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2008 DIGILAW 371 (RAJ)

Nissr Ahmed v. Raj. Board of Muslim Wakf

2008-02-06

GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS

body2008
JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, the petitioners are challenging the order dated 6.11.2007 Annexure-7 passed by Rajasthan Board of Muslim Waqfs, Jaipur as also the order dated 8.1.2008 Annexure-9 passed by Rajasthan Waqf Tribunal, Jaipur whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 64/67 read with Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (hereafter, for short "the Act of 1995" only) was rejected as not maintainable. 2. This writ petition was filed before this Court on 10.1.2008 and on 10.1.2008, notices of writ petition as well stay petition were issued and an interim order was passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court to the effect that "in the meanwhile, effect and operation of impugned order dated 08.01.2008 (Annexure-9) and order dated 06.11.2007 (Annexure-7) shall remain stayed, till the next date of hearing." and the case was ordered to be listed on 17.1.2008. On 15.1.2008, an application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India was filed by the respondents. 3. Thereafter, on 17.1.2008, in presence of both the learned counsel for the parties , the matter was fixed for hearing on 22.1.2008 and interim order was extended till then. Again on 22.1.2008, an order was made by the Court that the writ petition has not yet been admitted and let it be listed for admission on 23.1.2008 before the appropriate Bench as prayed by the learned counsel for the parties and interim order was ordered to be continued till then. On 23.1.2008, the case was ordered to be listed on 25.1.2008. Again on 25.1.2008, the case was fixed for hearing on 28.1.2008 while extending the interim order. On 28.1.2008, after hearing both the parties, notice was issued to learned Addl. Advocate General of the State for apprising this Court why the Regulations and Rules were not framed according to the new Act of 1995 and how the State Government has allowed Wakf Board to follow the Regulations for years together without framing the new Regulations in accordance with the Wakf Act, 1995 and next date 01.02.2008 was fixed for hearing. 4. On 1.2.2008, for want of time, the case was ordered to be listed on 4.2.2008. On that date, arguments were heard on behalf of both the parties upon application filed by the respondents under Section 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. 5. 4. On 1.2.2008, for want of time, the case was ordered to be listed on 4.2.2008. On that date, arguments were heard on behalf of both the parties upon application filed by the respondents under Section 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. 5. In the application filed under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the interim order, learned counsel for the respondents applicants has raised three grounds with regard to territorial jurisdiction, non-maintainability of the writ petition in view of Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 and the expiry of the term of petitioners' Committee and taken over the charge by newly appointed committee on 7.11.2007. Learned counsel for the respondents-applicants argued that the appeal filed against the impugned order dated 6.11.2007 has been dismissed by Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur as the petitioners failed to raise any bonafide dispute about existence of any bonafide right and infringement thereof. So also, it is contended that since the Tribunal is a civil Court as per Section 83 (5) of the Act of 1995 therefore, Wakf Tribunal is subordinate to the permanent Bench of Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, and as per Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995, a revision petition could have been filed at Jaipur Bench against the impugned order dated 8.1.2008 passed by Wakf Tribunal. The Principal Seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction over the matter. Learned counsel for the respondents-applicants argued that for all purposes, in view of Section 83 (5) of the Act of 1995, the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same power as may be exercised by a civil Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 while trying suit or executing a decree or order. Therefore, the remedy availed by the petitioners by way of filing writ petition is against the provisions of the Act of 1995 and if at all the petitioners are having any grievance with the impugned order dated 8.1.2008 passed by Wakf Tribunal, then, they are required to file a revision petition and that too at Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court. While inviting attention of this Court towards judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Darshan Singh v. Ghewar Chand & Ors., reported in 1993 (2) RLR 710 , it is submitted that a similar question arose with regard to maintainability of revision petition against the order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In para 27 of the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that all the tribunals are subordinate to the High Court. Para - 27 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : "27. While holding that a Claims Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court, the learned Judge, who decided the case in Dushyan Kumar & Ors. v. R.S.R.T.C. and Others (1990(1) WLN 179) relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above in support of the view taken by him. Reliance had also been placed on a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Suffari Begum v. Orinetal Fire and General Insurance Co. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act being Civil Court was amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and that the Tribunal was a court subordinate to the High Court." 6. Likewise, learned counsel for the respondents-applicants has invited the attention of this Court towards the judgment passed by learned Single of this Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in SB Civil Revision Petition No.212/2006 in which a contention was raised with regard to maintainability of the revision petition and after observing the provisions contained in Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995, learned Single Judge has held in para 10 that revision petition is maintainable against the order passed by Wakf Tribunal. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants that once it has been held by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court that every Tribunal of the State is subordinate to the District Court and High Court where it is situated, then, there is no question of entertaining this writ petition against the order of Wakf Tribunl. