ORDER This writ petition has been filed for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation on account of the injury sustained by the petitioner in the course of an attack that occurred during his detention in Sub Jail, Nagercoil. Projected case of the petitioner: 2. The petitioner was arrayed as fifth accused in Cr. No. 16 of 1996 on the file of Asaripallam Police Station in Kanyakumari District and he was remanded on 5.3.1996 and confined in Cell No. 8 of Sub Jail, Nagercoil from 5.3.1996 along with other prisoners. 3. While so, on 9.4.1996 at about 3.10 hours, when all the prisoners and remand prisoners like the petitioner were locked up in the cell, an armed gang trespassed into the Sub Jail with deadly weapons such as aruval, country gun, iron road etc. and forced open the cell in which the petitioner and other prisoners were locked up and they started attacking one Lingam Muthulingam. 4. In the course of such attack, the petitioner as well as other prisoners were attacked and finally, head of the prisoner Lingam Muthlingam was severed from his body and the same was taken away by the gang. All the other prisoners who were in the same cell along with Lingam were attacked by the gang and one of the prisoners by name Babu Suresh succumbed to the injuries in the hospital. The other prisoners including the petitioner were seriously wounded and they were admitted in the Government Hospital at Nagercoil. The petitioner was in the hospital as in-patient and he was discharged later, after taking treatment for 61 days. The petitioner sustained injury on his right elbow, left knee, wrist, chest and his left hand thumb was cut and removed by the gang. Injury below the right elbow of the petitioner was extended to four inches in length and the same was a deep cut injury. Since the left thumb was severed, the same resulted in permanent disablement and as such, the petitioner was disabled from carrying things in his hand. The petitioner sustained permanent disability assessed at 20% and as per the report of the orthopedics surgeon, percentage of disability at 20% was partial and permanent. 5. Since the left thumb was severed, the same resulted in permanent disablement and as such, the petitioner was disabled from carrying things in his hand. The petitioner sustained permanent disability assessed at 20% and as per the report of the orthopedics surgeon, percentage of disability at 20% was partial and permanent. 5. The petitioner was not a convict or involved in the offence along with the said Lingam @ Muthulingam for whose life the gang trespassed into the Jail. The petitioner was only a remand prisoner. A case in Cr. No. 74 of 1996 was registered by Nesamani Nagar Police Station at Nagercoil with respect to the accident that happened in the jail on 9.4.1996. Since the petitioner sustained permanent disability, he was not in a position to do any kind of work so as to maintain his family and as such, he was constrained to file the writ petition, claiming compensation from the respondents. Defence Version 6. The claim of compensation was resisted by the Government and in the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Home Department, it was their contention that about 20 persons armed with deadly weapons entered into Sub Jail, Nagercoil by scaling over the compound wall with the help of a ladder and the said incident was a pre-planned one and the assailants after attacking the warden on duty and snatching the key from them, opened the cell in which remand prisoner Lingam was kept and severed his head due to previous enmity. 7. Though stiff resistance was put up by the Sub Jail staff with all their might at their command, they were easily overpowered by the miscreants. The said armed gang also attacked the other prisoners who were kept in the same cell and fled the scene. Government have admitted the multiple injury sustained by the petitioner including the fact that the left thumb of the petitioner was cut and removed. According to their version, the petitioner was an in-patient in hospital from 9.4.1996 to 24.4.1996 and he was transferred to Central Prison, Palayamcottai on 13.5.1996 and was released on bail on 8.6.1990 as per the orders of the Magistrate. 8. The respondents have also indicated about the departmental action taken against the Sub Jail staff. According to their version, the petitioner was an in-patient in hospital from 9.4.1996 to 24.4.1996 and he was transferred to Central Prison, Palayamcottai on 13.5.1996 and was released on bail on 8.6.1990 as per the orders of the Magistrate. 8. The respondents have also indicated about the departmental action taken against the Sub Jail staff. Ultimately, they have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition, as according to them, no liability could be fastened on the Government to pay compensation as the petitioner was given all the protection and security ever since the date of his remand on 5.3.1996 and he was also provided with the medical treatment for the injury sustained by him. Version of the Jail Department: 9. