JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—At the time of arguments no one appeared on behalf of respondents, hence only the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner were heard. 2. This is tenant’s writ petition arising out of a suit for eviction filed by original landlord respondent No. 2 Ram Murti Srivastava since deceased and survived by legal representatives in the form of S.C.C. Suit No. 52 of 1982. Property in dispute is a shop rent of which is Rs. 25/- per month. The suit for eviction was filed on the ground of default alleging that since November 1978 rent had not been paid. Tenant-petitioner pleaded that no notice was received by him; that the plaintiff alone was not the owner-landlord, hence the suit was not maintainable and that rent was sent by money order, which was refused by the landlord. Before the trial Court it was argued by the landlord that defence of the tenant should be struck off. On 14.12.1983 trial Court passed an order that within three days entire due rent should be paid otherwise his defence would be deemed to have been struck off. Against the said order revision was filed and the revisional Court granted further time to make the deposit and within that time deposit was made, hence the trial Court did not strike off the defence. 3. Regarding service of notice upon the tenant, trial Court held that plaintiff in his oral statement admitted that he could not say as to whether Harbir the tenant got the notice or not. The trial Court further held that in view of this statement it was essential for the landlord to prove service of notice by producing evidence. Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that notice was not proved to have been served; plaintiff alone was not the owner landlord and tenant had sent the rent through money order. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court original landlord-respondent No. 2 filed S.C.C. revision No. 72 of 1985. Revision was allowed by the District Judge, Shahjahanpur through judgment and order dated 6.2.1986. The revisional Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit with costs. The tenant has challenged the said judgment and order passed by the revisional Court through this writ petition. 4. Revision was allowed by the District Judge, Shahjahanpur through judgment and order dated 6.2.1986. The revisional Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit with costs. The tenant has challenged the said judgment and order passed by the revisional Court through this writ petition. 4. Revisional Court decided the question of striking off defence in favour of the tenant. 5. Regarding right of plaintiff alone to file the suit the revisional Court held that rent was payable to the plaintiff hence he was the landlord. I do not find any error in the said view. A Full Bench of this Court in Gopal Das v. A.D.J., 1987 (1) ARC 281 (FB) and Supreme Court in AIR 2004 SC 1321 , India Umbrella Manufacturing Co., M/s. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla; and AIR 2006 SC 1471 , Mohinder Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain, have held that even one of the landlords can file the suit for eviction. 6. The third point discussed by the revisionai Court was regarding the validity and service of the notice. This question was dealt with by the revisional Court in detail. The registered envelope through which notice was sent contained postman’s endorsement of refusal by tenant dated 25.4.1981. The revisional Court held that there was presumption of service. In my opinion the view of the revisionai Court is quite correct. Landlord very rightly stated that he could not say as to whether the defendant got the notice or not for the reason that normally sender of the registered notice does not accompany the postman. 7. However, in my opinion, on the findings recorded by the revisional Court revision could not be allowed. The revisional Court held that the amount of rent had been deposited by the tenant. Revisional Court did not decide as to whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 or not. The revisional Court held that the amount of rent had been deposited by the tenant. Revisional Court did not decide as to whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 or not. The said sub-section is quoted below : “In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or [tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court] the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord’s costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground : Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area”. 8. The trial Court had only recorded that tenant had sent the rent through money order. However, it was not decided by the trial Court that rent for what period was sent by the tenant and when and whether the money order was refused by the landlord or not. Accordingly, in my opinion, the matter requires remand to the trial Court to decide the question of default after taking into consideration the plea of the tenant that he had sent the amount of rent through money order. Trial Court is further required to decide as to whether tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act or not. 9. Trial Court is further required to decide as to whether tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act or not. 9. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 652 that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 10. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2410 , Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, paragraph-11 of which is quoted below : “It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.” 11. Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I held as under : “‘Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I held as under : “‘Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C., ( AIR 1996 SC 2410 ). has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.” 12. The same principle may be applied while setting aside eviction order and remanding the matter to the trial Court. 13. Accordingly it is directed that irrespective of decision of the suit, tenant-petitioner shall pay rent to the landlord-respondent @ Rs. 750/- per month w.e.f. January 2008 onward. 14. Accordingly writ petition is allowed. Judgment, order and decree passed by both the Courts below are set aside. Matter is remanded to the trial Court. However, it is reiterated that the finding on maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff alone and the finding that notice was presumed to have been served upon the tenant recorded by the revisional Court are affirmed. These questions shall not be re-opened by the trial Court. Matter is remanded to the trial Court. However, it is reiterated that the finding on maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff alone and the finding that notice was presumed to have been served upon the tenant recorded by the revisional Court are affirmed. These questions shall not be re-opened by the trial Court. The view of both the Courts below that the defence was not liable to be struck off is also affirmed. The trial Court shall only decide the question pertaining to the allegation of the tenant regarding sending of rent through money order and the question whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. As no one appeared on behalf of the legal representatives of landlord-respondents hence trial Court is directed to issue notice to them before proceeding further into the matter. The petitioner is directed to file a certified copy of this judgment before the trial Court/J.S.C.C. Shahjahanpur within six weeks from today failing which this writ petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed and from today until eviction, tenant shall be liable to pay rent/damages for use and occupation as Rs. 1000/- per month. ————