JUDGMENT This second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by trial Court and the appeal has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 2. No exhaustive statement of facts are required to be narrated for the disposal of this second appeal. Suffice it to say that three persons namely Chunnilal, Ramlal and Nanoolal filed suit against Banshilal, Leelakishan, Ram Gopal and State of Madhya Pradesh. The plaintiffs prayed that in the suit property they are having right, title and interest and are possessing the suit property and defendants be restrained from interfering in their possession. It has also been prayed that the plaintiffs are having 1/5 share each in the suit property and accordingly, they are entitled to get their name mutated in the revenue record and the disputed land cannot be declared as surplus under M.P. Ceiling On Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (in short the 'Act') to the extent of plaintiffs' share. 3. The case of plaintiff, as borne out from their plaint and the evidence placed on record, is that Shivlal whose wife is Phula Bai was having three sons namely Leelakishan (defendant No. 2), Dhanlal and Khushilal. Dhanlal was having five sons namely Banshilal (defendant No. 1), Chunnilal (Plaintiff No. 1), Ramlal (Plaintiff No. 2), Nanoolal (Plaintiff No. 3) and one more son Bhanwarji who had died and his son is Ram Gopal (defendant No. 3). According to the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 namely Banshilal and Leelakishan and plaintiffs were having joint share in 1/2 portion of the entire land which was declared surplus under the Act. Plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 are the real brothers and the father of defendant No. 1 and plaintiffs namely Dhanlal and father of defendant No. 2-Leelakishan were real brothers. The entire suit property, description whereof has been mentioned in para-1 of the plaint, is of the grand-father of plaintiffs namely Shivlal and the same was also recorded as such in the revenue record. The suit property, description where of has been mentioned in para-1 of the plaint, is ancestral property and defendant No. 1- namely Banshilal was the eldest brother amongst the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were minor and were the joint owner along with defendant No. 1-Banshilal and were jointly having 1/2 share in the entire land, description whereof has been mentioned in para-1 of the plaint. The plaintiffs were minor and were the joint owner along with defendant No. 1-Banshilal and were jointly having 1/2 share in the entire land, description whereof has been mentioned in para-1 of the plaint. The plaintiffs were residing under the guardianship of their elder brother defendant No. 1-Banshilal. Since Banshilal was the eldest brother, 14 share of the land was recorded in his name in the revenue record, though the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1-Banshilal were having 1/5 share each in 1/2 portion of the entire property. Very feebly the plaintiffs have pleaded about the factum of acquiring title on the suit property by adverse possession. 4. In para-5 of the plaint, it has been pleaded that out of 34.79 acres of land, the competent authority under the Act declared 11.69 acres of land to be surplus and, hence, the rights of plaintiffs are jeopardized. The decision of the competent authority first came into the knowledge of plaintiffs on 31-5-1976 and, hence the present suit has been filed. 5. Defendant No. 4/State of M. P. refuted the plaint averments by filing the written statement. The stand of State is that holder was Banshilal (defendant No. 1) whose name was recorded in the revenue record and rightly the land 11.69 acres has been declared surplus by the competent authority vide order dated 25-2-1976. A plea of limitation has also been raised in the written statement that the suit is barred by time. The factum of suit property being ancestral of plaintiffs and defendant No. 1-Banshilal has also been denied. 6. Defendant No. 1-Banshilal filed written statement but admitted the entire claim of plaintiffs. 7. Learned trial Court framed necessary issues. The plaintiffs adduced the evidence. However, defendant No. 4/State of M. P. did not adduce any evidence. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit on merit as well as on the ground of limitation. 8. Plaintiff No. 1-Chunnilal, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court dismissing the suit, filed first appeal which has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree of learned first appellate Court. 9. In this manner, present second appeal has been filed by plaintiff-Chunnilal. During pendency of this appeal appellant-Chunnilal died and Smt. Puniya Bai and others who are his LRs, were brought on record. 10. 9. In this manner, present second appeal has been filed by plaintiff-Chunnilal. During pendency of this appeal appellant-Chunnilal died and Smt. Puniya Bai and others who are his LRs, were brought on record. 10. This Court on 16-10-2007 admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law : "(i) Whether the Court below erred in dismissing the suit of the appellants/plaintiff on the ground of limitation while the plaintiff was not a party to the ceiling proceedings, no notice on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 was issued to him and he was entitled to file suit independently? (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code? (iii) Whether the suit and this appeal abate because of death of respondents 2, 3, 4 and 5 and this appeal deserves to be dismissed as abated?" 