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent, they have admitted the injury sustained by the petitioner in the attack on 9.4 1996 and it was their contention that the jail staff was quite unaware when the miscreants suddenly entered into the Sub Jail during the early hours on 9.4.1996 by scaling over the compound wall with pre-meditated conspiracy to murder the remand prisoner Lingam due to previous enmity. Accordingly, the jail authorities also prayed for dismissal of the writ petition, as according to them, the petitioner was not entitled to any kind of compensation as the jail authorities were in no way responsible for the injuries caused to the petitioner. On the point: 10. The claim of the petitioner was based on the injury sustained by him in the attack on 9.4.1996 while he was in Cell No. 8 of Sub Jail, Nagercoil along with the accused in some other cases including one Lingam @ Muthulingam, who was also a remand prisoner. The attack by about 20 persons at 3.10 a.m. on 9.4.1996 and their entry into the Sub jail by scaling over the compound wall with the help of a ladder and their possession of dangerous weapons like aruval, pistol were all admitted by the respondents. The injury suffered by the petitioner and the cut and removal of his left hand thumb and other injuries sustained by the petitioner in the said incident were also admitted by the respondents. The injury suffered by the petitioner and the cut and removal of his left hand thumb and other injuries sustained by the petitioner in the said incident were also admitted by the respondents. The claim of compensation has been disputed by the respondents on the ground that the jail authorities were not negligent and they did not expect the attack by the armed gang in the early hours of the day by scaling over the compound wall. The factum of opening the lock with the key taken away from the jail staff were also beyond any dispute. Similarly, the factum pf admission of the petitioner in the hospital and his stay in the hospital as an in-patient were also beyond any controversy. Therefore, there is no disputed question of fact involved in the present case about the incident in question as well as injury sustained by the petitioner during his stay in Sub Jail, Nagercoil. The disability certificate issued by the Orthopaedics surgeon, attached to Kanyakumari Medical College Hospital shows that the petitioner sustained disability at 20% which was found to be partial and permanent. Article 21 of Constitution - a salutary provision: 11. Article 21 of the Constitution of India is one of the salutary provisions included in Part III of our Constitution. The scope of Article 21 has been widened in the recent past on account of the extended meaning given to the said Article by a series of judgments of the Apex Court. Even some of the provisions contained in part IV of our constitution has now been given a meaningful interpretation. The State is expected to protect the life and property of the citizen and the State is also obliged to carryout the constitutional obligations. Right to life means not an animal existence but a meaningful life. The state is obliged to protect the life of the citizen and similarly, when a person is kept inside the jail, a duty is cast on the State to protect the life of the prisoner whether he be a remand prisoner or a convict. 12. Though by reason of confinement behind the bars the convicts are deprived of their right to move freely anywhere in our territory, it cannot be said that they are not entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed in our constitution. 12. Though by reason of confinement behind the bars the convicts are deprived of their right to move freely anywhere in our territory, it cannot be said that they are not entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed in our constitution. Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution is equally available to a prisoner. Conviction or remand in jail does not have the effect of putting a person in adverse circumstances except warranted by law and it does not disentitle a prisoner from exercising the constitutional rights unless the very constitution itself puts such restriction by virtue of the conviction or remand. Responsibility of Jail Officials: 13. Responsibility to protect the life of the prisoner inside the jail lies with the jail authorities. They cannot treat a convict as an animal and it is not sufficient that the inmates of the jail are rounded up and confined in a particular cell and provide food for their existence. The approach of the jail authorities should be to reform the prisoner rather than to make his life miserable in the prison. Like any other individual, prisoners have also got feelings and emotions and the prisoners are also entitled to have security cover provided by the jail authorities. 14. The prison authorities cannot be heard to say that the prisoners were attacked by strangers who trespassed into the Sub jail by scaling over the compound wall and all the inmates of Cell No. 8 were injured in the said unforeseen incident wherein the head of the remand prisoner Lingaro was severed. The petitioner has not gone to the prison as a tourist or guest to reside there for a couple of days. It was indeed an involuntary action consequent to the order of remand passed by the Magistrate. It was only as per the orders of the Magistrate that the petitioner was put in the cell of Sub Jail, Nagercoil. The petitioner was handed over to the jail authorities for safe custody during the time of investigation and it was only by way of a judicial order that he was kept in the prison. It was only as per the orders of the Magistrate that the petitioner was put in the cell of Sub Jail, Nagercoil. The petitioner was handed over to the jail authorities for safe custody during the time of investigation and it was only by way of a judicial order that he was kept in the prison. Jail authorities have taken custody of the petitioner for his safe keeping in jail for the required number of days as indicated in the remand order of the Magistrate, and as such, they owe a responsibility to produce the remand prisoner in good and healthy condition before the Magistrate on the date on which he was directed to be produced. 