Judgment :- M. Venugopal, J. 1. This Original Side Appeal is filed by the appellant/plaintiff as against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 31.01.2006 passed in C.S. No. 1514 of 1991 dismissing the suit. 2. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff inter alia observing that the acquisition proceedings of the Government cannot be challenged by filing a civil suit and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and resultantly, dismissed the same with costs. 3. The appellant/plaintiff Devasthanam has filed a-suit stating that it is the owner of the lands bearing S.No. 37/7 and 37/65 in Kodambakkam Village, the extent being more than 4 acres and in or about 1965, attempts were made to acquire certain portions of the lands near the appellant/plaintiffs temple and that the appellant/plaintiff preferred W.P. No. 235 of 1965 before this Court and that this Court has directed the second respondent/second defendant not to acquire an extent of 1 1/2 acres of land in and around the temple. During 1983 when some lands belonging to the appellant/plaintiff has sought to be acquired then it caused a notice to the second respondent/second defendant on 28.02.1983 with a request to indicate the exact area proposed to be acquired and marked the same in the sketch and also for the stone so as to find out whether the lands sought to be acquired include the extent of 1.57 acres and the 25 ft. open space from the western compound of wall of the temple for taking the deity of procession and that after long time, the appellant/plaintiff was managed to obtain a rough sketch showing the lands sought to be acquired by the respondents/defendants for road purposes and it was found that the portion sought to be acquired were shown in Green Colour and they were neither shown in Sec.4(1) Notification nor in Section 6 Declaration of the Land Acquisition Act. Further, in S. No. 37/65 an extent of land 2.18 acres belongs to the appellant/plaintiff absolutely the appellant/plaintiff has leased out the portion of the said lands to different tenants and collects the rents. The second respondent/second defendant proceeded on the assumption that the Green Colour Portion belonged to the Corporation. Further, in S. No. 37/65 an extent of land 2.18 acres belongs to the appellant/plaintiff absolutely the appellant/plaintiff has leased out the portion of the said lands to different tenants and collects the rents. The second respondent/second defendant proceeded on the assumption that the Green Colour Portion belonged to the Corporation. Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff has issued a notice on 28.03.1983 enclosing a plan and informing that the Green Colour Portions belong to the plaintiff and if the same were to be acquired the market value should be paid thereof. Again on 06.08.1990 a statutory notice has been issued by the appellant/plaintiff to the respondents/defendants requiring them to deliver possession of the lands acquired without paying the compensation the act of the respondents/defendants in taking the possession of the said lands amount to trespass and they are bound to deliver possession of the same to the appellant/plaintiff. The respondents/defendants are liable to pay damages for their wrongful use and occupation, which is estimated at Rs.5,000/-per year by the appellant/plaintiff and the same is to be paid. Hence, the appellant/plaintiff has filed a suit. 4. In the written statement filed by the second respondent/second defendant, it is averred that there is no difference between S. No. 37/7 and 37/65 and originally the suit lands along with other large extent of lands were sub divided as S. No. 37/7 and further sub divided as 37/65 in Kodambakkam Village and originally classified as Village site. Moreover, as per the orders of the first respondent/ first defendant dated 28.07.1978 the classification of the lands were changed from village site (Government Poramboke) to Ryotwari Manai, and regular pattas were issued to the occupants. Consequent to the orders passed in W.P. No. 235 of 1965 the respondents/defendants had not acquired an extent of 1.5 acres around the temple and two awards were passed after enquiry. It is the further stand of the respondents/defendants that on 08.05.1985, Section 4(1) Notification was issued invoking urgency clause, under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and that the said lands were acquired for the purpose of constructing the Inter Ring Road and because of the urgency Section 5(A) enquiry was dispensed with and that Section 6 Declaration was made on 02.09.1985 and 06.09.1985 in Notification II (2)/HOS/4736/85 at page 4 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette and in newspapers "Thinathanthi" and "News Today". The substance of the declaration was published on 06.09.1985. The award enquiry was conducted on 112. 1985 and that the award was passed on 04.09.1987. The possession of the lands were taken on 210. 1985 and the lands were handed over to the Highways Department, the requisitioning body, for whose benefit the lands were acquired. The appellant/plaintiff has participated in the Enquiry Proceedings and an award was also made within its knowledge. In fact, the appellant/plaintiff has failed to approach the plaint averments before the Enquiry Officer or filed any writ before the Honble High Court and therefore, it is estopped from raising these pleas for the first time before the Court. The suit is barred by limitation in as much as the date of taking over possession is on 210. 