarded a sum of Rs. 2,25,000/-and Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses. The appellant has challenged the same on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to deduct one – third of the amount towards the personal expenses of the deceased and that the total compensation ought not to have exceeded Rs.1,50,000/- and that therefore, the amount is excessive. 5. TheCounsel for the parties in all these appeals have argued at length and have drawn attention to various authorities to assert that the compensation awarded is excessive or conversely that it is inadequate. Having regard to the varying opinion expressed as to the quantum of compensation to be awarded in the case of death of minors in a motor accident, it is found necessary to survey the principles governing the award of compensation in such cases before addressing the cases on hand. 6. In the case of C.K. Subramania Iyer and others vs. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair, 1970 ACJ 110, involving the death of a boy, aged 8 years, who was killed in a motor accident in the year 1956, and wherein the Court of first instance had found that the deceased boy was a bright child and at the top of his class and at the time of his death, was in the third standard. His parents were affluent. His parents were affluent. Hence on the basis that they could have afforded him a good education, the Court of first instance had granted Rs.5,000/- as damage under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The High Court , in appeal, had determined the damages at Rs.6,000/-. The Supreme Court, after a review of the English and Indian case law on the point, laid down that: a) There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrival at by precise mathematical calculations: b) The amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstance of each case; c) The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor; d) As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child; e) In addition the parents may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after child attains majority. 7. Applying the above rules to the case before the Court, it was held that the deceased child was only 8 years old at the time of his death, How he would have turned out in life later was, at best a guess. But there was a reasonable probability of his becoming a successful man in life as he was a bright boy in school and his parents could have afforded him a good education. It was not likely that he would have given any financial assistance to his parents till he was at least 20 years old. As was seen from the evidence on record, his father was a substantial person. He was engaged in business. As thing s stood, he would not need any assistance from his son. Further, as there was no material on record to find out how old the parents were at the time of death of the child nor there being any evidence about their state of health, the Court felt that the damages ordered by the courts below was adequate. 8. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. G. Ramanaiah, 1988 ACJ 223, on an extensive and painstaking review of the English and Indian cases on the point, the Court has held as follows: “28. 8. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. G. Ramanaiah, 1988 ACJ 223, on an extensive and painstaking review of the English and Indian cases on the point, the Court has held as follows: “28. From the aforesaid discussion, the following principles can be stated: .(a) In the case of death of children, the parents can claim the present value of the future contributions which the deceased would have made to them. The dependency can be estimated by computing the annual contribution which the child would have made from the date of his probable earning. The question as to when a child would have reached such an earning capacity and as to what he could have contributed would depend on the facts of each case, the relevant factors being a child’s general level of intelligence or health, the family background, the father’s or family profession, if any, the capacity of the parents to educate the child etc. .(b) After arriving at the annual contribution (or annual dependency) to the family, the multiplier that has to be applied is not the one appropriate to the age of the child at its dead but to the age of the parents. This is because of the fact that the dependency to the parents will last only for the lifetime of the parents, who are likely to predecease the child (if the latter had not died in the accident). Of course, if the child is a grown - up person and married, the multiplier to be applied for arriving at the present value of the future loss to the wife, is the one appropriate to the age of the deceased because the wife, being younger, is normally likely to live upto or beyond the life of her husband. .(c) If the child is unmarried at the time of accident but likely to be married in course of time, the court cannot proceed on the basis that the contribution to the parents will be altogether stopped after such marriage. It may only be partially reduced. This is because of the statutory obligation in our country upon children to maintain their aged parents. In such cases, it is permissible to assess the contribution upto the possible date of marriage and later, separately. It may only be partially reduced. This is because of the statutory obligation in our country upon children to maintain their aged parents. In such cases, it is permissible to assess the contribution upto the possible date of marriage and later, separately. .(d) In the case of children above 5 years and below 10 years, it will not be possible to ascertain a suitable multiplier because of the fairly higher mortality rates in that period. But, it is permissible to arrive at conventional amounts, which may range upto Rs.15,000/- for accidents in late seventies. .(e) In the case of children below 5 years (there are no decided cases of award of damages to the parents) a nominal amount upto Rs.5,000/- may perhaps be granted. 29. This is in addition to the grant of other conventional amounts towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities for the short period between the time of accident and the time of death and for long expectation of life and this will be the award towards the loss to the estate. 30. Before leaving this part of the discussion, I have to emphasise a certain difference between claims by parents in cases of death of children and cases of claims by injured children. It will be noticed that in case of death of children, because the parents are older and the dependency will not last till the total expected period of life of the child, the multiplier is to be selected on the basis of the age of parents. But in the case of injured children, the claim being not by the parents but the child himself, there is no question of selecting the multiplier appropriate to the parents ‘age’. The multiplier appropriate to the age of the injured child at the date of trial will have to be selected”. 