11. The contention of Shri Divesh Jain, learned counsel for the appellants, is that since original appellant-Chhunilal along with other plaintiffs namely Ramlal and Nanoolal, who were co-plaintiffs, in a suit for declaration and injunction prayed a joint decree of declaration and injunction and because the estate has been represented as the LRs of Chunnilal have been brought on record, this appeal does not abate. 12. It has also been contended by learned counsel that present plaintiffs were not the parties to the order passed by competent authority on 25-2-1976 and since they came to know about passing of such order only on 31-5-1976, the suit filed by them on 24-8-1976 cannot be said to be barred by time. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court Smt. Gulabrani vs. State of M. P., 1973 MPLJ Short Note 29 and Jagat Singh vs. State of M. P., 1982 MPLJ 575 = 1982 JLJ 609 . Hence, according to learned counsel, the finding of two Courts below holding the suit to be barred by time, since the same was not filed within three months from the date of passing of the order of competent authority under the Act which was passed on 25-2-1976, is not the correct approach of law and the two Courts below misdirected itself by interpreting Section 11(5) of the Act wrongly. 13. 13. It has been then contended by appellants that before the first appellate Court, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code was filed by plaintiff-Chunnilal along with certified copy of Khasra of the year 1941 to 1943 indicating that the suit property was recorded in the name of Phula Bai wd/o Shivlal who was the grand-mother of plaintiffs and for no rhyme or reason the said application was required to be dismissed. According to learned counsel, since the stand of plaintiffs is that the property, description of which is given in plaint para-1, is the ancestral property in which plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 are having joint ½ share, therefore, it was in the interest of justice to take the document on record which is a certified copy of a public document. The contention of learned counsel is that learned first appellate Court has erred in law in not allowing the application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. 14. On the other hand, Ms. Nidhi Verma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1/State of M.P., argued in support of the impugned judgment and has submitted that the holder was defendant No. 1-Banshilal in whose name the land was recorded and rightly it was held by the competent authority under the Act that the land having area 11.67 acres is surplus land. Further it has been argued that the order of competent authority is dated 25-2-1976 and, hence, the suit which was filed on 24-8-1976 is ex-facie barred by time in terms of Section 11(5) of the Act. It has been then contended by learned counsel for the State that cogent reasons have been assigned by learned first appellate Court in dismissing the application under Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code of plaintiff-Chunnilal. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this second appeal deserves to be allowed in part and the case is remanded to first appellate Court to re-decide the first appeal. REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO. 3 : 16. This Court has already held on 3-3-2008 that the suit has not abated. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this second appeal deserves to be allowed in part and the case is remanded to first appellate Court to re-decide the first appeal. REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO. 3 : 16. This Court has already held on 3-3-2008 that the suit has not abated. On going through the plaint, this Court finds that the suit was, filed by Chunnilal, Ramlal and Nanoolal Since LRs of Chunnilal have already been brought on record and they are appellants in this appeal and because the estate is represented, I am of the view that the suit does not abate. Respondent No. 2-Banshilal died without leaving any heir of class-I to Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act and against respondent No. 3-Ram Gopal no relief has been sought in the plaint. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the appeal does not abate. Substantial question of law No. 3 is answered accordingly. REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO. 1 : 17. Admittedly, the plaintiffs were not the parties in the proceedings initiated against defendant No. 1-Banshilal before the Competent Authority under the said Act. To me, under Section 11(5) of the said Act the period of Limitation of three months to file civil suit is applicable only for the parties to the proceeding before the competent authority. Since present plaintiffs were not the parties to the proceeding, the period of three months' limitation from the date of passing of the order i.e. 25-2-1976 would not be applicable to the plaintiffs. In this context, I may place reliance on the decision of Smt. Gulabrani (supra) and Jagat Singh (supra). I may further add that no draft statements were served on these plaintiffs and for this reason also filing of the suit within three months from the date of order of competent authority as envisaged under Section 11(5) of the Act is not applicable to the plaintiffs. I may further add that no draft statements were served on these plaintiffs and for this reason also filing of the suit within three months from the date of order of competent authority as envisaged under Section 11(5) of the Act is not applicable to the plaintiffs. In the case of State of M.P. and another vs. Leelabai and others, 1998 R.N. 116 and Rajkumar and another