1985 and that the Section 4(1) Notification was effected on 08.05.1985. The suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party viz., the Highways Department -requisitioning body. Hence, the suit has to be dismissed with costs. 5. Before the trial Court, on the side of appellant/plaintiff witness P.W.1 was examined and Exs.P.1 to P.17 were marked and on the side of respondents/defendants witness D.W.1 was examined and Exs.D.1 to D.8 were marked as documents. Further, Ex.C.1 was also marked. 6. After contest, on an examination and consideration of material evidence on record, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and resultantly, dismissed the same with costs. 7. Further, Ex.C.1 was also marked. 6. After contest, on an examination and consideration of material evidence on record, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and resultantly, dismissed the same with costs. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contends that the trial Court has not appreciated the fact that the appellant/plaintiff is the owner of the vast stretch of land in T.S. No. 34 in Block 5 in R.S. No. 37/7, especially when the respondents unsuccessfully defended the writ petition 8599 of 1983 filed by the petitioner questioning the acquisition of their land in T.S. No. 34 and that the trial Court has not considered that the suit land is a Grama natham and hence, there cannot be title deeds of conveyance and that even pattas are not granted in cases of Grama natham and in fact Grama natham is a land in use of individual conferring right of ownership based on long usage and possession and that the holder is entitled to file a suit against the trespasser and resist ejectment and in this regard ought to have followed the decision reported in 1964 (1) MLJ at page 290 and that Section 2 of the Land Encouragement Act, 1905 excludes Grama natham from Government Jurisdiction and further that the appellant/plaintiffs ownership of the suit land in Ex.P.1-Section 4(1) Notification has been admitted by the defendants whereby the suit land has been referred to as village site S. No. 37-7 part-present enjoyers (various individuals) and Trustees, Sivan Koil, Kodambakkam and that the contents of Ex.P.2-Lawyers notice dated 04.08.1972 whereunder a reference to W.P. No. 235 of 65 has been made and by an order dated 10.04.1968 an exemption of 1.57 acres out of 3.75 acres holding to be that of the appellants was given by this Court and therefore, the appellant/plaintiffs title to suit property has been admitted by the respondents/defendants and as a matter of fact, in W.P. No. 8599 of 1983 the appellant/plaintiff has acquired the land in respect of 2.18 acres thereby the appellant/plaintiffs title to suit property has been confirmed and moreover, in Ex.P.3 -appellant/plaintiffs title to suit property has been admitted by the respondents and that there is no Oorani and unilateral change of revenue records by the respondents/defendants will not bind the appellant and that the appellant/plaintiff has filed the suit in respect of the suit land, which is outside the acquisition proceedings and there is deliberate trespass into the suit land and therefore, only a suit will lie in view of the disputed questions of facts are involved and these facts have not been taken into consideration by the trial Court and that the respondents/defendants have not pleaded in the written statement that a suit land is a Oorani and therefore, a plea is not raised ought not to have been accepted and that Section 2 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905 excludes temple site and not merely outside from the ownership of the Government and the respondents/defendants have not established that suit properties are land/street/Oorani and in any event, the trial Court having accepted that Section 4(1) Notification has not included the suit properties ought to have decreed the suit and therefore, prays for allowing the appeal to prevent aberration of justice. 8. Contending contra, the learned Special Government Pleader submits that the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is per se not maintainable because of the fact that the Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained one and further that the appellant/plaintiff took part in the land acquisition proceedings and took the compensation and therefore, the suit is barred as per Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and that in between 1963 and 1985, as per the survey that took place in 1978, the suit property has been classified as road, lane, Oorani and therefore, there was no need to acquire the said property in 1985 and as such, the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief, much less the relief of compensation. 9. At the out set, it is to be mentioned that on the basis of arguments advanced on either side, this Court is inclined to allow the appeal and therefore, this Court is not going into the merits of the case in detail. 