15. It is not an excuse that the jail authorities have not expected of such attack from an unruly mob who were inimically indisposed of against the remand prisoner Lingam. The respondents clearly failed to protect the petitioner from attack at the hands of the gang and he was Subjected to bodily injury for no fault of him. The jail authorities cannot wash their hands in the way in which they have shirked the responsibility by pleading ignorance of the entire episode and describing the incident as a sudden attack which was never thought of by the authorities. There was a clear dereliction of duty and it is also evident that there was no proper planning insofar as jails were concerned. In case the situation like the one happened in Sub Jail, Nagercoil on 9.4.1996 occurs elsewhere and more particularly in Jails where hardcore criminals were lodged, the consequences would be disastrous and in suet: circumstances also, the very same excuse that the jai] authorities were not aware of the plan to attack the jail, could be pleaded as a defence. 16. The facts projected in the present writ petition clearly shows that the life of the petitioner was put in danger on account of the negligence of the respondents. Therefore, the petitioner was clearly justified in claiming compensation from the respondents. The subject claim being one on the basis of strict liability, State cannot plead sovereign immunity so as to defeat the claim. The State is answerable to the citizen and in case there was unlawful violation of the rights of the citizen, the State is bound to pay compensation. 17. The subject claim being one on the basis of strict liability, State cannot plead sovereign immunity so as to defeat the claim. The State is answerable to the citizen and in case there was unlawful violation of the rights of the citizen, the State is bound to pay compensation. 17. Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in AIR 1978 SC 1675 considered the question as to whether convicts are entitled to the constitutional right and Mr. Justice V. R. KRISHNA IYER in his inimitable style observed thus: "Part III of the Constitution does not part company with the prisoner at the gates, and judicial oversight protects the prisoner's shrunken fundamental rights, if flouted, frowned upon or frozen by the prison authority. Is a person under death sentence or under trial unilaterally dubbed dangerous liable to suffer extra torment too deep for tears? Emphatically no, lest social justice, dignity of the individual, equality before the law, procedure established by law and the seven lamps of freedom (Article 19) become chimerical constitutional claptrap. Judges, even within a prison setting, are the real, though restricted, ombudsmen empowered to proscribe and prescribe, humanize and civilize the life-style within the concerns. The operation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 may be pared down for a prisoner but not puffed out altogether. For example, public addresses by prisoners may be put down but talking to fellow prisoners cannot. Vows of silence or taboos on writing poetry or drawing cartoons are violative of Article 19. So also, locomotion may be limited by the needs of imprisonment but binding hand and foot, with hoops of steel, every man or woman sentenced for a term is doing violence to Part III." 56. And what is "life" in Article 21? In Kharak Singh case SUBBA RAO, J. quoted FIELD, J. in Munn v. Illinois to emphasise the quality of life covered by Article 21: "Something more than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world." A dynamic meaning must attach to life and liberty. 57. ... The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world." A dynamic meaning must attach to life and liberty. 57. ... So the law is that for a prisoner all fundamental rights are an enforceable reality, though restricted by the fact of imprisonment. The omens are hopeful for imprisoned humans because they can enchantingly invoke Manoka and, in its wake, Articles 14, 19 and even 21, to repel the deadening impact of unconscionable incarceratory inflictions based on some lurid legislative text or untested tradition. 18. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (supra) case, the Apex Court also indicated as to what is safe keeping in jail custody and the position was summarized in the following words: "102. This 'safe keeping' in jail custody is the limited jurisdiction of the jailor. The convict is not sentenced to imprisonment. He is not sentenced to solitary confinement. He is a guest in custody, in the safe keeping of the host-jailor until the terminal hour of terrestrial farewell whisks him away to the halter. This is trusteeship in the hands of the Superintendent, not imprisonment in the true sense. Section 366(2) Code of Criminal Procedure (Jail Custody) and Form 40 (safely to keep) underscore this concept, reinforced by the absence of a sentence of imprisonment under Section 53, read with Section 73, Indian Penal Code. The inference is inevitable that if the 'condemned' men were harmed by physical or mental torture the law would not tolerate the doing since injury and safety are obvious enemies. And once this qualitative distinction between imprisonment and safe keeping within the prison is grasped, the power of the jailor becomes benign. … Safe keeping means keeping his body and mind in fair condition. To torture his mind is unsafe keeping. Injury to his personality is not safe- keeping. So, Section 366 CrPC forbids any act which disrupts the man in his body and mind. To preserve his flesh and crush his spirit is not safe-keeping, whatever else it be." (emphasis applied). 