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants that once it has been held by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court that every Tribunal of the State is subordinate to the District Court and High Court where it is situated, then, there is no question of entertaining this writ petition against the order of Wakf Tribunl. The petitioners are required to file revision petition, if at all they are having any grievance against the impugned order dated 8.1.2008, that too, at Jaipur Bench because Wakf Tribunal is situated at Jaipur and it is subordinate to the District Court as well as to the Rajasthan High Court Bench at Jaipur. He has invited the attention of this Court towards the judgment rendered in case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2001 (2) SCC 294 in which it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if any cause of action arises at Jaipur, then, jurisdiction is left with Jaipur Bench. In the present case also, the Tribunal is established at Jaipur, therefore, against the order of Tribunal, the only remedy available to the petitioners is to file revision petition under Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 at Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents applicants vehemently argued that new committee has been constituted and new members have been appointed and those new members had taken over the charge of the committee on 7.11.2007 and committee is functioning for last two months and during a short tenure of two months, the Committee has deposited more than Rs.4,68,000/- with the Bank, therefore, the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondents rather than in favour of the petitioners. It is also submitted that final relief cannot be granted in the writ jurisdiction. 8. According to the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants, the writ petition is not maintainable against the impugned order passed by Wakf Tribunal and only revision is maintainable under Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995. So also, on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, only Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench, Jaipur is having jurisdiction to hear even revision petition because the Wakf Tribunal is a Civil Court for all purposes in view of Section 83 (5) of the Act of 1995. So also, on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, only Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench, Jaipur is having jurisdiction to hear even revision petition because the Wakf Tribunal is a Civil Court for all purposes in view of Section 83 (5) of the Act of 1995. As such, the interim order dated 10.1.2008 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court may be vacated and stay petition may be dismissed as no final relief can be granted in the writ petition, which is not even maintainable. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioners while opposing the application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India vehemently argued that initially on 17.1.2004 vide Annexure-1, the petitioners Committee was appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1995 and the said Committee was dissolved vide order dated 18.12.2004 and it was ordered that charge may be given to respondent No.3 Mohammed Harun S/o Abdul Kadir. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Rajasthan Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur and vide judgment dated 13.4.2005, the learned Tribunal set aside the order dated 18.12.2004 and since then the petitioners' Committee is performing duties of Tauliyat Wakf Committee Darbah Dewan Shah Sahab, Kapasan (Chittorgarh). Thus, the order of appointment of the petitioners' committee on 17.1.2004 was held to be legal by the learned Tribunal and by virtue of order dated 13.4.2005 passed by learned Tribunal the order of dissolution of committee dated 18.12.2004 was set aside. However, all of a sudden without dissolving the petitioners' Committee an order dated 6.11.2007 was issued whereby respondent No.3 - Mohd. Harun and other persons were appointed as members of the Committee and in Note No.2, it was specifically mentioned that " iwoZ lnj@iwoZ lfpo fytk oDQ desVh diklu dks izsf"kr dj ys[k gS fd vki rqjUr mDr desVh ds ftEesnkjku dks leLr fjdkMZ@pktZ lEHkyk;s vU;Fkk oDQ ,DV] 1995 ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA " The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no formal order for dissolution of petitioners' committee was passed and in view of the order dated 6.11.2007, a new committee was constituted for a term of three years in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1995 and the members of the petitioners' committee was directed to hand over the charge without dissolution of the petitioners' committee. The said order was challenged by the petitioners before the Wakf Tribunal under Section 64/67 read with Section 83 of the Act of 1995. However, upon objection raised by the respondents application, the appeal filed by the petitioners before the learned Tribunal was dismissed vide order dated 8.1.2008 while holding that the appeal is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that vide impugned judgment dated 8.1.2008, the petitioners have become remedy-less. Thus, they preferred the present writ petition before Hon'ble Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. As per the counsel for the petitioners, the Committee was constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1995 and in the Wakf Act, no tenure is prescribed. However, it is submitted that before enactment of new Wakf Act of 1995, the old Act known as Wakfs Act, 1954 was in existence and while exercising powers under Section 68 of the Wakfs Act, 1954, the regulations were framed known as Rajasthan Muslim Wakfs Regulations, 1964 and according to Regulation 25 of the Regulations of 1964, the term of a Committee was prescribed as one year and further it is provided that the Board may by resolution made in that behalf, extend the term for a further specified period, no exceeding six months but those regulations were come to an end when the old Act, 1954 was repealed and new Act, 1995 was enacted. Learned counsel for the petitioners has invited the attention of this Court that no rules and regulations have been framed after enactment of new Act, 1995 though there is specific provisions for framing rules under Sections 109 and 110 of the Act of 1995, therefore, in absence of any tenure prescribed in the Act of 1995, the petitioners' committee was constituted on 17.1.2004 without stipulation of any term and that order was upheld in earlier appeal decided by learned Tribunal vide order dated 13.4.2005 when the said committee was dissolved vide order dated 18.12.2004. 10. The plea of respondents-applicants cannot be accepted that the term of the petitioners' committee was expired, therefore, new committee was constituted and new members had taken over the charge of the Committee on 7.11.2007. 