JUDGMENT:- (1) THIS revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an appellate order passed by the learned Appeal Court in an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 50 of 2007 arising out of a temporary injunction proceeding. The plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction, is the petitioner before this Court. (2) THE learned Trial Judge rejected the petitioners prayer for temporary injunction and the Appeal Court also affirmed the said order in appeal. Hence, this revisional application has been filed by the plaintiff/petitioner herein before this Court. (3) LET me now consider as to how far the learned Appeal Court was justified in afirming the order passed by the learned Trial Judge whereby the petitioners prayer for temporary injunction was rejected. (4) THE plaintiff/petitioner filed the said suit inter alia praying for a decree for declaration of her right, title and interest over the suit property and for a decree for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants/ opposite parties from erecting any structure over the suit property and/or from parting with possession of any portion of the proposed structure with a third party and/or for restraining them from causing any wastage and damages and/or from changing the nature and character of the suit property. (5) IN such a suit the petitioner filed an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure inter alia praying for similar injunction in temporary form during the pendency of the suit and an ad-interim order of injunction in similar term was also prayed for therein. (6) THOUGH an ad interim order of injunction was initially passed by the learned Trial Judge on 24th November, 2006 directing both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of nature and character of suit property till 22nd December, 2006 but, ultimately the petitioners prayer for temporary injunction was rejected by the learned Trial Judge on 28th May, 2007 vide Order No. 19. (7) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 50 of 2007 was filed by the petitioner before the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Track Court-1, but the said appeal was also dismissed on contest on 24th January, 2008 and, thus, the order passed by the learned Trial Judge was affirmed in the said appeal. Appeal No. 50 of 2007 was filed by the petitioner before the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Track Court-1, but the said appeal was also dismissed on contest on 24th January, 2008 and, thus, the order passed by the learned Trial Judge was affirmed in the said appeal. (8) FOR proper appreciation of the propriety and/or correctness of the judgment and/or order of the learned Appeal Court, brief facts which are necessary to be taken note of, are set out hereunder:- (i) The plaintiff claims that the suit property was purchased by her father Santosh Kr. Mukherjee on 4th November, 1953 in the benam of the plaintiffs brother who is the defendant No. 1 herein from Khitish Chandra Das who was the admitted owner of the said property. It was alleged by the plaintiff that at the time of such transaction the defendant No. 1 was a minor and he had no source of income at the relevant time. It was further alleged therein that the consideration money for such purchase was paid by the father of the plaintiff and the payment of such consideration by the father of the plaintiff to his vendor was also recorded in the deed itself. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that her father constructed a house on the suit property and also exercised all the right of ownership therein during his lifetime. (ii) After the death of the said Santosh Kr. Mukherjee the plaintiff and her brother viz., the defendant No. 1 herein inherited the suit property in equal share. (iii) The defendant No. 1 subsequently by two registered gift deeds gifted some portion of the suit property out of his share in favour of his two nephews being the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 who are the sons of the petitioner herein. (iv) Subsequently, when the defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement with the defendant No. 2, a developer for developing the suit property by constructing a multistoried building on the rest portion of the suit property, the petitioner filed this suit seeking the abovementioned reliefs therein. (v) Immediately after filing the said suit, the petitioner filed an application for temporary injunction in the said suit inter alia praying for interim injunction by making similar averment as made out by her in her plaint of the said suit. (v) Immediately after filing the said suit, the petitioner filed an application for temporary injunction in the said suit inter alia praying for interim injunction by making similar averment as made out by her in her plaint of the said suit. (9) THE defendant No. 1/opposite party contested the said injunction proceeding by filing objection denying the material allegations made out by the petitioner in his said application for injunction. The defendant No. 1 in his said objection categorically stated that he purchased the suit property out of his own fund. The said defendant denied that he was minor at the time of purchase of the suit property. The said defendant claimed that he has been exercising all rights of ownership over the suit property right from the date of purchase. He has not only mutated his name as owner thereof in the Municipal records but also constructed a house therein during the life time