JUDGMENT: The suit for specific performance, being O.S.No.91 of 1996, on the file of the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Karimnagar, filed by the first respondent herein (hereafter called, the plaintiff), was decreed on 05.12.2003 directing the appellant herein (hereafter called, first defendant) to execute sale deed for House No.1-5-266 (new) situated at Kaman Road, Karimnagar, and further directing first defendant to induct the plaintiff into possession of the eastern portion of the suit house by evicting the tenant. The second respondent herein (hereafter called, second defendant) is statedly the person to whom first defendant and his brother, Baddam Ram Reddy, sold their respective shares in the suit house in February and April 1986. For this reason, the second defendant was added as proper and necessary party. 2. Plaintiff is related to first defendant. He is son-in-law of the elder sister of the first defendant. Admittedly, he has been staying in the western portion of the suit house very much prior to commencement of the dispute. Be that as it is, the plaintiff pleaded that he purchased the suit house under agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993 for sale consideration of Rs.1,20,000/- duly paying a sum of Rs.61,200/- as advance and agreeing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs.58,800/- within a period of one year, and obtain regular registered sale deed. According to him, possession was also delivered to him. He further alleged that since one year prior to filing of the suit, i.e., 23.11.1994, he had been demanding first defendant to execute sale deed, in vain, and hence he filed the suit for specific performance of contract of sale directing the first defendant to execute the registered sale deed after accepting balance of sale consideration and for consequential permanent injunction. 3. Initially, the second defendant was not arrayed as a party to the suit. First defendant filed the written statement denying the execution of agreement of sale and alleged that the same is forged. 3. Initially, the second defendant was not arrayed as a party to the suit. First defendant filed the written statement denying the execution of agreement of sale and alleged that the same is forged. He further stated in his written statement that he along with his brother, Ram Reddy, constitute joint family, that in 1980 there is a partition between them, in which, Ram Reddy got eastern portion and he got western portion, that on 14.02.1986 Ram Reddy sold his share in the suit house to second defendant, that subsequently, on 14.04.1986 first defendant also sold his share of the property to the second defendant, and that plaintiff is not in possession of the property. The allegation of the plaintiff that he made a demand on the first defendant for execution of sale deed was denied specifically alleging that plaintiff never demanded specific performance of forged contract of sale. After his impleadment, the second defendant filed written statement on the same lines. He also further alleged that after purchasing the property from Ram Reddy in 1986 he is in possession of the eastern portion. 4. Based on the rival pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed five issues on 26.06.1995. These were recast on 18.02.1999, which are as below. 1. Whether the agreement of sale Dt.20.4.1993 executed by D1 in favour of plaintiff is true, valid and binding on the defendant No.1? 2. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of suit schedule house in pursuance of agreement of sale Dt.20.4.1993? 3. Whether the defendant No.2 was in possession of suit schedule house, if so, under what capacity? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of contract Dt.20.4.1993 and permanent injunction, as prayed for? 5. To what relief? 5. During the trial, plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1. P.Ws.2 and 3, who, allegedly attested the suit agreement were also examined. Exs.A.1 to A.17 were marked. Ex.A.1 is the suit agreement of sale, and Exs.A.2 to A.17 were produced to prove the possession. The first defendant came to the witness box as D.W.1, and second defendant was examined as D.W.4. The brother of the first defendant was examined as D.W.3 and Exs.B.1 to B.35 were marked. As first defendant pleaded forgery, he sought expert's opinion and at his instance, Ex.A.1 was sent to one Pandit Ashok Kashyap, handwriting expert of Delhi. The first defendant came to the witness box as D.W.1, and second defendant was examined as D.W.4. The brother of the first defendant was examined as D.W.3 and Exs.B.1 to B.35 were marked. As first defendant pleaded forgery, he sought expert's opinion and at his instance, Ex.A.1 was sent to one Pandit Ashok Kashyap, handwriting expert of Delhi. The opinion given by him was marked as Ex.B.2, and he was examined as D.W.2. 6. Learned trial Judge rejected the plea of forgery on the ground that the evidence of D.W.2 and Ex.B.2 - opinion, are not corroborated and no steps are taken by the first defendant in that direction. Ex.A.1 was held to be valid and binding on the first defendant. The trial Court also believed plaintiff's case that he is in possession of eastern portion pursuant to Ex.A.1, and having recorded a finding that eastern portion was in possession of people belonging to first defendant, learned trial Judge while decreeing specific performance of Ex.A.1 - agreement of sale, also directed the first defendant to put plaintiff in possession of eastern portion of suit house. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Counsel for the second respondent made the following submissions. When expert evidence is offered before the Court, corroboration is not required, though under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act, for brevity), expert's opinion with regard to disputed handwriting is not always binding on the Courts. Therefore, they would urge that the trial Court committed an error in rejecting Ex.B.2 and evidence of D.W.2. According to them, as per this evidence, the signature of first defendant on Ex.A.1 is a forged signature. They would also point out that long prior to filing of the suit, in 1980 there was a partition between the first defendant and his brother, Ram Reddy, and therefore, execution in respect of entire suit house by the first defendant, as alleged, is improbable. Lastly, they submit that the requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Specific Relief Act, for brevity), and Order VI Rule 3 read with Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), are mandatory. Lastly, they submit that the requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Specific Relief Act, for brevity), and Order VI Rule 3 read with Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), are mandatory. In this case plaintiff did not specifically make a demand in writing by sending a notice requesting for execution of sale deed, and therefore, the suit for specific performance of agreement of immovable property is barred. They placed reliance on Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishnasetty1, Pushparani S.Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James2, Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi)3, Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank4, and Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa5. 8. Learned Counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submits that a categorical plea was taken in paragraph 3 of the plaint that since one year prior to filing of the suit plaintiff has been demanding first defendant to receive the balance consideration, that such oral demand is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix A of CPC, and therefore, suit is not barred. He placed strong reliance for this purpose on Syed Dastagir (supra). Insofar as Ex.B.2 and evidence of D.W.2 are concerned, learned Counsel submits that the evidence of D.W.2 was not consistent, and therefore, it is always open to the trial Court to insist corroboration. According to learned Counsel, ordinarily, the evidence of an expert is not always binding on the trial Court, as it is a weak piece of evidence. 9. In the background of the case, two points would arise for consideration. 1) Whether Ex.A.1 - suit agreement, is forged, not valid and is not binding on the defendants? and 2) Whether the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is barred for want of prior demand in writing and for want of proof that such demand was made by the plaintiff on the vendor? 9-A.. In Re Point No.1: To prove execution of Ex.A.1 - agreement, plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1. He deposed that Gaddam Ramesh Reddy scribed Ex.A.1 and that P.Ws.2 and 3 attested the same. He then deposed that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract since 20.05.1995 onwards, and that within one year when he approached the first defendant with balance of sale consideration, the latter refused to take balance and execute registered sale deed. He then deposed that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract since 20.05.1995 onwards, and that within one year when he approached the first defendant with balance of sale consideration, the latter refused to take balance and execute registered sale deed. P.W.2 deposed that at the time of execution of Ex.A.1, he along with P.W.3, Krishna Murthy and Rameswara Reddy were present. He also deposed that P.W.1 informed him that he was making demands for execution of sale deeds. Curiously, P.W.1 does not say that Krishna Murthy was present at the time of execution of agreement. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are silent with regard to the time and place of execution of the agreement, though they say that P.W.1 was already a tenant in the western portion of the suit house. It is also interesting to note that P.W.2 is co-brother of P.W.1. P.W.3 admits that he is residing in Bank Colony, Karimnagar, and that he is not resident of Kaman area, where he used to stay six years back. He further deposed that the first defendant did not reside in the suit house. This itself would show anxiety of P.W.3 to help P.W.1, who himself admits in his evidence that he has been residing in the suit schedule house since 1986. Taking an overall view on the matter, the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 do not inspire confidence. If this evidence is excluded, what remains is, the interested evidence of P.W.1. 10. The first defendant, as a core contention, alleged that Ex.A.1 is not executed by him, and that his signature is forged. The document along with admitted signatures was sent to D.W.2. He submitted Ex.B.2 - report, after scientifically examining and comparing the disputed signature on Ex.A.1 with admitted signatures. After recording elaborate opinion, he opined that the disputed signature on Ex.A.1 is forged. An Advocate Commissioner was appointed to examine D.W.2. In his examination he deposed that he studied in Guntur, and therefore, he knows Telugu. After making reference to the enlargements of the disputed signature as well as admitted signatures, he deposed that "the admitted signatures (specimen signatures) are found to be written carelessly, freely and speedily without any signs of disguise and the disputed signature on Ex.A.1 is found to be written slowly, cautiously and hesitatingly with an evidence to suggest concentration of attention on the external and minute details". D.W.2 was thoroughly cross-examined by the Counsel for the plaintiff on these aspects. D.W.2 did not budge nor Counsel was able to impeach him. It is admitted before this Court that D.W.2 is an expert, and therefore, this Court need not record a finding that he is an expert. When once expert opines that the disputed signature is forged, whether such opinion is binding on the Court and the parties? 11. Section 45 of the Evidence Act is to the effect that the opinions of experts specially skilled in science or arts or in question as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, are relevant facts when the Court has to form opinion on such a point. One fact is said to be relevant to another when one is connected with other relating to relevant facts. As per Section 5 of Evidence Act, evidence has to be given with reference to every fact in issue and relevant facts. Reading Sections 3, 5 and 45 of the Evidence Act, it becomes clear that when an opinion is to be formed with regard to a disputed handwriting, the opinion of an expert is relevant fact, but still it requires evidence. "Evidence" means, a statement, which the Court permits to be made by a witness. Therefore, the opinion given by an expert is a relevant fact and the expert himself becomes a witness. In such an event, merely because the witness is not corroborated, the Court cannot throw away the opinion of expert (relevant fact) and the evidence given in relation to such relevant fact (evidence of expert). For this reason, though Courts often describe the opinion of handwriting experts or fingerprint experts as weak piece of evidence, in many cases and on many occasions, the opinion of handwriting expert becomes strong reason for the Court to form an opinion on a disputed question of fact. These principles are well settled. It is not necessary to travel beyond past five years in search of precedents. 12. In Alamgir (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the opinion of handwriting can be acted upon without insisting upon corroboration. After making reference to precedents, which are both ways, the apex Court laid down as under. These principles are well settled. It is not necessary to travel beyond past five years in search of precedents. 