Judgment : 1. This writ petition has been preferred for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to restore the wet lands bearing Survey Nos. 10/1 and 10/2 in Patta Nos. 585 and 662 to an extent of 64 cents in Agaram Village of Eral Firkka, Srivaikundam Taluk in Tuticorin District to its original condition and to direct respondents 2 to 4 to provide adequate compensation for the thirty trees uprooted by trespassing into the land. 2. The factual matrix as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition are as under: Petitioner’s version The property in Survey Nos. 10/1 and 10/2 having an extent of 64 cents in Agaram Village of Eral Firkka, Srivaikundam belongs to the petitioner and his father and four brothers. However, the property was managed by the petitioner. The entire extent of property was developed into a coconut grove and the petitioner has planted 60 coconut saplings initially and all the saplings came out well and started giving substantial income in view of their situation near a channel. 3. The land of the petitioner was situated on the southern side of Vazhaivettai channel and as the respondents found that there was some obstruction of free flow of drain water, they have entrusted the work to a private contractor to restore the free flow in the channel. The petitioner reliably came to know that there was a proposal to remove the entire coconut grove of the petitioner so as to enable the respondents to take lorry as well as machinery to the channel through the property of the petitioner. Immediately the petitioner approached the Tahsildar, Srivaikundam to identify his patta land in the presence of PWD authorities so that at the time of actual execution of the work, the property of the petitioner could be saved. Accordingly the Assistant Revenue Inspector, Srivaikundam deputed by the Tahsildar measured the property along with the Taluk Surveyor on 26. 1999 and found that the survey stones already existing were correct. A certificate was also issued to the petitioner to the said effect by the Tahsildar on 26. 1999. 4. Accordingly the Assistant Revenue Inspector, Srivaikundam deputed by the Tahsildar measured the property along with the Taluk Surveyor on 26. 1999 and found that the survey stones already existing were correct. A certificate was also issued to the petitioner to the said effect by the Tahsildar on 26. 1999. 4. When it was brought to the notice of the petitioner that there was an attempt to destroy the coconut grove for the purpose of taking escalator and other implements as well as lorry to the channel through the property of the petitioner, he made a complaint to the second respondent to avoid such untoward incident. However no action has been taken by the second respondent and as such the petitioner made a representation to the Special Cell of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and the Special Cell responded immediately and as per their communication dated 26. 1999 instructed the second respondent to take immediate action and to carry out the work without causing any damage to the property of the petitioner. The petitioner also sent a telegram to respondents 2 to 4 on 26. 1999 to ensure that the machine scooping earth does not enter his patta land. Representations by way of telegram were also sent to the local police station informing about the attempted trespass at the instance of respondents 3 and 4 along with their men. 5. However respondents 3 and 4 and their men were able to accomplish their purpose of trespass into the property of the petitioner and to form a road through his property by uprooting thirty out of sixty coconut trees. The said incident took place in the early hours of 7. 1999 and all the thirty trees fell on the ground and the earth was also dug by 5 to 6 feet below the ground level and the entire stretch of the patta land had been dug and destroyed. The damage caused on account of the unlawful act of respondents 3 and 4 and their men were heavy. According to the petitioner the damaged coconut trees were yielding about 300 nuts per tree every year and they have been selling at Rs. 5/- per nut and they were also getting a decent income of Rs. 45,000/- per annum from the trees. According to the petitioner the damaged coconut trees were yielding about 300 nuts per tree every year and they have been selling at Rs. 5/- per nut and they were also getting a decent income of Rs. 45,000/- per annum from the trees. Because of the illegal and unwarranted action resorted to by respondents 3 and 4 along with their men, the petitioner lost the valuable coconut trees and the value of the property was also diminished. Aggrieved by the said action of the respondents, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Defence 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent it was their contention that no relief has been prayed for against them and as such, the first respondent was not a necessary party to the writ petition. 7. In the affidavit filed of behalf of the third respondent, it was stated that based on the request of the neighboring villagers, Member of the Rajya Sabha had allotted a sum of Rs. 17 lakhs from the M.P. Funds for desilting the Vazhaivettai drainage as the free flow of drainage water was obstructed. Accordingly, the Collector, Thoothukudy had accorded administrative sanction for a sum of Rs. 17 lakhs as per proceedings dated 15. 1999 and the work was entrusted to the contractor Smt. A. Krishnammal alias Rajalakshmi. It was also stated that there was no other way to reach vazhaivettai drainage except through the petitioner’s land and the said land was the only way for the movement of machinery also. .8. The counter further proceeds that on 26. 