10. It is apt to point out that P.W.1-Gowrishankaran in his evidence has deposed that he was the Dharmakartha of the appellant/plaintiff Devasthanam from 1959 to 1987 for about 28 years and during his tenure as Dharmakartha arrangements were made in 1963 to acquire properties from the appellant/plaintiff and that the Notification in respect of S. No. 37/7 Kodambakkam Village in Ex.P.1, dated 08.05.1963 and that he raised objection to the said Notification stating that acquiring 3 acres and 75 cents in S. No. 37/7 will cause interference to the Pooja and Thirupani of the plaintiff and requested the Government to exclude 1.57 acres of lands from the acquisition and he filed a writ in W.P. No. 235 of 1965 and there was a direction issued in the aforesaid writ to return 1.57 acres to the appellant/plaintiff and no orders were passed by the Government inspite of the said direction and that Ex.P.2-notice dated 04.08.1972 has been issued by the appellant/plaintiff for which the reply dated 012. 1973 Ex.P.3 has been received from the Government stating that they have published a notice in the Tamil Nadu Gazette as per the orders issued by the Court and in Ex.P.4-order dated 112. 1973 Ex.P.3 has been received from the Government stating that they have published a notice in the Tamil Nadu Gazette as per the orders issued by the Court and in Ex.P.4-order dated 112. 1983 passed in W.P. No. 8599 of 1983 and thereafter, the Government once again came forward to acquire the appellant/plaintiffs property by taking measurement of the property and that they informed that they were doing so to lay the roads and the appellant/plaintiff informed that as per orders of Honourable High Court, 1.57 acres and also an extent of 20 feet have to be left out on the western side of the temple for which the authorities agreed but they did not demarcate the property by fixing stones in respect of the property to be excluded from acquisitions and again Ex.P.5-notice dated 23.03.1983 has been issued through the appellant/plaintiffs counsel and after the appellant/plaintiff addressing a letter-Ex.P.8, the Government initiated urgent action to lay inner ring road in the land owned by the Devasthanam and an award Ex.P.10 dated 04.09.1987 was passed by the Special Tahsildar, Guindy and as per Ex.P.10, a plan was drawn up regarding the land acquired and the land excluded from acquisition and Ex.P.11 is the aforesaid plan (marked subject to objection) and this has been obtained by him unofficially and that no compensation was given for the area marked in green in Ex.P.11 and no mention was made in Ex.P.10-award regarding the said area marked in green in Ex.P.11 and Ex.P.16 is the notice dated 06.09.1990 issued through the appellant/plaintiffs counsel to the Collector and the Land Acquisition Officer. 11. P.W.1-Gowrishankaran in his cross examination has specifically stated that the entire extent of 24 acres pertaining to S. No. 37/7 does not belong to the temple and the temple owns 3.75 acres which includes 1.57 acres, 180 feet on which the temple is situated and an additional 7 grounds in the said survey number and that Ex.P.10, 12 and 13 pertains to the acquisition proceedings and that he took part in the proceedings and as per Ex.P.10-award, he has received the compensation and in the plaint he has not stated that the temple property is a Gramanatham. 12. 12. D.W.1-Subramaniam (Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, CMDA, Chennai) in his evidence has stated that the plaintiffs claim of the land in T.S. No. 67 in schedule A, B and C in the plaint are recorded as street etc., in Ex. D6 and in Ex.D.7 is the attested copy of the sketch showing inner ring road at Kodambakkam village Block No. 4 and 5 wherein the portion marked in red colour is the village site bearing Survey No. 67 and is a useless road and in Sec. 4(1) Notification and declaration under Section 6, the S. Nos. 22/2, 23, 24, 66, 24, 25, 27 and 2 have been mentioned and whereas the Survey Nos. 26, 34, 43, 67 are not found either in Section 4(1) Notification or in Section 6 declaration and the reason for the omission of the aforesaid survey numbers is because these belong to the Government as Poramboke land and classified as village sites and a red marked portion is Ex.D.7, was used as a road and lane and he did not know who has carved it and in Ex.D.6 against survey No. 34 in Block No. 5, it is mentioned as Vengeeswarar/Sivan Koil, Oorani and as against T.S. No. 41, it is mentioned as Vengeeswarar Devasthanam and the present trustee is mentioned as Manicka Mudaliars son Gowrisankar and that his evidence in chief that the survey No. 67 was used as a road has been based on records Ex.D.6 and that he has not personally seen. 13. Admittedly, the appellant/plaintiff prays for the relief of directing the defendants to deliver possession of the suit lands to it or the value thereof and directing the respondents/defendants to pay damages at Rs. 5,000/- per year etc. 14. Under the Land Acquisition Act, if the Collector takes possession of land not in the declaration, he will be a trespasser. It is needless to emphasise that the staff of Collector must do the measurement and prepare plan. Demarcation demands making out of the outer boundaries of the land, which