9,(a) Latha Wadhwa and Others Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 has also offered certain guidelines as to the quantum of compensation that could be awarded in cases involving death of minors. It was a case decided by the Supreme Court on a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . The facts leadings up to the petition were that, on the celebration of the 150th Birth Anniversary of Sir. It was a case decided by the Supreme Court on a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . The facts leadings up to the petition were that, on the celebration of the 150th Birth Anniversary of Sir. Jamshedji Tata, in the year 1989, within the factory premises of Tata Iron and Steel Company, a large number of employees, their families including small children had been invited. While the function was on, a fire is said to have broken out engulfing the pandal. By the time the fire could be extinguished, many died. The death toll reached 60 and the total number of persons injured was 113. Amongst the dead were 26 children, 25 women and 9 men. Smt. Latha Wadhwa, the petitioner, had lost both her children, a boy and a girl and her parents. Her husband was an employee of the company. She along with others were therefore before the Court seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering of prosecution of the officers of the Company for negligence and to direct that appropriate compensation be provided to the victims by the State Government as well as the Company and sought protection, since it was apprehended that the company may use its influence to harass the petitioners and other relations who were victims. 9. (b) During the course of hearing, the Senior Advocate appearing for the Company expressed that the respondent Company does not wish to treat the petition as an adversarial one and that the matter was in the hands of the Court for determining the monetary compensation payable . The Court having found that the question of grant of compensations must be examined by a person having expertise , had requested Shri Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India to examine the matter and determine the compensation payable, by an order dated 112.1993. It was also indicated that in determining the compensation, principles indicated by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in its decisions in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shafiya Khatoon, 1985 ACJ 212, Bhagwan Das vs. Mohammad Arif, 1987 ACJ 1052 and Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Ramanaiah, 1988 ACJ 223 (supra) should be borne in mind. It was able only in November 2000, that Shri Chandrachud was able to submit his report quantifying the compensation payable. Shafiya Khatoon, 1985 ACJ 212, Bhagwan Das vs. Mohammad Arif, 1987 ACJ 1052 and Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Ramanaiah, 1988 ACJ 223 (supra) should be borne in mind. It was able only in November 2000, that Shri Chandrachud was able to submit his report quantifying the compensation payable. On the basis of the report, the Supreme Court has granted compensation. While dealing with the compensation payable to the parents of the deceased children, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “11. So far as the award of compensation in case of children is concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud had divided them into two groups, the first group between the age group of 5 to 10 years and the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years. In case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, a uniform sum of Rs.50,000/- has been held to be payable by way of compensation to which the conventional figure of Rs.25,000/- has been added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a consolidated sum of Rs.75,000/- each has been awarded. So far as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, there are 10 such children who died on the fateful day and having found their contribution to the family at Rs.12,000/- per annum, 11 multiplier has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of the father and then the conventional compensation of Rs.25,000/- has been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of the deceased above 10 years of age, have been granted compensation to the tune of Rs.1,57,000/- each. In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child’s lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expection of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived.* This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. V. Jenkins and Lord Atkinson said thus: “all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits should be entertained by the person who sues. V. Jenkins and Lord Atkinson said thus: “all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact – there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphasis dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can, I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them”. At the same time, it must be held that a mere speculative possibility of benefit is not sufficient Question whether there exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always a mixed question of fact and law.* There are several decided cases on this point, providing the guidelines for determination of compensation in such case but we do not think it necessary for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits, which the parents expected. In case of a bright and healthy boy, his performances in the school, it would be easier for the authority to arrive at the compensation amount, which may be different from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and bad student, but as has been stated earlier, not an iota of material was produced before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him arrive at a just compensation in such cases and, therefore, he has determined the same on an approximation. Mr. Nariman, appearing for TISCO on his own submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well – placed officials of Tata Iron and Steel company, and on considering the submission of Mr. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well – placed officials of Tata Iron and Steel company, and on considering the submission of Mr. Nariman, we would direct that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In others words, it should be Rs.5.lakhs, to which the conventional figure of Rs.50.000 should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs.2.00 lakhs. So far as the children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees TISCO. TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of his children employed in the Company. Having regard to these facts, in their case, the contribution of Rs.12,000/- per annum appears to us to be on the lower side and in our considered opinion, the contribution should be Rs.24,000/- and instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis should be worked out to Rs.3,60 lakhs, to which an additional sum of Rs.50,000/- has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at Rs.4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children’. (*emphasis supplied) 10. More recently, in Manju Devi and another Vs. Musafir Paswan and another, 2005 ACJ 99 which was a case of a 13 year old boy, who was killed in an accident in the year 1988, the Tribunal had awarded a fixed sum of RS.90,000/- which it had held to be just, proper and reasonable. On an appeal for enhancement, the High Court had dismissed the same. The Supreme Court in enhancing the compensation held as follows: “2. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Trilok Chandra, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC), it has been held by this court that there should be no departure from the multiplier method on the ground that payment being made is just compensation. The Supreme Court in enhancing the compensation held as follows: “2. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Trilok Chandra, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC), it has been held by this court that there should be no departure from the multiplier method on the ground that payment being made is just compensation. It has been held that the multiplier method must be accepted method for determining and ensuring payment of just compensation as it is the method which brings uniformity and certainty to awards made all over the country. In view of this authority, it will have to be held that the award of compensation had to be made by the multiplier method. 3. As set out in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for a boy of 13 years of age, a multiplier of 15 would have to be applied. As per the Second Schedule, he being a non-earning person, a sum of Rs.15,000 must be taken as the income . Thus , the compensation comes to Rs.2,25,000/- 4. We accordingly modify the award to be in a sum of Rs.2,25,000/- with interested as awarded. The appeals stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs”. 11. InNew India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Salendar and Others, AIR 2007 SC 324. The Apex Court was dealing with the case of a child aged 9 years, who was killed in a motor accident in the year 2002. The Tribunal had adopted a notional income of Rs.30,000/- per annum and after deducting one third towards personal expenses, the financial dependency of the parents was taken at Rs.20,000/- per annum and considering the age of the parents, the multiplier of 17 was adopted. The total financial dependency was calculated at Rs.3,40,000/- and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was awarded for emotional loss, Rs.5,000/- for funeral expenses, a total sum of Rs.4,45,000/- was awarded with interested at 9% per annum. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed and therefore, the matter was before the Supreme Court. The total financial dependency was calculated at Rs.3,40,000/- and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was awarded for emotional loss, Rs.5,000/- for funeral expenses, a total sum of Rs.4,45,000/- was awarded with interested at 9% per annum. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed and therefore, the matter was before the Supreme Court. While taking note of the distinction made in Latha Wadhwa’s case between the deceased children falling within the age group of 5-10 years and the age group of 10-15 years, it held that applying the principle indicated in Jasbir Kaur’s case, a sum of Rs.1.80,000/- would meet the ends of justice and that the same shall carry interested at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition. 12. In Kaushlya Devi Vs. Shri Karan Arora and Others, 2007(3) TAC 16 which was a case arising on account of the death of the appellant’s son aged 14 years, as a result of a motor accident in the year 1997, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was awarded along with interest at 12% per annum by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed. The Supreme Court in appeal held , that having regard to the principle that in cases of young children of tender age, in view of uncertainties neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of future increase in their income are capable of proper determination on an estimated basis. Therefore, the financial loss projected by the parents is not capable of computation and dismissed the appeal. 13. This Court in S. Sana Ulla and another vs. A.R. Shivashankar and Others, ILR 2008 KAR. 1896 was dealing with a case involving the death of a 13 year old boy. The appellants were the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. The Tribunal had awarded Rs.1,51,500/- with 8% interest. On a comparative analysis of the compensation awarded to children between 10-15 years by the various High Courts and by the Supreme Court, in the case of Manju Devi Vs. Musafir Paswan supra, held that the various High Courts, following the judgment in Manju Devi’s case, have consistently years and that it would be appropriate if compensation is enhanced to Rs.2,25,000/-with interest at 6% per annum. 14. Musafir Paswan supra, held that the various High Courts, following the judgment in Manju Devi’s case, have consistently years and that it would be appropriate if compensation is enhanced to Rs.2,25,000/-with interest at 6% per annum. 14. On a study of the above cited cases, the following principles emerge: a) The amount of compensation recoverable, in respect of the death of a minor by the claimants, in a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 depends on the particular facts and circumstances there can be no ceiling placed, on the amount recoverable; b) Parents are entitled to recover as compensation the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child, and reasonable compensation for the loss of present services (see(j) below); c) Compensation payable is towards loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably expected after the child attains majority. Dependency can be estimated by computing the annual contribution which the child would have made from the date of his probable earning, excepts as indicated in (j) below; d) Reasonable probability as regards the minor child growing into adulthood and being more successful than the parent (as it ought to be the expectation of every parent) and correspondingly working towards higher levels of income may be accepted if supported by material to indicate such a possibility with reasonable certainty. The older the child, less would be left to chance, as there is bound to be material to point to a strong possibility of the deceased child becoming a successful adult. e) As dependency lasts only for the lifetime of the parents, the