10. The plea of respondents-applicants cannot be accepted that the term of the petitioners' committee was expired, therefore, new committee was constituted and new members had taken over the charge of the Committee on 7.11.2007. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that without dissolution of the earlier Committee, no new Committee can be appointed and for removal of the committee, there is a procedure laid down in the Act of 1995 and without following the said provisions, the new committee is constituted which is against the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the order impugned dated 8.1.2008 passed by learned Tribunal holding that the appeal preferred by the petitioners is not maintainable then there was no remedy available to the petitioners except to approach this Hon'ble Court by way of filing writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. With regard to non-maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2001 (2) SCC 294 (supra), the Committee so constituted which is in dispute is for the purpose of property and management of Wakf Committee of Kapasan District Chittorgarh and the jurisdiction is to be decided as per the area where the dispute arises. Obviously, the petitioners Committee was constituted for Wakf property of Kapasan District Chittorgarh and District Chittorgarh is specified within the territorial jurisdiction of principal seat at Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur. Therefore, in view of above judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioners have rightly invoked the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India at Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur because for Chittorgarh District, the territorial jurisdiction lies at Principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments made by the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants that there is no territorial jurisdiction left with principal seat of Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur. 11. Therefore, there is no substance in the arguments made by the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants that there is no territorial jurisdiction left with principal seat of Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur. 11. With regard to objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants for maintainability of revision petitioner under Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995, it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order under challenge has been passed by learned Tribunal while holding that the appeal is not maintainable. If appeal is not maintainable, then how against the said order revision is maintainable. Similarly, while inviting the attention of this Court towards proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995, it is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that it is not a remedy of revision but it is in the form of supervisor power. The legislature has not specifically used the word "revision" but inserted proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995, which reads as under : "83 (9) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order whether interim or otherwise, given or made by the Tribunal : Provided that a High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of the Board or any person aggrieved, call for and examine the record, relating to any dispute, question or other matter which has been determined by the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such determination and may conform, reviews or modify such determination or pass such other orders as it may think fit." 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners while inviting the attention of the this Court towards Article 227 of the Constitution of India submitted that both the powers are supervisory in nature, therefore, when appeal of the petitioners was dismissed as not maintainable, then, obviously, the petitioners cannot be thrown remedy-less. In that event, the petitioners preferred the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and there is no illegality in it, so also, the revision petition is also not maintainable in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In that event, the petitioners preferred the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and there is no illegality in it, so also, the revision petition is also not maintainable in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited the attention of this Court towards the fact that respondents-applicants themselves have preferred a writ petition being SB Civil Writ Petition No.6966/2007 before Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The said writ petition was filed by none-else but the respondents-applicants challenging the order passed on 16.11.2007 whereby the order dated 6.11.2007 was stayed and appeal was entertained. He has placed on record the order passed at Jaipur Bench as Annexure-13. Thus, it is clear that against the interim order, a writ petition was preferred by the respondents before Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur and here in this petition, they are raising voice that revision petition is maintainable and writ petition is not maintainable. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment cited by learned counsel for the applicants was passed by learned Single Judge at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur on 12.10.2007 was very much in the knowledge of the Wakf Board that the revision petition has been entertained by Rajasthan High Court under Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 but they invoked the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the said interim order passed by Rajasthan Wakfs Tribunal in appeal, therefore, such a ground taken by the respondents cannot be accepted because they themselves have invoked the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.14. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that even if it is presumed that learned Tribunal is a Civil Court, then also, it cannot be said that only revision is maintainable, that too, only at Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that even if it is presumed that learned Tribunal is a Civil Court, then also, it cannot be said that only revision is maintainable, that too, only at Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in 1993 (2) RLR 710 is not applicable upon the present controversy because the said case was related with the order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and there is no specific provision for revision is provided in the MACT Act, therefore, Hon'ble Division Bench has held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a civil court for all purposes and revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is maintainable. However, here in this case, the proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 has been added and a supervisory power is given and the said power cannot be termed as revisional power. It is true that words used in proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 is with regard to supervisory jurisdiction but that cannot be terms as a remedy of revision. With regard to the judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondents-applicants rendered at Jaipur Bench wherein the revision petition was held to be maintainable, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 gives power of superintendence to the High Courts and it does not bar the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is also analogous to the revisional power of the High Courts.15. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of this Court that in case of Harday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer, reported in AIR 1971 SC 33 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the remedy of revision is available there is no bar for entertaining writ petition. Para 12 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : "12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissionr of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. Para 12 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : "12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissionr of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income-tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on merits." 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also invited the attention of this Court towards the judgment rendered by Karnataka High Court in case of Syed Abdul Salam & Ors. v. Chief Executive Officer, reported in 2005 AIHC 2702 wherein a specific question was decided whether the revision is maintainable as against the final order of Karnataka Wakf Tribunal. In that said judgment, Hon'ble Karnataka High Court had held that revision petition is not maintainable and the petitioner is at liberty to file a writ petition.17. Learned counsel for the petitioners lastly invited the attention of this Court that none else the counsel who is appearing for Wakf Board in this case gave reply in SB Civil Writ Petition No.449/2207 wherein in reply to para 3 of the writ petition, it is stated as follows : "It is correct that under the Wakf Act of 1995, section 17 mandates that meetings of the Board shall be held as per regulations to be made under the Act and that regulations have not been framed so far. But it is not correct to say that regulations made under Wakf Act of 1964 are being followed by the Board because by the repealing section of Wakf Act of 1995, not only the Wakf Act, 1964 has been repealed but the rules and regulations made thereunder, have also been repealed. But it is not correct to say that regulations made under Wakf Act of 1964 are being followed by the Board because by the repealing section of Wakf Act of 1995, not only the Wakf Act, 1964 has been repealed but the rules and regulations made thereunder, have also been repealed. So, it is incorrect to say that provisions of old regulations about meetings of the Board, time of the meetings of the Board, requisition of the meetings of the Board, notice by the Board and regarding other matters of the Board are being followed by the Board. Rather the position is this that in the absence of the regulation the Board is summoning its meetings according to the conventions which was in force prior to Wakf Act of 1995." 18. The said reply is supported by affidavit of Saghir Ahmed S/o Shabbir Bair, acting CEO of Rajasthan Muslim Wakf Board, Jaipur. Meaning thereby on one hand, in one petition, the Wakf Board is taking plea that after repealing the old Act, all regulations are also repealed and no regulations have been framed under the new Act and on the other hand, it is argued that in this case that as per Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, till the formation of new rules and regulation under the new Act, the old rules and regulations shall remain in force.19. I have heard both the learned counsel for the parties and perused the application filed under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India.20. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 8.1.2008 passed by learned Wakf Tribunal in which the Tribunal has held that appeal filed by the petitioners under Sections 64/67 and 83 of the Act of 1995 is not maintainable. The petitioners have preferred the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of certiorari. In the Constitution of India, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals through the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The High Courts are having supervisory powers in view of language of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the Constitution of India, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals through the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The High Courts are having supervisory powers in view of language of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution of India is a holy 'granth' for citizens of India and if any illegality is committed by any subordinate courts, tribunals or any authority having judicial powers, the same can be rectified while exercising supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and there is no bar to check the illegality. In the present case, the petitioners cannot be left remedy less. The statutes created by the legislature must be clear for the purposes of providing remedy to the citizens of a country. Here in this case, under Section 83 (9) of the Act, no word like 'revision' has been used as has been used under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. Meaning thereby, a supervisory power is given to the High Courts and the High Courts can exercise the supervisory power while maintaining the revision petition as well as writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is also made clear that after amendment in Civil Procedure Code, the scope of revision is limited but supervisory power is left with the High Courts in accordance with proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995 as well as under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the said power cannot be restricted only to entertain the revision by the High Courts, if any gross illegality is committed by subordinate Court or Tribunals then the writ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be entertain. The writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be thrown only on the ground that a specific provision similar to the revisional jurisdiction is provided under proviso to Section 83 (9) of the Act of 1995. Here in this case, the conduct of the