can be done by cutting trenches on the ground or by fixing marks as posts at each bend and corner. Accuracy in description of area and extent etc. are the essential ingredients of land acquisition. Indeed, the Collector is clearly bound by the declaration made in the official gazette. Accuracy in description of area and extent etc. are the essential ingredients of land acquisition. Indeed, the Collector is clearly bound by the declaration made in the official gazette. No wonder, the correct plan has to be prepared if it has not already been done. 15. It is to be borne in mind that when an individual while in possession has been wrongfully ousted by another he can sue to recover possession from the wrong doer. It cannot be gainsaid that possession is presumptive evidence of title and it is prima facie evidence of title against all but the true owner. As a matter of fact, the effective possession means either actual possession or possession through tenants who should have paid rent voluntarily or under a decree to person claiming possessory title. It is the well settled principle of law that a rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without use of unreasonable force. However, if the trespasser is in settled position of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to retake recourse to law, in the considered opinion of this Court. In fact, in the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title because of the fact that law presumes the possession to go with title unless rebutted. 16. In Ex.P.1-Government Gazette No. 18 dated 08.05.1963 in regard to the Acquisition of Lands [Memo No. 160018 SI/62-6, Industries, Labour and Co-operation, 26th April 1963] Ii-1 No. 2674 of 1963 it is inter alia mentioned that ‘Whereas it appears Government of Madras that the lands specified below are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for development of the areas as "Kodambakkam Pudoor Neighbourhood" in the City of Madras in accordance with the Land Acquisition and Development Scheme of the Government for the purpose of increasing house accommodation, notice to that effect is hereby given to all whom it may of concern in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894); and, the Governor of Madras hereby authorizes the Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras Neighbourhood Project, to perform the functions of a Collector under section 5-A of the said Act. Madras district, Madras (Extended area) taluk, No. III Kodambakkam village (The extent given is approximate) Village site, S. No. 37-7 part, present enjoyers Chinnasamy Mudaliar, Elumalai Mudaliar, Sampath Mudaliar, Senu Mudaliar, Sadaiyappa Naicker, Navaneethammal, Samarapuri Mudaliar, Dr. Krishnasami Mudaliar, Rangabashyam, Kuppusami Mudaliar, Thiruvengada Mudaliar, Vaidiyanatha Iyer, T.S. Sivaprakasa Mudaliar, Rajeswari Ammal, Trustees Sivankoil, Kodambakkam, K.R.P. Haran, Kamalammal, Dharmakartha, Ellamman Koil, Chinnappa Naicker, Trustee, Eswaran Koil, Kodambakkam and interested persons Thai Ammal, Amirthammal, P. Chella Achari, P. Ganga, Rajammal, Wife of late Venkateswara Rao, Ganapathy, Kannan, Panjavarnam, V. Samrasan, Kannan, D. Subramanian, Kalimuthu Naicker, Doraisami Naicker, Mahalingam, Govindammal, Marimuthu Gramani, Raghava Mudaliar, Govindammal, Munusami Nadar, Tanjan Pillai, Manicka Pillai, Munusami Naicker, Krishnan, S. Kasi, Chandrasekaran, Bhoopathi, Doraisami Mudaliar, Thiruvengadam, son of Govindasami, Dakshinamurthy, Venkatachalam, Azeer Khan and Ekambaram-5.00 acres. 17. Ex.P.2 is the lawyers notice dated 04.08.1972 issued to the Secretary to Government, Department of Industries Labour and Housing, Madras wherein it is inter alia mentioned that as per order in W.P. No. 235 of 1965, the Honourable High Court has directed that out of the total extent of 3.75 acres in S.No. 37/65 and 37/7 a portion of the extent of 1.57 acres as claimed by the appellant/plaintiff should be excluded from acquisition and that a request was made for to issue necessary direction to exclude the portion of 1.57 acres as per order of the High Court which is to be demarcated and the necessary Notification of withdrawal is made to that effect. In Ex.P.3 reply letter of the Housing Board dated 012. 1973 addressed to the Advocate of the appellant/plaintiff temple, it is mentioned that the Chairman has reported that the dumping of the mud in the land belonging to the devesthanam has been stopped. It is seen from Ex.P.4 order of this Court dated 112. 1983 passed in W.P. Nos. 8599, 8909 to 8912 and 9007 of 1983, the Honourable High Court has quashed the land acquisition proceedings in respect of appellant/plaintiff and other writ petitioners therein, in regard to the lands in T.S. No. 37/7, part, sub divided as 37/65 Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam, Guindy Taluk, Madras. 18. 1983 passed in W.P. Nos. 8599, 8909 to 8912 and 9007 of 1983, the Honourable High Court has quashed the land acquisition proceedings in respect of appellant/plaintiff and other writ petitioners therein, in regard to the lands in T.S. No. 37/7, part, sub divided as 37/65 Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam, Guindy Taluk, Madras. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant cites the decision State of U.P. and others V. Manohar 2005-3-L.W.160 whereby and whereunder the Honble Supreme Court has inter alia observed that State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent and that the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim and further finds utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondents property by the appellants who are State authorities etc. 19. He also relies on the decision Matadin Babadin and others V. State of Vindhya Pradesh and Others 1956 VIN PRA 16 (AIR V 43 C 8 Aug.) wherein it is held that Where by the date on which a suit was instituted for possession of the plots in dispute, possession of which was acquired by the Government there was no Notification under S. 6 in respect of these plots, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit is not barred under any provision of law. 20. Yet another decision the State of Bihar and others V. Nemdhari Singh and others AIR 1978 Patna 14 is relied on the side of the appellant/plaintiff wherein it is held as follows: "Any person interested can move for a reference under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Collector in respect of the subject-matter of the award. But in view of the fact that the trees were not the subject-matter of the award, the persons interested could not have moved the Collector for referring the matter to the Court. Hence a suit for compensation in respect of the trees would lie in Civil Court. A suit for awarding compensation in respect of the acquisition of land or trees will lie before the Civil Court where the parties have not been able to put forward their claim by reason of the defects or irregularities in the proceeding or where the claim has been put forward but not adjudged. A suit for awarding compensation in respect of the acquisition of land or trees will lie before the Civil Court where the parties have not been able to put forward their claim by reason of the defects or irregularities in the proceeding or where the claim has been put forward but not adjudged. In this circumstance, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be treated as superseded. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant presses into service the decision the Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat, Harur Taluk V. V. Swaminathan and 3 others 2004-3-L.W.278 wherein this Court has held that title to a house site in a Grama Natham is protected from transfer to Government and it is obvious that the land was never vested with the Government or the Town Panchayat etc. Another decision K. Subban Pagadai V. S. Subban Pagadai and another (2000) 2 M.L.J. 636 is cited on the side of the appellant to the effect that gramanatham does not vast with the Government and the title of the same is not transferred to the Government. It is also held therein that the title of the plaintiffs vendor was not extinguished by virtue of the Notification issued by the Government, as per the said Act and the plaintiff can maintain a suit for title. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant also cites the decision A.K. Thillaivanam and another V. District Collector, Chengai Anna District and 3 others 1998-3-L.W.603 whereby this Court has held that as the land never vested with the respondent, being Gramanatham, and as petitioners had exclusive right, title and possession, respondents had no right to interfere or give complaint under S.420 of IPC. Further in the aforesaid decision at page 605 it is observed that Being a grama natham, it is obvious that the land is question had never vested with the Government. Section 2 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905 excludes gramanatham owned as house site. As such the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905 cannot be invoked by the respondents in respect of the land in question. 23. It is pertinent to point out that the issue of a Notification u/s. 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further power under the Act. The Notification u/s. 4 is a sine qua non. 23. It is pertinent to point out that the issue of a Notification u/s. 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further power under the Act. The Notification u/s. 4 is a sine qua non. In the absence of Section 4 Notification no acquisition proceedings can subsist neither the Collector can enter upon the property for the purposes mentioned in Section 4(2), nor can the Collector hear the objections under Section 5 A nor can it submit the report to the appropriate Government for consideration and issue of the declaration in Section 6. The award of compensation is on the basis of market value is on the date of Section 4 Notification. In the absence of Section 4 Notification the machinery provided by the act for determination of compensation obviously cannot apply. 