multiplier to be applied is the one appropriate to the age of the younger of the parents. f) Dependency need not be deemed to cease on the marriage of the minor, though it may be reduced, having regard to the traditions and practices in this country. g) Dependency may vary given the social and economic condition of the family of the deceased. E.g. An affluent parent is not likely to be depend on the earnings of his child as would a less well – to – do parent. h). Deduction towards the personal expenses of the deceased Cannot be uniformly taken at one-third or one-half, this will depend on the facts of the case. E.g. An affluent parent is not likely to be depend on the earnings of his child as would a less well – to – do parent. h). Deduction towards the personal expenses of the deceased Cannot be uniformly taken at one-third or one-half, this will depend on the facts of the case. i) Nominal compensation has been awarded in the past, in case involving children above 5 years and below 10 years and so also in the case of children below 5 years, This need not be a rule for all time to come. With improved and assured basic health, educational and other needs becoming available the to the general populace in greater numbers, by the year, if not by the day, it is possible to award higher amounts of compensation even in respect of such cases and in view of the progressive in longevity, denial of compensation, on the basis of mortality rates amongst very young children in the past decades, cannot be sustained; j) There are several decided cases where it has been observed that compensation cannot be granted to the parents in the event of death, due to accidents, of very young children, for the reason that it would be many years before they actually become earning members. While on the other hand, the parents would in fact require to continue to spend money and effort for several years in nurturing the child to become a successful adult. But it has never been considered, in those decided cases, that money and effort has already been expended on the child even up to the date of death, which is lost. It is also not taken into consideration that even a very young child is capable of running errands and attending to chores for the parents even at a tender age. The loss of such services cannot be undermined. The loss in this regard needs to be compensated reasonably and well, - depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. Keeping the above principle and observations in view, I hold as follows: In the appeal in MFA.1293/2006, the deceased minor was aged about 13 at the time of the accident . The appellants have merely claimed a compensation of Rs.4,00,000/-. 15. Keeping the above principle and observations in view, I hold as follows: In the appeal in MFA.1293/2006, the deceased minor was aged about 13 at the time of the accident . The appellants have merely claimed a compensation of Rs.4,00,000/-. There is no material placed on record to indicate the social and financial background of the appellants, though there is an attempt to produce some material to indicate that the deceased child was doing well in studies. However, the contention that the mother had undergone an operation to prevent child birth and that she was not capable of having any more children, and that the deceased was the only son is a contention that has been completely overlooked by the Tribunal. The Tribunal having proceeded to award a lump sum amount of Rs.1,50,000/- is there not justified. The appellants are entitled to a larger amount of compensation. In the absence of evidence to indicate the income of the appellants and the probability of the child receiving higher education and earning large amounts of money, it is possible to compute the compensation payable only on the basis that the notional income would be about Rs.15,000/- per annum and if the age of the younger of the parents namely, the mother, as on the date of the claim, is taken as she was 39 years old, the appropriate multiplier would be 14 and if the same is applied, the appellants would be entitled to a loss of dependency of Rs.1,40,000/-(15,000 X 1/3 – 5,000) (15,000 – 5000 X 14). The appellants are entitled to the compensation under the conventional heads more particularly as the mother is no longer capable of bearing any children, (which assertion is not disputed) the award of a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- justified. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The appellants are held entitled to a compensation of Rs.2,40,000/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of claim. 16. In the appeal in MFA. 1453/2007, the minor was aged 16 and there was material on record to show that the minor was doing well in School and was actively performing in sports and extracurricular activities. There was material evidence also to indicate that the child was employed after school hours, as a coolie and it is on that basis that the Tribunal has adopted a notional income of Rs. There was material evidence also to indicate that the child was employed after school hours, as a coolie and it is on that basis that the Tribunal has adopted a notional income of Rs. 24,000/- per annum for purpose of computation of compensation. The ground in appeal to contend that the younger of the parents was 43 years old as on the date of the accident, is apparently incorrect. As on the date of the claim petition, the mother, who was the younger of the parents was aged 35 and hence, there is no error in the Tribunal having applied the multiplier of 16. The contention that the Tribunal ought to have deducted 50% of the notional income towards the personal expenses of the deceased also cannot be sustained. The deduction of one-third by the Tribunal towards such deemed expenditure is in order. There is no warrant for interference. The appeal stands dismissed. 17. In the appeal in MFA.8823/2006 the appellant – insurer is justified in contending that the deceased minor, who was aged 5 at the time of the accident belonged to parents aged 26 and 23. The material evidence on record did not indicate the avocation of the parents not their income and the claim is also bereft of details. The Tribunal however, has proceeded on the basis that the claimants could sustain the claim for compensation and that the notional income of the deceased minor could be taken at Rs.15,000/- per annum and has applied the multiplier of 15 and has awarded Rs.2,25,000/- as the loss of dependency, apart from funeral expenses. The appellant would be justified in contending that there ought to have been a deduction of one-third of the same as attributable towards personal expenses of the deceased, even assuming that the child grew into an adult and was a capable of providing for his parents. Hence, if such deduction is given, the amount of compensation would stand reduced to Rs.1,55,000/-. The appeal is therefore allowed in terms as above.