respondents-applicants is required to be seen. First of all, they have objected that the appeal is not maintainable and their contention was accepted by Tribunal without even reading the provisions of Section 83 (2) of the Act and the appeal of the petitioners has been dismissed upon the objection of the applicants that the appeal is not maintainable. First of all, they have objected that the appeal is not maintainable and their contention was accepted by Tribunal without even reading the provisions of Section 83 (2) of the Act and the appeal of the petitioners has been dismissed upon the objection of the applicants that the appeal is not maintainable. Under Section 83 (2) of the Act of 1995, any mutawalli person interest in a wakf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under this Act, or rules made thereunder, may make an application within the time specified in this Act or where no such time has been specified, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to the Wakf. In these circumstances, when the appeal of the petitioners, which is of course provided under Section 83 of the Act of 1995 has been rejected while holding that the same is not maintainable upon objection raised by the applicants, then, only recourse was left with the petitioners to approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to check the illegality committed by Tribunal. Similarly, even if it is presumed that the Tribunal is a Civil Court then also, if any illegality is committed by Civil court, which is apparent on the face of it, then also power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised. There is no bar for exercising power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, if any illegality is committed by subordinate courts or tribunals, which has been committed by Wakf Tribunal in this case while dismissing the appeal of the petitioners as not maintainable. The respondents applicants cannot be allowed to take again preliminary objection before this Court with regard to maintainability of writ petition and for filing revision petition before High Court. The conduct of the respondents - applicants is clear that somehow they want to throw the petitioners out of legal remedy. First of all, they have raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the appeal knowingly well that Section 83 (2) of the Act of 1995 gives power to the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter and subsequently before this Court that only revision petition is maintainable. First of all, they have raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the appeal knowingly well that Section 83 (2) of the Act of 1995 gives power to the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter and subsequently before this Court that only revision petition is maintainable. In view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Harday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer (supra), it is obvious that even if specific provision for revision is provided, then also, the High Court can exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as supervisory power. Article 227 of the Constitution of India reads as under : "227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court - (1) Evern High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may - (a) call for returns from such courts ; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces." 21. Therefore, the present writ petition filed by the petitioners under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable.22. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction, the applicants' contention is that only jurisdiction is left with Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur is also not tenable because in view of judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction, the applicants' contention is that only jurisdiction is left with Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur is also not tenable because in view of judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors. (supra), the territorial jurisdiction of the Committee constituted at Kapasan District Chittorgarh is within the jurisdiction of principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. Therefore, obviously if any order is passed by Rajasthan Muslim Wakf Tribunal with regard to appointment of committee for administration of property situated in District Chittorgarh which is in the jurisdiction of principal seat of Rajasthan High Court, then, the writ petition is maintainable. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants is rejected that writ petition is not maintainable at principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur because the Committee is constituted for Kapasan District Chittorgarh and territorial jurisdiction of Chittorgarh District lies with the principal seat of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur.23. The petitioners have approached this Court for exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Obviously, while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is power of superintendence all over the courts, this Court has passed interim order. Therefore, when gross illegality has been committed by the Wakf Tribunal, then the application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the interim order is not sustainable. The order has been passed by this Court while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to check the tribunal's gross illegality.24. With regard to the contention of taking over the charge by the members of the newly constituted Committee of respondents-applicants without dissolving the earlier committee, is a precise question of law, which requires adjudication by this Court. Once the Tribunal has refused to entertain the appeal then only remedy available to the petitioners is to invoke the jurisdiction of this High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, even if forcibly the charge is taken over by the members of newly constituted committee of the respondents applicants, that does not confer any right to the Committee of the respondents in absence of any order of removal of earlier constituted Committee.25. Therefore, even if forcibly the charge is taken over by the members of newly constituted committee of the respondents applicants, that does not confer any right to the Committee of the respondents in absence of any order of removal of earlier constituted Committee.25. In these circumstances, I do not find any ground for vacating the interim order dated 10.1.2008 passed by this Court. Accordingly, the application filed by the respondents - applicants under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the interim order is rejected. The interim order dated 10.1.2008 passed by this Court is here made absolute till final disposal of the writ petition.Applications dismissed. *******