vs. State of M.P., 1993 RN 32, it has been held by this Court again that if the plaintiff was not a party in the proceedings under the Act, civil suit can be filed by him within three months from the date of knowledge of the order passed by competent authority. In the plaint it has been specifically stated that the plaintiffs came to know about the factum of passing of the order of competent authority only on 31-5-1976 and the suit was filed on 24-8-1976 by them, which is within the period of three months from the date of knowledge and, therefore, to me, the suit is within time. The finding of two Courts below holding that the suit is barred by time is hereby set aside. Substantial question of law No. 1 is, thus, answered that the suit is within limitation. REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO. 2 : 18. On going through the application under Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, this Court finds that specifically it has been mentioned that after due diligence the plaintiff could not obtain certified copy of the revenue record which is quite old and for this reason the same could not be filed in the trial Court at the time when the evidence was adduced. The application of plaintiff is supported by his affidavit. Certified copy of the revenue record which was filed along with application, is quite old and is the certified copy of public document, the authenticity of the said document cannot be doubted. I may further add that the stand of plaintiffs in their plaint is that the name of their elder brother Bahshilal was mentioned in the revenue record though the suit property is ancestral. The competent authority under the Act has declared the land to be surplus by holding it to be of defendant No. 1-Banshilal exclusively. I may further add that the stand of plaintiffs in their plaint is that the name of their elder brother Bahshilal was mentioned in the revenue record though the suit property is ancestral. The competent authority under the Act has declared the land to be surplus by holding it to be of defendant No. 1-Banshilal exclusively. In order to prove their stand by the plaintiffs, certified copy of revenue record which was filed along with application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code is not only a relevant piece of evidence but would be a determining factor to decide the real matter in controversy. These documents are the certified copies of Khasra and Khatoni, and are the copies of the public documents. In the case of Kaluram vs. State of M.P., 1992 RN 296, this Court while allowing the application under Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code which was filed in the second appeal, has held that certified copy of Khewat being a public document should be taken on record as additional evidence in the interest of justice by affording opportunity of rebuttal to the opposite party. In the case of Subhan Khan and others vs. Raheem Khan and others, 1995 RN 433, a certified copy of the order of Naib Tehsildar was sought to be adduced as additional evidence which was filed before this Court in second appeal along with application under Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code and it was held by this Court that the additional evidence will be necessary for proper adjudication of the question involved in the appeal. This Court further came to hold that the document produced, is a certified copy of the order and there cannot be any apprehension that the same is not correct and genuine copy and, thus, the application was allowed. In the present case also the documents are certified copies of Khasra and Khatoni and genuineness of these documents cannot be doubted because they are certified copies of the public document. 19. Apart from this, no reply was filed on behalf of the State Government against this application which is supported by the affidavit of plaintiff. Hence, I am of the view that learned first appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code filed on behalf of the appellants. 19. Apart from this, no reply was filed on behalf of the State Government against this application which is supported by the affidavit of plaintiff. Hence, I am of the view that learned first appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code filed on behalf of the appellants. The plaintiff has demonstrated from the application that after due diligence, certified copy of the old revenue record could not be produced in the trial Court at the time of adducing of evidence. Accordingly, application under Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code filed on behalf of appellants, is hereby allowed. 20. Substantial question of law No. 2 is, thus, answered that the learned first appellate Court erred in law in dismissing the application under Order XLI, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. 21. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate Court is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to learned first appellate Court to re-decide the appeal after providing opportunity to the respondent No. 1/State to adduce evidence in rebuttal, if any. Since the entire judgment of learned first appellate Court has been set aside, the learned first appellate Court shall be free to reconsider the application under Order VI, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code filed by the plaintiff. The parties are directed to appear before the first appellate Court on 1st May, 2008. The Registry is hereby directed to send the record to learned first appellate Court post-haste. Looking to the facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal partly allowed.