1999, the petitioner had arranged for measuring the land and accordingly his land was measured and it was informed that the existing survey stones were correct as per the revenue records. The contractor was strictly instructed not to remove any tree or to do any earth work in the petitioner’s land. On 7. 1999, the local villagers have demanded desilt work in the petitioner’s land and insisted that only if a portion in the petitioner’s land was desilted, the drainage would function properly and they objected to move the machinery without doing the said work. On 7. 1999, the Tahsildar, Srivaikuntam was requested by the third respondent either to remeasure the land in question or to arrange to continue the work. On 7. On 7. 1999, the Tahsildar, Srivaikuntam was requested by the third respondent either to remeasure the land in question or to arrange to continue the work. On 7. 1999, when the revenue officials along with officials of the respondent went to Agaram Village for remeasuring the disputed land, it was found that certain trees in the petitioner’s land have fallen down. The enquiry conducted by them revealed that the riots of the neighboring nine villages had completed the work with the same machinery on the night of 7. 1999 by threatening the driver of the machinery. However, it was the case of the third respondent that the department officials have not instructed the contractor to do the desilt work in the disputed land and it was beyond the control of the Government officials. 9. It was also indicated in the counter affidavit that the villagers have given confession statement for having completed the desilt work in the petitioner’s land and that the department officials were not responsible for the incident. In such circumstances, the third respondent contended that no liability could be fastened on them for the incident in question. .10. This writ petition was filed on 17. 1999 and along with the writ petition, the petitioner also filed an application for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to inspect the property and to submit a report. Accordingly Advocate Commissioner was appointed as per order dated 17. 1999 and the Advocate Commissioner with notice to the parties inspected the property on 17. 1999 and submitted his report on 27. 1999. The report, sketch as well as photographs produced by the Commissioner clearly shows that the coconut trees were uprooted and a road was laid through the property of petitioner and extensive damage was caused to the property. Contention of the counsel for petitioner 11. Thiru S. Subbiah, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in spite of the representation submitted by the petitioner before the respondents as well as to the Chief Minister’s Special Cell and disregarding the specific direction given by the Chief Ministers office, the respondents in association with the local people trespassed into the property of the petitioner and caused considerable damage to the property. By placing reliance on the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner, the learned counsel contended that the entire thirty trees were uprooted and the land had become practically useless and respondents 3 and 4 have also desilted the petitioner’s land. According to the learned counsel the high handed action of respondents 3 and 4 along with the men employed by them caused considerable loss to the property of the petitioner and as such the petitioner is entitled for compensation. The learned counsel, further contended that there are no factual controversy involved in the present case inasmuch as the trespass made into the property has been admitted by the third respondent and the factum of such damage has been proved by the report of the Advocate Commissioner. Contention of the Government Pleader .12. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that though the property of the petitioner was damaged, the respondents cannot be made liable for such destruction as they have not played any part in the act of destruction. .Factual analysis .13. The ownership and possession of the property are not in dispute. The counter affidavit filed by the third respondent clearly shows the measurement undertaken by the revenue department and the boundary fixed by them and as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was not in possession of the property in respect of which, the act of encroachment has been made. In the counter affidavit of the third respondent, they have also admitted that there was no other way available to reach, the Vazhaivettai drainage except through the property of the petitioner. The demand made by the local people to enter the property of the petitioner and to desilt the same by taking the lorry as well as machinery through the property has also been admitted by the third respondent. However, the third respondent maintained that they have instructed the contractor that no damage should be caused to the property of the petitioner and it was their contention that disregarding the instruction given by the respondents the riots of the nine villages have completed the work with the machinery, by threatening the driver and as such no liability could be fastened on the respondents. The extensive damage caused to the property of the petitioner was clearly indicated in the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner. The extensive damage caused to the property of the petitioner was clearly indicated in the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner. The respondents have not filed any objection to the said report and in fact the inspection made by the Advocate Commissioner in the presence of the respondents and the details noted by him were all referred to in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the third respondent. 