of his father without any objection from him. In short, the defendant No. 1 claimed that he is not a benamder but the real owner of the suit property. (10) THE said defendant prayed for rejection of the injunction application by contending inter alia that since the suit itself is not maintainable being barred under the provision of Section 4 of the Benami transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, interim injunction cannot be granted in such a suit. (11) THE said defendant further contended that prior to the filing of the instant suit the plaintiff filed another suit being Title Suit No. 50 of 2006 against the defendant No. 1 inter alia praying for partition of the suit property. In the said suit the plaintiff/petitioner claimed 50 per cent share in the suit property by way of inheritance from her father. In the said suit the plaintiff, however, made a contradictory and inconsistent claim regarding the payment of the consideration money for the said transaction. It was stated by the plaintiff in the earlier suit that she provided the fund to her father for purchasing the said property and her father purchased the suit property from the erstwhile owner thereof by utilizing the fund of the petitioner. The said defendant, thus, prayed for rejection of the petitioners application for injunction by pointing out such inconsistent and contradictory stand taken by her in different pleadings concerning the said property. The said defendant, thus, prayed for rejection of the petitioners application for injunction by pointing out such inconsistent and contradictory stand taken by her in different pleadings concerning the said property. (12) THE said defendant further stated that the petitioner herein also sought for an injunction of similar nature in the earlier suit but her prayer for injunction was rejected in the said suit. After being unsuccessful in obtaining an order of injunction in the earlier suit, the petitioner filed the present suit for the aforesaid reliefs and prayed for interim reliefs as aforesaid. It was further stated by the defendant that subsequently the earlier suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff though her prayer for leave to file a fresh suit on the selfsame cause of action was rejected by the learned trial Judge. An objection regarding maintainability of the present suit was thus raised by the defendant who also claimed that interim injunction cannot be granted in such a suit which is not maintainable in law. (13) THE learned Trial Judge, while rejecting the petitioners prayer for temporary injunction held that the plaintiff/petitioner had no locus standi to contend that the transaction in question of the year 1953 was a benami transaction and the defendant No. 1 was not the real owner of the suit property but a mere name lender. In short, the learned Trial Judge was of the prima facie view that the said suit is barred by the provision of Section 4 (1) of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act,1988. (14) BY taking note of the contradictory pleadings made by the petitioner in her different pleadings either in the earlier suit or in the present suit, the learned Trial Judge held that the petitioner is not entitled to get any interim relief on the basis of such contradictory statements regarding payment of the consideration money as aforesaid. (15) THE learned Appeal Court practically affirmed the aforesaid findings of the learned Trial Judge in the appeal. The learned Appeal Court further considered the balance of convenience and inconvenience of the party and held that if an injunction is granted in the facts of the instant case, the defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 will not be able to enjoy their property according to their choice and they will also suffer irreparable loss and injury as the cost of construction will be much higher in future. 1, 3 and 4 will not be able to enjoy their property according to their choice and they will also suffer irreparable loss and injury as the cost of construction will be much higher in future. The learned appeal Court further held that if, on the contrary, the plaintiff ultimately succeeds in the suit, the plaintiff notwithstanding refusal of her prayer for injunction, cannot suffer any loss and injury as in case of her success in the suit, structure which will be made thereon can be dismantled by an order of mandatory injunction. Holding as such, the learned Appeal Court dismissed the petitioners appeal. (16) MR. Chatterjee learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner challenged the said order of the learned Appeal Court by contending inter alia that the learned Appeal Court erred in holding that the plaintiff/petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case. Mr. Chatterjee contended that prima facie case does not mean a full-proof case. According to Mr. Chatterjee, prima facie case means a case which requires consideration at the stage of trial of the suit. By pointing out the recital in the deed of 1953 regarding payment of the consideration money for the said transaction, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that a prima facie case regarding benami transaction was successfully made out by his client in the suit as the defendant No. 1 was not only a minor but also had no source of fund for purchasing the suit property at the relevant time coupled with the averment recorded in the said deed regarding acknowledgement of the receipt of the consideration money for the said transaction through the father of the plaintiff, by the vendor. (17) BY referring to the judgment of this Honble Court in the case of ramesh Goyel v. Dwinder Pal Singh and Ors., reported in 2008 (1) WBLR (Cal)709, Mr. Chatterjee contended that such a suit is prima facie maintainable as the impugned transaction was made in 1953 prior to the benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act came into operation. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, submitted that the learned Appeal Court erred in expressing his doubt regarding maintainability of the said suit because of the bar created under section 4 (1) of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. (18) MR. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, submitted that the learned Appeal Court erred in expressing his doubt regarding maintainability of the said suit because of the bar created under section 4 (1) of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. (18) MR. Chatterjee further contended that there was, as such, no contradiction between the plaintiffs pleadings in the earlier suit and her pleadings in the present suit so far as the payment of consideration money made by the plaintiffs father to the vendor is concerned. According to Mr. Chatterjee, even if there is any contradiction between the earlier pleading and present pleading of the plaintiff still then such contradiction is not so acute and grave which may lead to rejection of the petitioners prayer for interim injunction particularly when the defendant No. 1 failed to disclose his source of income at the relevant time. (19) MR. Chatterjee ultimately contended that since construction has already progressed substantially, he is not praying for any injunction for restraining the defendant from carrying on further construction on the suit property. According to Mr. Chatterjee, justice will be sub-served if the petitioners right to claim partition is protected in case the petitioner succeeds in the present suit. Mr. Chatterjee, thus, ultimately submitted that such protection can be ensured if the opposite parties are restrained from creating any further third party interest in the suit property and in case where an agreement has already been entered for transferring the defendants interest in the suit property then they should not be permitted to complete such transaction without disclosing the pendency of this suit to the intending purchaser so that the intending purchaser cannot claim any equitable relief by contending inter alia that since they are bona fide purchasers of the suit property for a valuable consideration without notice of the suit, their title in the property cannot be affected by such suit. (20) MR. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite parties strongly supported both the judgments of the Courts below by placing both the plaints filed by the plaintiff in her earlier suit as well as in the present suit. Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out the contradictory statements which were made by her in her aforesaid pleadings regarding the payment of the consideration money by her father to his vendor. Mr. Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out the contradictory statements which were made by her in her aforesaid pleadings regarding the payment of the consideration money by her father to his vendor. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, thus, submitted that when both the Courts below by taking note of such contradictory statements of the petitioner in her earlier pleading as well as in the present pleading, refused to pass any injunction in favour of the petitioner in the facts of the present case, this Court, sitting in this jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, should not interfere with such concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the learned courts below. (21) BY referring to the deed itself Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out that his client was described as major in the said deed and, as such, it cannot be contended by the petitioner that the defendant No. 1 is minor at the time of such transaction. (22) MR. Roy Chowdhury further contended that his client has been exercising all the rights of true owner in the suit property right from the date of purchase thereof. The defendant No. 1 not only mutated his name as owner of the suit property in the Municipal record but also he has obtained a sanctioned plan for construction of a building thereon. The defendant has also been regularly paying the rates and taxes of the suit property to the Municipal Authority and his father never exercised any right of ownership over the suit property during his lifetime. (23) MR. Roy Chowdhury further contended that all the title deeds relating to the suit property are in the custody of the opposite party No. 1 and, as such, it cannot be contended that the said opposite party is a mere name lender. (24) MR. Roy Chowdhury further contended that his client was generous enough to transfer a portion of the suit property in favour of his nephews namely the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 who are the sons of the plaintiff, by way of gift. (25) MR. Roy Chowdhury ultimately submitted that since the construction of the suit property has progressed substantially, injunction as sought for by the petitioner, cannot be granted at this stage. (26) THUS, Mr. Roy Chowdhury prayed for rejection of this revisional application. (27) HEARD the submission of the Counsel of the respective parties considered on