ORDER (P. Mitra, F.C.) - The present matter has come up for hearing before me in pursuance to order dated 30.11.2007 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. in CWP No. 1222 of 2005. The Hon’ble High Court while quashing the orders dated 18.10.2005 passed by my predecessor in Revision No. 08/2002 had observed as under :- “In the present case, the only question to be gone into by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) was whether the appellate authority had correctly rejected the application preferred by the respondent under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or not alone, but the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) has touched the very merits of the case and ultimately he had set aside the order passed by the authorities below.” The Hon’ble High Court had remanded back the matter for decision afresh. The present petitioner Smt. Baksheesh Kaur had gone in appeal before a Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court in LPA No. 4 of 2008 which vide orders dated 4.4.2008 directed the undersigned to decide the revision within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of their orders became available. 2. In compliance to the order of the Hon’ble High Court of H.P., the revision petition No. 08/2002 has been restored and is being decided keeping in view the observation made by the Hon’ble High Court. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has filed an application under Section 151 of the CPC on behalf of the petitioner for placing on record certified copies of documents such as agreement, mutation and Jamabandi as well as copy of the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court in LPA No. 04 of 2008 decided on 4.4.2008 mentioned above. The learned Counsel argued that he is submitting the said documents in order to prove that the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade has given a relief which was never sought. According to him, the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade has mentioned in his order that the plaintiff (i.e. the present respondents) have brought this suit under Section 58(3) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 but a perusal of the application preferred before him would reveal that the present respondents had filed an application for correction of Khasra Girdawari. According to him, the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade has mentioned in his order that the plaintiff (i.e. the present respondents) have brought this suit under Section 58(3) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 but a perusal of the application preferred before him would reveal that the present respondents had filed an application for correction of Khasra Girdawari. On the point of limitation, which the District Collector, Solan had refused to condone vide the impugned order dated 25.9.2001, learned Counsel contended that the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade has committed a patent illegality by firstly setting aside mutation No. 12 dated 16.2.1956 and secondly in preceding exparte against the petitioner thereby robbing the petitioner of her valuable rights. Under such circumstances, the limitation should be condoned and the matter should be heard on merits. He cited the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.M. Prashad v. P. Arumugam, AIR 2001 SC 2497 to stress his contention. He further argued that the petitioner is an old lady residing outside the State and the advocates to whom she had entrusted her case did not pursue the same diligently. She came to know about the order dated 3.3.1997 only in November, 1997 as the local advocates representing her did not apprise her of the same. As the petitioner was unaware of these orders and owing to her old age and failing health, she was unable to personally appear before the authorities in order to ascertain the fate of the proceedings. The limitation in her case should be liberally construed. According to him, valuable rights of the petitioner are involved in this matter and in view of the fact that the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade had overstepped his jurisdiction, the limitation should be condoned. He also cited the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter N. Bala Krishnan v. M. Krishnana Murthy, 1998(7) SCC 123, to fortify his arguments. 4. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the documents being sought to be placed on record cannot be taken cognizance of. He cited the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Major K.K. Taneja, AIR 1992 Delhi 192 in this regard. According to him, the only issue before this Court is whether the learned District Collector has rightly refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal before him. He cited the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Major K.K. Taneja, AIR 1992 Delhi 192 in this regard. According to him, the only issue before this Court is whether the learned District Collector has rightly refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal before him. He contended that the application filed by the respondents before the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade was contested on behalf of the petitioner. Further, he argued, the petitioner was represented through various counsel before the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade. He argued that the conduct of the petitioner does not warrant interference as brought out in the well reasoned order of the District Collector dated 25.9.2000. He cited the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, 1993 SCC 572 and the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sukhwinder Singh and others v. Surinder Pal and others, CCC 1995(2) 673 to fortify his argument. He contended that there should be “sufficient cause” to condone delay which is not apparent in this case. 5. Having perused the record including the orders passed by the subordinate revenue authorities and after giving due thought to the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, I find that the order of the Collector, Solan District dated 20.9.2001 is detailed. He has carefully considered the record brought on the case file and also given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the both parties. The learned Collector found that the applicant (Petitioner in this instant case) was represented in the lower court by various counsels. Her counsel was present when issues were framed on 20.8.1994. Apparently she was given many opportunities to lay her evidence but failed to avail the opportunity. He was given last opportunity on 20.7.1996 to produce her evidence on next date i.e. 21.8.1996 but on this date she failed to do so. Another last opportunity for 23.9.1996 was given on which date she again failed. The Collector has noted that it appears that she was given one more opportunity when hearing fixed on 18.10.1996 subject to payment of cross of Rs. 100/-. The Collector has further pointed out that the applicant was well aware that the suit was pending before the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade Kasauli and it was for her to be in contact with her counsel. 