14. In pursuance of the complaint preferred by the petitioners, about one week prior to the incident in question, the Chief Minister’s Special Cell directed the District Collector to take immediate action to cautiously carry out the work and to send a report to the Cell within fifteen days. Even after receipt of such specific orders from the Chief Minister’s Special Cell, neither the second respondent nor-the first respondent have taken any serious action in the matter. In case they have seriously looked into the issue, the untoward incident could have been avoided. Respondents 3 and 4 were in the full know of things inasmuch as they were the authorities, who have entrusted the work to the contractor and according to them, they have instructed the contractor as well as the driver to abstain from removing the trees or to do any earth work in the petitioner’s land. In the very same counter affidavit filed by the third respondent it was indicated that there was ho other way for entering the Vazhaivettai drainage except through the property of the petitioner. Therefore, it is evident that it was only as per the direction given by respondents 3 and 4 that the contractor has cleared the land of the petitioner by uprooting about thirty trees. Without the direction of respondents 3 and 4 the contractor appointed by them would not have dared enough to carry out the said work and that too by uprooting large number of coconut trees and also by digging earth by 5 to 6 feet below the ground level. The so called instruction given by respondents 3 and 4 to the contractor, driver as well as local people were all made up for the purpose of avoiding their liability. The alleged confession given by the local people to the effect that they have carried out the work by threatening the driver were all after thought and that also shows the identify of the people, who carried out the work. The alleged confession given by the local people to the effect that they have carried out the work by threatening the driver were all after thought and that also shows the identify of the people, who carried out the work. In any case, respondents 3 and 4 cannot avoid the liability and the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent indicated the part played by respondents 3 and 4 in the matter. .15. The petitioner being the owner of the property is entitled to be in possession of the property and he cannot be dispossessed except through the process known to law. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law and such protection under Article 300-A is available to any person. The petitioner has got a right to possess the property and the respondents being Government cannot invade into the said right except as prescribed by law. There was no mandate given to the respondents to encroach into the property of the petitioner and to cause irreparable damage and loss to him in respect of such property. 16. Admittedly, the second respondent had sanctioned a sum of Rs. 17 lakhs as provided by a Member of Parliament and the work was also entrusted to the contractor by respondents 3 and 4. When the work was entrusted to the contractor by respondents 3 and 4 they were also having the responsibility to see that the work was carried out in such a manner that no damage or loss has been caused to the neighboring land owners. 17. The respondents were also well aware that there was no other way available to reach the Vazhaivettai drainage and the only way was through the property of the petitioner. Therefore they should have taken alternative arrangement either by getting the consent of the petitioner or by acquiring the property of the petitioner in the manner known to law. A perusal of the counter affidavit clearly shows that everything was within the knowledge of respondents 3 and 4. When the third respondent themselves admit that the only way to reach the drainage was through the property of the petitioner, it is evident that everything was within the knowledge of respondents 3 and 4. A perusal of the counter affidavit clearly shows that everything was within the knowledge of respondents 3 and 4. When the third respondent themselves admit that the only way to reach the drainage was through the property of the petitioner, it is evident that everything was within the knowledge of respondents 3 and 4. Now that extensive damage has been caused to the property of the petitioner, the respondents cannot absolve themselves from the liability by accusing the villagers. 18. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the counter affidavit filed by the respondents as well as the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner taken together would clearly show the magnitude of damage and the part played by the official respondents in causing such damage. The Government cannot shirk the responsibility by saying that it was only the act of the mob. The Government is having the responsibility to protect the life and property of the people. Under the guise of action taken by the unruly mob, the Government cannot wash their hands by saying that they are not responsible for such untoward incident. 