24. At this stage, this Court points out the decision M/s. Chetandas Gulabchand V. State of Bihar AIR 1958 Patna 512 wherein it is held that where the Additional District Magistrate who passed the order of requisition and acquisition of plaintiffs goods under R. 75A of the Defence of India Rules did not commit any irregularity and his act was not tortious there can be no question of making him personally liable for the compensation payable in respect of the property. Even if his act was wrongful or tortious the State would still be liable when it ratified the act of the servant by refusing to pay compensation and by profiting out of the act by retaining the amount realized by the sale. 25. It is not out of place to make a significant mention that Article 300 A of our Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. .26. This Court aptly points out the decision Secretary of State V. Alex Pinto and others AIR 1937 Madras 212 wherein it is observed that the onus lies on the person claiming land against Government to prove his and his predecessors in title possession for the requisite period. He is not relieved on that burden by showing his possession for something less than the statutory period. He is not relieved on that burden by showing his possession for something less than the statutory period. Further this Court points out the decision Asher Ali V. Sukhna Seikh (deceased by LRs) and others AIR 1992 Gauhati page 1 at page 2 at para 6 it is laid down as follows: ."The question, however, may also be examined from another angle i.e. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in regard to dispute arising out of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The broad proposition regarding the jurisdiction of the civil court or the ouster of jurisdiction are well settled by now by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. It is well accepted proposition of law that the civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those expressly or impliedly barred. So far as the exclusion of jurisdiction is concerned, it is equally well-settled that such exclusion is not be readily inferred. It must be explicit or clearly implied. Even in cases where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded there are circumstances under which a Civil Court may entertain ,a suit. So also the mere fact that a special statute provided for certain remedies does not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the case brought before it is respect of some of the matters covered by the same statue (see Tara Shankar Chakaraborty V. Union, (1991) 1 Gau 43, 48). As held by the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Kumar Bhargav V. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 752 , if a pre-existing right in common law is recognized by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Courts jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving upon an element of election to the persons of inherence. The Civil Courts jurisdiction is also not excluded in cases where the provisions of a particular Act has not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. .27. The Civil Courts jurisdiction is also not excluded in cases where the provisions of a particular Act has not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. .27. In the decision the State of Mizoram and others V. Deniel and others 2004 A I H C 249 at page 250, it is among other things observed as follows: .“… Petitioners claim for damages for their dispossession, from the land cannot be adjudicated by the Collector/Deputy Commissioner or by his subordinate authorities. Claim of the petitioners for compensation is based on the fact that possession of land was taken from them and, thereafter the possession was restored to them on withdrawal of acquisition. Determination of compensation for dispossession does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner. For that, the petitioners have to approach a Court having civil jurisdiction and not the Land Acquisition Officer or his subordinate who gets jurisdiction only under the Land Acquisition Act that too in regard to land which have been acquired. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed and the judgement and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 09.05.2001 is set aside. 28. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff brings it to the notice of this Court the decision N.S. Kuppuswamy Udayar and another V. The Panchayat Narthangudi represented by its President Murugayyan and others 1971-1-M.L.J.-190 at page 191 wherein it is held that the mere fact that in the Re-settlement Register, a particular piece of land has been described as Poramboke will not by itself establish title of the Government to the land in question. .29. It is an axiomatic fact that the jurisdiction of a Court depends upon the right to decide the case and not upon the merits of the decision. Equally, it is the well settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of the Court is to be fixed on the basis of averments made in the plaint. In short, the pith and substance of the plain averments, the substance of the relief sought for are to be borne in mind. It is needless to state that the jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence projected by the defendants in the written statement. In short, the pith and substance of the plain averments, the substance of the relief sought for are to be borne in mind. It is needless to state that the jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence projected by the defendants in the written statement. Generally speaking, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied. In