19. To torture his mind is unsafe keeping. Injury to his personality is not safe- keeping. So, Section 366 CrPC forbids any act which disrupts the man in his body and mind. To preserve his flesh and crush his spirit is not safe-keeping, whatever else it be." (emphasis applied). 19. The Apex court in (1993) 2 SCC 746 indicated the development of law with regard to public law proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32 as well as under Article 226 and held thus: "10. ... It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings." 20. In (1983) 4 SCC 141 the Apex Court summarized the legal position with respect to the claim of compensation consequent upon the deprivation of fundamental right thus: "In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (supra) it was held that in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court can grant compensation for deprivation of a fundamental right. That was a case of violation of the petitioner's right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., dealing with this aspect, stated as under: Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing, orders to release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers." 21. In (1997) 1 SCC 416 in the context of custodial violations, the Apex Court held that claim for compensation for the wrong was based on the principle of strict liability and in such cases, the defence of strict liability was no more available to the State and observed thus: "54. Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must receive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrongdoer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal Courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal Courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a civil suit." 22. The contention that the aggrieved has to approach the civil Court for claiming damages is no more available in view of the development of law with regard to payment of compensation on account of infringement of the indivisible right to life of the citizen. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), the Apex Court indicated the changing trend in the matter of action for damages on account of interference with the life of the people and the following observations in para 45 of the said Judgment makes the position clear: "45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the Courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A Court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A Court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family." 23. It is also found from the Judgment of this Court dated 30.4.2008 in W.P. No. 10726 of 1999 that in respect of the very same incident, this Court granted a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs as compensation to the wife and children of the deceased Lingam @ Muthulingam whose head was severed. 24. Since the injuries sustained by the petitioner as well as the disability sustained by him was established, the question that arises further is in respect of the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the petitioner. 25. To arrive at the quantum of compensation on account of violation of the fundamental rights of citizens as well as infringement of right guaranteed to the citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, so many factors need to be taken into consideration. Each case depends upon the peculiar facts of the said case and there cannot be a universal rule in such cases for payment of compensation. The structured formula as found in the Motor Vehicles Act for payment of compensation as well as the table prescribed under the Workmen's Compensation Act could be taken as the basis to fix the quantum in such cases. 26. During the material time, the petitioner was aged 45 years and the permanent disability was assessed at 20%. 27. As per the Workmen's Compensation Act, permanent disability on account of loss of thigh would be 30%. However, in the present case, the disability was assessed at 20% and as such, permanent disability is taken as 20%. 26. During the material time, the petitioner was aged 45 years and the permanent disability was assessed at 20%. 27. As per the Workmen's Compensation Act, permanent disability on account of loss of thigh would be 30%. However, in the present case, the disability was assessed at 20% and as such, permanent disability is taken as 20%. In the absence of any other provisions which could be resorted to for the purpose of assessment of compensation, I am of the view that the provisions of sister enactment like Motor Vehicles Act could be taken to determine the compensation under the public law jurisdiction. 28. It is found that the petitioner was aged 45 years at the time of the incident and as such, multiplier 15 could be taken. The monthly income of the petitioner could be fixed at Rs. 3,000/- by taking the minimum wage of a coolie in villages. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to compensation as below: Rs. 36,000 x 15 x 20 100 Rs. 1,08,000/- The petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for pain and suffering. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to a total sum of Rs. 1,13,000/- as compensation. 29. In the result, the first respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,13,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Thirteen Thousand only) as compensation to the petitioner with interest at 6% from the date of filing the writ petition and such amount shall be paid as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is disposed of subject to the above direction. The first respondent shall also pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to the petitioner by way of litigation expenses. Writ petition disposed of.