materials-on-record including the order impugned. (25) MR. Roy Chowdhury ultimately submitted that since the construction of the suit property has progressed substantially, injunction as sought for by the petitioner, cannot be granted at this stage. (26) THUS, Mr. Roy Chowdhury prayed for rejection of this revisional application. (27) HEARD the submission of the Counsel of the respective parties considered on materials-on-record including the order impugned. (28) ON consideration of the plaint of the present suit as well as the injunction application filed in connection therewith, this Court cannot hold conclusively at this stage that the suit is barred under the provision of section 4 (1) of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as the impugned transaction was held in 1953 i.e. prior to the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came into operation. That apart whether purchase of such property by the father in the name of his son comes under the provision of Section 4 (3) of the said Act or not cannot be decided without trial on evidence. This Court has arrived at this conclusion by following the principle as laid down by this Honble Court in the case of Ramesh goyel v. Dwinder Pal Singh and Ors., reported in 2008 (1) WBLR (Cal) 709 (supra). (29) ON careful consideration of the earlier pleadings and present pleadings of the petitioner, this Court finds apparent contradiction between such pleadings of the petitioner regarding the payment of the consideration money of the said transaction. In the earlier suit, the petitioner claimed that the petitioners father purchased the suit property in the benam of his son by utilizing the petitioners money lying in her bank account. But in the present suit the petitioner claims that the consideration money was paid by her father to his vendor. When both the Courts below, by taking note of such contradiction in different pleadings of the plaintiff, disbelieved the petitioners claim regarding the benami transaction, this Court does not find any apparent unreasonableness in such findings of the Courts below particularly when the original title deed is in the custody of defendant no. 1 and the defendant No. 1 not only mutated his name as owner of the suit property pursuant to such transaction but also has been exercising all acts of ownership thereon right from the purchase of the suit property, without any objection from his father during his life time. 1 and the defendant No. 1 not only mutated his name as owner of the suit property pursuant to such transaction but also has been exercising all acts of ownership thereon right from the purchase of the suit property, without any objection from his father during his life time. (30) BUT, at the same time, this Court cannot ignore the averment made in the impugned deed itself regarding payment of consideration money through the plaintiffs father to the vendor inasmuch as such payment is akin to the concept of benami transaction particularly when the defendant no. 1 has failed to disclose his source of income and/or utilization of his own fund for purchasing the suit property at the relevant time. (31) BE that as it may, this Court cannot pass any order of injunction as prayed for by the petitioner as the construction of the building has progressed substantially but, at the same time, this Court feels that some arrangement should be made so that in case of the plaintiffs success in the suit, the plaintiff can enjoy the fruits of this litigation. The arrangement which was thought of by the learned Appeal Court, for giving relief to the plaintiff in case of her success in the suit, by way of dismantling a multistoried building, is an impractical solution as, such a relief can hardly be granted by the Court, particularly when third parties interest in the property will intervene. (32) UNDER such circumstances, this Court feels that justice will be sub-served if the defendants are permitted to complete the construction without claiming any equity therefor and in case they want to create any third party interest in any portion of the said construction and/or in the suit property, then, they must disclose the pendency of such suit to such third party purchasers before entering into such transaction with the third party or at least at the time of execution of the deed of transfer pursuant to a prior agreement, by mentioning about the pendency of litigation therein so that the third parties cannot claim any equitable right by contending inter alia that their interest in the suit property cannot be affected by such suit as they are bona fide purchase for valuable consideration without notice of the suit. (33) ACCORDINGLY, the defendants are restrained from creating any third party interest in the suit property without disclosing and/or mentioning about the pendency of this litigation in the deed of transfer to be made by the defendants in favour of the proposed transferees of the suit property and/or any portion thereof till the disposal of the suit. (34) IT is also made clear that the defendants may complete such construction and may also transfer the same and/or any part thereof at their own risk but they will not be permitted to claim any equity for such construction subsequently. (35) THE learned Trial Judge is directed to expedite the hearing of the suit as far as possible and is further directed to make all endeavour to dispose of the said suit preferably within one year from the date of communication of this order. The revisional application is, thus, disposed of.