all forms of civil disputes, the Civil Court has inherent jurisdiction as per Section 9 of C.P.C., unless a part of the jurisdiction is curbed out from such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and confer on any other Tribunal or authority. However, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded where the statute gives finality to the orders and to know the same, the scheme of the act has to be necessarily taken into consideration. Moreover, if under the statute a liability is created then it is essential to see whether the statute creates an effective machinery for the redressal of the grievances relating to any law and facts arising therein. Suffice it to state that the plea of bar to the jurisdiction of a civil Court ought to be considered it regard to the contentions raised in the plaint and as a matter of fact, the pleadings required that plaint must contain material facts, in the considered opinion of this Court. 30. In Ex.P.7 lawyers notice dated 22. 1983 issued on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff and addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar, M.M.D.A., Madras it is among other things stated that the exact area to be acquired in S. No. 37/65 was not shown or demarcated either by preparing a sketch or fixing the boundary stones and that the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowment in his letter No. M.M.N. 41882/82/R2 dated 19.07.1982 addressed to the Divisional Engineer Highways, World Bank Scheme, Madras had stated that the temple authorities have no objection to the land in S. No. 37/65 being acquired leaving in tact an extent of 1.57 acres and a corridor of a length of 25 ft. to the western compound wall of the temple etc. Added further, in Ex.P.16 lawyers notice dated 06.08.1990 issued on behalf of the appellant/ plaintiff addressed to. to the western compound wall of the temple etc. Added further, in Ex.P.16 lawyers notice dated 06.08.1990 issued on behalf of the appellant/ plaintiff addressed to. the respondents/defendants, it is specifically stated that the extent of the land belonging to the appellant/plaintiff in S.No.37/65 is about 2.18 acres and that the land appellant/plaintiff has been leasing out of the appellant to several defendants and for the ingress and egress the adjoining portions to the demised lands were kept vacant and that the second respondent/defendant has probably proceeded on the assumption that the said green marked portion in the sketch belongs to the Corporation and that must have been the reason why those lands were not shown in Section 4(1) Notification etc. In Ex.P.11 is the plan in respect of Block Nos. 4 and 5 in R.S. No. 34/2, 37/2, 3 and 43/3, land required for temple programme wherein extent like 1995 sq. ft., 787, 5618, 3465, 683, 19350, 400, 469 Sq. ft. have been furnished. A close look of Ex.P.11 shows that the land in S. No. 34/2 and S. No. 37/65 are shown in green colour. It is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the said green portions were not shown either in Section 4(1) Notification or in Section 6 declaration of the Land Acquisition Act and that no compensation was given for that said portion and further that no mention was made in Ex.P.10-Award No. 3/87 dated 04.09.1987 in regard to the area marked in green portion in Ex.P.11 .31. As far as the present. case is concerned, D.W.1-Subramaniam (Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, CMDA, Chennai) in his cross examination has clearly stated that under Section 4(1) Notification and declaration under Section 5, the survey Nos. 22/2, 23, 24, 66, 24, 27 and 28 have been mentioned and whereas the survey Nos. 26, 34, 43, 67 are not found either in Section 4(1) Notification or in Section 6 declaration and the reason assigned for omission of these lands is that these lands belong to the Government poramboke land and classified as village sites and that these village sites belong to the Government and that they are known as Natham Poramboke in revenue parlance. 32. 32. Further, the appellant/plaintiff claims title over the suit with reference to Ex.P.1-Notification dated 08.05.1963 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act whereunder the Government has proposed to acquire village site S. No. 37/7 part 5 acres. In Ex.P.4 Section 4(1) Notification dated 112. 1983, the name of appellant/plaintiff trustees, Sivan Koil, Kodambakkam is made mention of along with other individuals. By virtue of orders passed in W.P. No. 235 of 1965 in and by which the Court has passed orders to exclude 1.5 acres for the praharam of the temple. Even though as per Town Survey Register T.S. No. 34, Block 5 has been classified as Vengeeswarar Koil Oorani, this will not by itself will establish the title of the Government to the land in question, in our considered opinion. How the suit schedule lands have been classified as either as road or lane or Oorani unilaterally as contended by the respondents/defendants will have to be satisfactorily explained or proved by adducing qualitative or quantitative evidence by examining appropriate persons who were involved or connected with the classification task. In this regard, in as much as the evidence of D.W.1-Subramaniam to the effect that S. No. 67 was used as road is based on records and that he has not personally seen will not suffice. Therefore, we are of the view that further elucidation is necessary so as to enable the trial Court to come to the proper conclusion in this regard. 