100/-. The Collector has further pointed out that the applicant was well aware that the suit was pending before the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade Kasauli and it was for her to be in contact with her counsel. The applicant, it appears, was issued summons through registered A.D. letters and on occasions her counsel Shri Rajiv Kataria or clerk of the said counsel appeared to attend the proceedings. The learned Collector has therefore reasoned that the plea taken by the applicant that she came to know about the judgment/decree passed on 3.3.1997 in the first week of November, 1997 is not tenable. 6. The learned Collector has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in P.R. Ram Krishnan v. State of Kerala and another, 1997(7) SCC 556 wherein it has been held that the law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but as it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and that the courts have no power to extend period of limitation on equitable grounds. This view has been reiterated in other cases also. The learned Collector found that appellant (i.e. the present petitioner) had miserably failed to establish that she came to know about the judgment/decree passed by the lower court only in the first week of November, 1997. He also found that no explanation for what has been called the applicant’s willful absence even after costs of Rs. 100/- was imposed on her. He therefore found the application for condonation of delay to be without force and dismissed the same on this solitary ground. 7. The learned Collector has indeed given due thought to the various aspects involved in the matter before him but to my mind it appears that he overlooked one aspect; this important aspect is that the applicant before him was an aged widowed lady of failing health who resided at Delhi. It is well known that older women in this country are generally not well conversant with the ways of the world and much less of legal procedures and limitations. Such persons are dependent upon others for most things, more so in litigation matters. It is well known that older women in this country are generally not well conversant with the ways of the world and much less of legal procedures and limitations. Such persons are dependent upon others for most things, more so in litigation matters. Such a person should not be treated in the same manner as an ordinary litigant but due attention should be given to her circumstances of being a woman old in age and also a widow, especially while deciding matter where valuable rights are involved. Secondly, the petitioner had apparently changed residence prior to the passing of orders by the Assistant Collector, Ist Grade, Kasauli. 8. Further, as far as the point of limitation is concerned, it would also be appropriate to recall that the Apex Court has laid down in N. Balakrishnan v. N. Krishnamurthy, 1998(7) SCC 123 wherein stated as under :- “8. The appellant’s conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much for from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to cheek up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to deficit him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation does not say that such direction can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is not matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be unconditional due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus : The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage cause by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life-span must be fixed for such remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 6 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1969 SC 575, IR-1972-SC 749).” In the case tilted M.K. Parshad v. P. Arumugam, reported in AIR 2001 SC Pages 2497 the aforesaid judgment has been followed. Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under :- Again in State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality , 1972(1) SCC 366 : AIR 1972 SC 749 and G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988(2) SCC 142 : AIR 1988 SC 897 this Court observed that “the expression `sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delay be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. Law of Limitation has been enacted to serve the interests of justice and not to defeat it.” Again in N. Balakrishnan v. N. Krishnamurthy, 1998(7) SCC 123 : 1988 AIR CW 3139 : AIR 1998 SC 3222. This court held that “acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion and length of delay is not relevant. In the absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactics, the Court should normally condone the delay. However, in such a case the court should also keep in mind the constant litigation express incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly.” 9. Apart from this, the learned Collector has at page 7 of his order recorded that he found that the applicant was represented in the lower court by various counsels. This should have immediately alerted the Collector that the applicant was facing difficulties in respect of counsel. Apart from this, the learned Collector has at page 7 of his order recorded that he found that the applicant was represented in the lower court by various counsels. This should have immediately alerted the Collector that the applicant was facing difficulties in respect of counsel. This is to an extent understandable because hardly any counsel resides at Kasauli where the lower court is situated and counsel from the district headquarters at Solan are reluctant to and avoid travelling to the Tehsildar’s court at Kasauli. This therefore calls for greater consideration towards the present applicant. 10. Factors like that the applicant is a widow, that she is aged, that she was residing at for all place, that she had shifted residence and that she was having difficulties in respect of counsels should in my view incline courts to give such a litigant greater latitude. Further -valuable rights are involved which would normally motivable a litigant to follow-up the legal proceedings carefully unless the circumstances of his/her situation came in the way. In these circumstances, the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in the absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilator tactic, the court should normally condoned the delay, need to be followed. These does not appear anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay in the instant matter. 11. The ratio of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reproduced above is therefore applicable to this case and it would be in the interest of justice, equity and fair-play to condone the delay. I therefore allow the revision and condone the delay. The matter is remanded to the Collector to hear/decide the same on merits after giving opportunity both sides. 12. As regards the additional details presented by counsel for the petitioner, these need not be gone into at this stage. 13. Announced in the open court today the 23rd July, 2008. 14. Record of the courts below be returned and the case file be consigned to the record room after due completion. M.R.B. ———————