19. The issue regarding right of the aggrieved person on account of destruction of property and the liability of the State in case of loss of life or damage of property were considered by a Full Bench of this Court in P.P.M. Thangaiah Nadar Firm and 4 Others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 3 Others (2006) 4 LW 560 : (2007)2 MLJ 685 and after a survey of decisions on the point, the Full Bench formulated the following three question for consideration. “(1) What is the effect of deletion of Article 19(1)(f)? .(2) What is the liability of the State regarding loss of life or damages to the properties during rioting? .(3) What is the remedy available to a victim, that is to say, whether a writ petition can be filed or the victim is required to file a suit for claiming compensation?” 20. The Full Bench in P.P.M. Thangaiah Nadar Firm and 4 Others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 3 Others (supra) held that though the right to acquire and hold property has ceased to be a fundamental right, it cannot be contended even for a moment that the right to hold the property has ceased to be a legal right. The Full Bench in P.P.M. Thangaiah Nadar Firm and 4 Others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 3 Others (supra) held that though the right to acquire and hold property has ceased to be a fundamental right, it cannot be contended even for a moment that the right to hold the property has ceased to be a legal right. And such, right to property has been declared as a ‘Constitutional right’ under Article 300A. If any person’s property was taken away by the Executive without authority of lw, such person would be entitled to legal relief on the ground that such action was in contravention of Article 300A and the aggrieved person would be entitled to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or a Civil Suit, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and by referring to various judgments of the Apex Court observed thus at pp. 692 & 697 of MLJ: “13. In the decision Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC 596, the right to property under Article 300A has been recognised as a Constitutional right. If, without providing for payment of compensation or without taking recourse to any provision relating to land acquisition, a person is forcibly deprived of his property, such a person can obviously approach a Court of law, including the High Court under Article 226. Such an exigency has been recognised by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and Others v. Manohar AIR 2005 SC 488 : (2005) 2 SCC 126 : 2005 (3) LW 160, where it has been observed as follows: “7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.- No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent’s property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would have perhaps followed suit, but for the intransigence displayed before us.” 14. Therefore, our conclusion is notwithstanding the deletion of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, in case where a person is deprived of his property without authority of law, such person can protect the right recognised under Article 300A by approaching the High Court under Article 226, of course within the known parameters of jurisdiction under Article 226.” 21. It is no doubt true that in the aforesaid decisions, the learned Judges have proceeded on the footing that compensation is payable when a fundamental right is affected on account of any negligent act or dereliction of duty. The destruction of property was considered as violation of fundamental right under Article 21. Even assuming that destruction of property may not come within such fundamental right, in our opinion, such right being a Constitutional right, is also required to be protected. It is the duty of the State to protect life, liberty and property of a person and any negligence or dereliction of duty on the part of the Government machinery would obviously make the State Government liable. However, the question of amount of compensation payable is obviously a matter of inference to be considered on facts of each case. 22. That in a fit case the State can be asked to pay compensation to the victims of the riot either when their life is affected or their property is affected appears to have been recognized by the Supreme Court in the decision S.S. Ahluwalia v. Union of India and Others AIR 2001 SC 1309 : (2001) 4 SCC 452 . The Delhi High Court in Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration (C.W.P.No. 1429 of 1996) had observed that the State has duty to protect the life of its citizens and the State has to pay compensation. The High Court of Delhi by its order dated 7. The Delhi High Court in Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration (C.W.P.No. 1429 of 1996) had observed that the State has duty to protect the life of its citizens and the State has to pay compensation. The High Court of Delhi by its order dated 7. 1996 held that in the expanded meaning attributed to Article 21 of the Constitution it is the duty of the State to create a climate where members of the society belonging to different faiths, castes and creeds live together and, therefore, the State has a duty to protect their life, liberty, dignity and worth of an individual which should not be jeopardised or endangered. A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 contending that similar direction relating to payment of compensation should apply to similar cases all over the country. The Supreme Court observed: “2. Certain claims have been made in para 13.3 of this writ petition setting out certain facts which need to be verified. After this petition was filed notices were issued to the Governments of different States and they have filed responses in each one of those cases