33. In as much as the present suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is for deliverance of possession of lands illegally encroached by the Government as a trespasser without legal acquisition and for payment of damages at Rs. 5,000/-per year etc. this Court is of the considered view that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit because the subject matter of the suit lands are not that portion of the lands which are acquired but that portion of land which has alleged to have been encroached and which has not been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings admittedly and the said suit is perfectly maintainable in law (of course subject to the statute of limitation) and the same is not expressly or impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, in our considered opinion. 34. 34. Coming next to the plea of the respondents/defendants that the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary party viz., the requisitioning body-Highways Department, it is to be pointed out that the criteria for determining whether an individual be impleaded or not cannot depend solely on the question whether he is interested in property but whether the right of a person will be affected if not impleaded. It is to be remembered that no doubt the plaintiff is a dominus litus and the same ought not to be stretched too far and the Courts duty is to see that proper or necessary party is impleaded and in this regard, the Court has a judicial discretion. A proper or necessary party can be impleaded even during the appellate stage after dismissal of the suit by the trial Court, in our considered opinion. 35. It is relevant to state that a necessary party is one whose presence is absolutely necessary and without whose presence the issue cannot effectually and completely be adjudicated upon and decided between the parties. However, a proper party is one whose presence would be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the disputes. 36. In as much as the requisitioning body viz., the Highways Department has not been arrayed as one of the defendants in the suit, when the suit has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff, this Court opines that the said Highways Department is a proper party and it can be impleaded so by amending the plaint by the appellant/plaintiff so as to put an end to the controversies in the suit and for deciding the factual disputes in an effective and comprehensive manner, in the interest of justice and in that view of the matter, the appellant/plaintiff is directed to take appropriate steps to amend the plaint before the trial Court. 37. On going through the plaint, we find that the appellant/plaintiff has not averred in regard to the Section 4(1) Notification and the award proceedings. Therefore, on the basis of equity and fair play, we also direct the appellant/plaintiff to amend the plaint by mentioning the details of 4(1) Notification and the award proceedings so that the trial Court will have a complete and comprehensive picture about the overall material facts of the case. 38. Therefore, on the basis of equity and fair play, we also direct the appellant/plaintiff to amend the plaint by mentioning the details of 4(1) Notification and the award proceedings so that the trial Court will have a complete and comprehensive picture about the overall material facts of the case. 38. In as much as this Court has come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is maintainable in law and since this Court has directed the appellant/plaintiff to implead the requisitioning body viz. the Highways Department and also further directed the appellant/plaintiff to amend the plaint by furnishing details of Section 4(1) Notification and the award proceedings, we come to the conclusion that the judgment of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside to prevent aberration of justice and consequently, the same is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this appeal, leaving all the issues of controversy in the suit left open. 39. In the result, the Original Side Appeal is allowed. The matter is remanded back to the trial Court to hear the suit and to decide the same according to law by adverting to the points of controversy on the basis of material evidence on record and also by providing opportunities to both parties to. let in oral and documentary evidence to prove their respective contentions. Liberty is given to the appellant/plaintiff to amend the plaint in regard to furnishing of details pertaining to Section 4(1) Notification and the award proceedings and also the appellant/plaintiff is directed to implead the requisitioning body viz., the Highways Department being a proper party in accordance with law and on such impleading, the proper party viz., the Highway Department is also to file written statement within two weeks from thereof. Since the suit if of the year 1991, the trial Court is required to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.