12. In Alamgir (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the opinion of handwriting can be acted upon without insisting upon corroboration. After making reference to precedents, which are both ways, the apex Court laid down as under. In our view, however, reliance in Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab6 is rather misplaced in the contextual facts since no conviction is based on the opinion of the Handwriting Expert but admittedly it can be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. The Handwriting Expert's opinion simply corroborates the circumstantial evidence and as such we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Singh on this score. Significantly, this Court in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh7, in no uncertain terms observed that the hazard in acceptance of opinion of an Expert is not because it is unreliable evidence, but because human judgment is fallible. Needless to record that the signs of identification of handwriting have attained more or less a state of perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. This Court went on further to record that doubting the opinion of a Handwriting Expert ought to be a far cry and insistence upon further corroboration as an invariable rule does not seem to be a justifiable conclusion... In fine in Murari Lal (supra) this Court stated that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law that opinion- evidence of a Handwriting Expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. We feel it expedient to record our concurrence therewith, though, however, we hasten to add that since human judgment cannot be said to be totally infallible, due caution shall have to be exercised and the approach ought to be that of care and caution and it is only upon probe and examination the acceptability or creditworthiness of the same depends... 13. In Lalit Popli (supra) relying on Murari Lal (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated that the evidence of expert cannot be discarded on the ground that it is not corroborated. The relevant observations are as under. 13. In Lalit Popli (supra) relying on Murari Lal (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated that the evidence of expert cannot be discarded on the ground that it is not corroborated. The relevant observations are as under. Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act') deal with opinion of experts and comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved. Section 45 itself provides that the opinions are relevant facts. It is a general rule that the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill is admissible. There was no challenge to the expertise of V. K. Sakhuja. He deposed to have testified in about ten thousand cases relating to disputed documents. Though the employee highlighted certain adverse remarks, it cannot be lost sight of that they were about four decades back. But we need not go into that aspect in detail as no infirmity in the report acted upon by the authority in the present case was noticed or could be pointed out. 14. The learned trial Judge, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents, rejected Ex.B.2 and evidence of D.W.2 only on the ground that it is not corroborated. The trial Court erroneously applied law ignoring the binding precedents of the Supreme Court and therefore, finding cannot be sustained. In view of this, on point No.1 it is held that Ex.A.1 is not valid and binding, and the signature of the first defendant is forged signature. 14-A. In Re Point No.2: Order VI Rule 3 of CPC mandates that "the forms in Appendix A when applicable...shall be used for all pleadings". Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix A of CPC are in relation to specific performance suits. These read as under. No.47 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.1) (Title) A. B., the above - named plaintiff, states as follows:-- 1. By an agreement dated the ............ day of ............ and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of (or sell to) the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of ......... rupees. 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on his part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. rupees. 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on his part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 6. The plaintiff claims that the Court will order the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full possession of the said property [or to accept a transfer and possession of the said property] and to pay the costs of the suit. No.48 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.2) (Title) A.B., the above - named plaintiff, states as follows:-- 1. On the .............day of ........19....../20......, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing, and the original document is hereto annexed. The defendant, was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement. 2. On the ............day of ............19...../20......, the plaintiff tendered ........rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument. 3. On the ............day of ............19...../20......, the plaintiff again demanded such transfer. [Or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff.] 4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer. 5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase - money of the said property to the defendant. [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 8. The plaintiff claims:-- (1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement]; (2) .............rupees compensation for withholding the same. Paragraph 3 of Form No.47 is to the effect that "plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which defendant has had notice". Similarly, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Form No.48 are to the effect that plaintiff tendered the balance money and demanded the transfer of the property by sufficient instruments. Paragraph 3 of Form No.48 is also to the effect that plaintiff again demanded such transfer and defendant refused to transfer the same. Similarly, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Form No.48 are to the effect that plaintiff tendered the balance money and demanded the transfer of the property by sufficient instruments. Paragraph 3 of Form No.48 is also to the effect that plaintiff again demanded such transfer and defendant refused to transfer the same. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that when Form No.47 speaks of notice it necessarily refers to a notice in writing, and therefore, in the absence of any such notice by the plaintiff prior to filing of the suit, the suit is barred. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff/first respondent submits that plaintiff pleaded that since one year prior to filing of the suit plaintiff demanded the first defendant to receive balance of sale consideration and execute sale deed and this is sufficient pleading. 16. Reading Form Nos.47 and 48 of CPC together and Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, it has to be held that ordinarily the requirement of law is issuance of a registered notice by the plaintiff demanding the accepting of (balance) sale consideration and execution of sale deed by the vendor (first defendant). Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that the plaintiff has to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. A contract for sale of immovable property has to be performed by the buyer in accordance with Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Transfer of Property Act, for brevity). Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, contains the rights and liabilities of buyer and seller. Section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that seller is bound to execute proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders the amount due in respect of the price at a proper time and place. Section 55(5)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act is to the effect that buyer is bound to pay at the time and place of completing the sale, the purchase money to the seller and then request for a proper conveyance deed. The execution of conveyance deed, as a duty of the seller and as a right of buyer, has a commonality with reference to time and place of completing transaction. The execution of conveyance deed, as a duty of the seller and as a right of buyer, has a commonality with reference to time and place of completing transaction. There cannot be better evidence of showing compliance with these provisions than the buyer sending a registered notice to the seller demanding execution of a conveyance deed. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 17. This Court, however, hastens to add that, in law, oral demand by the buyer of immovable property, as such, being sufficient compliance with requirements of Form Nos.47 and 48 cannot be totally ruled out. In such circumstances, the proof of oral demand should be strong and unimpeachable and mere allegation, that too, in a passing manner would not be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. This aspect of the matter, however, has to be gone into a little deeper in an appropriate case, but it would be sufficient to leave the issue with the observations as made hereinabove. 18. A study of four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant namely, Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K.Sara Bai8, Syed Dastagir (supra), Pushparani S.Sundaram (supra) and Manjunath Anandappa (supra), would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of sale deed is not complied with prior to filing of the suit, it would weaken the case of plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of contract in respect of immovable property. If a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would - to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S.Sundaram (supra) it was held. ...Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. In Pushparani S.Sundaram (supra) it was held. ...Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court. But in the present case, not only the plaintiff has not come in the witness box, but not even sent any communication or notice to the defendant about his willingness to perform his part of the contract. In fact no evidence is led to prove the same. 19. In some the cases referred to hereinabove, invariably, reliance was placed on Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley9, wherein it was held as under. The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement of defendant. A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the 1st Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the plaint nor at any subsequent stage of the suit the plaintiff has taken those pleas. As observed by this Court in Pt. Prem Raj v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd. It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable. 20. As observed by this Court in Pt. Prem Raj v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd. It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable. 20. From the above brief discussion, the law can be taken as well settled that a suit for specific performance has to comply requirements prescribed in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix A of CPC, and averments should be proved. If a suit is filed for specific performance of agreement of sale without making prior demand by way of a notice on the defendant - vendor, such a suit is not in compliance with Form Nos.47 and 48, and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. This Court also hastens to add that in appropriate case, subject to strictly proving such allegation, an oral demand can also be proper compliance with requirement of law, but this question has to be gone into in detail in appropriate case. 21. In this case plaintiff alleged that since one year prior to filing of the suit he has been demanding first defendant to receive the balance of consideration and register sale deed. The suit was filed on 23.11.1994. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, he had been demanding first defendant since November 1993. However, in his chief examination he admits that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract since 20.05.1995. This would certainly belie allegation that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. P.Ws.2 and 3 are silent on this aspect. Therefore, even oral demand has not been proved, and the plea of oral demand does not carry the case of the plaintiff any further. Therefore, this Court holds that the suit is barred, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 22. In view of the findings on points 1 and 2, the appeal has to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal, being A.S.No.1404 of 2004, is allowed, and the judgment and decree in O.S.No.91 of 1996, dated 05.12.2003, is set aside, and the said suit is dismissed. The appellant/first defendant shall be entitled to the costs through out. 23. 22. In view of the findings on points 1 and 2, the appeal has to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal, being A.S.No.1404 of 2004, is allowed, and the judgment and decree in O.S.No.91 of 1996, dated 05.12.2003, is set aside, and the said suit is dismissed. The appellant/first defendant shall be entitled to the costs through out. 23. In view of the judgment in A.S.No.1404 of 2004, the Cross Objections (SR) No.50168 of 2004 are disposed of in terms of the judgment therein with costs