stating the steps that have been taken by them in cases where there had been death or other kinds of violence resulting in injuries or loss of property. But in the nature of the circumstances of the case, it is very difficult for us to extend the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration (supra) to all the States without making a detailed examination of the circumstances arising in each case. Such examination cannot be done by us. Therefore, it would be appropriate for us to direct the High Courts of Delhi, Rajasthan, Orissa, Punjab and Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Goa to deal with the matter in respect of the allegations made herein in respect of the State falling in their jurisdiction by treating this writ petition as a petition filed in that High Court. These proceedings, therefore, shall stand transferred to the respective High Courts. A copy of the petition with annexures and response of the respective State Governments shall be sent to the High Court for appropriate action.” 23. These proceedings, therefore, shall stand transferred to the respective High Courts. A copy of the petition with annexures and response of the respective State Governments shall be sent to the High Court for appropriate action.” 23. From the aforesaid direction of the Supreme Court it is apparent that the Supreme Court recognized the principle that it is the duty of the State to protect life and liberty and property and on failure of the State Government to do so, direction regarding compensation can be given. However, since a detailed examination of the circumstances arising each case is required to be considered, the Supreme Court observed that such application, which was filed in the Supreme Court, should be treated to be a writ petition in each High Court and the matter would be finalized therein. 25. Thus a conspectus of the decisions of several High Courts and even those of the Supreme Court makes it clear that it is the Constitutional obligation of the State to protect the life, liberty and property of a person, and where the State, that is to say its machinery without any justification fails in such duty resulting in loss to a person the State cannot avoid its responsibility by taking refuge under a plea that the damage was done by the rioters and not by State’s machinery. 26. The allied question is the Forum where the remedy is to be sought for. This question is again a fiercely fought legal battle as evident from several decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court. The decisions already analysed indicate that depending upon the facts and circumstances, remedy can be sought for under the public law remedy concept by invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or even that of the Supreme Court under Article 32. In this connection, it is fruitful to refer to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court. 35. While considering the question of public law remedy, a note of caution was appended by the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Ghosal v. University of Calcutta and Others AIR 2002 SC 3650 : (2002) 7 SCC 478, which observed: “8. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law. 35. While considering the question of public law remedy, a note of caution was appended by the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Ghosal v. University of Calcutta and Others AIR 2002 SC 3650 : (2002) 7 SCC 478, which observed: “8. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law. A claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution is undoubtedly an acknowledged remedy for protection and enforcement of such right and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy, provided for the enforcement of fundamental right is distinct form, and in addition to the remedy in private law for damages for the tort, as was held by the Court in Nilabati Behera. It is in fact an innovation of a new tool with the Court which are the protectors of the civil liberty of the citizens and the Court, in exercise of the same, would be in a position to grant compensation when it comes to the conclusion that there has been a violation of fundamental rights under Article 21. It is in the context, this Court has observed: “The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasible right under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the established violation of the fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under the public law by the Courts exercising writ jurisdiction.” 9. The Courts having the obligation to satisfy the social aspiration of the citizens have to apply the tool and grant compensation as damages in public law proceedings. Consequently when the Court moulds the relief in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights and grants compensation, it does so under the public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. But it would not be correct to assume that every minor infraction of public duty by every public officer would commend the Court to grant compensation in a petition under Articles 226 and 32 by applying the principle of public law proceeding. But it would not be correct to assume that every minor infraction of public duty by every public officer would commend the Court to grant compensation in a petition under Articles 226 and 32 by applying the principle of public law proceeding. The Court in exercise of extraordinary power under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution, therefore, would not award damages against public authorities merely because they have made some order which turns out to be ultra vires or there has been some inaction in the performance of the duties unless there is malice or conscious abuse. Before exemplary damages can be awarded it must be shown that some fundamental right under Article 21 has been infringed by arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the public functionaries and that the sufferer was a helpless victim of that act.” 37. No discussion, on these aspects can be complete without reference to the decision in Chairman, Railway Board and Others v. Ms. Chandrima Das and Others AIR 2000 SC 988 : (2002) 2 SCC 465 : (2000) 2 MLJ 26 a decision which has been fairly brought to our notice by the learned Additional Advocate General, it was observed: “11. Having regard to what has been stated above, the contention that Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon should have approached the civil Court for damages and the matter should not have been considered in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law.” 38. Now the inevitable end of the journey or may be beginning of another. In view of the various decisions noticed by us and many other decisions referred to in such decisions, the following conclusions can be reached. The State is not necessarily liable in every case where there is loss of life or damage to the property during rioting. Where, however, it is established that the officers of the State ordained with duty of maintaining law and order have failed to protect the life, liberty and-property of person and such failure amounts to dereliction of duty, the State would be liable to pay compensation to the victim. Where, however, it is established that the officers of the State ordained with duty of maintaining law and order have failed to protect the life, liberty and-property of person and such failure amounts to dereliction of duty, the State would be liable to pay compensation to the victim. Such liability can be enforced through Public Law remedy or Common Law remedy. Where, necessary facts to establish culpable negligence on the part of the officials are available, the High Court under Article 226 can issue appropriate direction. Where, however, the main aspect relating to culpable negligence of the officer is seriously disputed, filing of suit may be more appropriate remedy. No hard and fast rule can be laid down on these aspects and obviously the availability of remedy under Article 226 would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Compensation for loss to the property can also be claimed under Article 226 and merely because right to property has been deleted from the Chapter of Fundamental Rights and has been recognized as a constitutional right, would not disentitle the High Court to examine that question in any appropriate case.” .21. The case of the petitioner would clearly come under the parameters laid down by the Full Bench for claiming compensation under public law. Since there was a clear admission with regard to the title and possession of the petitioner in respect of the property, the description of property and the damages caused to the property by uprooting thirty trees, there is no necessity to file a civil suit. Similarly the part played by respondents 3 and 4 are also proved from the very counter affidavit filed by the third respondent in the writ petition. Therefore the State is liable to pay compensation to the petitioner on account of the illegal action of the respondents and especially respondents 3 and 4. 22. It is appropriate to quote the following servation of the Apex Court in Bishan Das v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570 : “Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basis principle of the rule of law. The facts and the position in law thus clearly are (1) that the buildings constructed on this piece of Government land did not belong to Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and (3) that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh-5, the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorities their acts.” 23. With regard to quantum of compensation, it was the case of the petitioner that he was getting sum of Rs. 45.000/- per year from the property. .24. The yield from coconut trees would be in the range of 100 to 250 per tree. In the event of taking 10 nuts per tree, the total nuts would be around 3000 per year. The selling cost taken at the rate of Rs.5/- per nut would comes to Rs. 15,000/-. Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- had to be earmarked for ploughing the land and manuring. In order to arrive at the loss of income, multiplier of ten could be taken, even though the coconut tree would give good yield even beyond ten years. As such the total compensation on account of uprooting of trees would be around Rs. 1,49,000/-. Besides, the petitioner is also entitled to a sum of Rs. 21,000/- as compensation on account of digging the earth by 5 feet below the ground level as well as for causing mischief. Accordingly, the first respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,49,000/-. Besides, the petitioner is also entitled to a sum of Rs. 21,000/- as compensation on account of digging the earth by 5 feet below the ground level as well as for causing mischief. Accordingly, the first respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- as compensation to the petitioner and such payment shall be made within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order along with 6% interest for the said amount from the date of filing the writ petition. 25. The writ petition is allowed subject to the above direction. No costs.